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ABSTRACT 
The 1980s saw the wider availability and growing consumption of illicit drugs. The 
increase in drug trafficking and drug use has occurred despite increasing international 
action to prevent it. In describing the situation as a "drug problem", policy-makers 
have responded to the concern as if it were a single issue. However, the drug 
phenomenon is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. It is the concern of numerous state 
and non-state actors, it necessitates multi-lateral co-operation among governments, it 
involves the participation of numerous departments of government and a complex web 
of issues exists which affect and are affected by the phenomenon. In this sense the 
"drug problem" clearly demonstrates the characteristics of interdependence. 
The undeniable growth of interdependence in the world in the last half-century 
has caused a rethink of the traditional Realist approach to international relations. Neo-
realists were principally responsible for introducing the concept of an international 
regime as a means of revamping the power politics philosophy of Realism. In this 
approach, international regimes are understood to rise and fall in line with the powers 
of the state-actors comprising them. An alternative approach to international relations 
challenges the belief that change in world politics is defined in terms of changes in 
state power and that the emergence of regimes is similarly defined. The Global Politics 
approach asserts that agendas are determined by the attempt of actors to allocate values 
authoritatively on specific issues by forming issue-systems. According to this approach, 
issue-systems, consisting of all actors for whom a particular issue is salient, can be 
abstracted from the international system as a whole. 
Previously the two concepts of international regimes and the concept of issues 
forming issue-systems have developed in isolation and have suffered from lack of 
clarification. In order to develop a theoretical framework for an analysis of the drug 
phenomenon this research has attempted to clarify and develop the concept of an 
"issue", central to both concepts, for an understanding of international regimes which 
gives them an independent impact on world politics. In developing the concept of an 
issue, an understanding of the nature and role of values and norms in international 
affairs, lacking development in current regime literature will be seen as central. 
vi 
AIDS 
BCCI 
BSA 
BCP 
CATF 
CCC 
CIA 
CMO 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
Bank Secrecy Act 
Burmese Communist Party 
Chemical Action Task Force of the Group of Seven 
Customs Co-operation Council 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities 
in Drug Abuse Control (See Appendix A) 
CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs of ECOSOC 
CORA Coordinamento Radical Antiproibizionista 
CTR Currency Transaction Report 
DIU Drugs Intelligence Unit of Europol 
DND Division of Narcotic Drugs of the UN Secretariat 
DPF Drug Policy Foundation 
DTOA Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
EDU European Drugs Unit 
EMNDP European Movement for the Normalization of Cannabis 
F AO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
FA TF Financial Action Task Force of the Group of Seven 
FOPAC Fonds provenant des activites criminelles 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
HIV Human immune deficiency virus 
HONLEA Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies 
ICDAIT UN Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICPO/Interpol International Criminal Police Organisation 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
MAG Mutual Assistance Group of the European Community 
MLA T Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NORML National Organisation for the Reform of Marijuana Laws 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Pompidou Group Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit 
SWIFT 
UNDCP 
UNDP 
UNFDAC 
Trafficking in Drugs 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
UN International Drug Control Programme 
UN Development Programme 
UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
vii 
UNICEF 
UNIDO 
UNITAR 
UPU 
WFP 
UN Children's Fund 
UN Industrial Development Organisation 
UN Institute for Training and Research 
Universal Postal Union 
World Food Programme 
viii 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
List of targets of the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in 
Drug Abuse Control adopted at the 1987 International Conference on Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking ........... p 311 
Appendix B 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Adopted in Vienna, 19 December 1988 .......... p 313 
Appendix C 
Political DeClaration and Global Programme of Action adopted by the General 
Assembly at its 17th special session, devoted to the question of international co-
operation against illicit production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 23 February 1990 ............ p 336 
Appendix D 
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, December 1988. 
Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering .......... p 358 
Appendix E 
Group of 7 Economic Declaration of 16 July 1989 
(extracts) .......... p 363 
Appendix F 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Report of 6 February 1990, Paris 
(extracts) ...... ... p 364 
Appendix G 
1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds of Crime .......... p 375 
IX 
Appendix H 
Council Directive of Ministers of the EEC of 10th June 1991 on Prevention of the Use 
of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering ......... p 388 
Appendix I 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Report of 16 June 1994, Paris 
(extracts) .......... p 404 
x 
grant power of discretion to the University Librarian to allow this thesis to be copied in 
vhole or in part without further reference to me. This permission covers only copies made 
or study purposes, subject to normal conditions of acknowledgment. 
xi 
Chapter 1 
Keep Orf the Grass: The Global Politics of Dlicit Drug Control 
1 
Introduction 
Unprecedented developments in world politics since the 1980s; the dismantling of the 
Berlin Wall, the ending of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
ending of apartheid in South Africa and the signing of a Middle East peace agreement, 
have led to a growing number of other concerns emerging at the forefront of the 
international political agenda which demonstrate the complexity and interdependence 
of world politics. Environmental concerns such as global warming. rainforest depletton 
and pollution; human rights concerns such as increasing numbers of displaced peoples; 
and the control of disease such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 
have led to increased international action across state boundaries and increased attention 
to international organisations that handle these concerns. The significance of this for 
the student of International Relations has been a re-evaluation of the orthodox view of 
international politics, exemplified by Hans Morgenthau, that the nation-state is the sole, 
principal actor in the international arena and that the dominant issue in international 
relations is the struggle for power. 1 This has led to an increasing interest in emerging 
alternative forms of transnational co-operation by International Relations scholars. 
The concept of international regimes as "sets of governing arrangements that 
affect relationships of interdependence"2 has been developed predominately by the 
traditional Realist school of International Relations, to combat the challenge of 
interdependence and to explain the growth in new forms of co-ordination and 
organisation. However, in this approach, international regimes are created by states to 
further the state's interests, and are not expected to survive the dem ise of the hegemon 
under which they were created. 3 States are viewed as the dominant actors in the 
international system, but co-operation in the form of international regimes may be 
necessary to secure the optimal outcome under conditions of interdependence in some 
2 
situations. 4 This writer believes that international regimes can and do influence 
behaviour and outcomes in the international arena independently of the wishes or needs 
of state actors. As Keohane says, "If international regimes did not exist they would 
have to be invented"S, but in order for the concept to be analytically useful we need 
to see regimes as having an independent impact on world politics through a synthesis 
of regime literature with the literature on issues, developed by writers such as Rosenau, 
Mansbach and Vasquez, and Keohane and Nye, from a more thorough use of the 
concept of interdependence. As James Rosenau states in his book, The Study of Global 
Interdependence: "Four characteristics seem salient as central features of all the diverse 
issues of interdependence. " They are highly complex and technical phenomena, involve 
non-governmental actors, have fragmented governmental decision-making, and 
necessitate multi-lateral co-operation for their management. 6 
The response to the drug phenomenon by those involved at the international, 
national and grass-roots level has been as if it were a single issue, with constant 
references to the "drug problem" by policy-makers, the judiciary, the media, 
educationalists, and health organisations alike. The "drug problem" clearly 
demonstrates the characteristics of interdependence as outlined above. This research 
attempts to set the "drug problem", as it has become known, into a theoretical 
framework which aids our understanding of the phenomenon, by further developing 
theories of regime creation. In so doing, basic concepts used in regime literature need 
to be clarified. The literature on international regimes implicitly suggests that a regime 
must have an issue that it seeks to regulate. The concept of an issue however, suffers 
from lack of clarification in current International Relations literature. This research will 
show that the "drug problem" is too multi-faceted ahd multi-dimensional to be viewed 
as a single issue, as an analysis of the values and the stakes evoked will demonstrate. 
How and why issues come on to the agenda and how and why regimes are 
created from certain issues and not others will be shown as different stages in the same 
process of agenda-building. A clearer understanding of values and norms, their 
evolution and role in international decision-making is needed to give international 
regimes an independent impact in international relations and is also central for an 
3 
alternative understanding of change in world politics. For the traditional Realist school 
change in world politics is defined in terms of changes in state power, and the 
emergence of regimes is similarly defined. An alternative approach to the emergence 
and role of international regimes challenges this established belief by asserting that 
agendas are determined by the attempt of actors to allocate values authoritatively on 
specific issues. Therefore new actors can be considered from both above and below the 
state and we do not just need to consider the state. 
This chapter will attempt to set the drug phenomenon into an initial theoretical 
framework within International Relations theory. The usefulness of what are viewed 
as the two major competing paradigms to explore the complexity of the multi-faceted 
and multi-dimensional phenomenon will be examined. The presumption will be that a 
regime analysis which emphasises the role of norms and values in agenda-formation, 
rather than concentrating on rules and decision-making procedures, is necessary for an 
understanding of the drug phenomenon. The rigidity of the Cold War gave the 
discipline of International Relations an excuse for not taking into account the advances, 
concepts and methods from alternative disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy, 
anthropology, and history, with their concepts of identity, values and community. In 
the study of drug control, these disciplines have obviously a great deal to offer. The 
connections between these disciplines and the discipline of International Relations needs 
to be explored in order to understand and respond to the current changes in world 
politics. 
Interdependence: Rosenau's four characteristics 
The technological and economic changes that took place during the 19705 saw a swift 
response from International Relation theorists with the work on the concept of 
"interdependence", credited to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. 7 However, "complex 
interdependence" as described in their book Power and Interdependence, consisting of 
multiple channels of communication, the absence of hierarchy among issues, with 
military force playing a minor role, did not so much rock the foundations of Realist 
orthodoxy as knock politely on the door. Keohane and Nye restricted the use of the 
4 
concept by applying their work to economic issues, only offering "complex 
interdependence" as an alternative to Realism when it provides greater understanding 
of the nature of the issue in a particular situation. an area where Realist writers were 
willing to concede to a development of their ideas to encompass the changing economic 
realities. 
However, as Rosenau suggested in The Study of Global Interdependence, the 
restriction of the concept to economic issues and thereby merely adapting the Realist 
paradigm to changes in the real-world limits the usefulness of the concept. The concept 
of interdependence, when followed to its logical theoretical conclusions. giving non-
state actors influence in world affairs, is a direct challenge to the Realist paradigm. 
Furthermore a focus on issues and the interactions between actors, rather than the units 
themselves, and the idea of multiple issue-based systems rather than a single 
, . 
international system with each system featuring a unique cast of governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental actors gives a more useful framework for an 
analysis of regime creation. 
Global action on drug control clearly demonstrates the immediate and increasing 
interdependence of world politics as understood by Rosenau, with the inclusion of non-
state actors giving the term interdependence a greater meaning. As stated in the United 
Nations Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse 
Control: 
"The value of NGOs and governmental agencies working together on 
complex national and international problems is nowhere more apparent 
than in the comprehensive long term effort to reduce illicit demand for 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. "8 
The Geneva International Opium Convention of 1925 9 created the first international 
non-governmental body concerned with drug control; The Permanent Central Board. tO 
The drug phenomenon involves the participation of not only health, welfare and 
education groups on a domestic, national and international level, but also private banks 
5 
and insurance companies (concerned with drug-money laundering), the church, the 
mafia, and the drug barons. An indication of the extent of the influence that can be 
exercised by the drug barons is illustrated by the events following the assassination of 
the Colombian Justice Minister, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984. The Colombian 
government's determination to end the drug-related violence and enforce the 1979 
extradition treaty with the United States, forced several important traffickers to move 
with their financial assets from Colombia to Panama. As a result, the value of the 
dollar on the black market rose (to 140 pesos compared to the official rate of 100 
pesos). In an attempt to negotiate their return to Colombia the traffickers released some 
of their funds back into the economy, and the dollar value on the black market 
stabilised. II Indeed the wealth and influence of the drug barons, particularly in South 
America, makes them dominant actors in any analysis of the drug phenomenon. 
The drug phenomenon is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. It is the concern 
of educationalists, sociologists, anthropologists. health workers, social workers. policy-
makers. economists, the police and the judiciary. It also involves numerous 
departments of government. and challenges the orthodox view of the state as a unified 
and autonomous rational actor. Recent clashes in France between the Health Ministry. 
supporting improved public health care for French drug addicts, including a needle-
exchange programme to reduce the risk of HIV infection, and the Ministry for the 
Interior pledging to crack down on drugs and apply systematic pressure on street 
traders and users, has seen addicts collect needles from the needles-exchange 
programme only to be picked up by the police and have the needles destroyed. 11 A 
similar complexity exists at the international level, as this study will demonstrate. 
The drug phenomenon necessitates multi-lateral co-operation among 
governments. As with environmental concerns such as air and marine pollution, drug 
trafficking does not conform to political boundaries and cannot be controlled by a 
single state acting in isolation. Drug trafficking is now a problem which "most 
governments can thus neither dismiss nor handle on their own" and is an example of 
the fourth characteristic of interdependence as described by Rosenau.1 3 The Global 
6 
Programme of Action 14, which was the product of the seventeenth Special Session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th February 1990, stressed the need 
for collective action in combatting both drug abuse and illicit trafficking, stating that 
governments were not in a position to deal with this problem individually. The 
Secretary-General's opening statement to the Special Session said: 
"Drug abuse is now right at the top of the list of priorities requiring 
urgent attention from the international community. It is by its nature 
truly international; and it demands a co-ordinated international 
response". 15 
With the collapse of international communism, the end of the Cold War and the 
opening up of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries. new markets 
and transit routes have been exploited by drug traffickers. The previously-denied 
, 
problem of drug use in communist societies has been recognized, with a steady 
expansion in drug use in recent years. 16 No one country can hope to isolate itself from 
such a transnational phenomenon, or hope to solve its domestic "drug problem" 
independently. 
In his work on the structure of interdependence issues. Rosenau states: "Perhaps 
the most pervasive characteristic of all such issues is the large degree to which they 
encompass highly complex and technical phenomena. "17 Furthermore, as Rosenau 
explains, most of the issues "overlap so thoroughly that proposed solutions to anyone 
of them have important ramifications for the others. "18 The drug phenomenon clearly 
illustrates these two points. As has already been stated. the drug phenomenon is a 
multi-faceted and multi-dimensional problem and is too complex to be viewed as a 
single issue. In order to understand the nature of international regimes and the nature 
of issues, the linkages with other wider issues needs to be understood. 
Issue-linkage 
The complexity of the drug phenomenon is illustrated by the diversity of the issues 
linked to drug production and usage. The drug phenomenon is linked to environmental 
7 
concerns such as deforestation, pollution, the destruction of eco-systems and the issues 
of pesticide control. The destruction of the environment caused by modern day coca-
growing has earned the plant the title, the "Attila of Tropical Agriculture" .19 In 
Bolivia the previously sparsely populated Chapare region saw an influx of coca-growers 
during the eighties which has led to huge environmental degradation. President Paz-
Estenssoro's Under-Secretary for crop substitution said that it constituted the greatest 
devastation in Bolivian history.10 In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori has described 
the drug trade as the "number one enemy" of the Amazon rainforest". 21 The 
International Narcotics Control Board Report of 1990 stated that: "Coca bush 
cultivation threatens to alter the whole ecological balance of vast areas of the 
country" .11 Deforestation has occurred from the slash-and-burn agriculture of the 
coca-producing peasants for actual coca plantations and also from the planting of 
subsistence crops such as cassava, bananas and corn for the workers: The estimated 
amount of land calculated to have been deforested, directly or indirectly, in Peru due 
to coca production is 700,000 hectares - about 10 per cent of the total deforestation in 
the Peruvian Amazon region during the twentieth century. n The recent expansion of 
opium poppy cultivation in Latin America and Colombia in particular, has led to the 
cutting and burning of large areas of virgin cloud forest to plant opium poppies. 24 It 
has been recently reported that, in Colombia, the area under illicit poppy cultivation 
has expanded to an estimated 18,000 hectares, thereby equalling the size of the area 
under illicit coca bush cultivation. 2s 
Coca-growers use large quantities of pesticides and herbicides which drain into 
rivers and cause pollution. However, it is the manufacture of cocaine that utilises the 
most harmful chemicals. Producers of cocaine in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru 
have polluted the valley's rivers with the kerosene. sulphuric acid, quicklime. carbide, 
acetone and other dangerous substances used in cocaine processing. 26 These rivers 
now exceed the pollution standards for fresh and inland water established by the World 
Heal th Organisation (WHO). 27 The poll ution of the rivers poses a threat to many 
species of fish, amphibians, aquatic reptiles, and crustaceans. 28 
Attempts to eradicate coca crops by law-enforcement agencies has led to the 
8 
controversial use of herbicides such as paraquat (used extensively in Mexico and 
Colombia in the 1970s to eradicate marijuana.) and gliphosphate (used in Colombia in 
the 1980s). Both paraquat and gliphosphate were found to destroy not only coca but 
other crops, and cause numerous health problems, such as liver damage to those living 
in the drug-producing regions. Fears concerning the danger to health of paraquat 
spraying in Mexico in the 1970s (and particularly its association with birth defects), led 
to the adoption of the Percy Amendment by the United States Congress which made 
it illegal to support fumigation programs in other countries. 29 Del Olmo suggests 
however. that the real reason for the temporary ruling (which was annulled in 1981) 
was concern over the amount of paraquat being ingested by smokers of marijuana in 
the United States. and not the environmental and health risks to those living in the 
drug-producing regions in Mexico.30 Despite reports of medical and environmental 
dangers, the United States government has continued to apply pressure on governments 
in Latin America to permit aerial spraying in crop-eradication programmes3! and 
during the early 1990s increased the drug-budget proposal for the Agricultural Research 
Service. 32 
In 1988, environmental groups were successful in disrupting the Reagan 
administration's plans to implement coca-eradication programmes in Peru, using the 
herbicide tebuthurion (more commonly known as "Spike"). Eli Lilly, the company 
responsible for Spike, refused to sell it to the Peruvian government for planned 
eradication programmes. 33 Environmental groups stressed Spikes' effects on the 
fragile tropical eco-system in Peru; the destruction of endangered plant species, and the 
draining of chemicals into the Amazon, as well as the dangers to the health of 
farmers.3<4 The long-term significance of the use of environmentally unsafe chemicals 
to fight the drug war is especially serious since the regions which are targeted are often 
populated by the poorest segments of the population, often totally dependent on the 
land. According to Fagan, the intensive use of herbicides to eradicate illicit drug 
production in Latin America in the 19605 and 19705 caused high levels of herbicide 
poisoning with the accumulation of toxins such as DDT in humans, as well as in 
livestock and the entire food chain.35 
9 
The link between environmental issues and drug control is reflected in the 
participation of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 
in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held at Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, from 3-14 June 1992. At the Conference, the UNDCP submitted a 
paper on the linkages between drug issues and environmental concerns, highlighting the 
cultivation of illicit drugs and the release into water sources of chemical products from 
cocaine and heroin processing, and pledging its support for Agenda 21.36 
The failure of countries to comply with the United States administration's crop-
eradication programmes has often resulted in a suspension of US aid to the country 
concerned. In July 1989, aid was suspended to Bolivia and US troops were sent to 
"assist" anti-narcotics forces after the Bolivian government objected to- ch~mical 
spraying. 37 The relationship between the use of chemicals in the war on drugs, 
development and debt is a close one. As Andreas and Bertram note, "US economic aid 
to the Andean nations is conditioned on co-operation in counter-narcotics efforts; US 
trade policy and loan approval through multilateral lending institutions are similarly 
I inked to anti-drug objectives". 38 
The drug phenomenon has been linked with questions of debt, development and 
the support for a New International Economic Order for countries whose economies 
are suffocated by the present economic order and who depend on the cultivation of 
coca and opium for economic survival. Heroin is reportedly funding Afghanistan's 
reconstruction after the destruction caused by the war, as refugees returning to their 
devastated villages need money to re-build their farms and homes, and no crop is as 
financially rewarding as opium.39 In many developing countries, the production and 
distribution of illicit drugs are major sources of employment and export earnings, as 
we will see in the next chapter. Latin American leaders have always seen the "drug 
problem" as fundamentally an economic problem. The Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori, shortly after taking up office in 1990, rejected massive military aid packages 
from the United States, emphasising the need for an analysis of the "global context" 
of the drug problem, alternative economic strategies and a political system permitting 
10 
peasant participation. 4O 
The revenue from drug production has led to increased incomes for peasants in 
countries such as Bolivia and Peru, and in some cases a strengthening of the position 
of peasant associations and worker's unions. In many cases the peasant unions are 
closely tied to the national labour movement. The increasing influence of the peasant 
agrarian unions (in which coca-growers have taken a prominent role) was reflected in 
the decision of Peru's then President, Alan Garcia, attempting to introduce a peasant 
leader to President George Bush at the Drug Summit in Cartagena in February 1992.41 
As laMond Tullis speculates, this may lead to increasing demand for social 
restructuring, "illicit drugs may, where other avenues have failed, force the issue of 
such change before the close of the century" .42 
As MacDonald states, the lack of economic development is a core element of 
the Andean cocaine trade and one possible anti-narcotic option would be to combine 
debt reduction and drug enforcement. MacDonald suggests that an alternative anti-
narcotic strategy would be for the United States to purchase portions of a country's 
debt on the secondary market and give it to them as a form of anti-narcotics assistance. 
MacDonald uses the example of Mexico as an illustration. If the United States brought 
$10 million of Mexican debt on the secondary market, where the value of the debt has 
an actual worth of under 50 cents for each dollar at face value, then officially $20 
million could be utilised for investment in the country in a conversion of bilateral debt 
into local currency debt, with annual interest payments to be set aside for use in 
alternative development. 43 
Bolivia, approaching the problem as an economic one is considering the 
industrialisation of the cultivation of the coca bush in order to export coca leaves and 
particularly coca tea, which they believe could become more profitable than cocaine 
production and would generate greater revenue than the country's gas exports to 
Argentina (in 1991 worth $214 million). In a formal statement at the 22nd assembly 
of the Organisation of American States in Nassau, Mr Ronald Maclean, the foreign 
minister called for "the legitimisation, industrialisation and commercialisation of the 
11 
sub-products derived from the innocent coca leaf and its protein-rich and medicinal 
qualities".44 
A complex web of issues therefore exists which affect and are affected by the 
drug phenomenon. Questions of debt and development, the need to improve living 
conditions and prospects for the peasant growers are inextricably caught up in drug 
control policies in the Americas. As Kempe Hope describes, 
"The cardinal aim of rural development is viewed not simply as 
agricultural and economic growth in the narrow sense, but as balanced 
social and economic development, including the generation of new 
employment; the equitable distribution of income; widespread 
improvement in health, nutrition, and housing; greatly broadened 
opportunities for all individuals to realize their full potential through 
education; and a strong voice for all rural people in shaping the . 
decisions and actions that affect their lives" .4~ 
Concern with the displacement of peoples is also linked to the drug phenomenon 
and in turn is linked to environmental, and developmental concerns. As has already 
been suggested, the migration of peasants to drug-producing regions in South-East Asia 
and Latin America throughout the eighties can be seen as a challenge to the prevailing 
political and social structure of countries. These migrations often towards remote areas, 
frontier regions, forests and jungles have partly replaced the earlier movements from 
rural to urban shanty towns and slums. This transfer of peoples has however resulted 
in damage to the environment as already described, and has also had effects on food 
production. The migration of labour to coca-growing areas throughout Latin America, 
but particularly in Bolivia and Peru, has led to a decline in food production due to 
increased labour costs, the result of a short-fall in labour and the lack of seasonal 
labour being available. In Peru, where nutrition data is available, this has led to a rise 
in the level of malnutrition among the poorest of the population since 1980.46 
The war on drugs has also had the effect of encouraging large-scale 
militarisation in Latin America, which can be seen as threatening democratic control 
by fragile governments. This has led to large-scale violations of human rights and is 
12 
closely connected to the growth of the infamous "death squads". 47 The United States 
administration has poured funds, training and hardware into co-operating with Latin 
American governments in the fight against drug trafficking. Most of the resources have 
been for the police and the military. The United States administration has been accused 
of assisting repressive right-wing regimes on the pretext of fighting the war against 
drugs. 48 Critics of the administration's drug policy see its main aim as the 
continuation of United States authority in the region as established by the Monroe 
Doctrine and the "not in my backyard" philosophy of the fight against communist 
encroachment during the period of the Cold War. 
The Colombian military for example, has been closely linked with right-wing 
death squads and assassinations, torture, disappearances, and sometimes mass 
murder. 49 In September 1989 when George Bush, then President of the United States 
declared an all-out war on drugs, the Andean Commission of Jurists in Lima published 
a critical report on the Colombian military called Etcesses in the Anti-Drug Effort. 50 
The strength of the military, due to United States resources, has also assisted other 
Latin American oligarchies, such as in Peru and Bolivia, in similar erosions of human 
rights and the repression of opposition groups, trade union and church leaders. In 
November 1989, the killing of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter, 
drew attention to the human rights abuses of the Salvadoran military. Despite 
allegations that top military officers were responsible for the murders, United States 
funding for the Salvadoran military in the fight against drugs, which had been 
temporarily decreased by Congress, was restored by George Bush in late 1990.51 
The drug war has created a situation where the military can conveniently blame 
their own violence on the cartels. The cartel~ in response have claimed for themselves 
the role of the defenders of human rights. For example, in February 1991, the 
Medellin cartel claimed that the killing of the sister of a former presidential aide who 
had helped plan a large-scale anti-drug crackdown was in retaliation for human rights 
abuses against the Colombian people by the police. 52 
The drug war has intensified anti-American sentiment in many developing 
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countries and has undermined popular support for elected governments whose leaders 
are forced to co-operate with United States sponsored drug-control operations and to 
accept increased United States' military aid. This discontent has enabled groups such 
as the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining PathS3 in Peru to gain support among the 
population as defenders of human rights against the abuses of the government-supported 
military and United States intervention. 
Drug traftickers themselves are also abusers of human rights with drug-related 
violence affecting the lives of millions of people throughout South-East Asia and Latin 
America in particular. Because of the large amounts of money involved in drug 
trafficking, developed and developing countries alike are suffering from the effects of 
the corruption of officials and institutions by drug traffickers with the threat that this 
poses to the human rights of its citizens. After taking office in 1990, the Colombian 
, - . 
President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, reaffirmed his governments resolve to fight drug 
trafficking, but emphasised that his government's highest priority was to end the drug-
related violence rather than to combat international drug smuggling.s~ A United States 
report depicts the Peruvian dilemma: 
"Peru considers drug trafficking its third priority. With a 6,000 per cent 
inflation, the economy is in shambles. Insurgents control portions of the 
country ... Peruvian politicians have made statements that Peru can live 
with the narcotics problem for the next fifty years, but may not survive 
the next two years if the economic and insurgent problems are not dealt 
with now ... The wiIl to deal with the drug issues, when faced with 
problems that threaten the immediate survival of the country, remains 
the most difficult issue. "55 
The effect of the drug-related violence and corruption on developing and developed 
countries al ike will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Attempts by law-enforcement agencies to control drug use in developed 
countries have also found themselves accused of infringing on civil liberties through 
a broad range of measures, such as random searches based on police suspicions, aimed 
primarily at young ethnic minorities. S6 In the UK there has also been a challenge that 
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the law allowing the government to retrieve the proceeds of drug deals breaches the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Lawyers have argued that the Drug 
Trafficking Offence Act of 1986, which allows profits of crimes committed before the 
act came into force to be confiscated, breaches Article 7 of the convention: that no-one 
convicted of a crime shall suffer a heavier penalty than was applicable at the time the 
offence was committed.57 
Widely quoted in the debate over the infringement of human rights with regard 
to drug control is the work of the nineteenth- century philosopher, John Stuart Mill. 
Mill believed that any attempt by the state to restrict the freedom of the individual to 
choose what he does was an illegitimate interference on the freedom of the individual 
and 
"That the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to 
do so would be wise, or even right. "58 
Many of the participants in the current debate favouring decriminalisation of illicit 
drugs share Mill's philosophy and their views will be explored in the concluding 
chapter to this research. 
Mill's work was widely quoted during the time of Prohibition in the United 
States. The rationale for the restriction of alcohol during Prohibition and the current 
restriction on certain drugs is still central to much of the current debate on drug 
control, as Chapter Three on the nature of the values and the stakes involved in the 
drug phenomenon will demonstrate. 
The drug phenomenon is also linked to a number of less obvious issues. During 
the seventies and first half of the eighties, the vast majority of cocaine and marijuana, 
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and to a lesser extent heroin, was transported to its destinations around the world by 
ship. Since the transportation of the illicit drugs occurred along the same routes as 
legitimate trade and recreational vessels, efforts at interdiction have had a profound 
effect on the evolution of the law of the sea, in negotiation during the same period. As 
Andrew Anderson states, efforts at international drug control have had a major impact 
on the renewed sal ience of the need for consensus on the law of the sea: 
"Between the events which have occurred on the high seas and in the 
courtroom as a result of the interdiction effort and the events of the 
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the law of the sea has 
become an area of law with a new vitality, vibrancy and 
relevancy ..... Principles of the law of the sea such as the right of 
approach, hot pursuit, freedom of navigation, vessel nationality, law of 
the flag, and stateless vessels have become as familiar to defense 
lawyers, prosecutors, and trial judges as to legal scholars an.d law 
students" . 59 
The above examples of the linkages of other issues with the drug phenomenon 
serve to illustrate the complex nature of issues and emphasises the necessity of reaching 
an understanding of issues by exploring the values and stakes involved as the next two 
chapters will illustrate. The drug phenomenon affects different countries in different 
ways, since there are different stakes involved for different actors. 
The challenge to Realism from interdependence 
The Rosenau concept of interdependence as outlined above also challenges the 
traditional distinction between domestic and international politics in the Morgenthau 
analysis of international pol itics. Efforts to control drugs suggest the domestic and the 
international are inextricably linked. Indeed with the case of the regulation of opium 
at the turn of the century, international legislation preceded national legislation, 
challenging another Morgenthau concept, central to the Realist understanding of 
agenda-building, that of the "national interest". Furthermore, as S D Stein notes, 
"International considerations still impinge directly on domestic drug-control 
programmes." According to Stein, the work of international bodies like the United 
Nations and the World Health Organisation. "institutionalised the processes whereby 
16 
the drug-control policies of one country are dictated by considerations that do not 
emanate from, or have a direct bearing upon, its own domestic situation at the time 
they are introduced". bO 
The drug phenomenon challenges the Realist response to increasing 
interdependence and the creation of international regimes that their concerns are of the 
"low politics" type, ie. issues that do not affect security and diplomatic prestige, do not 
involve the highest decision-makers in government, do not lead to crises and are not 
dominated by states. and that a new paradigm to understand and explain international 
politics is not needed. For the countries of Latin America. the problem of cocaine is 
intrinsically linked to their very survival: 
"The issues that will determine the fate of the region in the 1990s -
foreign debt. economic crisis. civilian-military relations, human rights, 
democratization. and guerilla insurgencies - are being shaped by the 
politics of cocaine".61 
As the next chapter will demonstrate, a social problem can effect security and prestige, 
involve the highest decision-makers in government and can lead to crisis. The 
phenomenon can also help illustrate the irrelevance of the Realist high/low politics 
distinction to explain agenda-formation and change in international politics. 62 
The drug phenomenon also challenges the Realist concept of state sovereignty. 
As has already been stated, the drug phenomenon is such that no one country can deal 
with this multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon in isolation. Furthermore, 
the influence and organization of the Colombian and Bolivian drug cartels have spread 
to a point where they are described in a Unit~d States Department of Justice Report as 
a state-within-a-state in Colombia and Bolivia, operating openly and with impunity. 63 
The wealth of the drug barons through their illicit activities has enabled them to offer 
to pay their countries national debt in exchange for immunity from prosecution64 and 
in many cases the barons have private armies, better equipped than the state's own 
military.65 Drug traffickers therefore have to be viewed as major actors in any 
analysis of the drug phenomenon. 
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The Global Politics paradigm 
An alternative approach to the traditional Realist school of thought is the paradigm 
variously known as pluralism, the multi-centric approach, issue-politics, or the term 
favoured by this writer, the Global Politics paradigm. The Global Politics approach 
attempts to synthesise the literature on interdependence (already introduced) and 
international regimes with the literature on foreign policy analysis (developed by 
Rosenau) and with the literature on transnational ism and international organisations (as 
developed by Mansbach and Vasquez). In this way the Global Politics approach or 
Globalism allows for a greater understanding of the dynamics of change in the ever 
changing area of world politics, whereas mere adapt ions to an approach which 
emphasises anarchy and continuity cannot do so. In the Global Politics approach to 
international relations, international regimes are central. 
The concept of "international regimes" was first introduced into International 
Relations literature by John Ruggie. In his 1975 article, "International Responses to 
technology: Concepts and trends", Ruggie defined a regime as "a set of mutual 
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial 
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states". 66 A conference on 
international regimes held in 1982 led to the emergence of the now-classical definition 
of international regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations" .67 Yet despite the almost universal acceptance of this 
definition, credited to Stephen Krasner, there has been I ittle development on the 
conceptual ambiguity inherent in the definition, which this research has tried to clarify. 
Susan Strange's criticism of regime theory a decade ago, as "woolly" and "imprecise", 
still applies to much of the current regime literature. 68 Krasner defines the four 
recognizable characteristics of an international regime as "principles" - beliefs of fact, 
causation and rectitude; "norms" -standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
obi igations; "rules" - prescriptions or proscriptions for action - and "decision-making 
procedures" as prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 
These characteristics however are not clarified and are hard to differentiate 
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conceptually - "principles" blur values with facts, and "norms" are difficult to 
distinguish here from "impl icit rules". This ambiguity is not helpful in attempting to 
establish why international collaboration on an issue, in the form of an international 
regime occurs in some areas and not others. Furthermore, the implicit linking together 
of rules (prescriptions or proscriptions for action) and decision-making procedures 
(prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice) looses valuable 
information concerning the importance of formal institutions for effective 
implementation of the regim~ norm-regulated rules as Chapter Four will demonstrate. 
The Krasner definition suggests that "values" and "norms" are central to an 
understanding of the evolution of an international regime. As Krasner himself 
emphasises, "Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a 
, - . 
regime ... Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within 
regimes "69 Unfortunately, the concepts suffer from lack of clarification in the 
literature on regimes and the discipline of International Relations in general. This 
research will attempt to clarify and develop the reasons for the emergence of issues, 
values and norms in international politics in order to create a theoretical framework for 
an analysis of the drug phenomenon. 
A similar confusion over terminology and use of concepts can be found within 
the area of drug control. 
The Politics oj semantics 
"Words are, oj course, the most powerfuL dr.ug 
used by mankind. " Kipling 
The basic premise of the drug-control system is that a number of substances, decided 
by the World Health Organisation, are harmful and dangerous and are therefore 
prohibited by the international system.70 Under the Single Convention there are four 
schedules of controlled substances: Schedule I includes those substances having 
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addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties greater than those of codeine and 
more or less comparable to those of morphine; those substances that constitute a risk 
of abuse greater than codeine or have a liability to abuse comparable to that of 
cannabis, cannabis resin or cocaine; and those convertible into substances having a 
liability to abuse comparable to that of cannabis, cannabis resin or cocaine. Schedule 
II includes substances having addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties not 
greater than those of codeine but at least as great as those of dextropoxyphene or a 
substance convertible into a substance that constitutes a risk of abuse not greater than 
that of codeine. Schedule III contains those substances intended for legitimate medical 
use, have no, or negligible risk of abuse, and cannot easily be converted into a 
substance that can. Schedule IV however states that substances under this schedule are 
those which have strong addiction-producing qualities, or a liability to abuse not offset 
by therapeutic advantages which cannot be afforded by some other drug; -and/or for 
which deletion from medical practice is desirable because of the risk to public health. 
Substances under Schedule IV are therefore also placed under Schedule I. 
The categorisation of certain substances as illegal and others as legal (and some 
drugs as if they were not drugs at all, as in the case of alcohor'), is however, not 
simply an objective, scientific exercise based on scientific facts which the above 
premise implies. Rather it varies from generation to generation and from country to 
country. Different drugs have been salient to different cultures at different times 
throughout history. The main concern in England during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries was the "gin epidemic". In the 1950s the problem was seen as 
heroin use, in the 1960s, particularly in America, the problem drug was LSD, in the 
late eighties in the United Kingdom glue-sniffing became a dominant concern72 and 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s crack-cocaine is seen by many in America and the 
United Kingdom as being the dominant problem. This is despite the fact that the "crack 
epidemic" in the United Kingdom, fore-warned by the American DEA, has failed to 
materialise. 73 In Russia, for the greater part of two centuries, the problem has been 
defined as the consumption of vodka, in Canada and Australia alcohol and solvent 
abuse' among Native Americans and Aborigines has received widespread attention. In 
some cases, substances previously regarded as being perfectly harmless have been the 
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focus for concern. A good example of this is the condition termed chatorpan, found 
among the Hindi-speaking people of western Uttar Pradesh in northern India. The 
substances of their "addiction" are sweets and spicy snacks. 74 
Most drugs when first introduced to European society were thought of as 
negative and harmful to both the individual and to society as a whole and serve to 
illustrate the changing values and concerns of society, as well as those of the rul ing 
elite. Tobacco, coffee, chocolate and even the potato, when first introduced, faced 
opposition. 75 Tobacco, was first smoked in Europe by a colleague of Christopher 
Columbus (nearly a century before Sir Walter Raleigh introduced tobacco from 
Virginia to the English court), with the consequence that the Spaniard was tried by the 
Inquisition and sent to prison, since they believed that the Devil had entered him due 
to the exhalation of smoke. Soon after however, tobacco became popular in the courts 
of Europe. But by the seventeenth century, James I of England was denouncing it,76 
as was the Chinese Emperor. In the Mongul Empire, smokers had their lips cut, and 
in Russia smokers faced execution. The introduction of coffee from Ethiopia to Egypt 
in the sixteenth century led to its ban, the burning of stocks, and the arrest of coffee-
drinkers. In the seventeenth century in England coffee-houses were treated with 
suspicion by the government as dens of sedition.77 Both tobacco and coffee proceeded 
to become well-established in European culture and yet the latter half of the twentieth 
century has again seen a shift in attitudes towards their consumption. 
Recent changing attitudes towards alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking 
in the West emphasise the changing salience of certain drugs for different generations. 
Thirty years ago smoking could be seen to be integral to adult social life, yet today in 
public places such as restaurants, cinemas al)d on public transport, the smoker is now 
the minority and even the outcaste. In America, particularly on the west-coast, anti-
smoking measures now cover vast areas of public life; smoking in all enclosed public 
places has recently been banned in France; smoking is restricted in public places in 
Canada and Australia; the British government is considering legislation to outlaw 
smoking in all public places and in the workplace; and Singapore is aiming to become 
the first smoke-free city. 
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The eighties and early nineties have seen a decrease in the potency of legal 
substances. Motivated in good part by health concerns, smokers are turning 
increasingly to lower-tar and nicotine tobacco products, alcohol drinkers from spirits 
to wine and beer, with an increasing number of low-alcohol beers appearing on the 
market, and even coffee drinkers have turned to decaffeinated coffee in increasing 
numbers. The dangers to public health from alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking 
are well-documented. According to Ethan A Nadelmann, a strong supporter for the 
legalisation of illicit drugs, all of the health costs associated with the abuse of illicit 
drugs pale in comparison with those resulting from tobacco and alcohol abuse. Griffith 
Edwards, head of addiction research at the Institute of Psychiatry in London stated that 
"Only by the most wilful mythologising can \l,'e maintain the myth that the dominant 
problem we are encountering with drugs results from illicit substances" .78 The total 
cost of alcohol abuse to American society is disputable. but it has been' estimated by 
Nadelmann to be as high as S 100 billion annuallyi9, and in some European countries. 
at between 5 and 6 per cent of gross national product. 80 Although alcohol is 
recognized as "the most widely abused substance [emphasis added] in America", by 
the Office of National Drug Control in their strategy for a "Drug-Free America" it is 
not viewed as a drug by the report, "because it is not a controlled substance under the 
law".81 This dichotomy between alcohol and other drugs is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and owes little to the lessons of history. such as Prohibition, which treated 
alcohol as a dangerous drug. The health costs of tobacco use are different but of 
similar magnitude. Cigarette smoking is the single greatest cause of preventable deaths 
in dozens of countries, and it is also indisputably linked to the premature deaths of 
millions of people each year. In the United States alone. an estimated 320,000 people 
die prematurely each year as a consequence of their consumption of tobacco. For 1984 
it was estimated that cigarette smoking cost the United States approximately $54 
billion. 82 By comparison, the figures associated with deaths from the use of all illegal 
drugs has been estimated at a fraction of this figure. 83 Yet despite this, alcohol and 
tobacco still remain, for the majority, the acceptable face of drug consumption. 
The term "drug" is commonly not defined in academic and policy-making 
literature. Policy-making literature refers to "drugs". "narcotics". "psychoactive 
22 
substances" and "dangerous drugs" with little explanation of the reasons for the various 
terms. As with the understanding of the concept of an "issue" and the lack of any 
rigorous academic use, there is great difference between the medical or 
pharmacological and public perception of the term "drug". For the public the term has 
negative connotations, encouraged by the description of a "war" on drugs, yet the use 
of the term is not based on any objective criteria. 
The commonly used term "narcotic drug" is defined by the 1988 United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances as 
"any substances natural or synthetic in Schedules I and II of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961". @.4 The term "narcotic" 
in the field of pharmacology, refers to the sedative effects produced by a group of 
, - . 
substances, mainly opiates and alcohol. However, the 1961 Convention, (the keystone 
convention on drug control) considers as "narcotic" such substances as cannabis, 
cocaine, stimulants and psychedelics, but not alcohol. Terminological confusion is 
added to by the fact that cannabis and heroin are listed in Schedule IV of the World 
Health Organisation's classification of controlled substances. The position of cannabis 
in schedule IV with heroin can be seen to be not because of its dangers, but because 
of its wide-spread recreational use and the fact that it has no medical use. The term 
"narcotic drug" therefore is used to define substances according to their legal status as 
socially disapproved substances rather than by any scientific criteria. All illegal drugs 
are included, with alcohol and tobacco excluded. Also excluded are the barbiturates and 
amphetamines and other substances that are frequently obtained both legally and 
illegally for illegal use. 
Other key terms in the prohibition of certain drugs such as "drug addiction" and 
"drug abuse" elude clarification. In 1975 the WHO itself recognized that the term 
"abuse" had been used within an arbitrary and non-scientific approach: 
"Drug abuse is a term in need of some clarification ... The term is really 
a convenient, but not very precise way of indicating that (1) an 
unspecified drug is being used in an unspecified manner and 
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amount. .and (2) such use has been judged by some person or group to 
be wrong (illegal or immoral) and/or harmful to the user or society. or 
both. What might be called drug abuse by some would not necessarily 
be considered so by others ... For these reasons, the term "drug abuse" 
is avoided here. "85 
However, WHO publications have used the term ever since. Whenever illegal 
substances are referred to in either WHO or UN publications, they are always referred 
to in terms of drugs of "abuse". As the United States' National Commission on 
Marijuana and Drug Abuse stated in their report entitled Drug Use in America: 
Problem in Perspecti've, this has the effect of "rallying all parties to a common cause 
since no one could possibly be for abuse of drugs any more than they could be for 
abuse of minorities, power or children". 86 The term "abuse" then has no functional 
utility yet discredits the non-medical use of drugs and suggests medical authority in 
, . 
doing so. 
The concept of "addiction" has been used to justify strict legal and social 
control on illegal drugs and yet again there is no agreement on the term by those that 
use it. Sociologists speak of "assimilation into a special life style of drug taking". 
Doctors speak of "physical dependence" an alteration in the central nervous system that 
results in painful symptoms when the drug is withdra\\"n; "psychological or psychic 
dependence" an emotional desire, craving or compulsion to obtain and take the drug; 
and of "tolerance", a physical adjustment to the drug that results in successive doses 
producing smaller effects and, therefore, in a tendency to increase doses. Statutes speak 
of habitual use; loss of the power of self-control, and of the effects detrimental to the 
individual or potentially harmful to the public morals, safety, health or welfare. In 
1957, the World Health Organisation classified two types of drug dependence: 
"addiction", that is qualified by physical dependence and tolerance; and "habituation". 
qualified by psychic dependence and no tolerance. These terms were replaced in 1965 
by a new general definition, which stated that: 
':Orug dependence is a state. psychic and sometimes also physical. 
resulting from the interaction between a living organism and a drug, 
characterised by behavioral and other responses that alv.'ays include a 
compulsion to take the drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order 
to experience its psychic effects and sometimes to avoid the discomfort 
of its absence. Tolerance mayor may not be present. "S7 
This is so general that almost everything we do, from the regular morning cup of tea 
to the bedtime cup of cocoa, could be described as an addiction. Nine specific 
dependencies were listed and discussed: alcohol; amphetamines; barbiturates; cannabis; 
cocaine; hallucinogens; khat; opiates; and solvents. Yet there was no explanation of the 
reason for the inclusion of alcohol but the exclusion of tobacco. 
Although alcohol was officially included in the WHO classification of 
dependence-producing drugs, alcohol (and tobacco) have never been mentioned in any 
of the United Nations' drug control conventions despite universal global acceptance 
of their dependence-producing nature, and acceptance of the dangers to health 
associated with them. 
The concept of drug addiction, or drug dependence as it is now referred to, 
suffers from a high degree of conceptual confusion and is indeed "a monstrous tangle 
of social, psychological and pharmacological issues"88, that is difficult for policy-
makers to unravel. All types of illegal drug use are seen as equally dangerous and 
threatening and all levels of use are seen as equally dangerous and threatening, 
"experimental first use, casual use, regular use, and addiction alike. "89 
There is confusion within the expert community on the three major drugs that 
authorities seek to control; heroin, cocaine and cannabis. Although the dangers 
associated with acute and chronic consumption of heroin are on the whole not disputed. 
a variety of research has shown that although heroin is likely to be addictive it is not 
automatic. If taken in chemically pure form (unlikely with its present illegal status), 
consumed occasionally or on a regular basis, there are no adverse side effects other 
than mild constipation. 90 On this basis in the early twentieth century in the United 
States, opiates were used to treat alcoholism, since opiate addiction was seen to be a 
preferable condition to alcoholism by the medical profession when abstinence was not 
a realistic option.9\ 
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Similarly, as recently as the later half of the 1970s, cocaine was described as 
non-addictive and relatively harmless by numerous observers. 91 Although much of the 
current literature views cocaine consumption with considerable alarm, addiction to 
cocaine has been described as uncommon (but possible, particularly when used in 
"crack" form) and studies have shown that it is rare for moderate use to lead on to 
heavy use. Among heavy users there is increased likelihood of heart attack, brain 
haemorrhage, liver damage, psychotic episodes, delusions and violent behaviour, but 
use when controlled leads to few adverse effects. However, much of the research on 
cocaine use has concentrated on the crack-cocaine use in urban ghettoes, rather than 
the cocaine use that has been described as analogous to social drinking.93 Grinspoon 
and Bakalar go as far as to state that many Americans accept cocaine use as a 
"relatively innocuous stimulant, casually used by those who can afford it to brighten 
the day or evening". 9-4 
Perhaps the strongest example of the lack of scientific consensus, however, can 
be seen with cannabis use. As LaMond Tull is states; "Perhaps more than any other 
abused drug, cannabis has a diversity of experts whose research and opinion could 
justify almost any view". 95 On the one hand, researchers claim that cannabis causes 
harmful physiological effects,96 and on the other hand, researchers claim that cannabis 
has few harmful effects. 97 
The first reference to the question of the international control of cannabis was 
at the Hague Conference in 1912, where a resolution was adopted "to study the 
question of Indian Hemp from the statistical and scientific point of view with the object 
of regulating its abuse ... "98 However, it was not until the early 1970s that the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted for a resolution strengthening control measures 
for cannabis, while again requesting a study of the medico-social aspects of cannabis 
use to be carried out by the Division of Narcotic Drugs. The study, according to the 
French delegate, "would draw attention to the medical and social dangers of cannabis 
and would explain the reasons for its having been placed under international control by 
the narcotics treaties". 99 The decision was made therefore to control cannabis use 
before scientific studies had been carried out, and based on "preconceived ideas, beliefs 
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and traditional value judgements imposed on the international bodies" .1l1O 
Cannabis was included along with heroin in Schedule IV of the 1961 Single 
Convention due to its "addictive" nature, defined in terms of the 1957 WHO definition 
of "physical dependence". However, the addiction-producing properties of cannabis 
were" not possible to assess" at that time according to a WHO representative speaking 
at the XIV Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, as has already been 
suggested. 101 Furthermore, the 1965 WHO definition of "cannabis-type 
dependence" ,(described earlier), stated that there was "little, if any, physical 
dependence" associated with cannabis use. As Arnao notes: "Paradoxically, the 
inclusion of cannabis in Schedule IV by the Single Convention was based on a WHO 
classification, which was latterly disproved by the WHO itself" .102 The inclusion of 
cannabis in Schedule IV by policy makers can be seen to be due to its wide recreational 
use and lack of medical use. 
However, the use of cannabis for medical purposes has received widespread 
documentation. Its history as a western medicine lasted from the 1840s to the 1940s, 
during which period it was extensively used to treat a wide variety of diseases such as 
depressive mental conditions, and the muscle spasms of tetanus and rabies. lo3 The use 
of cannabis for medical purposes has recently been the subject of some debate again 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Patients suffering from a wide range of 
serious illnesses such as leukaemia, epilepsy and multiple sclerosis have claimed 
benefits from taking the drug. It has been claimed that cannabis relieves the nausea 
associated with radiation and chemotherapy and can alleviate the pain in some victims 
of multiple sclerosis. 104 The use of the drug for patients suffering from glaucoma has 
also been the subject of much research. Glaucoma sufferers claim that it can lower the 
pressure within the eye, so avoiding the onset of blindness. lo5 In 1989. the United 
States administrative law judge of the Drug Enforcement Administration recommended 
that marijuana could be legally available for such patients in the United States on 
compassionate grounds, but the DEA rejected the recommendations of its own judge 
to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II drug which would have made marijuana 
available on a prescription basis. 106 Judge Francis Young, called marijuana "one of 
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the safest therapeutically active substances known to man" and argued: "It would be 
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious for [the] DEA to continue to stand between 
those sufferers and the benefits of this substance in light of the evidence in this 
record". 107 
In order to utilise the possible medical benefits of cannabis, however, cannabis 
would have to be legalised, since it is unlikely that cannabis could ever be licensed. 
This is because the stringency of the drug trials and testing procedures would mean that 
it would be a risky investment for a drug company since the chance of the company 
securing a license at the end of it would be too small. Cannabis is also not just one 
drug but a myriad of chemicals which would take years to analyse. lOS 
As the "drugs problem" needs to be understood not as a single issue, -but.as an 
amalgamation of various issues, involving various values and stakes. so too is it 
important to understand and distinguish between the various illicit drugs because their 
markets, problems and potential solutions differ. As has been demonstrated, it is not 
the chemical properties of the substances that policy-makers are interested in. Drug-
taking is seen as challenging established values and established social norms. To sum 
up, drugs that are illicit are the problem; all drugs that are illicit are defined as equally 
problematic; and drug-taking itself is harmful rather than its harmful consequences. 
The seemingly scientific categorisation of drugs. and the rationale behind drug control, 
are based rather on the proscription of substances whose supposed effects on humans 
are by social norm and by law considered to be wrong. The evolution of these norms 
and values therefore needs to be explored. 
The structure of the research 
As has already been emphasised, the "drug problem" can be seen as not a single issue 
at all, but an amalgamation of a variety of separate issues involving various actors and 
various stakes in distinct issue-systems, within a similar context of what can be 
described as drug-related activity. The spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) and measures to combat it; increasing use of illicit drugs among 
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minors; money laundering by criminal organisations; the link of drugs to international 
terrorism and arms sales; the usurption of government by cocaine barons in Colombia; 
the corruption of governments, are all concerns which would now appear to have the 
status of global issues due to their importance on the international agenda and the 
increased international action over how best to combat them. Conceptually these issues 
can be seen as separate, but behaviorally these concerns are seen as linked by policy-
makers. Exploring the relationship between issue-systems and international regime 
analysis can help clarify the context under which an issue is regulated. However the 
concept of regimes and the concept of issues both suffer from lack of clarification in 
International Relations literature. 
Chapter Two of this research will therefore explore the scope and nature of the 
drug phenomenon and in so doing highlight the complexity of the nature of the issues. 
The International Relations literature on issues will be reviewed with the aim of 
understanding why international action on drug control has moved higher up the 
international agenda during the eighties and early nineteen-nineties. Chapter Three will 
explore the evolution of the values and stakes involved with international drug control 
during the nineteenth century in order to understand the nature of values and the 
evolution of issues on the international political agenda. 
Chapter Four in reviewing international co-operation to date on drug control 
will propose that a single international drug-control regime is not possible due to the 
multi-issue nature of the drug phenomenon. Furthermore, international consensus over 
the need to control global drug-trafficking has only produced a weak regime. With a 
greater understanding of the evolution and nature of issues, a more thorough 
understanding of regime creation can be atteJ!lpted in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will 
show that in order for an issue to become regulated by the creation of an international 
regime, the process of contention over values must lead those for whom the issue is 
salient to a high level of consensus over an agreed norm on which the regime can be 
based. Chapter Five will proceed to identify the norms in the international politics of 
drugs. Of the norms involved, it is the norm that "Banks should not profit from 
criminal activity", concerned with the tracing, freezing and confiscation of drug-
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traffickers assets that can be seen most clearly to be regulated by a regime. The 
evolution of this regime will be the focus for Chapter Six of this research. Finally, the 
current debate concerning the legalisation of illicit drugs will be explored in Chapter 
Seven in relation to regime formation. 
Conclusion 
The drug phenomenon is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon which challenges 
the traditional Realist approach to International Relations to explain its complexity. 
This complexity requires precisely the issue-specific approach of international regimes 
as understood by the Global Politics paradigm. However. the clarification of key terms 
used in the literature on international regimes is necessary for an understanding of the 
emergence of international regimes that is not based on Realist hegemonic-power 
theory. 
Within the field of International Relations there has been very little research 
done on the emergence of issues and the significance of values and norms in 
international politics. In attempting to understand the values and stakes involved in the 
drug phenomenon. a greater understanding of the phenomenon can be reached which 
does not ignore the lessons of history. As Zimring and Hawkins remark in their book. 
The Search for Rational Drug Control, "the immunity to historical evidence that 
characterizes the contemporary discussion of drugs in the United States is peculiarly 
pervasive" . 1Cl9 The same can be said of international drug control. I n developing an 
understanding of value and norm emergence, issue dynamics and regime evolution can 
be explained. 
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Chapter 2 
The Scope and Nature of the Drug Phenomenon 
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Introduction 
The last decade has seen the wider availability and growing consumption of cheaper 
and more potent forms of illicit drugs, and increasing concern over how best to combat 
drug use by the international community. In the 1980s, the cocaine supply increased 
dramatically. Between 1947 and 1980, 35 metric tons were recorded as having been 
siezed globally. During the three year period from 1983 to 1985, 94 metric tons were 
recorded seized in the Andean region alone, the main coca growing area in the world.' 
Due to O\'er-production, cocaine prices were estimated by one United States report, to 
have dropped by as much as 80 % by the end of the decade, and to have reached a level 
of production to satisfy four times the annual estimated cocaine market. 2 During the 
eighties, the media and various international conferences focused on coc~ine ~se, giving 
the impression that cocaine use was a relatively recent phenomenon. 3 That this is not 
the case is illustrated by the next chapter, which shows how mass cocaine consumption 
first appeared in the early nineteenth century. The focus on cocaine has been fuelled 
by the media publicity given to the drug "crack" and its association with inner-city use 
and increasing crime. 4 
This focus has also blurred the fact that there has also been a increase in heroin 
and cannabis production and consumption. The world's illicit opium production 
increased four-fold from 990 tons in 1971, to 4200 tons in 1989.s Illicit opium 
production in the main producing area of South-East Asia, the Golden Triangle, 
doubled in 1988/9, from the previous year's production, to some 2000 tonnes. with a 
corresponding surge in opiate availability.6 There has also been a diversification, from 
cocaine production to opium poppy production in many Latin American countries. 
Opium production in Colombia has been estimated as equalling the size of the area 
under illicit coca cultivation.' The purity of heroin at the retail level in the United 
States for example, has also increased significantly, averaging over 36 per cent 
compared with less than 10 per cent in the 1970s and early 1980s.8 Cannabis is still 
the most popular illicit drug in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 9 New technologies for 
production, have led to increased production and consumption patterns. Hydroponic 
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equipment facilitates year-round cultivation of cannabis. This technology has also 
increased the potency level of the drug. J() 
I ncreases in technology have led to new, so called "designer drugs", such as 
"Adam", "Eve", "China White" and most recently, and with most notoriety, 
"Ecstasy".11 These synthetic drugs add a worrying new dimension to the drug 
phenomenon for governments and law enforcers since their production is relatively easy 
and inexpensive. They are synthesised from readily available chemicals, may be 
derivatives of pharmaceuticals, are very potent, and in addition are marketed towards 
youth culture. Little data or research is available on these synthetic drugs, and the 
international regulatory procedure is not able to respond swiftly enough to the 
increasing numbers of new substances requiring investigation and possible control. 
Recent international control efforts have focused on the need to control diversion of 
precursor chemicalsl2 used in the manufacture of these, and oth-er illicit drugs from 
European manufacturing and exporting countries to illicit channels in parts of Africa 
and Asia. 13 Diversions are generally the result of deficiencies in the application of 
control measures in international trade. 
All these developments, have led to increasing concern within the international 
community over how best to combat illicit drug use, and have led to increased 
international action. In 1985, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de 
Cuellar. took the unusual step of calling for a United Nations Conference on Drug 
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.14 This was followed by the creation of the Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances initiated by the 
Government of Venezuela. IS The Convention, known as the Vienna Convention, was 
the first United Nations drug control document in 18 years and came into force on the 
11th of November, 1990. This was followed'in February 1990 by a United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session, called for by the P~esident of Colombia, which 
served to emphasise the importance of drug control on the international agenda, with 
the announcement of a United Nations decade against drugs. 16 In April of the same 
year, a World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Illicit Drugs and to 
Combat the Cocaine Threat took place in London.17 The drug phenomenon was also 
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discussed in a large number of meetings of heads of governments: a summit of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, the Group of Seven industrialised 
nations, the European Council; and a regional summit where the heads of state of 
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and the United States met together at Cartegena de Indias, 
Colombia, in February 1990, followed by a second meeting in San Antonio in February 
1992,t8 This increase in international co-operation on drug control shows how the 
need to control the illicit use of drugs has increasingly been placed higher on the 
international political agenda. That this has come about, is not merely due to an 
increase in drug consumption throughout the 1970's and 1980's, and its serious impact 
on human health, highlighted by the spread of AIDS, but rather as a reflection of an 
enhanced understanding of its adverse effects on political and economic dimensions of 
domestic and international security in an increasing number of countries. The 
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international community has become increasingly aware of the inadequacy of previous 
multi-lateral treaties to deal with the new developments. 
In order to understand why drug control has moved up the international agenda, 
a greater understanding is needed as to what constitutes an "issue" in international 
politics. The drug phenomenon is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted problem and 
cannot be analysed as a single issue as it often is. This necessitates a re-examination 
of the issue-centred approach to politics offered by the Globalist paradigm, and 
inevitably necessitates a new approach to agenda formation, one that is not dominated 
by hegemonic-power theory. Many Real ist writers accept that there are issues on the 
international agenda other than the issue of power and security, but the significance of 
these new issues is limited, since they still view the struggle for security, optimised by 
the pursuit of power as the dominant issue. In this context agenda formation is based 
on power-as-capabilities determining actor's abilities to put an issue on the agenda. 
Within the alternative Globalist paradigm a regime approach to understanding the 
evolution of co-operation in international relations is given a sounder theoretical footing 
by placing it firmly in an issue-centred paradigm. With this approach, the emergence 
of issues on the agenda is not dependent on Realist hegemonic-power theories. After 
the problems associated with drug use and drug trafficking have been outlined, this 
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chapter will examine what we mean by an issue and how issues arise on the 
international agenda. 
The nature of the drug phenomenon 
The drug phenomenon challenges traditional approaches to international relations since 
a social problem, drug-related activit~ is seen as a threat to national and international 
security by many governments. The alliance of terrorist and insurgency movements 
with drug producers in the eighties has been a significant development for international 
drug-control efforts. Insurgency groups have used drugs to fund their operations, 
directly or indirectly. In the coca growing regions of South America, terrorist and 
insurgency groups have supported the cocaine trade in order to strengthen their political 
position and acquire funds, even though they may claim to be ideologica))y opposed 
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to the drug trade itself. According to the United States State Department, during the 
eighties there were clear connections between left-wing Colombian gueriJIa groups and 
drug traffickers despite the fact that many of the drug traffickers were ideologica))y to 
the right. 19 The seige of the Palace of Justice in 1985 was seen as linking Colombia's 
drug barons with communist insurgency groupS.20 Press releases on the involvement 
of terrorist or insurgency groups with drug production have used the key term 
"narcoguerilJa". It is said to have been introduced in 1984 by the U.S Ambassador to 
Colombia, Lewis Tambs, who had announced a successful raid on a jungle based drug 
complex and had claimed that communist rebels had been guarding the facilities. 21 
During the eighties, according to the Peruvian government and United States State 
Department reports, the Maoist group in Peru. the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. 
established close ties to international narcotic traffickers and received arms and money 
in return for protection against law-enforcement authorities. One of the motives behind 
their involvement with drug production could be seen to be the desire to gain peasant 
support. by campaigning against the United States-backed coca-eradication programme 
and United States involvement in the domestic affairs of the country. 21 Groups in 
Ecuador, in co-ordination with groups in Colombia and Peru, have also been associated 
with regional drug traffickers.13 Throughout the region. there are many more 
examples of links between terrorist or insurgency groups and drug producers. 
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In the Golden Triangle of Burma, China, Laos and Thailand, the opium trade 
has helped finance insurgency groups. In Burma, insurgency groups include those 
directly involved with the narcotics trade, such as the Shan United Army who are 
involved for profit motives, to the ideological revolutionaries such as the Burmese 
Communist Party (BCP), who use drugs to fund their political operations. In the early 
eighties, three ethnic groups, the Kachins, the Shan and the Karens, were all supported 
in their fight against the government of Burma by drug money. 24 Separatist terrorists 
in Sri Lanka are said to have become involved in drug trafficking in order to finance 
their arms and ammunition purchasesY The United States supported "Contras" in 
Central America were repeatedly accused of links with drug traffickers, in order to 
supplement United States funds, with the full knowledge of the United States26 • A 
similar situation emerged in Afghanistan. 27 A link is also visible betwe~n i!,!surgency 
groups and the drug traffickers in the Bekka Valley in Lebanon. 28 Furthermore. these 
links between drug traffickers and terrorist or insurgency groups means that the trade 
in drugs and arms is becoming increasingly connected. 29 
There are numerous examples of how drug production and the vast profits to 
be made from drug trafficking have corrupted the governments and the military of 
many countries throughout the world. In the early 1980s, government and military 
leaders in Bolivia, were pre-eminent in the drug trade and the international narco-
mafia. Drug traffickers provided financial backing for the 1980 "cocaine coup" led by 
General Garcia Meza. 30 Involvement in drug trafficking can also be traced to the 
highest levels of government in Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Colombia. 31 A 1989 United States State Department Report noted that the corruption 
of the criminal justice system in Colombia was so complete that it was "virtually 
impossible" to arrest and convict drug dealers or to do serious damage to their 
organisations. 32 The phenomenon is not confined to Central and South America. Drug 
corruption in Mexico has been described as "endemic" and extending to the highest 
levels of the Mexican government. 33 In Pakistan, the entire Pakistani Cabinet offered 
its resignation in December 1986 over riots in Karachi, orchestrated by the drug 
barons, to disrupt a police operation against powerful drug dealers. Important figures 
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in the government were implicated as being involved in the drug-smuggling operations 
and the military was also implicated in the increasing heroin trade. During the eighties 
Pakistan developed into one of the principal sources, if not the principal source, of high 
grade heroin in the world's illicit drug market. 34 The United States considered the 
Laotian government to be heavily involved in the production and export of heroin, or 
at the very least of condoning it during the eighties. 35 After repeated allegations. 
beginning as early as 1983 over the involvement of the government of Cuba (with, or 
without Castro's blessing) in the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States, 
Castro finally acknowledged the problem within his government and had the principals 
tried and executed. 36 The corruption of governments and the state by drug traffickers 
is clearly illustrated by the case of Panama, where the military and the very highest 
leaders were implemented in promoting off-shore banking and other facilities for 
Andean drug traffickers. The role of the Panamanian military in the laundering of what 
has been termed "narcomoney" , has led to the adoption of a new term, the 
"narcomilitary state",3'7 Despite the evidence of the participation of top officials in 
Panama, Haiti, Mexico, Honduras, and the Bahamas in drug trafficking, the Reagan 
and Bush administrations have protected high-level military officials as long as these 
leaders supported the administration's agenda, since drug production and trafficking 
were secondary to their political interests in certain countries. For example, in the case 
of Honduras, the Honduran military provided support for the Contras, and were 
protected by the administration despite constant implication in drug trafficking on a 
huge scale. According to Rosenblum, in the fifteen-month period ending in 1988. 
"perhaps as much as fifty tons (of cocaine) moved through Honduras - nine tons of 
which was seized - amounting to half the estimated consumption in the United 
States".38 
The drug phenomenon can be seen as a direct threat to the governments of 
drug-producing countries. Colombia in particular has experienced what has been called 
" narco-terrorism " ,39 with an open war with the Medellin cocaine cartel declared by 
the drug traffickers. During the latter half of the eighties, several prominent politicians. 
and over 3000 military and police personnel, have been killed or wounded.40 
Colombia has been in a state of seige for the greater part of the eighties. The drug 
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barons threatened the very heart of the Colombian judiciary by systematic threats and 
corruption which led to the virtual collapse of the judicial system in the latter half of 
the eighties. The Medellin cartel declared a "total war" against the government of 
Colombia after the major offensive launched against the cartel by the then President, 
Virgilio Barco Vargas, following the drug-financed assassination of the presidential 
candidate, Luis Carlos Gatan, in August 1989.41 The Colombian extradition treaty 
with the United States government, agreed in 1979, was overturned in 1987, leading 
to a nation-wide debate about how best to bring the traffickers, "Los extraditables", to 
justice. 4~ Government negotiations with the leaders of the cartels, such as Pablo 
Escobar Gaviria, have been described by senior officials as being akin to a "pact with 
the devil".43 However, negotiations have led to the surrender of many leading drug 
barons and Colombia seems to be entering a new stage in its attempts to control drug-
related violence. 44 
The influence and organization of the Colombian cocaine cartels during the 
eighties, had spread to the point where they were described in the United States 
Department of Justice Report as a state-within-a-state in Colombia, operating openly 
and with impunity.45 As Rensselaer W Lee III states, "Drug barons today are major 
political forces in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, carving out states 
within states in coca-producing regions. "46 The estimated world-wide financial 
transactions in cocaine for 1986 exceeded the reported 1984 gross domestic product of 
88 of the world's market economies including Argentina, Belgium, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey, 47 making the drug traffickers very wealthy men. 
The 1989 Kerry Commission Report estimated that the Colombian drug cartels earn $8 
billion annually, and Forbes magazine listed Colombian cartel leaders Ochoa and 
Escobar as among the richest men in the world.48 The drug barons and traffickers can 
therefore afford huge, private armies that are often better equipped than many 
countries' official military forces, as in Colombia.49 In Bolivia in the mid-eighties, 
the armies of the drug barons threatened the very existence of the government and 
administration itself, and in 1986, Bolivia's President called for, and received United 
States troops to help restore order. The operation was seen by many within Bolivia as 
a "violation of sovereignty", the troops were withdrawn, and the cocaine barons 
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resumed their activities, with an alternative challenge to the concept of "state 
sovereignty".50 The incredible wealth generated by illicit drug trafficking has meant 
that cocaine barons have even spoken of using their financial power to take-over 
countries,51 and have challenged governments to participate in a contest for state 
power. 52 In Bolivia in the early eighties, the drug trafficker Roberto Suarez Gomez 
offered to payoff two-thirds of Bolivia's foreign debt (then at $3,000,000,000) in cash, 
in exchange for immunity to run his cocaine business. ~3 Their wealth has also been 
used to provide some of the traditional facilities that a government usually provides: 
hospitals, educational facilities, clinics, and sports plazas, and Escobar had reportedly 
constructed more public housing in Medellin than the government itself.54 In Burma, 
Khun Sa, one of the opium warlords of the Golden Triangle has held press conferences 
to boast of h is huge wealth. 55 It is alleged that the Thai government negotiated with 
Khun Sa to enable the government to import wood from the territory under Khun Sa's 
control because Thailand has depleted its own forests. In exchange the government 
have reportedly offered immunity from arrest for Khun Sa while on Thai soil.56 This 
incredible wealth, and the influence it provides, makes the drug barons major political 
actors in the area of drug control and challenges the Realist concept of "state 
sovereignty" . 
A great deal of research has been done on the importance of the drug trade to 
the economies of many developing countries and for Latin American countries in 
particular. Cocaine is deeply integrated into the economies of Peru, Bolivia and 
Colombia. Its production employs thousands and supplies much needed export earnings 
for the governments. In Peru an estimated 110,000-186,000 of the adult work force is 
employed directly by the production of the drug.57 In Bolivia the figure is estimated 
at 350,000-400,000 (or approximately 7 % of the population)", and in Colombia 
approximately 300,000 were estimated as employed in drug production in 1988.'9 The 
revenue generated by coca production has been estimated at $1 billion a year in Peru, 
and approximately $1.5 billion in Bolivia and Colombia.60 Once in the financial 
system, the huge amounts of money generated from cocaine production can be used to 
meet many foreign exchange needs, including servicing the countries foreign debt. 
According to Rensselaer Lee, cocaine provided 20 to 30 per cent of Peru's foreign 
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exchange and well over 50 per cent for Bolivia in 1989. 61 
This challenge to the stability of governments by illicit drugs, is not confined 
to producer countries, but also effects the traditional consumer countries of the 
developed world. The demand for drugs has been linked by governments to increasing 
crime rates, seen as increasingly threatening to the domestic security of developed 
countries. 62 However, since the source of illicit drugs is primarily international, their 
control becomes a part of a government's foreign policy. The threat to security posed 
by illicit drugs was recognised as long ago as the early seventies. In 1971 Nixon was 
the first United States President to declare a "War on Drugs". Drug abuse was 
described as a "national emergency", and drugs as "public enemy number one" needing 
a "total offensive".63 The effect of Nixon's war, the successful eradication 
programmes, for example in Turkey, and the destruction of long-established trafficking 
networks, was to disperse production and consumption around the globe, making 
control more difficult. Nixon's war can be seen to have had the effect of breaking up 
the established drug trafficking network between Turkey-Marseilles-New York, into 
smaller and less detectable pipelines; moving production from established areas to new 
areas, particularly into the Third World. In this way, First World drug users were 
connected to Third World producers for the first time. The success of Nixon's war also 
encouraged the diversification of traffickers into other substances. The cost of drugs 
such as cocaine and heroin also increased in price in the United States due to the 
success of Nixon's programmes making the profit margins that much more attractive 
for traffickers and encouraging further trafficking operations. As McCoy and Block 
note, 
"the international narcotics traffic became a cat's-cradle of smuggling 
routes far more resistant to suppression than ever before. Thus, 
America's first attempt at an international solution had, over the long 
term, compounded the problem. "64 
In October 1982 President Reagan announced the start of the current "War on 
Drugs" which was taken up by his successor, George Bush. In 1989, William J 
Bennett, then head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, declared: 
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"The source of the most dangerous drugs threatening our nation is principally 
international. Few foreign threats are more costly to the U.S. economy. None 
does more damage to our national values and institutions and destroys more 
American lives. While most international threats are potential, the damage and 
violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major 
threat to our national security". 65 
Attempts by governments to control the distribution and use of illicit drugs can 
therefore be seen to destroy another tenet of the Realist approach to international 
politics, that there is a clear divide between domestic issues and domestic politics, and 
international issues and international politics. Charles Rangel, Chairman of the House 
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control stated that, 
"If Colombia falls (to the drug cartels), the other, smaller, less stable nations 
in the region would become targets. It is conceivable that we would one day 
find ourselves an island of democracy in a sea of narcopolitical rule, a prospect 
as bad as being surrounded by communist regimes". 66 
As Lee states, the control of illicit drugs, once an issue far removed from the high 
politics of government, has become the United States highest diplomatic priority in 
relations with Colombia in particular, and a vital component of United States relations 
with Latin America generally.67 The United States "War on Drugs" is seen by critics 
as serving to legitimise continued United States intervention, both politically, 
economically and militarily, in Latin American in the post-Cold-War period. 
The eighties differed from previous attempts to control drugs by the scale of the 
resources allocated, and by the use of the military. George Bush consistently reaffirmed 
his commitment to further escalation of the war on drugs throughout the late eighties. 
Specific mention of drugs in his inaugural. address, direct United States military 
involvement in the invasion of Panama in December 1989, the consideration of plans 
for a battle fleet off the coast of Colombia, the sending of millions of dollars worth of 
military equipment,61 and the dispatching the Green Berets to Peru, have all 
confirmed this.69 Although Bush's war was initially a war on cocaine, it soon 
encompassed an attack on heroin, with the indictment of Burma's Khun Sa, in 
December 1989, on charges of conspiring to import narcotics.70 The attempt to bring 
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Khun Sa to justice was unsuccessful, but General Manuel Noriega was successfully 
prosecuted for his involvement in drug trafficking (see later). 
Deploying the armed forces of the United States to assist drug enforcement 
operations necessitated in 1981, the repeal of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which 
restricted military involvement in federal law enforcement. 71 The militarization of the 
war on drugs deployed not only the armed forces in interdiction exercises, but also the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the supplying of intelligence about foreign drug 
sources, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in carrying out 
satellite based surveillance of illicit drugs under cultivation. During the period 1989-
1990 there was a steady expansion of the role of the United States military along its 
borders and overseas, and intensified pressure was put on other governments in the 
hemisphere to assign a greater role to their own armed forces in combatt1ng -drug 
trafficking. 72 In mid-September 1989 Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney declared 
that "detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-
priority, national security mission" for his department. 73 
Despite changes in Eastern Europe and the events in the Persian Gulf, the expenditure 
by the United States on the drug war in 1992 was approximately $11 billion, with a 
projected increase to $12.7 billion requested for 1993, making it one of the largest 
government programmes.74 
The recent political and economic changes in Central and East European 
countries have resulted in a substantial increase in the movement of peoples, goods, 
services and capital within and outside Europe. This has resulted in a corresponding 
increase in drug trafficking and drug use in Europe. With the emergence of free-market 
economies in the former Eastern bloc, the manufacture, export, import, domestic trade 
and distribution of pharmaceuticals in Eastern Europe previously monopolised by the 
state, were now in the hands of hundreds of new manufacturing and trading 
companies. 7s The nascent democracies are also experiencing an upsurge of crime and 
corruption, providing opportunities for well-organised criminal networks, which profit 
from it"licit drug trafficking. 76 European concerns in the late eighties and early nineties 
have therefore focused on fully integrating the former USSR and Eastern bloc 
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countries into the European and international drug control system. 
Within Western Europe, the implementation of the Single European Act allows 
in principle for persons, goods, services and capital, to move more freely within the 
Community. The signing of the Schengen Convention in 1990 by eight of the Member 
States of Europe, with Greece signing in 1993, is a move towards the abolition of 
frontier controls. 77 However, the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic and Denmark 
remain outside the Schengen Group. The outside borders of the Community are feared 
by some as becoming the only barriers for drug traffickers to penetrate. Significantly 
drug seizures have also increased, suggesting that the amount of trafficking has also 
increased. In 1992, 4.5 tonnes of heroin was recovered in Europe, as against three 
tonnes in 1991. 7S Cocaine seizures increased by 42 per cent in the first half of 1993, 
and cannabis seizures increased from 80 to 91 tonnes. 79 
The European Community has recently focused its drug-control efforts on 
combatting drug-money laundering. Close co-operation has been achieved throughout 
the community with various financial institutions, in efforts to tighten the regulation of 
financial institutions and to prevent the utilization of the banking system and financial 
institutions for the purpose of laundering drug money.80 The Financial Action Task 
Force (FA TF) was set up in July 1989 in Paris by the Heads of State or Government 
of the Group of Seven industrialised countries, and the President of the Commission 
of the European Communities, with the aim of fighting money-laundering.sl A 
European Economic Community Directive, adopted in June 1991, obliges all member 
states to introduce measures against the use of the financial system for money-
laundering. 82 France has made it mandatory for financial institutions to make a 
declaration whenever they have reason to believe that funds stem from drug trafficking. 
In Germany, new legislation has been enacted to close the loopholes that have been 
used by traffickers to re-route into legal channels proceeds from illicit activity. 
Switzerland has seen the abolition of the traditional anonymous money deposits in 
Swiss banks. In 1991, the Swiss Criminal Code contained the specific offence of 
money laundering and a general obligation to identify the customer as well as any 
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possible beneficial owner of the funds. 83 Luxembourg has also amended its laws on 
money laundering, but only for funds that have been tainted with drug-related activity. E4 
Austria, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have also enacted similar legislation. 85 
The scale of crime and public disorder associated with drug use and trafficking 
has led many European countries dramatically to re-think their attitude to drug control. 
High-level public officials in several European countries have calJed for the debate to 
be opened on the decriminalisation and legalisation of not only marijuana, but also 
cocaine, heroin and other illicit drugs. In the United Kingdom, senior police officers 
have spoken out in favour of some form of legal isation, as has a national newspaper, 
a prestigious magazine, members of the judiciary, and a senior economist. 86 In Spain, 
eminent judges and lawyers, including law professors from half of Spain's universities, 
have been campaigning to legalise the sale of drugs, as part of an alternative-approach 
to Spain's serious problems with drug use and trafficking: Spain is now the major point 
of entry for cocaine from South America and cannabis products from Northern Africa 
destined for Europe. Thirty-six per cent of the cannabis and 44 per cent of the cocaine 
seized in Europe in 1991 were confiscated in Spain.s7. In Italy in 1993, in an attempt 
to control the increasing mafia-related crime, one of the eight separate referendums was 
concerned with de-penal ising personal drug use. 88 Chapter Seven of this work will 
explore further the current debate on the legalisation of drugs. 
The threat posed to European countries is a perceived threat to national stability 
and security, due to the link of ilJicit-drug distribution to international criminal 
networks, such as the Hong Kong Triads and the Japanese Yakuzas (see later). In the 
United Kingdom in 1985 the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee stated: 
"Unless immediate and effective action is taken Britain and Europe stand to 
inherit the American drug problem in less than 5 years. We see this as the most 
serious peace-time threat to our national well-being" .89 
This increase in crime and instability has led many European countries to begin to re-
evaluate their drug control programmes. Switzerland and the Netherlands are frequently 
cited as archetypal of this alternative approach. providing drug users with their chosen 
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narcotics in an attempt to drive the criminal traffickers out of business. 90 
The defining of the non-medical use of certain drugs as a criminal act has 
allowed the growth of the largest criminal enterprise ever seen. Estimates of the annual 
turnover from the drugs trade vary enormously, from $76 to $600 billion a year. 91 
The Director-General of the United Nations Office in Vienna stated at the opening of 
the 1988 Conference that, 
"The amount of money involved in illicit drug trafficking is staggering, a single 
drug, cocaine, was worth billions on the illicit market. Illegal drugs were 
estimated to have overtaken oil as a source of revenue globally; they were now 
the world's second biggest trading commodity, next to armaments, and 
amounted to 9 per cent of international merchandise in value" .92 
Estimates of the size of the drug trade vary considerably due to probl~ms of collecting 
data. The wide range of estimates is due to the fact that the financial flows arising from 
drug trafficking can be estimated in various ways. At the lower end of the estimates, 
such as in The Drugs Trade in Latin America Report, the estimated trade of between 
$76-181 bill ion would involve laundering, at the lower end, the equivalent of all the 
money spent yearly on lawyers fees in the United States, and at the upper end, the 
entire domestic turnover of the United States automobile industry. 93 Because drugs are 
illegal, criminals, terrorists or insurgency movements can gain large profits from the 
various stages of production and marketing. Drugs profits have become by far the 
largest single source of revenue for organized crime in developed countries. 
All the above examples serve to illustrate the fact that the drug phenomenon 
affects different countries in different ways, highlighting. the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Different governments have different stakes to preserve. In Colombia, 
the concern for the government is centred on ending the mafia violence or narco-
terrorism, "the principal threat against (our) democracy", rather than on ending the 
cocaine trade itself.904 In Peru and Bolivia the dominant issue facing the governments 
is the threat from the insurgents, often allied with the coca growers. In Peru the 
alliance of the Sendero Luminoso with the coca growers bestows a difficult dilemma 
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upon the government. Destroying coca production allies more and more peasants with 
the guerillas. In 1990, President Fujimori suspended the United-States-supported, anti-
cocaine, enforcement programme for fear that it would further strengthen the guerilla 
insurgency led by Sendero Luminoso. 9s Similarly, the government of Thailand has 
also been wary of moving against some of its poppy growing peasants, remembering 
that it was an earl ier destruction of opium fields that allowed communist guerillas to 
infiltrate and win over many hill tribesmen to an anti-government position. 96 
Competing stakes for the Peruvian government, meant that in March 1990, two 
separate missions of United States helicopters carrying Peruvian anti-drug police, were 
fired upon by army soldiers. Similarly, in June 1989, a Bolivian navy detachment shot 
at helicopters carrying Bolivian anti-drug police and United States Drug Enforcement 
Agency advisors. 
The traditional consumer countries of the developed world see drug trafficking 
as a threat to their security in relation to the rising cost of crime and social unrest 
associated with ill icit drug use. Furthermore, the increase in the laundering of profits 
made from the increasing sales of illicit drugs, and recent financial scandals involving 
drug money, such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) affair, 
threaten the economic stability of developed countries, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Six. In the United States, estimates of the profit to organised crime from narcotics 
traffic ha\'e been put at between $5-15 billion a year, which is tax-free and mainly 
channelled abroad. 97 For the traditional producer countries, drug trafficking currently 
threatens to undermine political and judicial systems in several countries, and forms 
an integral destabilising component of the economies of several countries. There is also 
concern that the drug traffickinglinsurgency connection will increasingly enable 
terrorist groups to force their agendas onto governments. The domestic political 
reaction therefore can be seen to be due to the problems of stability and security, 
resulting from increased trafficking and from the link between drugs and crime. The 
international agenda has subsequently been affected accordingly. 
The increase in drug trafficking 
From the 19505 onwards there has been a steady increase In international drug 
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trafficking due to a number of factors, as will be outlined briefly below. 
Increasing communications between regions and increased transport links with 
regular flights, for example between South America and Spanish cities, and the United 
States and Sicily, have facilitated consumer/producer links. The report of the United 
Nations International Narcotics Control Board for 1990 cites how new air services 
linking Angola, Nigeria, and Mozambique with South America have led to an increase 
in illicit drug trafficking in these countries. Furthermore, the increase in tourism world-
wide has spread the problems related to the use of drugs. In Sri Lanka, the increase 
in tourism has led to an increase in the use of heroin among young people.98 
Increasing communications have contributed to increased migration flows, with large 
diasporas of some ethnic groups now residing in strategic parts of the world, whose 
blood ties have been utilized by traffickers in the formation of illicit networks. The 
Chinese community is represented in almost every major city in the world, and ethnic 
Chinese are the dominant importers and wholesale distributors of heroin, with networks 
from the Golden Triangle through Bangkok and Hong Kong to California. The Turkish 
Cypriot community are conveniently spread across western Europe; and the southern 
districts of Florida and central and southern California with their large number of 
immigrants have been utilized for Colombian and United States operations. Migration 
to drug producing regions, what Edmundo Morales has called a "white gold rush", 
particularly in Peru and Bolivia, has also been a developing trend in the eighties. 99 
This has often resulted in widespread deforestation, land erosion, and the poisoning of 
rivers with the kerosene, sulphuric acid, quicklime, carbide, and acetone used in 
cocaine processing. 
In Viet Nam, changes in its economic system have resulted in an increase in the 
movement of both peoples and goods, both within the country, and in neighbouring 
countries. This has led to drug traffickers targeting it as a source of illicit drugs, as a 
transit route (due to its proximity to the Golden Triangle) and also as a potential 
market. More recently, the abolition of many of Europe's customs posts (particularly 
in Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, France, Greece and 
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Italy - the signatories of the Schengen Convention) and the promotion of free-trade has 
led to increased movement of peoples and an increase in illicit drugs available. Over 
the last decade, seizures of heroin in the European Community have gone up more than 
sevenfold from 1.1 tonnes in 1982, to 8.3 tonnes in 1991, and seizures of cocaine are 
42 times higher, up from 0.4 tonnes to 16.8 tonnes. loo Similarly, reports have been 
made of Colombian drug cartels setting up factories, warehouses and transport 
companies in Mexico to exploit the flood of cross-border commerce expected under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement which is awaiting endorsement. 101 
The increasing migration flows between countries, and the collapse of economic 
barriers, is often due to increasing economic growth. Economic growth has led to 
expanding markets in countries such as Japan, Germany and the former Eastern bloc 
countries, such as Poland. The increase in commerce between China an9 Ho_ng ~ong 
and Macao has led to increasing movements of heroin across China's southern 
borders.l02 The opening up of the former Eastern Bloc countries has led to new 
markets, where non-convertible currencies had previously meant that there was little 
profit to be made by drug traffickers. Greater freedom of movement and economic 
growth has allowed Italian mafia groups to buy up sectors of the new economies, in 
order to launder drug money. 103 In 1985, the Balkan heroin route from 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria via Turkey, accounted for an 
estimated quarter of all the heroin reaching Western Europe. It has been estimated to 
have increased by 70-80 per cent in 1990. 104 
One of the most significant factors in the increase in drug trafficking has been 
the involvement of organised criminal groups, beginning with the mafia in the 1950s 
in the United States. Since drugs are an illegal activity, vast profits can be made from 
their distribution, as has been stated. Some large multi-national, illicit drug distribution 
organizations ex isted as early as the 1930s. The" French Connection" between refiners, 
traffickers and producers in Marseille and Turkey supplied heroin to the United States 
from the 1930s until 1973. lOS Today the main competitors are the Japanese 
YakuzalO6 , the Chinese Triads 107, the Colombian cartels lO8 , the Mexican 
mafialo9 and the Sicilian mafiallO. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
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of communism, the former Eastern Bloc has become accessible to Italian and 
Colombian mafia groups. Mafia groups have also been reported to have been working 
together in unprecedented co-operation in order to expand their businesses. There have 
been reports of the Italian mafia signing deals with underworld gangs in the former 
Soviet Union to set up a global ring in narcotics and nuclear-weapon materials. III 
South American and western European organisations have used each-other's routes in 
a joint venture to smuggle cocaine to Europe and heroin to North America. Seizure 
data also shows linkages being established between South East-Asian traffickers and 
criminal organisations elsewhere. 1I2 The increase in the use of the western and 
northern sub-regions of Africa as transit countries for cocaine from South America has 
seen a corresponding increase in the activities of European and South American 
criminal organisations in the region. 113 
The present international economic order, debt, falling commodity-prices and 
poverty have helped pave the way for increased drug production in the traditional 
producer countries of the Third World. According to United Nations analysts: 
"The decline of prices for commodities like sugar (by 64 per cent). 
coffee (30 per cent), cotton (32 per cent) and wheat (17 per cent) 
between 1980 and 1988 motivated farmers to turn to cash crops like the 
coca bush and the opium poppy to avoid economic ruin. At the national 
level the export of illicit drugs often took up the slack of foreign 
exchange depleted by falling prices for agricultural goods as well as for 
minerals. including tin (down by 57 per cent in 1980-1988 period). lead 
(28 per cent), crude oil (53 per cent) and iron ore (17 per cent). "114 
In July 1989, the 74-nation International Coffee Organisation's price maintenance 
system collapsed and coffee prices halved. Coffee is Colombia's'largest legal export, 
and accounted for about one third of Colombia's total exports. Before the collapse of 
the coffee agreement, Colombia had been producing 1O-12m, 6O-kilogramme sacks per 
annum. Until the price collapsed, a Colombian farmer could earn almost as much from 
growing coffee as from the coca bushes, from which cocaine is manufactured ,115 
although coca growing is considerably less work (see later). A 1990 United Nations 
Drug Programme study quotes potential incomes per hectare per year in Peru from 
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possible coca substitutes such as cocoa ($1,615), coffee ($1,114), palm oil (S833), and 
rice ($885), using the best available technologies, compared to $4,500 per hectare (in 
1985) for cultivating coca. 116 A similar discrepancy between prices for legal produce 
and for illegal coca exists all over the Andean region of Latin America. 
Throughout the eighties, the economy in Peru was in a serious state of decline 
with an external debt of approximately $18 billion by the end of 1988.117 President, 
Alan Garcia, angered international bankers by limiting debt repayments to 10 per cent 
of export earnings (no exports, no payments). The country rapidly became capital 
starved and, since relations with international creditors were poor, money from cocaine 
production or "narcodollars", provided some relief. 118 Garcia stated that those 
demanding drug control should be aware that "the only raw material that has increased 
in value is cocaine" and that "the most successful effort to achieve Andean integration 
has been made by the drug traffickers. "119 He challenged the current economic order, 
and the emphasis of the international community on controlling drug production, by 
stating "it is an equally grave crime against humanity to raise interest rates, lower the 
prices of raw materials and squander economic resources on technologies of death 
while hundreds of millions of human beings live in misery or are driven to 
violence" .110 
The collapse of cotton prices In 1975 and 1976 had already forced many 
wealthy farmers in Bolivia to reconsider their options. From 1981 to 1982, the GDP 
contracted by more than 9 per cent; inflation soared from 123.5 percent in 1982 to 
11,750 per cent in 1985; and unemployment tripled to 20% by 1985. 111 Tin, natural 
gas and to a lesser extent oil, were Bolivia's natural exports. The collapse of the 
buffer-stock operations of the International Tin Council in October 1985 and the 1986 
downturn in oil prices had a dramatic effect on the economy of the country, which was 
already struggling. By the mid-eighties, a complex matrix of drugs, economic 
development problems, external debt, and political instability had brought Bolivia to 
a crisis in its history. m As Flavio Machicado, Bolivia's former finance minister 
explains, "Bolivia has gone from the economy of tin to the economy of coca. If 
narcotics were to disappear overnight, we would have rampant unemployment. There 
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would be open protest and violence." 113 
Similarly, the expansion of the coca trade into Venezuela, Ecuador and Chile 
in the late 1980's can be seen to be due to declining economic conditions. The price 
of oil started to fall in 1982 and by 1983 the GD P growth rate in Venezuela was 
5.6%.124 It had to re-schedule its external debt and accept austerity measures which 
led to an increase in unemployment. Venezuela became a transit route for Colombians 
into North America and Europe. In Ecuador, the economy entered difficulties in 1982. 
Growth slowed to 1.2 %, and in 1983 GNP contracted by approximately 3 %. The 
economy remained erratic throughout the early eighties until 1987, when a combination 
of natural disasters led to the re-schedul ing of its external debt (at $10.7 bn in 1987) 
and the introduction of austerity measures. A fall in prices, especially for oil and 
bananas (the main products), meant a decline in living standards and an increase in 
unemployment. These economic conditions combined with the crackdown on the drug 
trade in Colombia and Peru, opened up Ecuador to the drug traffickers. The growing 
role of Chile as a transit point for cocaine in the eighties and early nineties can also be 
seen to be due to the prevailing economic conditions.125 
The relationship between decreasing economic conditions and the increase in 
drug production is not only illustrated by Latin American countries. The cuts in the 
United States sugar quota system in the 1980s for example, have been advanced as a 
key force in pushing farmers in Belize and Jamaica out of sugar and into marijuana 
cultivation. 126 There has been also been an increase in drug trafficking in many parts 
of Africa in recent years with the global economic recession combined with severe 
drought, famine and civil war as major contributing factors according to an 
International Narcotics Control Board report. 127 Large quantities of heroin from 
South-East and South-West Asia are being routed through African cities for distribution 
on illicit markets in other parts of the world. Countries in the western and northern 
sub-regions are increasingly being used as transit countries for cocaine from South 
America. 128 
For many producer countries in the developing world, the problems associated 
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with attempts to control drug production are inextricably linked to the problem of 
economic development and to the question of trade rights. A recent report by the 
I nternational Narcotic Control Board (1991) stated that "I t is ax iomatic that if 
programmes designed to provide alternative income possibilities for growers of narcotic 
crops are to succeed, marketing opportunities and fair export prices for such 
alternatives must be established. "129 The report suggests that other Governments 
should take note of the actions by the European Economic Community to include 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru into its preferential customs system for a number 
of agricultural and industrial products. 130 
In Bolivia, attempts to promote legal alternatives to coca production by the US 
Agency for International Development were prevented by United States' farmers 
agricultural interests. In the late eighties. lobbyists working through the Departmeot of 
Agriculture succeeded in blocking any aid for the development of citrus and soy crops 
in the Andes on the grounds that they would compete with US productS. 131 The 
importance of economic interests is also illustrated by what Macdonald refers to as the 
over-concentration by the United States administration on drug control in Central 
America during the mid-eighties. The reason for this policy. according to Macdonald. 
was that the Andean countries had significant trade with the United States and 
therefore, were not to be disrupted. The United States trade with Costa Rica. Panama. 
Guatemala and EI Salvador equalled a little over $4 billion in the years 1986 and 1987. 
In comparison. US trade with Colombia alone in the same period accounted for $3.3 
billion. with US exports accounting for $1.45 billion. with similar patterns in other 
Andean countries. 132 Furthermore, debt repayments for Andean countries were huge 
(Colombia at $18 billion - projected year-end 1988) compared to many Central 
American countries (EI Salvador at $1.6 billion, Nicaragua at $5 billion) and were they 
to default it would be of great concern for western financial institutions. \33 
The increase in illicit drug trafficking since the fifties has come about due to 
the increasing interdependence of peoples and economies and an increase in economic 
growth and markets. The development of the current economic order and the 
involvement of national and international criminal organisations has led to the fact that 
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trafficking groups have succeeded in making available increasing amounts of illicit 
drugs, in particular cannabis, cocaine, and heroin, virtually anywhere in the world. 
Problems to control 
Throughout the latter half of this century drug trafficking has increased, despite 
increasing international action through the main international control body, the United 
Nations, and other international institutions to prevent it. The success of United 
Nations efforts since the 1940s, (12 multi-lateral treaties in all) have been limited in 
controlling the problem. There are many difficulties involved in attempts by a legal 
structure to control an illegal activity. 
Initial United Nations attempts focused on supply reduction, as emphasised by 
the keystones in United Nations drug control, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances. 134 The combination of crop eradication and crop substitution 
programmes, financial inducements and punitive measure against growers have met 
with mixed success. There are many obstacles in attempting to control supply. 
Coca leaves, which provide the alkaloids from which cocaine is derived, grow 
on bushes on a wide range of soils. The coca plant can be grown in virtually any sub-
tropical region of the world that receives between 40 and 240 inches of rain per year, 
where it never freezes and where land is not swampy or waterlogged. In South 
America, this comes to approximately 2,500,000 square miles, of which less than 700 
square miles are currently estimated as being used to grow coca. \35 In the proper 
climate therefore, coca bushes will grow on soils so infertile as to be unsuitable for any 
other cash crop. Coca bushes also mature sufficiently in three years for the leaves to 
be picked from 3 to 6 times annually, which is an excellent cash cropping pattern. 
Also, after the bushes have matured, little cultivation is required. 136 Cannabis can be 
grown year-round if water resources are sufficient, and hydroponic equipment also 
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facilitates year-round cultivation and increased potency. Opium can be grown in a wide 
variety of locations. The opium poppy stores well, does not spoil. can be grown in 
high terrain, can be grown without fertilizer or much irrigation, and can be harvested 
without machinery. Now some developing countries also have the technology to do 
their own refining. 137 
Problems of trying to control supply also involve problems with the 
identification of illicit cultivation. It is often diffict.;lt to locate illicit drugs, especially 
\I,'ith regard to coca production in and near the Andean region, in the remote areas and 
in mountainous terrain. In places the drugs are also grown interspersed with other 
plants which makes locating and eradicating them more difficult. In 1989 for example. 
less than 1 per cent of Peruvian and Bolivian coca products were interdicted. 13•s The 
areas are also difficult to control for law-enforcement agencies. The eradication of 
illicit drugs, in a small number of cases, poses problems that are not only practical in 
nature. In some areas, eradicating production would be environmentally damaging. In 
the Chu valley in Kazakhstan, cannabis is the only plant which grows in the sand. Its 
immediate eradication would result in an ecological disaster. transforming the valley 
into a desert. 139 
The drugs phenomenon is protean in form, changing over time. Suppression of 
one form of production, one form of traffic and one pattern of drug abuse leads to the 
emergence of others. In the late 1970's, under pressure from the United States 
government, the relatively successful attempts by the government of Colombia to 
eradicate marijuana production, led to the expansion of the production in Mexico. 
When the United States put pressure on Mexico to eradicate production, crop 
cultivation rapidly increased in the United States, where domestic production now 
fulfils over one third of demand. 140 When the Turkish authorities clamped down on 
the ill icit cultivation of opium poppies in the 1960s, drug producing organizations 
shifted production to the Golden Triangle region of South East Asia and to the 
mountainous regions on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. More recently, 
new growing areas of Ecuador and Brazil, have seen a shift from cocaine to opium and 
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marijuana production due to successful government programmes aimed at the 
eradication of cocaine. Illicit opium poppy cultivation is also increasing in 
Guatemala. 141 It has been recently reported that the area under illicit poppy 
cultivation in Colombia has expanded to an estimated 18,000 hectares, thereby 
equalling the size of the area under illicit coca bush cultivation. 142 Ironically, the 
dismantling of the Medellin cartel and the imprisonment of its leaders including Pablo 
Escobar, handed much of the business over to the competitive Cali cartel, described 
as "the most powerful criminal organisation in the world", and seen as a greater threat 
to security by law-enforcement authorities. 143 Furthermore, drug trafficking activities 
have dispersed to neighbouring countries, such as Bolivia, and throughout the 
continent, thereby exacerbating drug control efforts. The flexibility of the drug trade 
is also highlighted by the example of Panama. Emerging problems in the late eighties 
in Panama, led to a shift in the money-laundering business f~om ~an~ma to Paraguay, 
Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados and Luxembourg. 
Suppression of one pattern of drug abuse and one method of transportation has 
often simply led to the emergence of other forms. During the eighties, the Colombian 
government, in an attempt to reduce the amount of illicit cocaine production within its 
borders, restricted the amount of ether available, which was used by the drug producers 
for transforming coca paste into cocaine hydrochloride. The result was the diversion 
of coca paste through Central America and the Caribbean into Southern Florida for 
conversion. Methods of transporting the drugs from producer to consumer countries 
are also flexible and difficult for law enforcement agencies to control. The effective 
implementation of the United States National Air Interdiction Strategy, forced drug 
traffickers to abandon private aircraft as the favoured mode of transporting cocaine into 
the United States, and to resort to other, more complex modes of smuggling, such as 
commercial maritime cargo concealment. l44 Many recent cases of drug smuggling 
have involved individual "swallowers" who carry the drugs inside their bodies, often 
in condoms, while travelling on commercial airlines. In this form a "Nigerian 
Connection" for heroin traffic appeared in the early 1990s and has reportedly taken 
control of as much as 40 per cent of the heroin market in the United States.14' 
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Most drug enforcement authorities have focused their efforts on combatting 
trafficking in heroin and cocaine. Less attention has been given to the worldwide 
trafficking in psychotropic substances that have similar abuse potential. Increased action 
is required in this area in the light of evolving seizure data regarding amphetamines, 
MDMA, and LSD. Trafficking in, and abuse of, stimulants and sedative hypnotics are 
widely occurring in Africa, Asia, Latin America and also Europe and North America. 
The diversion of precursor chemicals for illicit drug production, is also increasing. In 
one recent case, large quantities of a precursor were exported from a European country 
to a Latin American country where it was used to manufacture MDMA, a Schedule 1 
psychotropic substance. The product, in tablet form, was registered in the Ministry of 
Health as a slimming pill and exported to North America, where it appeared on the 
illicit market as "Ecstasy". Effective implementation of the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention to prevent diversion of precursors requires adoption by governments of 
practical control methods. The establishment of the Chemical Action Task Force 
(CATF) by the Group of Seven major industrialised countries went some way towards 
trying to combat the situation. 146 
The ever increasing new "designer drugs", referred to at the start of this 
chapter, such as Ecstasy, are a growing problem for drug control agencies to regulate. 
Designer drugs are substances intended for recreational use, and have been modified 
from legitimate pharmaceutical agents in order to circumvent legal restrictions. The 
legal definitions of drugs on the controlled substances I ist are often very narrow, both 
in order to enhance the strength of cases brought in the legal system, and in order not 
to unduly inhibit or discourage legitimate chemical and pharmacological research. The 
challenge for regulatory and law enforcement authorities is to keep pace technologically 
with new screening techniques capable of detecting a wider variety of chemical 
substances, as well as more sensitive methods that can detect these drugs and their 
metabolites at the nanogram and picogram level. 147 The production and sale of 
designer drugs has been estimated to be a million-dollar industry.148 
. These new developments emphasise how illicit drug production and consumption 
patterns cannot be separated. The traditional divide between producer and consumer 
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countries is no longer valid. Consumer countries now produce illicit substances such 
as designer drugs, and there has been a steady increase in consumption patterns among 
the traditional producer countries. The availability and abuse of cocaine is expanding 
in many traditional producer countries such as in South and Central America. The 
smoking of coca paste mixed with tobacco or cannabis (basuco and pitillo) is the most 
frequent form of drug use in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Drug use 
amongst children has reached alarming proportions in many urban areas, particularly 
in Brazil. 149 This again emphasises that different countries face different and often 
changing problems with regard to controlling drug supply. Despite this, the United 
States administration has continued to emphasise supply reduction poliCies. Seventy per 
cent of the 1991 anti-narcotic budgets went on supply-reduction programmes. 150 
During the eighties however a new focus emerged, emphasising control of the 
demand for illicit drugs and a high level of international consensus against drug 
trafficking. The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the 
Demand for Illicit Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, both emphasised the 
necessity of the need to attack drug trafficking and the vast profits to be made. As has 
been previously stated, estimates of the annual turnover from the illicit drug trade 
surpass oil revenues by some estimates and are second only to the annual takings of the 
arms trade. The United Nations, which has been through the decades at the forefront 
of drug control, has not the necessary authority to deal with this emphasis on drug 
trafficking control and the focus on traffickers profits. In its present form it has no 
authority to implement global enforcement and policing powers, nor has it the authority 
to deal with banking regulation and traffickers assets. The United Nations drug control 
bodies are also under-staffed and under-funded to deal with the situation, as we will 
see in Chapter Four. Drug control in a state setting implies the participation of many 
branches of governmental machinery; those organs concerned with public health, 
education and social welfare, the judiciary, law enforcement, economic affairs, and 
also research and academic bodies and non-governmental organisations. In the United 
States, only two of the twelve federal government departments do not have a role in 
the drug war, with at least twenty-five agencies having a mandate and committing 
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resources. Co-ordinating the activities of these agencies is therefore a difficult task. lSI 
At the international level, similar complexities are faced in efforts at international co-
operation, particularly within the United Nations system. International co-operation is 
dispersed, which creates difficulties for policy co-ordination. 
The total annual expenditure of the United Nations, in the drug-control area, 
was approximately $37m in 1988-1989 (0.5 per cent of the regular budget) which 
equals just over 0.007 per cent of the estimated level of the world's illicit trade in 1989 
($500bn) which is only thirty-nine minutes turnover in the trade. ls2 The traffickers 
are well-financed and are well-resourced. Trafficking syndicates such as the Cali 
syndicate are thought to possess a large arsenal of automatic weapons (such as AK 47s 
and Uzis), trained contract assassins, the most modern forms of air transportation and 
the best of the state-of-the-art communication networks that money can buy~ 
Lack of success by the United Nations. in combatting the spread of illicit drugs, 
can be seen to be due to a number of factors. Drugs are the archetypal free-market 
commodity: as has been discussed, they are easy to produce, easy to transport, easy 
to conceal and, due to their illegality, have a high added-value at each stage of the 
trading chain. The Economist notes, "The drugs trade is a fine specimen of un-
restricted competition, which efficiently brings down prices and pushes up 
consumption. "153 In 1987, for instance, the price of coca leaves sufficient to produce 
one kilogram of cocaine was between $500-750. As coca paste, it was worth $500-
1000; as cocaine base $1000-2000. After processing in laboratories. the kilo of cocaine 
would be worth between $3000-6000. Once exported to the United States, it would be 
worth $14000-21000 at the wholesale level, and more than ten times that price. 
between $160,000 and $240,000, at the retail level (where it would be diluted with 
other substances).IS4 The focus on supply reduction has yielded unimpressive results. 
In some cases, such as in Latin American countries, efforts have had far-reaching 
consequences in terms of threatening social order and stability. Efforts to control 
trafficking routes have led simply to diversification by traffickers, from one method of 
transportation to another, and from one region to another. Attempts to eliminate 
patterns of drug use have led to the emergence of new, often more potent and more 
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dangerous varieties of drugs. The international community has been slow to respond 
to the advent of these new designer drugs, which help to illustrate how complex 
differing interests and perspectives are on the phenomenon of drug control. In the past, 
three clearly identifiable groups have emerged with regard to international co-operation 
on drug control; consumer countries, producer countries, and transit countries. Today, 
countries do not fit neatly into any of these categories. Most producer countries are 
also consumer countries, most consumer countries are also transit countries and most 
transit countries are also consumer countries. Also, traditional producer countries relate 
the drug problem to the wider problem of economic development (especially in Latin 
America), whereas traditional consumer countries are more concerned with the role that 
illicit drugs play in the increase in domestic crime and international crime, and the 
increase in money-laundering. Lack of success in combatting the spread of illicit drugs 
can be seen in part to be due to the conceptualisation of the drug problem as a single 
issue, as the problem is too disparate to be viewed in this way. 
Drug control and issue politics 155 
Attempts to control illicit drugs by the international community date back to 1909,156 
but as has been demonstrated, the drug phenomenon has recently acquired new 
characteristics. The increase in trafficking and the associated large amounts of money 
to be made from the activity, have become a threat to the political and economic 
dimensions of domestic and international security of nearly all the countries of the 
world. The size and comp.1exity of the international drug phenomenon, involving 
environmental, health, education, crime and development concerns, as discussed in the 
introductory chapter to this thesis, means that it must be viewed not as a single issue. 
Rather, it is an amalgamation of a variety of interconnected, but separate issues. For 
the purpose of this research, a disaggregation of what is often conceptualised as an 
"issue" is needed. The current "drugs problem" can be seen not as a single issue at all, 
but as an amalgamation of variety of a separate issues, involving various actors and 
various stakes, in distinct issue-systems, within a similar context of what can be 
described as drug-related activity. 
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The undeniable growth in transaction flows, the recognition of international 
actors other than states, the disaggregation of the state, the blurring of borderlines 
between national and international politics, and the increasingly minor role of military 
force in the international system since the 1970s, have all been subsumed under the 
Keohane and Nye concept of interdependence. 157 Two key concepts have emerged 
from this literature: 
1. The concept of international regimes predominantly explored by Realist writers in 
the face of the challenge from interdependence. 
2. The concept of issues forming distinct issue-systems governing behaviour within a 
state of interdependence. 
Previously the two concepts have been developed principally in isolation; and have both 
suffered from lack of clarification. In order to develop a theoretical framework for an 
analysis of drug-related activity this section will attempt to clarify and develop the 
concept of an "issue", in order to prepare the way for a more thorough understand ing 
of the emergence of international regimes. 
The International Relations literature on issues 
For Realists, all issues in international politics are dominated by the struggle for 
security, which is optimised by the pursuit of power. For Realists, an issue reaches the 
international agenda through the power of a state putting the issue on the agenda, or 
through changes in the balance of power transforming the agenda. Despite this 
emphasis on states and power, Realists have acknowledged the existence of 
transnational relations in an ever increasing interdependent world and accommodate it 
within their theory of international relations. Issues are classified into either "high 
politics" issues or "low politics" issues. Issues of high politics affect security and 
diplomatic prestige, involve the highest decision-makers in government, may lead to 
crisis, and are dominated by states. Low politics consists of economic, social, technical 
or environmental issues, involve government bureaucrats (if they involve governments 
at all), are handled routinely, and may be dominated by transnational actors. 
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An alternative view, advocated by the Globalists, is that all issues may affect 
security, involve the highest decision-makers, produce crises' and be dominated by 
governments. ISS As we have seen, the drugs phenomenon does effect the security, or 
perceived security, of several countries, involves the highest decision-makers in 
government and has led to crisis, particularly in the case of several Latin American 
countries. On the 15th February 1990, the Presidents of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru 
met with the President of the United States in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, to 
review co-operation with respect to drug control. The issue for the United States 
administration was viewed as important enough for the President himself to attend the 
meeting. 159 In order to understand the nature of issues and their emergence onto the 
international agenda without the Realist high/low power politics structure, the concept 
of issue salience, developed by the Global Politics paradigm, will be used. 
For the Globalists, debate on interdependence has led to the acceptance that 
there is not a single international system, as understood by the Realists, but rather, 
multiple issue-based systems, with each system featuring a unique cast of 
governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors. The actors in a 
Globalist system are those for whom the issue is relevant and importance. Stated more 
formally, "One issue is more salient than another issue, for a specific political actor, 
if it is perceived by that actor to be of greater priority for the optimisation of the 
actor's own set of value preferences". 160 Therefore, the salience of an issue will vary 
from one actor to another and may vary over time. The advantage of the concept is that 
it does allow for actors other than governments, to be included in an analysis of change 
in the global system. However, the concept of issues and their formation into issue-
systems first needs to be clarified. This involves a clearer understanding of the concept 
of an issue than is currently the case. 
Terminological confusion 
The concept of an "issue" is central to the paradigm approach variously known as 
pluralism, interdependence and trans nationalism , the multi-centric approach or, the 
term favoured here, globalism. Writers such as Rosenau, Mansbach and Vasquez, 
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Willetts, Keohane and Nye, have all written with the implicit theoretical assumption 
that we can recognize distinct "issues" on the global agenda. Despite this, an 
authoritative theoretical literature defining the concept of an issue remains elusive. 
Indeed, Rosenau's initial work in the area, his article on "pre-theories" (1964) and 
later, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (1971) do not even include a definition of 
what is understood by an "issue".161 Rosenau's work sought to bridge the artificial 
divide between domestic and international politics, seeing different levels of analysis, 
(local, national and international politics) as forming horizontal systems, cross-cut 
vertically by what he termed "issue-areas". 
Rosenau, in his work, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy defines an issue-
area as consisting of: 
"( 1) a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which 
(2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly 
over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the 
horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) 
they engage in distinctive behaviour designed to mobilise support for the 
attainment of their particular values". 162 
Rosenau stated that there were only four types of issue-area to be considered: "status 
area", "human resources area", "territorial area" and "non-human resources area". 
From this typology, Rosenau hypothesises that conflict over Berlin and conflict in 
Princeton, New Jersey, since they were both located in the territorial area of his 
typology, would generate different types of behaviour from the three other types!63 
The later work on issues by Mansbach and Vasquez, In Search of Theory, at 
first seems entirely compatible with the Rosenau work. Mansbach and Vasquez 
• 
describe an issue as follows: 
"It is the perceptions of contenders concerning the way in which these 
various proposals about stakes are related that shape issues. Proposals 
that are seen as related (either because actors consciously claim they are 
or behave as though they were) are perceived to constitute an 
issue ... stated more formally: An issue consists of contention among 
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actors over proposals for the disposition of stakes among them". 1M 
(Italics in the original) 
However, the two definitions are not compatible. Rosenau clearly states that an issue-
area consists of many issues. Issue-areas are described as persistent and general, 
whereas issues may be temporary and situational. 165 Mansbach and Vasquez however, 
take Rosenau's definition of an issue-area to be a definition of an issue. In fact, 
Rosenau's description of the differences between actors over the allocation of values 
leading to mobilisation of support refers to the concept of an issue, and the cluster of 
values generating distinctive behaviour was the basis for defining how different issues 
may be categorised into a common issue-area. The concept of an issue-area, as used 
by Rosenau, is not useful because it encompasses two concepts, the idea of concrete 
political processes that produce the relationships, as well as the idea of abstract values. 
However, for a clarification of the term "issue", the idea diat fhere is both an 
ideological (perception) and behavioral aspect to the term needs to be clarified. 
The work of Keohane and Nye writing a decade later, shows how much 
confusion was generated from the above work. Whereas Rosenau talked about issue-
areas as an area to be conceptualised at a high enough level of abstraction to encompass 
a variety of vertical systems, Keohane and Nye equate issue-areas, from this 
description, as consisting of aggregations of Rosenau's vertical systems, or the term 
favoured by this writer - issue-systems. As Keohane and Nye explain in their work, 
Power and Interdependence, "When the governments active on a set of issues see them 
as closely interdependent and deal with them collectively, we call that set of issues an 
issue-area. "166 
The use of systems analysis in political science was pioneered by David Easton. 
For Easton a political system is "any set of variables selected for description and 
explanation" . 167 Furthermore, if a system can be conceptualised wherever one can 
identify interdependence or behaviour modification in a given area of consideration, 
then this is in line with the Mansbach and Vasquez concept of an issue as "contention 
among actors over proposals for the disposition of stakes among them". The concept 
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of issue-systems is more analytically useful than the term, issue-area, because it need 
not evoke the behavioral processes that Rosenau associated with the term, issue-area. 
We can instead concentrate attention on the contention over values of the actors 
concerned. The Keohane and Nye definition of the term issue-area represents common 
academic usage of the term, issue, in International Relations theory, but it takes little 
theoretical footing from the original Rosenau work. 168 
The much overlooked work of Mansbach and Vasquez, in concluding that 
Rosenau's typology of issue-areas was not useful, but agreeing with Rosenau's 
emphasis on the tangibility of issues, can help explain the nature of issues and the 
formation of issue-systems. In concentrating on the means available for winning 
support, rather than the tangibility of the ends, Mansbach and Vasquez posed that a 
substantive typology could be arrived at deductively from the values that are invoked 
by an issue. This is possible they say, because there are a limited number of values that 
people pursue, such as physical security, order, freedom/autonomy. peace. status. 
health, equality. justice, knowledge, beauty, honesty and love. 169 Mansbach and 
Vasquez return to what they see as the original definition of an issue, offered by 
Rosenau. Namely, that "an issue consists of a cluster of values that are to be allocated" 
with an issue consisting of "contention among actors over proposals for the disposition 
of stakes among them". Mansbach and Vasquez state that since values are abstract and 
intangible they cannot be obtained directly, therefore they are represented by objects 
or stakes for which actors contend. 170 
What needs to be explored, therefore, is how an issue becomes a matter of 
contention. As Mansbach and Vasquez state, issues come on to the agenda when an 
actor wishes to bring about some change in the current authoritative allocation of 
values, by creating new stakes, reviving old ones, or altering the values ascribed to an 
existing stake. 171 The next chapter will explore further the relationship between 
values and stakes. Furthermore, since values are not stakes, but the criteria by which 
we choose stakes, the evolution of conceptions of what is to be preferred needs to be 
explored', with reference to the work on epistemic communities, discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Issues and agenda formation 
For the Realist, issues come on to the international agenda through changes in global 
power. As Kindleberger states, 
"Power politics constitutes the principle determinant of collective 
outcomes in international society in that outcomes flow directly from 
interactions among autonomous states, each of which is attempting to 
maximise its own power" . J72 
For Kindleberger (1973), as for Keohane (1984) and Krasner (1976, 1983) agenda-
building in international politics is dominated by the theory of hegemonic stability. 
Hegemonic-stability theory was originally presented as an explanation of patterns of 
international economic co-operation. 173 A state, acting as a rational actor, possessing 
, - . 
sufficient power in terms of capabilities to become the leader on an issue, would 
control its movement on the international agenda on the basis of a cost and benefit 
judgment. According to this perspective, state power and "state interests" explain 
which issues come on to the international agenda and which issues remain on the 
periphery. However, as we will see in the next chapter, the inclusion of opium 
regulation on the international agenda in the early part of this century was not through 
the power of a single dominant power, or hegemon, controlling the issue. The concept 
of hegemony has been used to explain the evolution of international regimes and will 
be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
An alternative approach to agenda-building is proposed by the work of 
Mansbach and Vasquez, but is not fully developed. As they state, work on agenda 
formation is practically non-existent in International Relations literature. 174 This is 
partly as a result of the Realist emphasis on the anarchy of the global system, rather 
than viewing world politics as the co-operation and conflict of actors over efforts to 
allocate values authoritatively in multiple systems. Mansbach and Vasquez suggest that 
issues influence actors to differing extents at different times, and have different impacts 
on agenda formation, by using the idea of an issue cycle: "During its life, an issue may 
be characterised by changes in stakes and variation in the cast of actors that are 
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contending for them" .175 The key stages they identify through which an issue passes 
before it may be resolved are crisis, ritualization, dormancy, decision-making and 
administration. An issue is described as in the "crisis stage" when it creates a sufficient 
sense of urgency for action, or creates shifts in pol itical order, or threatens accepted 
norms of behaviour. The next stage of ritual ization evolves when the actors affected 
by this crisis develop "patterned sets of expectations", with tacit sets of rules and 
procedures between actors as to how to deal with this crisis. Once this has occurred, 
according to Mansbach and Vasquez, the next stage is for the issue to be removed from 
the agenda through either direct resolution where a decision will be made, or 
dormancy. During the dormancy stage, the issue may for a time be relegated to the 
periphery of public attention, which then may lead directly to the decision-making 
stage, or the issue may remain unresolved in a state of atrophy. But their analysis is 
applied only to "issues that dominate the attention and energy of the major_actors -
critical issues",m and therefore does not claim to have general application. There is 
no accounting for "non-critical" issues in this evolutionary cycle. The analytical use of 
the concept of salience, as previously described, is a more fundamentally useful 
theoretical concept for understanding issue formation and evolution, because it shifts 
the "critical" property from the issue to the actor. Applying this concept allows us to 
challenge the Realist highllow politics distinction that Mansbach and Vasquez are in 
effect falling into with their explanation of "critical and non-critical" issues. The threat 
of an invasion of a country by a foreign army is a threat to the security of a country. 
However, applying the concept of sal ience also allows us to consider that the greatest 
probable security threat to the government of Bangladesh is a major monsoon; in Niger 
it is drought; for small island states it is the threat caused by global warming; and in 
Colombia, as has been demonstrated, it is conflict with the drug barons.177 
As we have stated, issue-systems arise because actors seek to generate support 
for a particular value. Since values are abstract and intangible, actors are in contention 
over proposals for the disposition of stakes that each actor perceives as being salient 
to the value under contention. An issue therefore can be seen as contention by a group 
of actors over a set of related stakes. Therefore we can define an issue-system as a 
point of contention about concrete stakes involving abstract values. The values evoked 
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explain the behaviour of the actors and the formation of an issue-system. This 
alternative view of agenda formation through the salience of values and the attempts 
to authoritatively allocate them, poses a direct challenge to the heart of the Realist 
paradigm. The Realist's assertion that values are authoritatively allocated only when 
it is in the interest of states that they do so, seems to imply that values are somehow 
unrelated to interest in the Realist approach to international politics. Interests cannot 
be separated from values as the Realist theory seems to imply, as will be shown in the 
next chapter. 
Regime analysis can help clarify the context under which an issue is regulated. 
It is possible to conceptualise a link between issues and regimes, since a regime must 
have an issue that it seeks to regulate. The concept of an issue-area has been widely 
and broadly used in International Relations literature and the literature on international 
regimes, to refer to the vertical boundary which encompasses the link of actors, 
processes and outcomes into one functionally significant whole (Rosenau) or the 
description of a set of issues that governments see as closely related and deal with 
collectively (Keohane). However, as has been stated, the term issue-area is not 
analytically useful because of this confusion. By using the term issue-system we can 
separate the actors beliefs and values from their behaviour. The actors in each issue-
system are in contention over proposals for the disposition of stakes that each actor 
perceives as being salient for the same value. The extent to which the actors in the 
issue-system regulate the issue (by authoritatively allocating the values at stake) is 
variable. An issue-system mayor may not form a regime, depending on the success 
of translating values into the form of an agreed norm, as will be discussed later in this 
work. Where regulation occurs, based on an agreed norm, the phenomenon of an 
international regime emerges. Therefore agenda setting, formation of issue-systems, 
agreement on norms and the creation of international regimes can be seen as different 
stages in the same process of global change. 
Conclusion 
The increase in drug trafficking, the threat to the political and economic stability in an 
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increasing number of countries, and the corruption of the international banking and 
financial networks as demonstrated by the BCCI scandal, has led to the problem of 
drug-related activity being placed higher up the international political agenda during the 
last decade. The size and complexity of the phenomenon means that North and South, 
East and West are all affected by it. International initiatives throughout the century 
have proved ineffective, and have in some instances aggravated this multi-faceted and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. Efforts to combat drug-related activity clearly 
demonstrate the increasingly fragmented issue-specific character of contemporary 
international relations with different actors facing different problems related to drug 
activity. Governments are faced with a phenomenon that requires more and more 
international co-operation, which is taking on a greater variety of forms, as traditional 
bi-lateral diplomacy proves unable to address the concern. This fragmentation requires 
precisely the issue-specific approach of regime analysis as understood by. this_res~arch. 
The concept of issue-areas has been widely used in International Relations 
literature. From the literature on issue-areas our understanding of the concept of an 
issue has evolved, yet an authoritative theoretical literature defining the concept of an 
issue remains elusive. Rosenau's initial work in the area subsumes both decisions that 
initiate behaviour and those decisions that implement it. There would however seem 
to be a very real distinction between issues as understood as the perceptions of actors 
that certain stakes are related and the concrete political behaviour involved in an issue 
entering the policy process. The concept of an issue-system avoids this confusion, by 
concentrating attention on the contention over values of the actors concerned. 
The drugs phenomenon must be viewed as not a single issue, but rather an 
amalgamation of many issues, such as the corruption of governments, the influence of 
cocaine barons in Colombia, the link of drugs to international crime and terrorism, the 
increasing use of drugs among minors, the increase in money laundering and efforts 
to combat it, the spread of AIDS and measures to combat it, and so forth. Each issue 
forms a distinct issue-system, with actors participating in the system, if the issue is 
sufficiently salient for them. The concept of salience has been utilized in contrast to the 
Realist hegemonic power-theory of agenda-building. The nature of values, and the 
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stakes that represent them, will be explored in the next chapter, which will attempt to 
explain the process through which drug use, a legitimate practice in the nineteenth 
century, was brought onto the international political agenda and delegitimised. 
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A History of Drug Use: The Dynamics of Change 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the changing attitudes towards drug use in the 
nineteenth century. Prior to the twentieth century opium, and to a lesser extent cocaine 
and cannabis, was widely available and on open sale in Britain and the United States 
for non-medical as well as medical use and no global patterns were discernible in the 
values and legal sanctions governing their use. Yet the latter half of the nineteenth 
century saw the establishment of changing values concerning drug use, with the 
subsequent definition of drug taking as a "problem" requiring international legislation. 
The 1909 Shanghai Conference and the Opium Convention of 1912 launched an anti-
drugs diplomacy followed by a specific mention in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and eight decades of further restrictive legislation by the international 
community. 1 
Although the drug phenomenon today bears little resemblance in complexity and 
scale to its nineteenth-century predecessor, sociologists, historians and policy-makers 
have frequently drawn parallels. It can be said that the growth of toxicology as a 
science in the nineteenth century, with new drugs creating new problems, parallels 
todays concerns with "designer drugs"; that" infant doping" of the previous century has 
some parallels to the vast prescribing in the United States of drugs to the "overactive 
child"; and that nineteenth-century fears of opium as a "stimulant", with the working 
classes as the focus of society's concerns, parallels twentieth century fear of the 
pleasure-seeking youth culture. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to draw 
historical analogies which can be misleading. An historical perspective instead will 
focus on the factors responsible for the emergence of restrictions on the sale and use 
of opiates and, to a lesser extent of other substances, in order to explain why values 
towards opium use changed; how practices were delegitimized; and also for considering 
why states develop mechanisms for co-ordinating policies on particular activities and 
not on others. 
During the nineteenth century an active temperance movement was gaining 
momentum in both Britain and the United States. 2 As with the anti-opium campaign 
9S 
during the later stages of the century, reform efforts concentrated on the damaging 
effects to the individual and society. Both campaigns began with high expectations and 
both were failures. And in the United States both generated criminally-organized black 
markets. Many of the activists concerned with the problems of alcohol were also 
involved in the anti-opium movement. But the extent to which the two movements 
came together was limited. Alcohol prohibition was abandoned in America (and alcohol 
never reached the position of a prohibited substance in Britain), while the issue barely 
surfaced at the international level during the first decades of the twentieth century, 
when drug restrictions were internationalised. Attempts to introduce a global alcohol 
control programme by the League of Nations in the 1920's were a failure. 3 
It is impossible within the scope of a single chapter to detail the historical 
factors involved in the changing attitudes towards drug use. Furthermore .... it.is also 
beyond the current discipline of International Relations to analyse in depth the social 
dimensions, the predominant concern of sociology. which led to such a fundamental 
change in the attitudes of people towards drug use and more widely to a world-wide 
change in attitudes and international co-operation and control legislation, before 
national legislation in the majority of countries was achieved. Traditionally predominant 
approaches to change in international relations have failed to take into account the 
advances. concepts and methods from alternative discipl ines, such as sociology, 
philosophy or history, to our understanding of change. 4 The connections between the 
various disciplines lack coherence and a coherent theoretical relationship needs to be 
developed. With the example of drug control, these disciplines have obviously a great 
deal to offer. There is a need to move away from an analysis of change. which is 
focused on states and their power capabilities. Likewise we need to avoid the criticism 
by Susan Strange of current regime analysis, as "overemphasizing the static and under-
emphasizing the dynamic element of change in world politics"5, by moving towards 
more of an understanding of social change, making obsolete the traditional approaches, 
which focus on power capabilities and differentiate between national and international 
politics. An emphasis on values as the means for understanding regime creation also 
avoids the criticism of the regime approach, by writers such as Stein that it has nothing 
new to add that current theory cannot deal with, and by Strange, that the concept of 
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regime is actually negative in its influence. 6 For as Krasner states, "It is the infusion 
of behavior with principles and norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in 
the international system from more conventional activity. "7 Th is chapter will present 
an overview of the history of drug use through to the nineteenth century when the 
significant developments led to changing attitudes towards drug use and the theoretical 
implications behind this change. 
The cultural tradition 
The use of drugs for medical and non-medical purposes (with no clear distinction) can 
be traced back to man's early history.8 As Aldous Huxley said, "Pharmacology is 
older than agriculture". 9 Coca is the oldest stimulant known to man and chewing the 
dried leaf to extract the alkaloids it contains has been utilised by the people in the 
. 
Andes since prehistoric times. Coca chewing increased physical endurance against 
tiredness and hunger, but also made breathing easier in the thin oxygen at the extreme 
altitudes where the Indians lived. to A recent discovery of the drug in a mummified 
South American Indian is the earliest scientific confirmation of coca use. ll In Peru, 
gourds containing coca leaves have been unearthed from burial middens dating back 
to 2100 BC. In Colombia, some of the idols standing in San Agustin's mysterious 
Valley of the Statues, dating back to 600 BC display the characteristic distended cheek 
of the coca chewer. The coca shrub, the basis for cocaine, enjoyed a key position in 
the Inca empire: prized far above the riches of silver and gold. Coca consumption was, 
and still is bound up with religious ceremonies and was regarded as the sacred, living 
manifestation of divinity, brought from heaven by the first Inca emperor, Manco 
Capac, and buried with the dead to help them on their journey to another world. Coca 
was at the centre of the Inca religious and social system. It was the gift that Peruvian 
Indians gave to the parents of a prospective bride; it was the talisman put under the 
cornerstone of new houses. The right to chew it was a sovereign gift, bestowed upon 
priests, doctors, young warriors, the relay runners who travelled miles a day to deliver 
messages, and the scholars who kept the emperors accounts. The Spanish conquistadors 
in the sixteenth century noted that priests and supplicants were allowed to approach the 
Altar of the Inca, only if they had coca leaf in their mouths. 12 If coca was the last 
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thing a dying man tasted, he went to heaven. Today the people in the Altiplano region 
still measure time and distance in "cocado": how far a man can travel while chewing 
one wad of coca leaf. \3 Throughout South America, an estimated eight million people 
chew coca leaves, and millions more drink "mate de coca" (coca tea), which is sold 
in almost every supermarket. 14 
Cannabis sativa, known as hemp, maflJuana, hashish, bhang or ganJa was 
brought to Europe with opium by the Moorish invaders of Spain and employed from 
early times as a pain-killer and tranquillizer. Cannabis has many derivatives and 
various names as demonstrated. The variety of alternative terms is testimony to the 
drug's established place in the culture of many Eastern countries. In India, Persia. 
Turkey and Egypt it was in common use for centuries. It had been known to the 
Chinese several thousand years before Christ and the ancient Greeks and ROrnans used 
it for both medical and social purposes. Cannabis was kno'v'm in Europe well before the 
nineteenth century. Its use as an intoxicant, medicine and even its fibre for clothing is 
'~\'idely documented. But it was in 1839 on the publication of a monograph by WB 
O'Shaughnessy "On the Preparation of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah" that hemp was 
introduced into conventional nineteenth century western medicine and described in 1890 
as "one of the most valuable medicines we possess" by the President of the Royal 
College of Physicians. IS 
Greek archaeological discoveries of seeds and capsules found in ancient pots. 
and clay tablets describing the cultivation and preparation of the wh ite poppy, Papaver 
Somniferum, date back to 5000 Be. Classical references dating back to Homer's 
Odyssey describe opium as a drug that will "lull all pain and anger. and bring 
forgetfulness of every sorrow" .16 Its healing properties were first detailed in the work 
of the Greek physician Hippocrates (466-377 Be) and later explored by the Roman 
physician Galen (130-200 AD). Aristotle, Virgil. as well as ancient writings from 
Egypt, India. Persia and China all give opium an honoured place in ancient medicine. 
For many centuries opium use was mainly restricted to the Middle and Far East. It was 
brought to India by Arab merchants and from there to Europe. Ironically. in Europe 
people used opiates because they regarded them as a sedative. whereas in the East they 
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were valued as a stimulant often used by soldiers before battle. 17 This emphasises the 
confusion surrounding the properties of the various drugs described in Chapter One. 
Trading in opium by Europeans began with the Portuguese traders in the 16th 
century but the modern era for the opium trade began in 1773 when the British East 
India Company took control of the export of Indian opium to China. Warren Hastings, 
the new Governor General of Bengal established a colonial monopoly on the production 
and sale of opium. As the company expanded production, opium became India's main 
export through the company's Calcutta offices to China. Exports of Bengal opium to 
China increased dramatically over the next seventy-five years, from 13 tons in 1729, 
to 148 tons in 1789, and 2,558 tons in 1839, with opium becoming "the world's most 
valuable single commodity trade of the nineteenth century" .18 Opium became a major 
global commodity of the same proportions as coffee, tea and cacoa, which 
distinguished it from its earlier forms as a folk pharmacopoeia or luxury item. 
In both Europe and the United States by the first half of the nineteenth century 
opium was distributed in a wide variety of forms; as lozenges, pills, plasters, enemas, 
and in drinks such as beer and tea, for a large and diverse range of medical uses 
ranging from treating masturbation, photophobia, nymphomania and violent hiccoughs, 
to dulling pain, inducing sleep, controlling insanity, alleviating coughs. controlling 
diarrhoea, and for "treating" a wide range of incurable diseases including malaria, 
smallpox, syphilis and tuberculosis. 19 In both Britain and the United States 
consumption of opium, and numerous preparations containing it was for rton-medical 
as well as medical use. Opium, and preparations containing it, were on legal sale 
throughout the century, conveniently and at low prices, with the price of the drug 
comparable to the price of aspirin today.20 Physicians dispensed opiates directly to 
patients, or wrote prescriptions for them. Pharmacists sold opiates over the counter to 
customers without a prescription. Corner shops and general stores stocked and sold 
opiates. Opiates could be ordered by mail from newspaper advertisements and 
catalogue sales and in the United States from the medicine show-wagons as they 
travelled throughout rural and urban America. 
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Opium used in Britain at this time was legally imported as just another 
commodity. There were also small-scale attempts at domestic cultivation of the drug. 
Berridge and Edwards note that opium played a small part in the moves towards the 
agricultural improvements of output and productivity in Britain and the establishment 
of a capitalist agricultural structure paralleling that of industry at the turn of the 
nineteenth century: 
"Opium's inclusion with turnips and rhubarb in the agricultural discussions of 
the period was one sidelight on the content of agricultural innovation. It was an 
indication, too, of the drug's acceptability; the "home-grown" product bore 
witness to the place of opium in society at the time". 21 
Increasing opium cultivation was also seen as a possible means of rejuvenating Irish 
economic life and even providing a solution to "the Irish problem".22 , 
Most of the opium consumed in the United States during the same period was 
also legally imported and opium poppies were also legally grown within the United 
States. In 1871 a Massachusetts official reported: 
"There are so many channels through which the drug may be brought into the 
State, that I suppose it would be almost impossible to determine how much 
foreign opium is used here; but it may easily be shown that the home 
production increases every year. Opium has been recently made from ",,'hite 
poppies, cultivated for the purpose, in Vermont. New Hampshire. and 
Connecticut, the annual production being estimated by hundreds of pounds. and 
this has generally been absorbed in the communities where it is made. It has 
been brought here from Florida and Louisiana, while comparatively large 
quantities are regularly sent east from California and Arizona, where its 
cultivation is becoming an important branch of industry ..... ".23 
Opium use was therefore not regarded as a social menace or problem for a large part 
of the nineteenth century. Among those who are known to have consumed opiates 
including morphine are; Elizabeth Barrett Browning, King George IV, Florence 
Nightingale, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Scott, Darwin. Ruskin, Rossetti. Coleridge, 
Dickens, William Wilberforce. and Disraeli, who made his famous record breaking 
budget speech on a mixture of brandy and opium. Opium consumption was revered for 
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expanding the consciousness and giving access to greater creativity by artists and 
writers of the period particularly. Opium could be legally purchased without a 
prescription and there was little demand for prohibition in the United Kingdom or in 
the United States. Unlike the communal activity of ancient times drug consumption was 
seen as a private affair. 
In the United States drug consumption was clearly associated with alcohol 
consumption. With the prohibition movement came an increase in demand for drug 
based elixirs such as Coca-kola (later Coca-Cola) which came out in 1886 when Atlanta 
went dry. Coca-kola was originally sold as a quasi-medicinal stimulant and contained 
cocaine. In addition to Coca-kola there were hundreds of other similar substances on 
the market. Vin Mariani's Coca wine contained fresh coca leaves and was consumed 
by such luminaries as then President William McKinley, inv~ntor _Th~mas Edison, and 
Pope Leo XIII. 24 This link between alcohol and drug consumption emphasised the 
ambiguity between health and pleasure, the blurring of the medical with the non-
medical use of drugs, which was the basis for the emerging challenge to nineteenth 
century drug consumption. 
The dynamics of change 
For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on the consumption and use of opium. 
Cocaine and cannabis use was not as prevalent as that of opium in the nineteenth 
century and they played quite a minor medical role in comparison. Unlike opium, coca 
never became popular in Europe and it was not until the mid-nineteenth century when 
cocaine, the principal alkaloid in the coca leaf, was successfully isolated that it began 
to compete with opium in terms of popularity particularly in the United States.25 
However both cannabis and cocaine played a part in altering the perceptions of drug 
use in a negative sense and were associated with opium in discussions on the 
medicalisation of addiction. Cannabis was seen to have little medical use and was 
associated only with pleasure during a time when the medical and non-medical use of 
drugs was being separated, and the discovery of cocaine i1Justrated the increasing 
dangers of new, more potent drugs. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there 
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was no formal regulation of opium use. As Berridge and Edwards forcibly state "drug 
use was embedded in culture and was no more legislated or formally controlled than 
is at present the eating of peas". 26 However changes during the century radically 
altered the position of opium, and other drugs in society. 
During the nineteenth century moves towards industrialisation led to shifts in 
populations from country to towns looking for work. This necessitated a change in diet 
accommodating what was available, coupled with the need to increase the nutritional 
quality to keep pace with the demands of the new industries. An increase in global 
trade had made foods high in protein such as eggs and beef, stimulants such as tea and 
coffee, and sugar, available for this new diet. 27 The modern factory worker would use 
the proteins, stimulants and glucose to accelerate the body's rhythms to those of the 
machinery, often for very long hours. The role of narcotics would be to so-othe and 
relax the body and mind artificially during the short hours of rest. In the mid-to late-
1800's patent medicine manufacturers produced drugs to induce any desired state. As 
McCoy states, "the growth of mass narcotics abuse seems part of the transformation 
of daily living in the 1800s. "28 
Increase in perceived use among the new working classes led to changing 
attitudes and the first attempts to control. Throughout the century there was a shift 
from middle-class use to working- class use. The situation in the United States was 
slightly different, but shows a similar change in users. Early nineteenth-century opiate 
users were from the middle-classes (often women) and also aged between 25 and 45, 
so that opium use was described as the "vice of middle-life"~9. Throughout the 
nineteenth century it was considered "unseemly" for women to drink. According to 
David Courtwright in his study, Dark Paradise. Opiate Addiction in America before 
1940, use of opium or morphine by women was a substitute for alcohol. 30 However, 
in the latter half of the century attention was focused on opium use by immigrant 
Chinese labourers and their opium-smoking in the dock areas of San Francisco. 31 In 
England the emphasis was on working class use, but as Berridge notes, working-class 
opium use may have been exaggerated for political purposes: opium was a narcotic and 
yet increasingly working-class use of the drug was viewed as "dangerous". and opium 
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was discussed as if it was a "stimulant" (as it was then wrongly classified) like alcohol 
32. It is significant that opium use among the working classes was associated with use 
for euphoric or experimental purposes, whereas middle-class users were seen as using 
the drug for medical, rather than non-medical purposes. The belief in working class 
"stimulant" use of opium in England helped justify the first restriction on the drug in 
the 1868 Pharmacy Act (see later). The emphasis here of the growing contemporary 
concern is not on the drug itself, but on the user and the uses, that is a separation of 
the medical and non-medical uses, not previously emphasised. 
The nineteenth century saw rapid and fundamental changes in socio-economic 
structures due to the process of industrialisation, which led to emerging class tensions 
and instability.33 This period of time was also concerned with the problems of the role 
of the individual and society, which was undergoing fundamental changes and was of 
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great concern to writers and thinkers of the time, for example with the work of John 
Stuart Mill. The question of drug use was becoming associated with the type of user 
and therefore linked to social control. This led to a shift from informal to formal 
controls. 
Another significant change to observe in the changing attitudes towards drug use 
was changes in medicine itself and the medical profession. The beginning of the 
nineteenth century saw medical practice as still rudimentary, an era of self-medication. 
Western medicine was "locked into a long transition from the eighteenth century's 
heroic remedies of bleeding and blistering to the genuine therapeutic remedies that first 
appeared in the early twentieth century".34 Doctors were impatient to transfer into the 
fields of biology and medicine the scientific revolution that had remade physics and 
astronomy and became disillusioned, when biological research seemed not to lead to 
universal laws but only to more complications and greater confusion. 
"Anxious to get their single explanations for all disease. they did so by 
neglecting the scientific method, or by following it only a short way. They built 
vast theoretical medical schemes by specUlative logic. The 18th century was a 
time of system-making. "35 
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Many of the new systems were a continuation of ancient lores dating as far back as the 
second century AD to the Greek physician, Galen. Galen's ideas on the nature of 
disease resulting in an imbalance of the four liquids in the body - blood, phlegm, 
choler (yellow bile), and melancholy (black bile) - were the dominant force in medical 
thinking in the nineteenth century. Treatments held the dictum that the worst a 
medicine tasted the greater its curative power: urine, dung and most of the substances 
commonly used as fertilizers of the soil were common. Dried horses hooves and wood 
lice was dispensed by three London hospitals in the eighteenth century. In this period 
of great change medical doctors were the most enthusiastic advocates of opium 
treatment. As historian Terry Parssinen explains, opium was the Victorian's aspirin. 
lomotil, valium and nyquil. At a time when Marx claimed that religion was the opium 
of the people it was easily and cheaply available.36 
There was little special training or diagnostic ability needed to dose patients 
with opium or cocaine for their complaints and still produce satisfied customers, who 
might come back for more indefinitely. The widespread habit of self-medication, 
particularly amongst the poor also detracted from the desire of the medical profession 
to exercise its authority. In order to exert influence the medical profession needed to 
become more professional; to differentiate themselves from the various chemists, 
druggists, apothecaries and herbalists and others then practising. In addition, there 
needed to be more professional controls over the availability of drugs. The nineteenth 
century saw the emergence of numerous separate "professions" and corresponding 
organisations in many areas such as accountancy and surveying. There were also 
moves to establish the medical and pharmaceutical professions as separate, self-
regulating bodies. This marked a significant stage in changing attitudes towards drug 
use in the second half of the century. 
In 1841 the Pharmaceutical Society was established in Britain with the initial 
objective to limit the title of chemist to those who had passed its own examinations as 
well as gradually to raise the status and quality of chemists already in practice and 
eventually to achieve a monopoly of practice for its own members. This however was 
incompatible at the time with the dominant free-market values (contradicting the 
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international values later displayed in relation to monopolies and trade with China) and 
no restrictions on sales were imposed. The society had yet to establish itself as the 
controlling body of the profession. The establishment of the General Medical Council 
followed, under the 1858 Medical Act, to represent the newly emerging profession of 
general practitioner, The Council even attempted to include pharmacy under the ambit 
of the medical profession. In 1860 the United Society of Chemists and Druggists was 
formed, to represent the non-members of the Pharmaceutical Society unhappy about the 
body's perceived failure to secure their interests. The societies all had conflicting 
interests and positions. 
The conflict between medical and pharmaceutical interests was shown by the 
struggle in the British parliament over the 1868 Pharmacy Act to control dangerous 
substances. Doctors, and those concerned with public health, wanted opium included 
in the Act and for its availability to be severely restricted. The pharmacists wanted 
limited control of the drug to protect their commercial interests. Their concern could 
be seen to be primarily with the availability of opium rather than its use. The passage 
of the Bill illustrates the competing influences of the groups on parliament. On first 
reading all mention of opium in the Bill had been dropped due to strong protests from 
pharmacists throughout the country who compelled the Pharmacy Bill Committee 
"against interfering with their [the pharmacists] business". Opium, they stated, was one 
of their "chief articles of trade" .37 However despite this argument, the medical lobby 
triumphed and "opium and all preparations of opium or of poppies" was added to the 
schedule as commodities that could not be sold without being labelled "poison". 38 
However, the power and influence of the Pharmaceutical Society remained, since the 
act failed to restrict patent medicines containing opium such as Dover's Powder, 
Daffy's Elixir, Godfrey's Cordial (for children) and many others', by "preparations of 
opium" being distinguished from "preparations containing opium" . 
Opium control in the nineteenth century was still seen by many as a matter of 
voluntary self-regulation rather than a matter for state legislation. In the United States, 
the largely un-organised medical and pharmaceutical industries were not viewed as an 
appropriate area for central government legislation. The United States free-enterprise 
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system positively discouraged controls on sales of opiates and later cocaine. 
Federalism, which gave the power of regulation to individual states, allowed for the 
repeal of medical licensing laws, adopted in earlier days, by state after state in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Any form of licensing that might lead to a monopoly by 
the educated elites was seen as a violation of democratic principles. 
The 1868 Pharmacy Act had I ittle affect in reducing the availabil ity of opium 
or of medicines containing opium in Britain. However in the area of patent medicines 
it was becoming increasingly clear to both doctors and pharmacists that they had little 
influence and that their authority was being challenged. The number of vendors 
applying for licences to sell patent medicines increased from over twelve thousand in 
1874 to twenty thousand in 1895 to meet the increasing demand from the consumer.39 
The increase in vendors was to some extent due to the provisions of the 1868 Act 
which had made ordinary opium preparations more difficult to obtain. Furthermore. 
in 1875 an Act had reduced the medicine licence duty, leading to an increase in 
vendors. Therefore there began in the 1880s a new professional campaign against open 
sale, concentrating on the issue of patent medicines. Patent medicines dealers were the 
largest newspaper advertisers in the United Kingdom and Australia, and the press 
consequently had an interest in not publicizing information detrimental to sales. This 
was significant in limiting the spread of information concerning the harmful effects of 
drug use. In the United States, legislation was slower to materialise, but again came 
about due to an uneasy alliance between the medical profession and pharmacists. From 
1895 to 1915 most states and many municipalities passed laws limiting the sale of 
opiates. 
An initial shift in values therefore came about due to the growing awareness 
among an emerging medical profession of the need to increase its influence in the field 
of opiate use, in competition with the increasing number of non-professional outlets 
supplying opiates and a newly emerging and competitive pharmaceutical profession 
which had hardly existed at all before the 1840s. 
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A major trend throughout the history of drug use is the increased hazards 
associated with the use of more potent drugs, either purified plant materials or the new 
synthetic drugs, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and "China White", as has 
occurred in the last two decades. Until the nineteenth century drugs came from two 
sources - unrefined plants and animal products and were usually taken orally. Eating 
crude plant material offered a certain safety margin, since biologically active 
components are usually present in small amounts and overdosing was physically 
difficult. In the mid-1800s morphine was isolated from opium: in the early 1900s 
cocaine was isolated from coca leaf and heroin was synthesised from morphine. The 
emergence of these new, more-potent drugs, which were the product of the 
pharmaceutical industry, in combination with the hypodermic syringe in the 1860s, 
spurred both consumption and a gradual increasing concern about their dangers which 
led to changing attitudes concerning domestic consumption. 
The invention of the hypodermic syringe was a significant breakthrough for 
medical science. A more accurate and exclusive means of treating disease was being 
sought by the medical profession, to separate themselves from the mass of 
apothecaries, chemists, herbalists, patent medicine vendors and manufacturers, and 
others then practising. The hypodermic method, and its use with morphine in 
particular, was hailed as a major breakthrough in treatment with a more immediate 
effect obtained, smaller doses needed, and safety assured with none of the unpleasant 
gastric side effects of opiates administered orally. Enthusiasm for hypodermic morphine 
was generally accompanied by a denigration of popular opium, and self-medication. In 
the United States the hypodermic method was first introduced in 1856. Between 1860 
and 1880, along with the scores of wounded veterans given injections to alleviate their 
injuries during the Civil War, a massive increase in morphine addiction was triggered. 
Promoters of the syringe played upon professional insecurities and implied that those 
who did not use it would fall behind in their profession. The percentage of American 
physicians using hypodermic medication grew dramatically. to the extent that by 1881 
virtually every American physician had one. The use of hypodermic morphine 
medication became widespread at a time when opiate consumption could be seen to be 
in decline. As Courtwright comments, its popularity amongst doctors and patients was 
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obvious, since for the first time in history near instantaneous relief was possible for a 
wide range of disease. 40 Administration was also controlled by the medical profession, 
increasing their influence. Organic drugs, such as cannabis, were non-soluble and 
therefore could not be administered in the more "scientific" way of intravenous 
injection and their medical use therefore declined. Towards the end of the century 
cannabis began to be seen as a dangerous, purely-recreational drug, described at the 
time as the major cause of insanity in both India and China.41 
The enthusiastic advocacy of the new treatment among the profession failed to 
establish true scientific facts and it was not long before this myopic support led to 
increased levels of addiction. The attention of the profession then focused on the 
"problem", it had in effect created, rather than the majority of consumers taking oral 
opium. 
"The quite small numbers of morphine addicts who happened to be obvious to 
the profession assumed the dimensions of a pressing problem - at a time when, 
as general consumption and mortality data indicate, usage and addiction to 
opium in general was tending to decline, not increase. " 41 
The medical profession had created a new problem when there was some evidence that 
opiate use was declining. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century specific disease agents for illnesses 
such as typhoid and cholera were isolated. The desire for scientific discoveries 
encouraged progress in trying to understand less definable conditions, such as that of 
opium addiction (a term not in widespread usage until the first decade of the twentieth 
century). Much of the work in this area was an offshoot of research into alcoholism. 
This led to the re-classification of illnesses with a large social or economic element in 
them on strictly biological lines: 
"From one point of view, disease theories were part of late Victorian 
. "progress", a step forward from the moral condemnation of opium eating to the 
scientific elaboration of disease views. But such views were never, however, 
scientifically autonomous. Their putative objectivity disguised class and moral 
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concerns which precluded a wider understanding of the social and cultural roots 
of opium use. "43 
For example in the United States, calls for restricting cocaine use were propelled by 
the increasing awareness of the medical dangers of cocaine and its association with 
respiratory failure, combined with widely publicised accounts of "coke-crazed negros 
raping white women", which were endorsed by writings and reports from such 
respected bodies as the American Pharmaceutical Association. 44 
Earlier in the nineteenth century, at a time of wide opiate use for self-
medication at all levels of society, regular opium use at worse was regarded as a bad 
habit, or minor form of moral failing. But in the later stages of the century, when 
overall use was in decline, the regular user became more noticeable. Along with these 
new developments in toxicology and bacteriology came a growing awareness of the 
dependency-producing nature of opium and morphine use among the medical 
profession.4s As has already been stated, the medical profession itself was more 
organised and eager to develop theories of "morphinism" and "morphiomania" to 
further their own goals. Disease theories of addiction were seen as individually 
orientated (the addict was responsible, rather than the physical or mental condition) but 
this was nevertheless seen as a proper area for medical intervention. Opium eating was 
medicalized, but failure to achieve a cure was a failure of personal responsibility, not 
of medical science. Morality and medical science should have been at odds with each 
other, but disease theory was very much a mixture of the two. 
By the last half of the nineteenth century, the emergence of toxicology as a 
science and also the elaboration of a "germ theory of disease" began to lead to less of 
a dependency on the use of opium as a treatment for all conditions. Advances in 
bacteriology led to public health measures, which reduced the incidence of gastro-
intestinal disorders, such as diarrhoea and dysentery, for which opium and morphine 
had been freely given. Vaccination, against typhoid fever (1896), and chemotherapy 
against syphilis (1909), began to provide effective alternatives to opium and morphine 
for a few diseases. The achievement of greater diagnostic precision, made possible by 
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the discovery and classification of pathogenic micro-organisms and by the development 
of new techniques, such as X-radiation, discouraged simply prescribing opiates for all 
ailments. Furthermore, these developments led to a host of new and less dangerous 
anodynes becoming available. The introduction of milder analgesics, the salicyclates 
and aniline and pyrazolone derivatives, constituted another major reason for the 
decline in opium and morphine prescribing. 46 The discovery of the analgesic 
properties of aspirin in 1899 and its subsequent role in the household as a general non-
addictive pain killer marked a decisive break with the drug-taking of the past and 
probably prevented thousands from becoming addicted to opium or morphine:" 
By the end of the century the alliance between the government and the medical 
profession in Britain over the control of drugs had been established. The laissez-faire 
model of drug use had gradually evolved into a model of governmental responsibility 
for health policy incorporating the medical profession. 48 In England the Registrar 
General's Office, established as early as 1837 was one of the first central government 
agencies. Throughout the second half of the century it provided the statistics on which 
the medical and public health case, against the use of opium, were based. 49 Narcotic 
legislation was seen as a form of social control of lower class and criminal usage, by 
the governing elite concerned about class tensions, which had emphasised working class 
use of opium. For the medical profession, narcotic policy served as a form of 
professional self-affirmation. The emerging organisations and institutions and the 
movement for control complemented and paralleled society's concern with public health 
and led to the creation of new values with a progressive medical dominance in society's 
way of thinking about and responding to drug use. More restrictive attitudes were 
appearing towards opium users, who were seen as deviating from the norms of society. 
However, although domestic concerns about the dangers of drug use were changing in 
both Britain and the United States the impetus for more fundamental change came from 
an international source, England's relationship with China. International developments 
were seen to impinge on domestic developments towards the turn of the century and 
finally establish society's attitude towards drug use. 
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The Eastern dimension and changing attitudes 
The contemporary "War on Drugs" as described in the last chapter was preceded by 
a very different kind of drug war. In 1839 and again in 1856 the British government 
declared war on China in an attempt to open China's markets for its merchants. It is 
not within the scope of this chapter to go into great detail on the Opium Wars ( 1839-
1842, and 1856-1858) but rather, to illustrate why values were slower to shift, with 
regard to opium use and the emerging medical dangers associated with drug use, in 
Britain than in the United States. This can be seen to be due to Britain's involvement 
in the opium trade from the end of the eighteenth century. 50 The 1842 Treaty of 
Nanking after the First Opium War opened five Chinese ports (including Hong Kong) 
to British merchants, and established British control over Chinese customs, allowing 
the import of opium without restraint. The British East India Company had begun to 
export opium from British India to China in the eighteenth century, as a convenient 
exchange for tea and silk, commodities at that time much valued in the West. Their 
monopoly over the China trade lasted until 1834, when the new reform parliament 
cancelled it. Opium exported from India had to be smuggled into China, since the 
Imperial authorities had repeatedly issued edicts prohibiting its importation and 
consumption. However, opium was seen as a legitimate international commodity by the 
British, European and American traders and an integral part of the international 
financial system: 
"Opium was considered the Chinese whiskey and as legitimate a commercial 
product as alcohol, tea, or coffee; it was a product from which "the maximum 
revenue from the minimum consumption" should be derived" .51 
The aim of the Opium Wars after the ban on opium by the Imperial government of 
China were to force China to accept British rules and values of free trade and 
diplomacy. The 1858 Treaty of Tientsin after the Second Opium War forced the 
Chinese to accept the British imposition of the legalization of opium imports to China. 
The Opium Wars of the middle of the century, had effects in the latter half of the 
century with an anti-opium movement emerging in the 1870s opposing England's 
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participation in the opium trade with China, changing perceptions of domestic opium 
use even though its primary focus was on the Far East. 
The early anti-opium movement was a loose alliance between British 
protestants, western missionaries, and Chinese imperial officials. As with the anti-
slavery movement in the eighteenth century, Quakers emerged as the leaders of the 
anti-opium campaign and founded in 1874 the Anglo-Oriental Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade. 52 The British Quakers were strong moral reformers. 
They were committed to changing what they saw as the social wrongs of the world. 
There was also support for the anti-opium movement from the alcohol temperance 
movement. Throughout the Victorian era, the alcohol temperance movement was very 
active. Many leading churchmen and much of the middle class were members of 
temperance organisations. The anti-opiumists believed that opium physically. and 
morally destroyed the user and was in itself, evil. Furthermore, the anti-opiumists 
believed that opium was to blame for retarding the progress of Christianity, since the 
Chinese could not be expected to distinguish between the white missionary and the 
white opium peddler. As Brown writes, "The Society, with its heavy evangelical 
commitment, had few reservations as to the wisdom of missionary activity within 
China".53 
The early aims of the Society were the abolition of the government monopoly 
of opium in India and a withdrawal of unfair pressure on the Chinese government to 
admit Indian opium, by the creation of an educated public opinion and parliamentary 
pressure. For thirty years England's missionaries and moralists fought a relentless 
campaign through meetings and petitions to change public opinion towards Britain's 
opium trade. 
"The anti-opiumist cause was a public issue in this period as it was not to be 
again until the 1900's. The Society's public activity expanded at an 
unprecedented rate. In 1880, election year, the Society placarded its election 
address which stressed commercial as well as moral arguments ... "54 
112 
Despite its denunciations of British involvement in the opium trade, the Society 
supported British involvement in China. They believed that termination of the trade 
would make British imperialism more efficient and that drug addiction had retarded 
"legitimate trade" in China and India. 
Domestic pressure by the anti-opium movement in the United Kingdom was 
helped by the election of a reform-minded Liberal government in 1906, which led 
eventually to moves to end the trade. In 1907 Britain and China signed an agreement 
to reduce the shipment of opium from India by 10% (see later). However since the 
1890s British civil servants and politicians had been increasingly aware that the opium 
trade was forming a declining proportion of the Indian revenue. During the period of 
the 1860s and 1880s, British trade with China had hardly increased. China's own 
cheaper production of the drug was increasing and by 1885 China was probably 
producing as much opium as it was importing.55 The opium trade was also strangling 
other forms of commerce. 56 The Chinese were too poor to buy British goods due to 
their dependency on opium smoking. An estimated 27% of the population were opium 
smokers at the height of the problem, with a level of addiction never equated by any 
country before or since. 57 England needed to improve its relations with China, by 
abandoning the opium trade, in order to enhance prospects for other forms of trade. 
As Berridge states, "Humanitarianism and economic self-interest coincided" .58 The 
promotion of opium control in China resulted from considerations essentially separate 
from the issue of drug use. 
The British anti-slavery and anti-opium agitations had much in common. But 
unlike its role in the anti-slavery campaign, the principal impetus for a multi-national 
approach to opium control came not from the British, but from th'e Americans, initially 
from missionaries returning from the Far East. As Arnold Taylor states, the role of the 
missionaries in the anti-opium campaign "might quite appropriately be referred to as 
a missionary movement, or better still, as missionary diplomacy". 59 Towards the end 
of the century, growing awareness of the public health aspect of narcotics addiction and 
a growing temperance movement made the issue of opium control increasingly popular 
among reformers. Furthermore the United States had taken control of the Philippines 
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following the Spanish-American war of 1898, which produced strategic and economic 
interests in the Pacific region. The Spanish had previously held the opium monopoly 
to supply the Chinese in the Philippines and missionaries in Manila and the United 
States lobbied hard for the repeal of the trade. The Philippines came under the direct 
control of the United States federal government, bringing the issue of opium 
consumption for non-medical purposes to the direct attention of Congress. The Civil 
Governor, William Howard Taft set up an Opium Investigating Committee. to consider 
the Philippine opium question. The Committee's investigation lasted five months and 
was the first multi-nation survey on opium use. It concluded that the opium situation 
was one of the gravest, if not the gravest, of problems in the Far East and 
acknowledged the position of opium as a major source of revenue for significant 
governments. The Committee also stressed the international dimensions to the problem 
stating that opium could not be controlled by the Philippines alone, \J.'ith'out 
international co-operation, since the use of opium In surrounding territories would 
make opium control in the Philippines unworkable,60 
The lead taken by the United States government however was due to a number 
of factors other than moral indignation. United States companies had themselves been 
involved in opium traffic to China since the beginning of the nineteenth century. as 
conveyors of Turkish opium to the Far East. After 1805 they had held a \'irtual 
monopoly, due to the policy of the East India Company. The Company barred its own 
ships from carrying opium and at the same time prevented private English shipping 
from trading between Europe and China (until the ending of its monopoly in 1834). 
The American trade with China in Turkish opium was sufficient to cause the Chinese 
commissioner at Canton in 1839 to think that Turkey was an American possession,61 
After the 1839 Opium War the US companies temporarily withdrew from the trade, but 
participated again in aiding the smuggling of opium into China, by supplying receiving 
ships or storeships anchored in waters around the islands near to the Chinese mainland, 
for carriers from India, Persia and Turkey.62 The United States was experiencing a 
period of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the later half of the century with 
corresponding social and economic transformation and increasing social unrest. In the 
United States, government links were perceived between working class criminal users 
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and foreign users of opium. Immigrant Chinese opium-smoking labourers in the west 
coast docks, brought in to help build the railways, were seen as a threat to society. 
Smoking opium began to be imported in significant quantities in the mid-1850s, when 
the first wave of Chinese immigrants arrived in California. Prior to July 1862, crude 
opium and smoking opium were reported together. The Smoking Opium Exclusion Act 
focused attention away from white, middle-class female crude opium users and onto 
a new "subculture" of users.63 
The economic interests of the United States government can also be seen to 
have played a vital role. After 1858 and the legalization of the opium trade with China, 
the American ships that had been used to help smuggle opium into China were no 
longer needed. This, combined with a general decline in United States shipping 
companies during and after the Civil War, meant that United States companies 
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participation in the drug traffic with China had dwindled to insignificant levels and led 
to the changing attitude of the United States government to the issue. The change in 
attitude can be seen to have come about due to the recognition by the American 
merchants that the opium trade was damaging legitimate business with the Chinese, in 
restricting Chinese purchasing power and jeopardizing relations with the Chinese 
government. Unlike for the British, direct financial benefits for the Americans of 
trading in opium rarely accounted for more than one-tenth of the total American trade 
to China in anyone year. 64 The United States administration wished to pursue an 
Open Door policy with regard to China but their treatment of Chinese immigrants in 
the United States led to a widespread boycott of United States goods in China in 1905. 
David Musto describes advisors suggesting to President Roosevelt that: 
"a humanitarian movement to ease the burden of opium in 'China would help his 
long-range goals: to mollify Chinese resentment against America, put the 
British in a less favourable light, and support Chinese antagonism against 
European entrenchment". 65 
The United States government, as William 0 Walker states, consciously sought to 
perpetuate the myth of a special relationship with China, supporting China in its anti-
opium position with American trade interests as their objective.66 The United States 
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therefore took the lead in organizing an international conference to discuss the 
international control of narcotics. 
The Shanghai Opium Commission met in 1909. At this time the United States 
had no federal laws proscribing the opium traffic, nor any reI iable statistics on its own 
opium "problem". There were no restrictions on the import of opium to the United .. 
States, other than a small tariff. The United States did not export manufactured opiates, 
not on moral grounds, but because its products were not competitively priced with 
Europe's. United States per. capita import of opium was declining, having peaked in 
1896 and other substances were entering the market in competition to opium. In order 
to present something at the Conference, but to avoid offending the medical profession 
and drug manufacturers, they instituted in 1909 a ban on the import of opium for 
smoking. The 1909 Conference produced a number of resolutions. The Conference 
called for all governments to ban opium smoking: the ban (United States position) or 
careful regulation (Britain's position) of opium use; and a call for strict international 
agreements to control the traffic in and use of morphine (United States position). 
Britain insisted that the responsibility for control should be assumed by the 
governments concerned within their own territories and commitments. These positions 
reflected fundamental disagreements among participants, especially between the United 
States and Britain. There was simply no consensus "that the use of opium for other 
than medical purposes was evil and immoral. "67 
Developments in the nineteenth century outlined above reflect the dynamics that 
established international regulation of opium use. For the British and American 
governments, the dominant value in the nineteenth century was free trade. In the 
nineteenth century Britain was the supplier and China the consumer, and drug control 
was treated as an economic question, an important element in overcoming Britain's 
trade deficit with China. In the 1840's Britain waged war on China in order to re-open 
Chinese markets to the East India Company's opium exports. In the mid-nineteenth 
century there was no consensus on knowledge that drug use was damaging to the 
individual. Domestic consumption was not seen as a problem that could not be 
controlled, despite the latter half of the century seeing an increase in consumption 
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amongst the lower classes and an increase in medical knowledge of the dangers of 
consumption. Despite this, and despite the British hegemonic position, the United 
States government was able to put drug control on the international agenda where it has 
remained firmly ever since. The nineteenth century clearly reflects the mixture of social 
and technological change, competing domestic interests, changing religious values and 
competing trade interests all reflecting changing values and norms about drug use 
leading to its control. The nature of these dynamics will be explored further in the next 
section. 
Values and agenda fonnation: From the value of power to the power of values 
Hans Morgenthau, one of the fathers of the Realist school of political thought, 
advanced a theory of international politics founded on the concept of the national 
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interest. In Politics Anwng Nations he states that "Interest is the perennial standard by 
which political action must be judged and directed"68, and therefore the "objective of 
foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest" .69 He goes on to 
expand on what constitutes the national interest by defining interest in terms of power: 
"The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined as 
power. "70 
For the orthodox school of International Relations in its heyday from the 1940s to the 
1960s, the issue in international relations was the acquisition, maintenance and exercise 
of power. However, during the 1970s, several writers challenged by developments 
around them introduced a "transnationalist" critique to explain a c;hanging international 
system 71 • But its challenge to Realist international theory has not been fully 
developed, with for example, Keohane and Nye's work in the area being seen as only 
modifying Realism while remaining loyal to the classic formulation of Morgenthau and 
Thompson that international relations is concerned with international politics, and that 
the subject of international politics is "the struggle for power among sovereign 
states. "72 The traditional analysis of change for the Realist in the international system 
is of change in global power: the traditional unit of change is the state, the replacement 
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of one hegemonic state by another with states pursuing sel f-interest understood in terms 
of power maximisation. 
Realist orthodoxy has also dominated in the disciplines of international history 
and sociology. A state-centred approach in international history dates back to the early 
1930s73 and many present-day historians continue to describe their field as diplomatic 
history.74 As with Realist international theory, international history has also concerned 
itself with "crises in the politics of power and the officials who wield such power. "75 
Recent studies of the international by various mainstream sociologists have also shown 
a pre-occupation with Real ist concepts of state and power, seeing social systems as 
national societies/states and all other interaction patterns as being sub-systemic in 
character. 76 Although interactions between the disciplines of International Relations 
and Sociology have been intermittent since the 1930s, the 1970s saw a more systematic 
attempt to draw on the discipline. Attempts were made to analyse the growth of an 
international consciousness, the advent of global norms, the sociology of international 
iaw and the sociology of world conflict with the work of Brucan, Pettman and Banks, 
developing Burton's "world society" conceptions of the subject matter of International 
Relations, where relations between individuals were seen as important as relations 
between states. 77 
The concept of an international regime was introduced by the neo-Realists in 
the same period, as a means of combatting the challenges to the power politics 
approach of a changing world and in the face of what many considered new global 
problems, such as environmental degradation, resource depletion, and pollution. 
Krasner's authoritative definition of an international regime implicitly contains the 
concept of "values" with the explanation of "principles" as "beliefs of rectitude" and 
the notion of "implicit norms". Krasner suggests that "values" are basic "causal 
variables" along with interests and power but does not expand on this. He emphasises 
norms and principles in defining regimes and regime change by stating that "Changes 
in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself", and that "Changes in rules 
and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes". 78 But for Krasner 
regimes were understood to rise and fall in terms of the power of the state actors 
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comprising them. Writing in the introduction to International Regimes he asserts that, 
"The prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic self-
interest".79 Puchala and Hopkins in the same volume state that regimes are "closely 
linked to two classical political concepts - power and interest"BO. Furthermore the 
Keohane concept of hegemonic stability, the most widely employed explanation of 
regime formation in the Krasner work, also emphasises the role of dominant states 
utilizing power capabilities for regime creation. 81 This concentration on states denies 
regimes independent impact seeing them as merely reflecting the overall structure of 
power in the international system as it is perceived by the Realists under the challenge 
of interdependence, making the concept of an international regime virtually redundant. 
A clearer understanding of values and norms, their evolution and role is needed 
to give international regimes an impact in international relations and is also central for 
an alternative understanding of the international system where regimes have an 
independent role. As Mansbach and Vasquez state: 
"The belief that the struggle for power is the dominant issue fails to 
accommodate the multiplicity of values and stakes for which actors both 
cooperate and compete". 82 
Rosenau, describing the limitations to a Realist theory of international politics, 
questions the Realist belief that "a nation's power has an objective existence and thus 
values need not enter into a determination of its national interest". 83 For this school 
of thought power is the dominant value and is the basis for ranking some values as 
preferable to others. However, at the turn of the century, the United States was not 
then a military power on a par with the global empires but they' were able to put the 
question of drug control onto the international agenda. The United States, unable to 
compete with the interest of the hegemon, linked the free trade challenge to a moral 
value - drugs were immoral. Britain, as the hegemon, was forced to accept 
international legislation that could be seen as going against the national interest from 
a Realist perspective, as well as facing a domestic value challenge. In 1906 the newly 
elected Liberal government, pressurised by the increasing disquiet regarding the opium 
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trade among the population and politicians, reached an agreement with China phasing 
out the opium trade between India and China. India's opium production would be 
gradually reduced by 10 per cent per year in the first instance, in order to prevent 
Turkey, Persia, or domestic producers from stepping in to replace the supply, and so 
protecting Britain's commercial interests. 84 Values within Britain had changed; ten 
years earlier the report of the Royal Opium Commission had declared the consumption 
of opium was not harmful and that "opium was more like the Westerner's liquor than 
a substance to be feared and abhorred. "85 How much the British government's change 
of attitude was due to market decline as previously mentioned rather than the influence 
of the new morality of the nation and the work of the missionaries is difficult to say. 
However, by their later delaying tactics and lack of co-operation with the international 
opium legislation, remaining the world's main manufacturer and exporter of opium 
until as late as the 1930's, it can be suggested that the missionaries made a successful 
value challenge forcing a change in official policy, challenging the Realist position on 
value change in the international system. 
To sum up, central to an understanding of the concept of issues and central to 
an alternative understanding of the concept of change in the international system to that 
of the Realists is a re-evaluation of the concept of power as the sole \'ariable for 
change. The emergence of control on drugs by the international system shows how the 
dynamics for change came not simply from a powerful state imposing its will, but from 
changing values and value-linkages. The simplicity of the Realist position on change 
can be contrasted with the much more complex reality of nineteenth-century drug use. 
The complex mix of social and technological change and competing domestic interests, 
changing religious values and competing trade interests all were shown to have 
promoted a value shift in attitudes towards drug use. Power relationships can be seen 
to have changed by a shift in values whereas for the Realists change is perceived as the 
other way round with the practice of states determining values. Also contrary to Realist 
understanding, the dynamics of drug control at the turn of the century is an example 
of international values impinging on national values, since fundamental international 
legislation came before national legislation. 
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A different approach to politics that identifies the source and role of values as 
central is needed. The approach of an alternative school of thought is centred around 
the work of Rosenau, Nye and Keohane, Mansbach and Willetts. All five writers in 
their work make reference to the ideas of the American political scientist David Easton. 
David Easton, writing about American political science in A Framework For Political 
Analysis defined politics as "the authoritative allocation of values". 86 This can be seen 
as a denial of the Realist's understanding of politics as the struggle for power. Little 
attention has been paid to the significance of these two quite separate definitions of the 
fundamentals of politics for understanding the essence of the international system. As 
Mansbach and Vasquez emphasise, 
"The Eastonian definition moves the analysis of global politics away from 
conceptions of power and security and toward the assumption that demands for 
value satisfaction through global decision making must be at,the heart of any 
theory, and must be the central process that awaits explanation." 87 
However, writers following Easton's work have not established an authoritative 
theoretical literature defining the concept of a "value" or expanding methodically on 
Easton's work in an international context. James Rosenau in his seminal work on 
"pretheories" defines issue-areas as a "cluster of values" but does little to expand on 
the fundamental nature of those values or where they come from.88 In, In Search of 
Theory. A New Paradigm for Global Politics. Mansbach and Vasquez attempt to 
expand on the work of Rosenau, (as outlined in the previous chapter) in attempting a 
more thorough analysis of issues and values and their role in the international system. 
This sadly neglected work will be the focus for elaborating on a clearer understanding 
of the role of values in the international system as an explanation of the dynamics of 
change. 
The nature of values 
The problem again, as with "issue", is that "value" is common terminology in a 
number of disciplines, obscuring the absence of a common understanding. For 
economists, the term refers to "utility generating property" or "valuation revealed in 
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a preferential choice". For sociologists, the term denotes some kind of "\I.'orld view" 
or "taken for granted belief or normative standard by which human beings are 
influenced in their choice among the alternative courses of action which they perceive". K9 
Sociologists emphasise the criteria governing evaluation (why we choose what we 
choose is based on our values), economists are concerned with the valuations 
themselves. 
An authoritative literature on the source and role of values in the discipline of 
International Relations is lacking. Analysis of values is central to the discipline of 
sociology concerned as it is with social transformations, but has traditionally been 
approached on a national rather than international level. However. a concern for the 
international aspects of social transformations was shown, as early as the first half of 
the nineteenth century. in the work of Saint-Simon, Comte. de Tocqueville. ~Jar~ and 
Spencer. 90 Attention to world affairs developed during the 1920s and 1930s to the 
extent that a sociologist could claim that "Sociology ... could legitimately compete with 
political science in studying international relations" .91 In the 1960s there was revival 
of interest in international politics by writers such as Talcott Parsons. Amitai Etzioni. 
and 10han Gallung. 91 Work on international social relations as opposed to inter-state 
politics increased from the late sixties onwards. However research progressed in 
isolation from other disciplines. 
Mansbach and Vasquez describe values as "subjective constructs that express 
human aspirations for improving their existence". 93 They suggest that there are a 
limited number of values that people pursue: "some of which have been identified and 
sought through time and across space are wealth, physical security, order, 
freedom/autonomy, peace, status, health, equal ity, justice, knowledge, beauty, honesty 
and love. "94 Values, according to Mansbach and Vasquez serve intrinsic needs - that 
is they are sought for themselves, but they also say that satisfaction of one value. in 
order to satisfy another, can also be seen as instrumental, that is serving an end. 9s 
Mansbach and Vasquez recognise this difference as central to understanding the 
pol itical· stances of different actors by means of the nature of the values that they are 
aiming to satisfy. 
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To return to the definition of politics by David Easton in Frameworks. politics 
is described as the authoritative allocation of values, "the authoritative allocations 
distribute valued things among persons or groups". 96 (italics by current author) As 
Mansbach and Vasquez expand, 
"Politics involves efforts to allocate values. Since values are abstract and 
intangible ends, they cannot be attained directly and must be sought through 
access to and acquisition of, objects that are seen as possessing or representing 
values. These objects are then regarded as stakes for which actors contend". 97 
That is values are abstract and intangible and are represented by objects or stakes 
representing the values. Mansbach and Vasquez make a distinction between concrete 
and transcendental stakes. Concrete stakes represent a means of directly satisfying a 
value since "the value is inseparable from the object itself", whereas transcendental 
stakes are, "entirely abstract and nonspecific, and which concern beliefs, prescriptions, 
or norms about how people should live or behave. "98 Mansbach and Vasquez also 
describe stakes is terms of their intrinsic or instrumental value, that is, valuable for 
their own sake, for the values they represent, or necessary for acquiring other values 
that are actually associated with other stakes. 99 
The work of Mansbach and Vasquez on values is unnecessarily confusing. They 
talk about both intrinsic and instrumental values and intrinsic and instrumental stakes, 
suggesting there is a corresponding relationship between them. Nethertheless it is clear 
that since values are abstract and cannot be attained directly of themselves, all values 
must be intrinsic. When satisfaction of one value enhances the prospects for satisfying 
another, preferred value, then a stake must be involved. Stakes are not values, but the 
concrete goals of action based on the values being allocated. It follows therefore, since 
stakes are the objects with which value satisfaction can be achieved, that all stakes are 
instrumental: a way of satisfying value preferences. Values can be seen to belong in 
a hierarchy, so it is possible to make choices among stakes embodying different values. 
Some stakes are pursued directly for the values they embody, whereas others are 
pursued in order to obtain other stakes. In this way, "self-interest" can still be 
understood as value-guided behaviour, contrary to the traditional Realist approach to 
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international politics. The United States government supported the public healrh and 
morality campaigns against opium use, because opium control represented a stake for 
the achievement of free trade. The missionaries and Quaker groups support for the anti-
opium campaign can be seen to have derived from the desire to avoid human suffering. 
In this way the terminology of Mansbach and Vasquez is simplified and clarified 
and aids in the redefining of power. All values are intrinsic, as and of themselves. No 
distinction is needed therefore between power as capability and power as interest. 
Power, another central tenet of the Realist approach to International Relations, can be 
understood as instrumental and not intrinsic, contrary to Realist assertions. Interests can 
be seen as a particular type of value. Furthermore since all stakes are instrumental this 
lends itself to the "power as influence" concept central to the Global Politics paradigm. 
In the nineteenth century, drug control was seen as a stake for acquiring free 
trade. This is emphasised by the attempts to include cocaine and morphine on the 
international regulation agenda. The second meeting dealing with opium control, the 
Hague Conference, ",,'as called in 1911 by the United States, which was by then 
preparing its list of demands on China (eg currency reform), in repayment for all the 
help the United States had provided on the opium issue. Britain's introduction of 
cocaine into the regulation discussions of the second meeting reflected its interests, not 
in curbing cocaine use, but in delaying international control over opium and protecting 
its trade monopoly with China. The necessity of acquiring statistics on the drugs would 
delay further measures on the restriction of opium. This action produced conflict with 
Germany, which was the leading drug manufacturer at the time. The German 
pharmaceutical company Bayer introduced the diamorphine alkaloid, (later to be given 
the brand name "Heroin", from the German word heroisch - of supernatural power) 
into the United States and Britain in 1898: the same company also manufactured 
cocaine. The German government supported Bayer, opposed the control of cocaine and 
engineered a unique ratification procedure, which required unanimous ratification by 
all forty-six states in the system ensuring that control became fully international. 100 
Therefore: implementation was successfully delayed until after the First World War 
when countries which ratified the Versailles Treaty automatically became parties to the 
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Hague Convention. The Hague Convention therefore established drug control on a truly 
global dimension. Germany was able to protect its economic interests against the 
interests of Britain and the United States, so that later, as the British delegates 
reported; "it (the Convention) has, for the first time, laid down as a principle of 
international morality that the various countries concerned cannot stand alone in these 
measures" . 101 
After the First World War the newly established League of Nations was given 
"general supervision over agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other 
dangerous drugs". 102 Its Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Substances created to carry out these responsibilities was dominated by the 
colonial powers with their opium monopolies in their Far Eastern colonies, and the 
drug manufacturing countries. The Committee was nicknamed "The Old Opium 
Bloc" .103 There was no agreement on the value that drugs' were immoral, evil and 
dangerous, but the stake of drug control was used to achieve free trade; therefore the 
Committee acquired the value - drugs are immoral, evil and dangerous in order to 
satisfy the stake of free trade with China. 
One of the dominant questions for international regime theorists is why we have 
regimes in some areas and not in others. To answer why opium and cocaine were 
controlled, and not other substances, such as alcohol and tobacco, we are again back 
to stakes. 
"Stakes that are initially beyond anyone's control are likely to reach the agenda, 
because this may be the only acceptable manner to allocate them. Conversely, 
when a stake is initially under some actor's control, that' actor will oppose its 
inclusion on the agenda, unless its loss appears inevitable." 104 
This is clearly applicable to nineteenth century drug control and aids understanding of 
why, amongst other factors substances such as tobacco and alcohol were not treated in 
the same way as opium. The stake of trade in tobacco and alcohol was not contested 
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and there was no consensus on the value that tobacco and alcohol use was immoral, 
evil and dangerous. As Easton also states writing nearly two decades earlier: 
"Briefly, authoritative allocations distribute valued things among persons or 
groups in one or more of three possible ways. An allocation may deprive a 
person of a valued thing already possessed; it may obstruct the attainment of 
values which would otherwise have been obtained; or it may give some person 
access to values and deny them to others." lOS 
The concept of salience, as explained in the previous chapter can explain why actors 
rank values and stakes in the way that they do. The salience of an issue to an actor can 
be due either to its direct or indirect potential for value satisfaction. 
Since values are not stakes, but the criteria by which we choos~ sta~es,. the 
evolution of conceptions of the preferable, which is why we have certain expectations 
and not others, needs to be explored. According to Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, 
expectations in international politics come from interpretive processes, involving 
political and cultural structures, as well as from institutions "dedicated to defining and 
modifying values and the meaning of action. "106 
Epistemic Communities 
John Ruggie introduced the term epistemic communities In his 1975 article 
"International Responses to Technology", in which epistemic communities were 
described by Ruggie as "interrelated roles which grow up around an episteme" .107 
The sociological term epistemes referred to "a dominant way of looking at social 
reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual 
predictability of intention".108 In his article Ruggie differentiated three levels of what 
he termed "institutionalization", that is as the sociologists define it, the co-ordination 
and patterning of behavior, setting the boundaries which channel behavior in one 
direction as against another. I09 Ruggie saw epistemic communities as the first level 
of institutionalisation - as the purely cognitive level. Ruggie described international 
regimes as the second level of institutionalization "consisting of sets of mutual 
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expectations, generally agreed to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which 
organizational energies and financial commitments are allocated". lJO The third level 
Ruggie refers to is that of international organizations. 
A special issue on international regimes was published in 1982 by the journal 
International Organisation, followed a decade later by a special issue edited by Peter 
Haas, exploring the development of interest in the concept of epistemic 
communities.1Il However a volume analysing the relationship between the two 
concepts is still lacking. The inter-relationship between the first two levels of 
institutionalisation can be understood by utilising the role of values and norm evolution 
in international relations. Ruggie's introduction of the concept of epistemic 
communities and international regimes can be seen as an attempt to go beyond 
institutions or organisations and the behavior typically analysed by Realist theorists, to 
explain international co-operation and conflict with a focus on the actual dynamics of 
change. 
An understanding of epistemic communities is necessary for understanding what 
Krasner calls actor's converging expectations. 1I2 Although Haas goes into great detail 
about the nature of epistemic communities in the introduction to the 1992 volume, it 
is in an earlier work on epistemic communities that we have what is seen as the 
authoritative definition of the concept: 
"Epistemic communities are transnational networks of knowledge based 
communities that are both politically empowered through their claims to 
exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by shared causal and principled 
beliefs. "1\3 
The fact that epistemic communities are described as (1) politically empowered through 
their claims to exercise authoritative knowledge, and (2) motivated by shared causal 
and principled beliefs is illustrated in Chapter Six with the work of the Basle 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. 
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The normative aspects to international relations, lacking development in the 
rule-orientated, state-centred work on international regimes, is emphasised in the 
literature on epistemic communities. The literature on epistemic communities focuses 
on "shared causal and principled beliefs", which affect the decision-making procedures 
around which actors expectations converge, which is not fully developed by 
Krasner.114 As with the literature on regimes however, much of the later work on 
epistemic communities has concentrated on states as the actors in the system and has 
been restricted to "helping states identify their interests"lls. But the epistemic 
community literature does not equate interests solely with power. The literature 
suggests that it is possible to perceive interests in terms of values, rather than in terms 
of power as it is currently understood. The concept of change therefore, unlike in much 
of the work on international regimes, has not been limited to changes in state power. 
As Haas explains, epistemic communities identify "a dynamic fOL persiste.nt co-
operation independent of the distribution of international power." 116 The literature 
on epistemic communities also emphasises that there is no distinction between domestic 
and international politics, a point that is significant for an understanding of the drug 
phenomenon. As Adler and Haas state, 
"to study the ideas of epistemic communities and their impact on policy making 
is to immerse oneself in the inner world of international relations theory and to 
erase the artificial boundaries between international and domestic pol itics so that 
the dynamic between structure and choice can be illuminated. "Iii 
Epistemic communities help define and modify values in a society by their claim 
to authoritative knowledge and can be one way of identifying where expectations come 
from in international politics. Both beliefs and values contribute to the epistemic 
community in an attempt by its members to establish a consensus of knowledge or 
norm. Since epistemic communities are set in a social context and not divorced from 
society, there is a danger of beliefs being established as authoritative knowledge, as has 
been previously stated in the case of nineteenth-century drug control, where "moral 
judgements were given some form of spurious scientific respectability, simply by being 
transferred to a medical context" .118 Furthermore by helping to define and modify 
values epistemic communities also develop the context for establishing norms and 
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creating a climate "favourable to the further acceptance and diffusion of [their] 
beliefs" .119 This can aid in an understanding of why some substances and not others 
are controlled by the international community. That is, epistemic communities 
institutionalise values by evolving norms. 
The epistemic communities literature highlights the relationship between the role 
of experts and the providers of knowledge and the role of political actors. The 
literature focuses attention on the process by which consensus is reached in 
international politics and directs our attention to the impact this consensual knowledge 
(norms) has on the evolution of international regimes as will be explored in Chapter 
Five. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, drug control became a question on the international agenda at the 
beginning of the twentieth century due to the value of free trade coming under 
contention. The Far-Eastern focus of the Shanghai meeting widened, to produce a 
world-wide system of control at the Hague Conferences (see next chapter). Although 
attitudes were changing regarding the dangers being associated with domestic opium 
use in the United Kingdom and the United States, and particularly the more potent 
derivatives, heroin and morphine, and moral questions were being raised by the 
missionaries returning from the Far East, the question generated conflict only when the 
parties involved began to disagree on the distribution of the benefits of trade and 
commerce with China. It was necessary to regulate their interdependence, if they 
wished to continue collaborating despite the contlict. As Haas states "an international 
issue arises when the terms of interdependence are questioned" ,120 
A global drug-prohibition regime was set up as a weak regime in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, because it was based on the stake of trade with China rather 
than an anti-drugs value. During this period there were two values under contention, 
namely the value of free trade and the value that drugs were evil,immoral and 
dangerous, represented by the two stakes of trade in opium with China and general 
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trade in other commodities. The value of free trade was more salient than the anti-
drugs value for governments, merchants and pharmaceutical companies, but the same 
stake was under contention: general trade with China (whether supporting the status 
quo or opening up to a free market) was instrumental in achieving both value 
preferences. Supporters of the free trade value made a value-linkage to the anti-drug 
position in order to achieve their objectives. Hostility to drugs and support for the free 
trade position were both satisfied. In this way, the goal of the end of the opium trade 
with China was achieved. The drugs trade was not controlled due to the support of the 
value that drugs were evil, immoral and dangerous but due to the salience of the free 
trade value for the actors concerned and the fact that the same allocation of stakes -
suppression of opium trade and opening up general trade was necessary for the 
satisfaction of both values. A strong regime however needs to be based on an intrinsic 
value which can be authoritatively allocated. Therefore, a regime can be seen to have 
emerged to control the licit trade in drugs, based on the free trade value, as the next 
chapter will explore further, but only a weak regime emerged to control drug use. 
The concept of an international regime focuses our attention on the source and 
role of values in international relations. However, the limiting straight-jacket of the 
dominant hegemonic power-theory of regime creation, change and decline has denied 
the concept any independent impact on change in international relations. The creation 
and maintenance of international regimes is described as dependent on the rules and 
decision-making procedures of powerful states. In this sense current regime analysis 
over-emphasises the static, as Susan Strange criticises, rather than emphasising the 
dynamic nature of international relations. 111 By focusing on changing values however, 
as illustrated by the complex value shifts in nineteenth-century drug control, and 
understanding where "convergent expectations" come from, regime analysis can be 
seen to challenge this criticism. 
A greater understanding of values and norm evolution by international relations 
scholars is needed in order to better understand regime creation, the dynamics of 
change, and more significantly, the role of regimes in the current international system. 
Focusing on international regimes will also give us a greater understanding of values 
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and norm creation. Fundamental problems facing the world today, such as ozone 
depletion, deforestation and pollution, are global in nature and need just such a focus. 
Furthermore there is agreement on the fact that something has to be done by the global 
community, but the contemporary debate is on what must be done. The question of 
"Why collaborate" posed by Ernst Haas in his 1980 study of international regimes 
therefore is superseded by the question of how to collaborate. By adopting an 
alternative approach to change in the international system with a focus on values, 
norms and international regimes, and releasing regimes from their current theoretical 
straightjacket, this question can be answered. 
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Chapter 4 
The United Nations and International Drug Control 
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Introduction 
This chapter will consider the fact that despite eight decades of international co-
operation on drug control, firstly by the League of Nations and then by its successor, 
the United Nations, the production, distribution and demand for illicit drugs has 
increased dramatically in the last decade and shows no sign of decreasing. 
Furthermore, the threat to domestic and international security brought about by drug-
related activity, as explained in Chapter Two, has forced the concern to the forefront 
of the international political agenda. This chapter will look at the history of drug 
control this century, beginning with the League of Nations. The central part played by 
the United Nations in the establishment of various bodies and organs with the mandate 
to control drugs, and the formation of rules and decision-making procedures with 
, - . 
regard to global drug control will be discussed. The preoccupation of the United 
Nations with the development of rules and decision-making procedures will be seen to 
be ineffective, both in controlling illicit drug use, and in understanding the nature of 
the phenomenon. 
Regime theory emphasizes the subjective nature of international politics lacking 
in much of the state-centric, rule-orientated work on international organisations. 
However, the preoccupation of much of the literature on international regimes with 
rules and structures, repeats the path taken by those writing on international 
organisations and therefore has similar limitations, as the second part of this chapter 
will demonstrate. A theory of international regimes encompassing an understanding 
of international organisations and formal rules and decision-making procedures, but 
also emphasizing an understanding of the nature of issues, value' consensus and norm 
emergence is necessary for understanding the drug phenomenon. 
An understanding of the values and the norms evoked by issues explains why 
international drug control to date has been unsuccessful and why no single regime to 
regulate drug use is possible. As the last chapter has demonstrated, the values evoked 
by nineteenth century drug use, were dominated by the value of free trade. This can 
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be seen to have continued into the twentieth century and the establ ishment of the 
League of Nations. 
The League of Nations pen'od 
As the last chapter has demonstrated, international action on drug control began as 
early as the 1909 Shanghai Conference.! The Shanghai Conference in turn led to the 
Hague Conference and the drafting of the 1912 International Opium Convention: the 
first international agreement to regulate trade in, and abuse of, opium and other related 
substances, including cocaine2 • The Convention provided for the control of the export 
and import of raw opium, but did not prepare for any preventative action to restrict it. 
with the responsibility mainly given to customs officials. 3 The trade in prepared opium 
was to be suppressed gradually, but the responsibility for this lay with the states party 
to the Convention.4 They were free to decide as to how to take action towards the 
gradual suppression of the manufacture, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations empowered the League to control both licit and 
illicit manufacture of, and trade and traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, with 
the League Assembly establishing at its first session in 1920 an Advisory Committee 
on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (later replaced by the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs), to carry out these responsibilities. s During the League period, 
three Conventions were completed focusing on control of the trade in licit and illicit 
substances: the International Opium Convention of 1925, the Convention for Limiting 
the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931: and the 
Convention for the Suppression of III icit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936. These 
Conventions established various procedures and bodies, and also established various 
values and principles which were carried over into the United Nations period, and are 
therefore worth noting. 
The 1925 Convention devised the procedure for establishing whether or not a 
drug should be categorised as a dangerous drug for international control. This would 
be the responsibility of the Health Committee of the League in consultation with the 
Permanent Committee of the Office International d'Hygiene Publique in Paris.6 Under 
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the Convention, coca leaves, crude cocaine and Indian hemp, substances not covered 
by the Hague Convention, were brought under control. The Convention also established 
an intricate system of import and export certificates to control the international trade 
in drugs. The Permanent Control Board, the forerunner of the International Narcotics 
Control Board (see later), was set up to receive and disseminate information concerning 
the trade. The Board had no power to prevent the accumulation of excessive quantities 
of drugs, but Article 24 of the Convention authorised the Board to report to the 
Secretary-General of the League if any country was accumulating a controlled drug. 
If the Secretary-General received no adequate response from the country concerned on 
inquiry, the Board could recommend to the Contracting Parties to the Convention and 
the Council of the League that no further Convention substances should be made 
available to the country concerned. The Board was composed of eight experts, 
independent of their governments, elected on the basis of their impartiality, competence 
, - . 
and disinterestedness. Although established by Treaty, the Board's status lay 
somewhere between an inter-governmental organisation and a non-governmental 
organisation. 
The Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution 
of Narcotic Drugs of 1931 was unique from a legal point of view in that "it applied the 
principles of a controlled economy to a group of commodities by international 
agreement" .7 As its title describes, the Convention's aim was to lim it the manufacture 
and trade in narcotic drugs and to regulate their distribution by a system of estimates 
in order to limit manufacture to the requirements of medicine and science. One of the 
special features of the Convention was with regard to Non-Contracting Parties. They 
were also expected to provide estimates of their drug requirements. A Supervisory 
Board, created by the Convention to monitor the operations of the estimates system, 
would, in the absence of any estimate from a Non-Contracting Party, submit an 
estimate for that country to the Permanent Control Board, established by the 1925 
Convention. 8 
Neither the 1925 Convention, nor the 1931 Convention directly defined traffic 
in illicit drugs as being a criminal offence. The Convention for the Suppression of 
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Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936 was the first international convention to 
make the offence punishable. 9 Unfortunately, the conditions necessary for 
strengthening "the measures intended to penalise offences" were not existent at the time 
the Convention was concluded. Although some of the contemporary international 
conventions dealt with criminal offences, such as the Convention on the Suppression 
of the Traffic in Women and Children of 1921, the Convention on the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Obscene Publications of 1923, the Slavery Convention of 1926, and the 
Convention on the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency of 1929, the Contracting 
States abstained from incurring obligations which went beyond what was seen as "the 
necessities of the situation".l0 However, in attempting to encourage closer co-
operation in respect of drug offences between the pol ice authorities of different 
countries the Convention raised issues to do with international enforcement and drug 
trafficking, which remain just as pertinent to international drug control today (~ndeed 
the initiative to conclude the Convention was taken by the International Criminal Police 
Commission which later changed its name to the International Criminal Police 
Organisation - Interpol).l1 Despite this, the concerns with trafficking. for all intents 
and purposes, remained dormant until the eighties, as the United Nations focused on 
supply-reduction programmes. The 1936 Convention's direct recognition of illicit 
traffic as a criminal offence would not be the focus of United Nations drug-control 
policy again until the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. We will return to this question later in this chapter. 
As has already been illustrated in the previous chapter, the concern of the inter-
war period, as in the late nineteenth-century, was in the economic benefits to be 
achieved through free trade. The conventions concluded during the League period were 
generally "promotive" to licit trade rather than "preventive" against illicit trade. This 
was also to be the focus of the work of the United Nations, until recent developments, 
with the International Opium Convention of 1925 and the International Convention of 
1931 forming the basis to a considerable extent, of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs three decades later. 
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The United Nations period 
In 1946 the United Nations took over the functions of the League of Nations in the 
narcotics field. In the pre-war years, the number of products considered to be a danger 
and therefore subject to control, were largely limited to those relating to the opium 
poppy, the coca bush, and the cannabis plant. The period just before the Second World 
War saw many other compounds being synthesized. A desire to control those 
substances led to emerging new problems for international control. By 1960 six 
different drug control treaties, plus three amending protocols, were in force. 12 The 
main impact of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs l3, (hereinafter, the 
Single Convention), was to consolidate the nine instruments into a single one, thereby 
simplifying and strengthening United Nations drug-control activities. As was the focus 
of much of the work of the League, the initial work of the United Nations in the field 
of drug control, focused primarily on limiting the supply of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances to amounts required by states for scientific and medical 
purposes, so as to prevent their diversion into illicit traffic. Article 4 of the Convention 
states the general obligation "to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the 
production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use, and possession 
of drugs" . 14 
The United Nation's bodies, and the conventions ratified, had little effect on 
controlling illicit drug-use during the first two decades of drug-control activities, and 
no international regime to regulate the recreational use of illicit drugs or to deal with 
the problem of addiction can be seen to have emerged. The work of the League and 
the work of the various United Nation's bodies had focused on limiting the supply of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The dominant stake for the actors for 
whom drug control was salient was the importance of controlling effective trade of licit 
drugs for medical and scientific purposes. The importance of the "medical use of 
narcotic drugs ... for the relief of pain and suffering"IS was the value utilised to allow 
for the effective trade to continue, and superseded the value that drug use and drug 
addiction was evil and immoral. Therefore no regime to control illicit drug-use can be 
seen to have emerged. The value position that drugs were evil and immoral was not 
represented by a salient stake. Instead an international regime for the control of the licit 
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manufacture and trade in dangerous drugs for scientific and medical purposes can be 
seen to have emerged, centred around the International Narcotics Control Board. 
The lack of salience of the concerns surrounding illicit drug-use to the actors 
participating in the drug control regime was emphasised by the lack of attention given 
to drug addicts or drug abuse in the Single Convention. Despite the reference, in the 
preamble to the convention, to the dangers of drug addiction, the article in the 
convention concerned with the treatment and after-care of addicts was one of the 
briefest. Article 38 of the 1961 Single Convention requires that parties "give special 
attention to the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care, and rehabilitation 
of drug addicts" and that if its "economic resources permit. it is desirable that it 
establ ish adequate facilities for the effective treatment of drug addicts". 16 No further 
detail was given, emphasising the point made by Stein that "much of the history of 
national and international narcotics control can be written without reference to addicts 
or addiction". 17 
Drug use and addiction were seen as a social problem for national, and not 
international, concern during this period. Furthermore. the level of drug use and 
addiction were seen as relatively minor and unimportant in this period before the 
arrival of the "sixties drug culture". The belief that drugs were evil and dangerous was 
also not salient to actors in producer countries, as was emphasised in Chapter Two. 
The trade in licit drugs was seen as an inter-state concern, addiction an internal social 
problem, and therefore there was no possibility of a global regime emerging to control 
drugs in its supply, distribution and demand side. 
Structure for UN Drug Control Activities, Pre-Special Session 
Until the recent restructuring of United Nations drug-control activities, initiated by a 
Special Session of the General Assembly in 1990 (see later), there were five United 
Nations organs concerned wholly with drugs. They were two committee bodies and 
three Secretariat units: the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). a functional 
commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); the International 
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Narcotics Control Board (lNCB), an autonomous body of independent experts; and 
three units staffed by members of the Secretariat, the Division of Narcotic Drugs 
(DND), the secretariat to the INCB, and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control (UNFDAC). There were furthermore numerous other programmes, agencies 
and entities which took part in drug-control activities. (See Figure 1.) 
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is one of the six functional 
commissions of the Economic and Social Council, and was established in 1946.18 It 
is the successor of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs, which was set up by the first Assembly of the League of Nations. 
The Commission is the central policy-making body in the United Nations system for 
drug control. The main functions of the Commission are defined in the Single 
Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (see 
later)19. The Commission assists the Economic and Social Council in supervising the 
application of international drug conventions; prepares drafts for international 
conventions; considers changes to the existing machinery for international control and 
receives recommendations from the World Health Organisation for changes in the 
substances under control. 20 The Commission meets annually and its members are 
elected by ECOSOC. The sessions are also attended by many observer Governments 
(including states not members of the United Nations such as the Holy See and the 
Republic of Korea), specialized agencies (such as the ILO, UNESCO and the WHO), 
intergovernmental organisations (such as the Commission of the European 
Communities, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe, the Customs Co-
operation Council and Interpol) and non-governmental organisations in consultative 
status with the Economic and Social Council for example, the International Alliance 
of Women, the International Pharmaceutical Federation, the International Catholic 
Child Bureau, the International Road Transport Union, the Association for the Study 
of the World Refugee Problem and the International Union for Health Education21 • 
Membership of the Commission was enlarged in February 1992 from 40 to 53 
representatives of Member States.22 
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The Commission has established subsidiary bodies to co-ordinate the 
mechanisms for drug law enforcement at the regional level: The Sub-Commission on 
Illicit Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East, and regional meetings 
of the operational Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA). 
The Asian and Pacific HONLEA dates back to the 1970s; the Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and the African HONLEA were both established in 1987.23 More recently, 
there have been two inter-regional meetings in 1986 and 1989,24 with the latter 
recommending the setting up of a European HONLEA, which was established in 
1990. 2S 
The International Narcotics Control Board was established by the Single 
Convention of 1961 to help simplify and unify international narcotics regulation by the 
merger of the various supervisory mechanisms into a unified body. 26 The Board 
replaced the Permanent Control Board. The most important functions of the Board 
(outlined in Articles 12, 13, 14, 19 and 20 of the Single Convention, Article 2 of the 
1972 Protocol which amended Article 9 of the Single Convention, and Article 19 of 
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances) are to administer the estimates 
system and a statistical returns system for the monitoring of international licit trade in 
drugs; and to take measures to ensure the execution of the conventions. The Board 
consists of 13 members who are elected for a period of five years by the Economic and 
Social Council. Three are elected from candidates nominated by the World Health 
Organisation and ten from a list of persons nominated by members of the United 
Nations and by non-member States Parties to the 1961 ConventionY These members 
serve in their personal capacity rather than as representatives of their governments and 
are "persons who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, will 
command general confidence". 28 Furthermore, as Article 9 (3) states, ECOSOC "shall 
give consideration to the importance of including on the Board, in equitable proportion, 
persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the producing, manufacturing, 
and consuming countries, and connected with such countries. "29 
In order to ensure the maintenance of the "technical independence" of the Board 
as specified in Article 9(2) of the Single Convention, the Board, like its predecessor 
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body, has a separate staff responsible exclusively to the Board. This stems from the 
responsibilities assigned by the international drug-control treaties, including "quasi-
judicial functions" as described above. However, the Board's Secretary and secretariat 
(described below) were an integral part of the Secretariat of the United Nations and 
were under the full administrative control of the Secretary-General, confusing the 
position of the Board in the United Nations drug-control structure. Being primarily 
responsible for supervising the licit supply of drugs for legitimate medical and scientific 
uses, and in so doing preventing the diversion of licit drugs into illicit channels, the 
Board has a very limited mandate in the control of illicit drugs. 
As already mentioned, previous to the restructuring of United Nations drug-
control activities, there were three secretarial units concerned wholly with drug control. 
The Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) served as secretariat to the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs. The functions of the DND were specified by the international drug-
control treaties and specific mandates of the General Assembly. ECOSOC and the 
Commission. The Division advised and assisted governments and the specialised 
agencies on the application of the international drug-control treaties and provided 
governments with information on supply and demand reduction. It collected data and 
reponed on the extent, patterns and trends of drug abuse world-wide. It analysed and 
published data on illicit-drug traffic, seizures, counter measures and trends. In addition, 
the Division organised training seminars and workshops for expert groups on technical 
subjects such as the use of drug-scenting dogs, detecting illicit cultivation through 
satell ite remote sensing and aerial photography. and environmentally sound methods 
to eradicate drug crops. The Division was also the technical centre of the drug-control 
bodies and provided a variety of technical services to developing countries such as the 
provision of laboratory equipment, the training of personnel and the transfer of 
technical knowledge through various projects. The Divisions' drug laboratory, the 
United Nations Narcotics Laboratory, carried out and co-ordinated international 
chemical research on drugs, identifying and analyzing substances of abuse. Its Manual 
of Staff Skill Requirements and Basic Equipment for Narcotics Laboraton"es was a 
fundamental document for drug laboratories throughout the world. The laboratory 
produced a portable drug identification kit, a rapid and simple colour-test to identify 
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the most commonly confiscated drugs, to assist customs and law-enforcement officers. 
The work of the Division was therefore extremely varied and overlaps inevitably 
occurred with the other two secretariat units. For example, the collection of statistical 
data, monitoring the trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, was also 
collected by the INCB secretariat. 
The second secretariat unit, the INCB secretariat, took its instructions 
exclusively from the International Control Board itself on substantive matters. 
However, on administrative matters and those concerning overall co-ordination of the 
United Nations drug-control activities the INCB secretariat reported directly to the 
chief executive designated by the Secretary-General, being an integral part of the 
United Nations Secretariat. Its work was carried out under five sUb-programmes: the 
Office of the Secretary of the Board; the Narcotics Control Unit; the Estimates Unit; 
, - . 
the Psychotropic Control Unit; and the Precursors Control Unit. The secretariat 
represented the Board at meetings of United Nations organs, specialised agencies and 
international, regional or intergovernmental bodies. 
Finally, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established in 
1971 by General Assembly Resolution 2719 (XXV) on the initiative of the Secretary 
General. The specific primary purpose of the Fund was to finance actions in developing 
countries in order to ensure their full participation in the global drug-control effort. 
Funded entirely from voluntary contributions, and headed by an Executive Director it 
reported directly to the United Nations Secretary-General. During its first decade 
UNFDAC concentrated on giving technical assistance to producer developing-countries. 
Pilot projects in Myanmar (formerly Burma), Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey mobilised 
national resources for drug-control activities. UNFDAC was the principal "operational 
arm" of United Nations drug-control activities, most clearly illustrated in the "master 
plan" projects. In 1982, the Fund developed its country and regional "master plans", 
which were a key element in the organisation of its activities, thoroughly analyzing the 
drug problems within a country or region and implementing cohesive, integrated 
projects. In Colombia, the country where the Fund was most involved, there were 20 
projects in operation in 1990. These projects included four rural development 
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programmes featuring crop substitution; education and public information programmes 
through the mass media; two training programmes for educators; and special 
programmes on AIDS and for street children in Bogota. 
The ad hoc emergence of bodies, and the development of the bodies established 
by the League of Nations to deal with the evolving new concerns of unprecedented 
scale, complexity and gravity, has been a significant problem in effective, co-ordinated 
international control. The diversity and multiplicity of United Nations drug-control 
mechanisms has handicapped effective action. In addition, most of them were 
established at a time when international action was principally concerned with the 
control of I icit drugs for medical and scientific purposes. The diverse origins of the two 
main bodies, the CND and the INCB, and the ad hoc way in which their 
responsibilities have evolved, adds to the complexity of co-ordinating international drug 
control, which the 1988 Vienna Convention confused further (see later). The complex, 
overlapping structure of the United Nations drug-control secretariat further complicated 
the decision-making and co-ordinating process. Confusion over overlapping mandates 
and lines of reporting led to calls for restructuring. Before the restructuring of the 
drug-control units, the three Secretariats were each responsible to the United Nations 
Secretary-General. However, they had markedly different structures and lines of 
reporting. The Director of the Division of Narcotic Drugs was immediately responsible 
to the Director-General of the United Nations Office in Vienna (who was in turn 
responsible to the Secretary-General). The Secretary of the INCB reported on 
administrative matters to the chief executive for drug-control activities as designated 
by the Secretary-General and on policy questions to the Board itself. The Executive 
Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control reported directly to the 
Secretary-General. This led to problems of co-ordination. Recognition of the problem 
of co-ordination led to the Secretary-General transferring co-ordination to the Director-
General of the United Nations Office at Vienna in 1987 from the previous co-ordinator, 
the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs (appointed in 
1984) who had to travel back and forth to Vienna for meetings. 
The number of United Nations bodies, programmes and agencies which took 
152 
part in drug-control activities before the restructuring illustrated the complexity 
involved in co-ordinating activities. In the field of prevention and reduction of the illicit 
demand for narcotic drugs, the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs through its committee of experts, the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control, considered various issues relating to drug trafficking and drug control. 
Activities carried out included the formulation of technical co-operation projects in co-
operation with UNFDAC, focusing on measures against organized crime, with 
emphasis on drug trafficking, and the treatment of HIV-infected prisoners. Drug-
control activities carried out by the International Labour Organisation (lLO) related to 
the question of employment and the well-being of workers, focusing on drug-related 
problems in the workplace and on the areas of vocational rehabilitation and social 
reintegration of drug-dependent persons. Drug-control projects were often carried out 
with the assistance and/or funding of the WHO, UNFDAC, and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). From 1987 the United Nations Development 
Programme and UNFDAC operated under a co-operative agreement in which UNDP 
provided administrative and liaison services and field support and monitoring of 
UNFDAC projects. UNDP however spent very little money on drug-control efforts, 
less than a quarter of a million dollars in 1988-89.30 The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was involved with the prevention of 
drug abuse through public education and awareness programmes. It also became 
increasingly active in professional training programmes. The United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) was involved with drug abuse as it related to the estimated 100 million 
"street children" worldwide. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), and the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) were both involved in 
the elimination of the supply of drugs from illicit sources. The FAO was principally 
involved in the identification, formulation and execution of field activities in crop 
substitution. In this capacity it collaborated with UNFDAC, before the restructuring, 
and also collaborated with the DND in the use of remote sensing techniques and 
satellite imagery in the detection of illicit crops. UNIDO worked with United Nations 
drug bodies to ensure that its industry-promoting technical co-operation projects. such 
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as upgrading technology for the manufacture of drug products for medical and scientific 
use, were consistent with the requirements of the international drug control treaties. 
UNIDO also implemented various UNFDAC-funded agro-industrial projects aimed at 
providing alternative sources of income for coca farmers. 31 The World Food 
Programme (WFP) was involved with drug-control programmes through integrated 
rural development schemes aimed at substituting other agricultural products for illicitly-
grown opium poppy. It also provided food assistance for farmers and their families in 
areas where crop substitution was under way. 
United Nations entities involved in the suppression of illicit drug-traffic besides 
the DND and the INCB included the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (lCAO), the Universal Postal UJ1ion _(U~U) 
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). A major concern of the HvlO 
related to the increasing amounts of illicit drugs being transported by ship.31 The IMO 
Convention on Faciliation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, was amended on 3 
May 1990 to take into account the threat to international shipping posed by illicit drug-
trafficking and terrorism. In October 1989 the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly 
of the ICAO adopted resolution A27-12 which urged the Council of ICAO to elaborate 
with a high degree of priority concrete measures in order to prevent and to eliminate 
possible use of illicit drugs and abuse of other drugs or substances by all staff and also 
to continue its work to prevent illicit transport of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances by air. 33 
An examination of international co-operation in the drugs field shows clearly 
the multiplicity of functions and responsibilities and also the diversity of their origins. 
The ad hoc way in which organs and mandates evolved emphasised the lack of co-
ordination of the United Nations structures for drug control. An understanding of this 
complexity, as well as an understanding of the need to reconsider the supply-reduction 
focus, led to the recent reforms and restructuring of United Nations drug-control 
activities· which will be looked at in the next sections. As we have seen, for the greater 
part of this century drug legislation focused primarily on controlling the manufacture 
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and movement of licit drugs and in preventing their diversion into illicit channels, 
thereby curtailing the supply of illicit drugs. During the eighties, an opposing view 
emerged that drug control efforts should concentrate equally on demand reduction and 
on controlling the movement of illicit drugs. 
Drug control in the eighties 
The increasing complexity of the drug phenomenon throughout the eighties was 
mirrored by the increasing complexity of the evolving drug-control structures and 
activities. Three major UN events during the eighties emphasised this expanded 
approach to drug control by the United Nations: the 1987 International Conference on 
Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the 1990 Seventeenth 
Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to the question of international co-
operation against illicit production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 
Initial calls for a specialised conference to focus on the fight against drug 
trafficking began as early as December 1984 in para. 9 of resolution 391143, in which 
the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council, through the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to consider the possibility of convening a specialised 
conference. Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
on his own initiative, proposed to the Economic and Social Council in May 1985 that 
a world conference at the ministerial level to deal with all aspects of drug abuse should 
be held in 1987.34 
The International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (lCDAIT), 
held in Vienna in June 1987, led to the adoption of the Comprehensive 
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control (CMO).35 As 
the title suggests, the document introduced a major expansion in focus of United 
Nations drug-control activities. The CMO states that both the supply and demand for 
illicit drugs should be reduced, and that action must be taken to break the link between 
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them: 
"For the purpose of deal ing with the total ity of the problems posed by 
drug abuse and illicit trafficking, both the supply of and the demand for 
drugs should be reduced and action should be taken to break the link 
between demand and supply, that is, the illicit traffic. "36 
The CMO contains four chapters, dealing with preventing and reducing illicit demand, 
controlling supply, illicit trafficking, and treatment and rehabilitation. The four 
chapters contain 35 targets which are meant as recommendations to governments and 
to non-governmental organisations suggesting practical measures, "realistically 
attainable" over the next 10-15 years, which can contribute to the fight against drug 
trafficking (the targets are listed in Appendix A of this 'Nork). The role of NGOs is 
specifically emphasised in paragraph 24 of the document which states: 
"The value of non-governmental organisations and government agencies 
working together on complex national and international problems is 
nowhere more apparent than in the comprehensive long-term effort to 
reduce illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. "37 
The document also disaggregates the state into numerous branches involved with drug 
control such as; legislative organs; the authorities concerned with public health, 
education, social welfare; the judiciary; law enforcement; and economic affairs. 38 
As the opening paragraph of the document notes" it is not and was not designed 
to be a formal legal instrument" .39 The significance of the CMO was that it was a 
move away from the treaty-based supply-side approach to international drug control, 
inherited from the League and pursued during the first three and a half decades of 
United Nations involvement in international drug control. The CMO entails no binding 
legal commitments of states, but was a move towards recognizing the complexity and 
multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon and a move towards consensus building. 
However, the CMO was followed instead by the adoption of the 1988 United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and 
a return to the treaty-based approach to international co-operation. 
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The CMO, adopted by the ICDAIT, recognized the importance of effective 
international co-operation on law enforcement: 
" .... it is necessary to ensure vigorous enforcement of the law in order 
to reduce the illicit availability of drugs, deter drug related crime, and 
contribute to drug abuse prevention by creating an environment 
favourable to efforts for reducing illicit supply and demand ... Co-
ordination of activities and co-operation among national agencies within 
each country and between countries are vital for the achievement of the 
objective" .40 
The two pillars of international drug control, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, were seen as inadequate 
to deal with modern international drug trafficking. While these Conventions "focused 
primarily on controlling the production of licit drugs and the prevention of their 
, - . 
diversion into the illicit market place"41, they made little provision for effective law 
enforcement. 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/141 in December 1984, 
following an initiative from the government of Venezuela, expressed the conviction that 
the wide scope of illicit drug-trafficking and its consequences made it necessary to 
prepare a convention which considered the various aspects of the problem as a whole, 
and in particular, those not envisaged in existing international instruments. The 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs was requested by the Economic and Social Council to 
initiate the preparation of a draft convention. Acting pursuant to that mandate the 
Commission adopted by consensus on the 14th February 1986 a resolution in which it 
identified 14 elements for inclusion in a draft convention, which after discussion, 
debate and consultation, including four two-week open-ended experts' meetings, 
culminated in the holding of the United Nations Plenipotentiary Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances in Vienna from 25 November to the 20 December, 1988.42 The 
Conference was attended by 106 countries and a variety of observers and adopted, 
again by consensus, a treaty text of 34 articles and one annex. The United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was 
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adopted on December 19th, 1988 (hereinafter the Vienna Convention).43 (See 
Appendix B) The next day, ninety-six states signed the Convention's Final Act, forty-
four of which signed the Convention itself. The adoption of the convention marked 
only a two-year negotiation process. The speed of which emphasises that the drug 
phenomenon, as understood by Chapter Two of this research, had achieved "a certain 
level of opprobrium in the commonly shared values of mankind".4-4 
The preamble to the Vienna Convention explicitly recognises illicit trafficking 
as "an international criminal activity" and calls upon party states to take specific law 
enforcement measures to improve their ability to identify, arrest. prosecute and convict 
drug traffickers. The Vienna Convention attempts to give force to the illicit trafficking 
recommendations of the Ct-.'fO in recognition of the changing nature of the drug 
phenomenon and the increase in trafficking since the 1970s. It requires that signatory 
states establish as criminal offences under their domestic law a comprehensive list of 
activities, involved in or related to international drug trafficking, such as the 
production, manufacture, distribution or sale of any narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance, money laundering, and the trade in chemicals. materials and equipment used 
in the manufacture of controlled substances. However, although the Convention "cannot 
be read to permit Parties to escape their obligations ... by arguing that they are 
inconsistent with domestic law"4s (as Article 36(2) of the Single Convention as 
amended, does allow), the principle of state sovereignty as defined by international law 
remaIns. 
Although David Stewart states that "The Convention is one of the most detailed 
and far-reaching instruments ever adopted in the field of international criminal law, and 
if widely adopted and effectively implemented, will be a major force in harmonizing 
national laws and enforcement actions around the world "46, there is little of great 
innovation in its provisions for policy makers in North America and Western Europe. 
Efforts to address the problems associated with the extremely large profits generated 
by illicit traffickers by the "confiscation" (ie freezing, seizing and forfeiting) of 
traffickers' assets provided for in Article 5 of the Convention are familiar to European 
and American policy makers. United States law already permits the forfeiture of 
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property located in the United States "which represents the proceeds of an offence 
against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, importation, sale or distribution of 
a controlled substance", if such offences would have been punishable by imprisonment 
for one year or more had it occurred in the United States.47 In reference to Article 6 
concerning the extradition of narcotics traffickers, the Vienna Convention simply 
supplements older bilateral treaties already established, but which did not cover drug 
offences. In the area of mutual legal assistance covered by Article 7, assistance was 
already provided for on a regional basis in Europe and on a bilateral basis in the 
United States through "MLATs"(mutual legal assistance treaties).48 In addition to the 
mutual legal assistance provided for by Article 7, states party to the Convention are 
required by Article 9 to provide other, less formal types of law-enforcement assistance, 
co-operation and training. These less formal activities are, however, already provided 
for to a great extent by the work of the International Criminal Police Organisation 
. 
(Interpol). Under Article 11, states party are required to take the necessary measures 
to allow for "controlled delivery", widely used by United States authorities, to monitor 
the passage of an illicit consignment without arrest or seizure in order to trace the 
further movement of the consignment and to identify higher levels of the trafficking 
organisation. Furthermore, the insertion of safeguard clauses in many articles, and the 
weakness of monitoring and supervisory mechanisms, allows for parties to avoid 
obligations under the convention with relative impunity. A further criticism of the 
Vienna Convention and of the law-making treaties of the United Nations in general, is 
that they often reflect the lowest common denominator of consensus, since if they were 
more, states could simply refuse to ratify them. 
The growing complexity of the nature of the drug phenomenon and the 
increasing recognition of its threat to international order and' stability during the 
eighties, paralleled a period of increasing activity in United Nations drug-control 
activities, as has been described. However developments, necessitated by the more 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the phenomenon emphasised by the 
Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control 
(see Appendix A), can be seen to have complicated an already complex structure, 
rather than to have achieved the aim of greater co-ordination among the various United 
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Nations bodies, units and programmes involved in drug control. Confusion over 
mandates in drug-control activities was added to by the Vienna Convention. The 
Vienna Convention partly blurred the legislative and policy-making functions entrusted 
to the Commission and the technical supervisory and control functions entrusted to the 
International Narcotics Control Board. Comparison of the articles of the Vienna 
Convention on the respective functions of the Commission and the Board with the 
corresponding articles of the previous treaties reveals that the supervision of the 
application of some provisions of the 1988 Convention were entrusted to the 
Commission instead of the Board.49 At the same time, the responsibility for the 
control of the implementation of the provisions on precursors and chemicals used for 
the manufacture of illicit drugs described in Articles 12, 13 and 16, rests with the 
INCB.~o 
As has already been referred to, problems of co-ordination of the drug-control 
units at Vienna led to the appointment in 1984 of the Under-Secretary-General for 
Political and General Assembly Affairs to act as overall co-ordinator. However the 
Under-Secretary-General being based in New York, complicated co-ordination, rather 
than promoted co-ordination. In 1987, the Director-General of the United Nations 
Office at Vienna became co-ordinator for the drug programmes. This decision was not 
so much based on the necessity of having those involved in drug control in the same 
location, but rather in the context of budget reform and rationalization. However, the 
responsibilities of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna were 
already substantial and had increased further in the eighties. The need of the drug units 
was not so much for co-ordination, but for direction and integration, which was not 
achieved. 
Throughout the eighties, the issues involved in drug control had been discussed 
in a large number of meetings of heads of government, for example, the 1989 summit 
of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of Seven industrialised nations, the 
European Council and the Commonwealth. In order for the United Nations to remain 
the focus for multi-lateral action in view of the changing nature of the drug 
phenomenon, a Special Session of the General Assembly was called. 
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The restructuring process 
The Seventeenth Special Session of the General Assembly was held in New 
York in February 1990, to enhance the role of the United Nations in the field of drug 
control. The decision to hold a Special Session of the General Assembly was taken in 
resolution 44/16 of 1st November 1989 (initiated by the President of Colombia), in 
response to the issues involved receiving increasing attention in other international 
meetings of heads of governments, and to growing official concern over the expanding 
dimension of the drug phenomenon reflected in a number of United Nations 
intergovernmental forums, including the Second Interregional Meeting of Heads of 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (Vienna, 11-15 September 1989)51, and the 
Forty-Fourth session of the General Assembly (New York, September to December 
1989). A Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action were adopted in an 
, . 
acknowledgment of the importance of the changing nature of the drug phenomenon, 
recognized not only as a threat to health, but as a "grave and persistent threat .... to the 
stability of nations, [and] the political, economic, social and cultural structures of all 
societies "52 (See Appendix C of this work) The Global Programme of Action 
emphasises demand reduction with the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of 
Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control (outlined above) as its reference. The 
emphasis on demand reduction is stressed as being necessary to break the distribution 
link between supply and demand, and in so doing to diminish the increasing financial 
power of the drug traffickers that the previous focus on supply had failed to achieve. 
The Pol itical Declaration affirms the need for 
" ... strategies that are comprehensive and multidisciplinary in scope and 
that comprise measures to eliminate illicit demand for narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, cultivation of illicit crops and illicit drug 
trafficking, to prevent the misuse of the financial and banking systems 
and to promote effective treatment, rehabilitation and social 
reintegration". S3 
The Programme of Action calls for states to enhance the role of the United 
Nations as an "advisory centre" for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information 
on drug control. 54 It also outlines specific efforts to address the treatment, 
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rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts, the strengthening of judicial and 
legal systems, measures to be taken against the diversion of arms and explosives, and 
additional resources for United Nations drug-control units as well as the measures 
outlined above. 
The emphasis on demand reduction during the Special Session reaffirmed the 
change in United Nations' focus from the previous supply reduction focus, and an 
expanded conceptualisation of the drug problem. As the representative from Colombia 
stated: 
"We are witnessing an evolution towards a comprehensive, concerted, 
and joint confrontation of the problem, with recognition of the effects 
of demand and consumer abuse as the determining factors in this 
complex area" .55 
Despite these optimistic words and the fact that the Political Declaration did recognize 
the importance of "viable alternative income schemes" for developing countries, 
implementation was not forthcoming.56 Instead the Special Session decided to 
investigate restructuring options. Paragraph 94(a) of the Global Programme of Action 
expresses the need for coherence of activities within the drug-related units, co-
ordination, complementarity, and non-duplication of all drug-related activities across 
the United Nations system. 57 A Group of Experts was established to investigate the 
efficiency of the United Nations structure for drug abuse control. 58 
The United Nations International Drug Control Programme 
A group of fifteen experts selected by the Secretary-General from both developed and 
developing countries, was set up to develop a plan to integrate and upgrade the drug-
control activities of the Vienna-based drug-control secretariats. The Group held a 
number of meetings during three sessions at Vienna in May, June and July 1990 and 
submitted their report to the Secretary-General. In December 1990 the General 
Assembly approved the recommendation for a United Nations International Drug 
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Control Programme (UNDCP) to replace the drug control organs described above. 59 
The United Nations International Drug Control Programme integrates the 
structures and the functions of the three main secretariat bodies, the International 
Narcotics Control Board's Secretariat, the Division of Narcotic Drugs and the United 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, with the objective of enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of drug-control activities. The Programme is headed by an 
Executive-Director at the level of Under-Secretary-General with the exclusive 
responsibility for co-ordinating and providing effective leadership for drug-control 
activities, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting directly to the Secretary-
General. The Programme provides secretariat services to the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board. Despite the recommendation of 
, - . 
the expert group that the Commission be given a greater policy-making role, the roles 
of both the Commission and the Board remain unchanged by the creation of a drug 
control programme. 60 
In respect of the secretariat, a unified unit has been created at Vienna with 
responsibilities for (a) treaty implementation; (b) policy implementation and research; 
(c) operational activities. The unit is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General. As 
regards treaty implementation there are two services: the secretariat of the INCB and 
the secretariat of the CND. The secretariat of the INCB continues to be responsible to 
the INCB for substantive matters in order to ensure the full technical independence of 
the INCB, as described earlier. (See Figure 2) 
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FIGURE 2 United Nations International Drug Control Programme 
Source: Enhancement of the efficiency of the United Nations structure for drug abuse 
control. Repol1 of (he Secretary General, 23 October, 1990. United Nations document 
A/45/652, Annex, p 6. 
The United Nations International Drug Control Programme is an organizational unit 
within the United Nations Secretariat, accountable to the Secretary-General. The 
Programme's work covers a wide range of activities, including demand reduction, 
suppression of illicit traffic, integrated rural development and crop substitution, law 
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enforcement, legal assistance, treatment and rehabilitation and social re-integration of 
drug addicts in its role of carrying out the mandates and recommendations of the 
Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control 
and the Global Programme of Action.61 The Programme's financial resources come 
from two sources: the United Nation's regular budget and voluntary contributions. In 
the latter respect it is supported by the Fund of the United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme, established by the General Assembly in 1992.62 The budget for 
UNDCP in 1992 and 1993 totalled $183 million.63 The Fund is the successor to the 
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control: like its predecessor it is supported 
entirely from voluntary contributions of member governments and private organisations 
and is responsible for financing operational activities mainly in developing countries. 64 
In addition to co-ordinating UN drug-related activities, UNDCP has encouraged 
parties outside the UN, especially financial institutions such as the World Bank, to 
include the drug dimension in their own policies and programmes. The World Bank has 
recently incorporated drug-related considerations in reports on Bolivia and Peru.65 The 
more structured approach of the programme in its co-operation with organisations such 
as Interpol and the Customs Cooperation Council has the aim of avoiding overlap and 
duplication of work. 
Significantly however the restructuring of United Nations drug-related activities 
has seen minimal change to the role of the two committee bodies, the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board. 
The future role of the UN in international drug control 
The problems associated with the United Nations drug control structure reflect the 
problems associated with the expansion in scope, range and volume of work of the 
United Nations in the last 40 years. The increase in the number of issues that are truly 
global in nature on the international agenda has led to an increase in inter-governmental 
machinery, a growth in institutions, subsequent overlap of agendas and duplication of 
work in the United Nations itself and its affiliated bodies and Specialised Agencies. 
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The United Nations structures have become too complex, leading to dispersion of 
responsibility and a diffusion of lines of authority, accountability and communication. 
Furthermore the emergence of other organisations with terms of reference compatible 
with its own has led to an inefficient tangle of duplicated work. This is particularly 
illustrated by drug-control efforts. 
On the question of law-enforcement and policing there was unnecessary overlap 
in Europe between the work of the DND, and now the work of the UNDCP and the 
Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Drugs (the 
Pompidou Group), the Trevi Group of EC Ministers of the Interior and Justice 
(Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence66) and the International 
Criminal Police Organisation ICPOlInterpol, where the work of the Drugs Intelligence 
Unit of the DND came close to police operations. Member countries reported drug 
seizures to the DND and exactly the same information went to Interpol. The DND also 
sponsored meetings of the Heads of National Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA). 
The DND was here involved in an activity in which Interpol has long specialised. Since 
the creation of the Drugs Sub-Division in 1930 Interpol has concerned itself with 
controlling drug trafficking, first working with the League of Nations and later with 
the United Nations drug control bodies. This cooperation culminated in Resolution 
1579 (L) adopted in 1971 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. which 
made it obi igatory for the Secretariats of the two organisations to exchange information 
and documents concerning matters of mutual interest, to consult each other. and to set 
up a system of technical co-operation for independent projects. Furthermore. following 
a meeting of Trevi ministers in The Hague on 2-3 December 1991 to discuss the 1992 
Programme of Action. a formal agreement was made to establish a European Police 
Organisation or "Europol", whose purpose is to collect and analyse information on 
cross-border crime. including crime that extends beyond the Community. The first 
stage in this process was the establishment of a European Drugs Unit (EDU).67 Title 
VI of the Maastricht Treaty for the first time brought "combatting drug addiction" and 
"preventing and combatting unlawful drug trafficking" within the scope of the Council 
of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament. This and other work of 
the Trevi Group still remains outside the European Community but is part of the wider 
166 
European Union. 68 The work of the United Nations, in many areas can be seen to be 
superseded by numerous other multi-national and regional initiatives. 
The importance of achieving direction and integration of the drug programme 
reflects the same problems facing the United Nations system in general, as numerous 
inquiries into the need for reform of the United Nations have pointed out. Various calls 
for reform of the United Nations system such as the 1969 Jackson Report69 , the 1975 
Report of the Secretary General's Experts 70, the 1985 Bertrand Report 71 and the 
1986 Report of Committee of Eighteen72 have each emphasised different areas for 
reform, whether managerial, structural or financial, but have added more sub-headings 
to the agenda of reform rather than improving and streamlining the system itself. 
According to Maurice Bertrand this has led to a pre-occupation in the way in which the 
miII operates becoming more important than the quality of the flour it produces. In his 
. 
report on the managerial and structural shortcomings of the United Nations, he states 
that: 
"The vagueness of the terms of reference, the similarity of jurisdiction 
between organs and the number and repetition of "general debates" 
preceding the examination of the agenda items repeated in committee 
after committee whose relative status is not clearly defined, have created 
in the UN particularly a state of confusion which in spite of countless 
efforts has been difficult to remedy. "73 
The decade-old Bertrand Report, often quoted by scholars writing about the 
United Nations, still reads as a relevant critique of the system today and the major 
criticisms made are particularly relevant to United Nations drug-control activities and 
structures. Bertrand criticizes the United Nations for its "sectoral functional ism" 
especially with regard to the Specialised Agencies, and for the "remote control by staff 
members living in the great capitals" and the subsequent "lack of co-ordination between 
the heads of various bodies", which had become, "altogether inappropriate for a 
problem which calls for an integrated approach and organised co-operation by all 
parties concerned. "74 The structural complexity leads to lack of co-ordination and 
definition of priorities. Bertrand comments on the universal nature of the contents of 
United Nations programmes, which adds to the organisations complexity, as with the 
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drug control programme which covers all aspects of the phenomenon as an integrated 
whole. The ad hoc emergence of bodies and programmes reflects the development of 
drug control activities as the organisation fought to keep up with events in the outside 
world. Indeed this sectoralisation and fragmentation of the United Nations has meant 
that the Specialised Agencies have become, in various respects, detached from the real 
world, and are not therefore able to identify global problems properly.75 
The view that the United Nations should have the capacity to deal with global 
problems, co-ordinating the international response, was emphasised by the Roundtable 
on "The Future Role of the United Nations in an Interdependent World" held in 
Moscow in September 1988 on the initiative of the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) and the USSR United Nations Association. 76 A new 
structure for the United Nations was called for in order to enable it to deal with what 
were termed "global watch issues"; issues on which convergence of interests exists. It 
was suggested that global watch would be appropriate for such issues as natural 
disasters, the global biosphere, international debt, disease control (such as AIDS), 
refugees, illegal capital flight and international narcotics trafficking. However, the 
inability of the United Nations drug control bodies to control the expansion in the 
production, distribution and demand for illicit drugs, can be seen to reflect its 
limitations as a formal organisation to manage the new global concerns on the 
international agenda. 
The restructuring and reorganisation of the Secretariat units called for by the 
Global Programme of Action, unless the roles of the Commission and the Board are 
also clearly defined, are not sufficient to have an effect on the United Nation's impact 
on global drug control. It is the involvement of the Specialised Agencies and other 
United Nations programmes whose activities were numerous but lacked co-ordination, 
which requires fundamental and far-reaching analysis. The United Nations International 
Drug Control Programme is still at a relatively early stage in "generating the necessary 
momentum for a globally coordinated drug effort". 77 The UNDCP has begun the 
process of developing effective co-ordination and co-operation arrangements not only 
with other United Nations entities, but with those outside the United Nations system 
168 
as well. 78 However, as shown by Chapter Two, the phenomenon is too complex and 
multi-faceted to be viewed as a single issue, despite the expanded conceptualisation of 
the drug phenomenon by the UNDCP. The creation of a drug control programme 
perpetuates the view of the phenomenon as a single issue. The structural approach 
adopted by international organisations is alone, incapable of understanding the nature 
of the drug phenomenon. International regimes, in encompassing an understanding of 
international organisations and formal rules and decision-making procedures, but also 
in encompassing an understanding of the nature of issues, values and norms, can more 
clearly explain the phenomenon. 
International collaboration and international regimes 
The study of international organisations has declined since the Second World \Var (see 
Figure 3) as scholars have shifted their focus away from the 'Study of formal 
international institutions and the perspective that international governance was whatever 
international organisations did, towards interest in broader forms of international 
institutionalized behaviour and renewed inquiry into the problem of international 
governance. 79 1001 
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As Kratochwil and Ruggie state, 
"When the presumed identity between international organizations and 
international governance was explicitly rejected, the precise roles of 
organizations in international governance became a central concern". 80 
This has led to increasing interest in the concept of international regimes, as expressing 
"the parameters and the perimeters of international governance "81, which can be seen 
to have culminated in the 1982 conference on international regimes in the United 
States, and a more recent European conference in Tubingen, Germany in 1991. 81 
However, concern with the nature of international governance. the role of 
international organisations, and the role of international regimes, has not been 
developed in any systematic fashion, so as to lead to an enhancement of our 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between international organisations~ such 
as the United Nations and its drug-control activities and the possible evolution of an 
international drug-control regime. This is because to date, the dominant work on 
international regimes, as with international organisations, has concentrated on structural 
models to explain the nature of both regimes and international organisations, within a 
Real ist hegemonic framework. 
In the introduction to his book, Krasner identifies three distinct models for 
understanding international regimes: structuralist or Realist, modified structuralist or 
modified Realist, and Grotian. The structuralist model assumes a world of unitary state 
actors engaged in power maximisation. According to this model, the concept of 
international regimes is useless since they have no independent impact on international 
outcomes, and as Kenneth Waltz states can be seen as only one small step removed 
from the underlying power capabilities that sustain themY It was the work of 
Keohane and Nye, already mentioned in earlier chapters that first linked regime 
emergence and decline with rise and fall of the power of a hegemon. They proposed 
a more disaggregated structural model, or "issue-structural" model S4 , that emphasised 
states as the dominant actors in international affairs, but that in certain restrictive 
conditions, accepted states may have to give up a certain degree of independence in 
order to reach the optimum outcome. In this situation they say, regimes may arise.~5 
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For modified structuralists, regimes "constitute the general obligations and rights that 
are a guide to states' behaviour" must be viewed as "something more than temporary 
arrangements that change with every shift in power or interests". 86 The above 
approach, which has been labelled "conventional structuralism", and its modification, 
"modified structuralism" both emphasise "states" as the dominant actors, and inter-state 
behaviour as the dominant concern for study. In this way international regimes can 
have no independent impact on global change and are therefore not analytically useful. 
Structural models of regimes however, are not useful in understanding behavioral 
processes underlying international co-operation in the form of an international regime, 
concentrating instead on rules and decision-making procedures. However the Krasner 
definition stresses the normative dimension to international politics, by emphasising 
change to rules and decision-making procedures as change within a regime, but change 
in principles and norms as changes to the regime itself. 87 
Although the structural approach has dominated much of the work on 
international regimes to date, an alternative, what has been termed "Grotian approach" , 
has been offered by writers such as Donald Puchala, Raymond Hopkins and Oran 
Young, which emphasises the existence of regimes in "every substantive issue-area 
where there is discernibly patterned behaviour". 88 Indeed Oran Young begins one of 
his articles, "We live in a world of international regimes". 89 The Grotian approach 
to international regimes is in contrast to both conventional and modified structuralism, 
in accepting regimes as a fundamental part of the international system. The 
international system is not seen as composed only of sovereign states with the only 
issue being one of power and security. The concept of state sovereignty is challenged 
by this approach. The ability of states to maintain dominance over all aspects of the 
system is seen as limited, as is the use of force. For Puchala and Hopkins, elites are 
the "practical actors" in international regimes: "bureaucratic units or individuals who 
operate as parts of the "government" of an international subsystem by creating, 
enforcing or otherwise acting in compliance with norms".90 In this approach a regime 
is defined as "a set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge. These serve to channel political action within a system and give 
it meaning". 91 
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The Grotian approach has been criticised by writers such as Arthur Stein for 
being so broad "as to constitute either all international relations or all interactions 
within a given issue-area", and that "Such use of the term regime does no more than 
signify a disaggregated issue-area approach to the study of international relations". 91 
And as such, as Jack Donnelly comments, "regime" means little more than "issue-area 
or political subsystem" and "pointlessly adds to our already overstocked store of 
jargon".93 However, Stein also criticises current regime analysis for the other 
extreme, in that "regimes are defined as international institutions. In this sense, they 
equal the formal rules of behaviour specified by charters of such institutions ... This 
formulation reduces the new international political economy to the old study of 
international organizations ... "94 
The Puchala and Hopkins definition of an international regime, outlined above, 
draws upon the work of David Easton. 9S Indeed, this explanation of the nature of 
international regimes can be seen as synonymous with David Easton's definition of a 
pol itical system as "any set of variables selected for description and explanation". 96 
However an exploration of the relationship between regimes and systems can lead to 
a more satisfactory explanation of regime dynamics. As has already been stated in 
Chapter T\\'o, two key concepts emerged from the literature of interdependence: the 
concept of regimes, and the concept of issues forming distinct issue-systems governing 
behaviour within a state of interdependence. Chapter Two has already looked at the 
nature of issues in international politics and Chapter Three developed a theory of the 
emergence of issues onto the international agenda through a focus on values. The 
emphasis on understanding the nature of issues through an understanding of values is 
central to systems analysis and gives a firmer theoretical footing for exploring the 
normative nature of international regimes which is lacking in the dominant structural 
approach to regime creation. 
The linking of systems theory with regime theory is not divorced from the 
intellectual progression of the discipline as described earlier. Indeed in David Easton's 
1965 volume of political theory, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, his description 
of a regime as an "object of support" between a constitutional order and a political 
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community, introduces concepts util ised by the later regime theorists. 97 A regime is 
described as a set of constraints on political interaction which can be broken down into 
three components: values (described as goals and principles), norms, and structures of 
authority. The values are described as "broad limits with regard to what can be taken 
for granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy without violating deep feelings of 
important segments of the community"; norms are described specifying "the kinds of 
procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of 
demands"; and the structures of authority "designate the formal and informal patterns 
in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and 
implementing of decisions - the roles and their relationships through which authority 
is distributed and exercised. "98 Easton goes on to say that "The regime also includes, 
however, those parts of the established expectations in political life that may seldom 
be envisaged as part of a constitution ...... " .99 The work of Easton parallels the later 
Krasner definition of a regime as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations". 100 
Although critics of regimes believe that regime theory is simply a new disguise 
for systems theoryl°l this research claims that international regimes and issue-systems 
can be seen as different stages in the same process of agenda formation. 
As already explained in Chapter Two, an issue-system is a set of actors for 
whom a single issue is salient. The extent to which the actors in the issue-system 
regulate the issue, by authoritatively allocating the values at stake (Easton) is variable. 
Where regulation occurs the phenomenon of an international regime emerges. A regime 
can be seen as a sub-set of an issue-system (See Figure 4). 
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en\'ironment 
FIGURE 4 Regimes and issue-systems 
Regulation occurs when the values under contention lead to the acceptance of a norm 
on which the regime is based. A focus on norms as more specific \'alues. can elplain 
the relationship between issue-systems and regimes. Issue-systems form norms through 
the process of contention over values leading to consensus around a norm, and regimes 
enforce and regulate norms in the policy-system. 
Despite the criticisms of regime theory as a "passing fad ... an American 
academic fashion" by Susan Strange101 , as we have seen, regime theory is part of the 
intellectual progression of the discipline of International Relations. Another criticism 
of regimes levied by Susan Strange in her article is that regimes were invented by 
social scientists. On the contrary, the concept of regimes ha\'e a long history in 
international law which the next chapter on the norms of international drug control will 
explore further. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show how despite eight decades of international action 
by the League of Nations and the United Nations in the field of international drug 
control the problems associated with all aspects of the drug phenomenon, as described 
in Chapters One and Two, have increased. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations 
in th is area can be seen to be due to the fact that the structural approach to global 
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change adopted by international organisations that concentrates on bargaining and 
negotiating procedures and legal rules, has not allowed the United Nations to recognize 
the diversity of issues involved. Therefore there has been no movement towards 
consensus on the issues and no agreement on norms by consensus. As Bertrand stated 
in his 1985 report, the United Nations needs to return to the aims of its Charter as a 
focus for international consensus-building. The drug phenomenon reflects this 
necessity. As the Executive Summary of the report on the "Enhancement of the 
efficiency of the United Nations structure for drug abuse control" states, the drug 
problem "involves the use that Governments wish to make of the United Nations and 
how they wish to confront a challenge that endangers the survival of human 
civilisation" .103 The recent changes to United Nations drug-control activities, as well 
as the numerous efforts at reforming the United Nations system, have concentrated on 
administrative and co-ordination changes. Consensus-building on the issues involved 
in the drug phenomenon has taken second place. 
During the eighties, however, consensus was reached on the need to "break the 
link between demand and supply, that is, the illicit traffic. "104 The adoption by 
consensus in Vienna in December 1988 of the United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances can be seen to be an 
example of the willingness of states to attempt to control an activity which had 
"attained a certain level of opprobrium in the commonly shared values of 
mankind. "lOS However, this focus on trafficking by the United Nations cannot be seen 
to have produced an effective global regime to control the activity. Implementation of 
the norm has proved to be impossible due to the nature of the drugs themselves and the 
ease with which they can be transported, as outlined in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the 
drug-control bodies of the United Nations, despite the restructuring, have not clearly 
evolved into an authoritative decision-making focus, necessary for regime creation and 
norm implementation. Whether the United Nations International Drug Control 
Programme can evolve into a global decision-making focus remains to be seen. The 
regionalisation of trafficking control, as demonstrated by the work of the European 
Community suggests not. Attempts to control drug trafficking can be seen to have led 
at best to the emergence of a "declaratory regime" to use Donnelly's regime 
175 
classification. 106 This will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
The drug phenomenon is not a single issue, as often conceptualised, but is in 
fact a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon requiring precisely the issue-
specific focus of regime analysis as understood by this research. Since the issues 
involved in the drug phenomenon are conceptuaIly linked but behaviourally different, 
no single international regime to regulate drug control is possible. As has already been 
mentioned, the expansion of illicit drug-production, trafficking and consumption has 
outpaced the United Nation's efforts to contain it. Furthermore, some of the economic, 
political and social developments that have occurred throughout the early nineties can 
be seen as potential harbingers of crisis for countries that have so far been relatively 
free of drug-related problems. Alternative forms of co-operation, such as the creation 
of several different international regimes, for the various drug-related problems. is 
urgently needed. 
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Chapter 5 
Norms and International Relations 
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Introduction 
The commonly accepted definition of an international regime as "implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations", emphasises the 
subjective nature of international politics!. Krasner includes principles (described as 
beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude) and norms (standards of behaviour in terms of 
rights and obligations) as defining characteristics of a regime2• Change of a regime is 
characterised by the alteration of principles and norms, whereas changes in rules and 
decision-making procedures are referred to as changes only within regimes3 • The 
inclusion of norms and principles in Krasner's definition emphasises one of the earlier 
attractions of regime theory in that it included patterns of co-operation that were not 
embodied in specific sets of legal rules or international organisations and so highlighted 
the normative area for exploration by regime theorists. Yet despite this, as the previous 
chapter has emphasised, structural explanations of regime dynamics. with a 
concentration on the rules and decision-making procedures of regimes, have 
predominated. The concept of hegemony, with powerful actors writing the rules in their 
own interests, has been used to explain both regime creation, change and decline. 
However, as Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins write, international regimes "exist 
primarily as participants' understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate, 
appropriate or moral behaviour"4 (emphasis by current author) which suggests that 
state-centric power theory cannot alone adequately explain regime creation. Despite the 
obvious need therefore to understand the nature and role of norms in regime analysis. 
very little work has been done in this area. 
One reason why regime norms have been neglected is due to the dominance of 
American literature on regime theory with its preoccupation with the concept of 
hegemonic stability and until recently, the lack of development of regime theory within 
a European context and its broader tradition of thought on the role of the individual, 
the state, and the existence of various conceptions of an "international society". One 
of the few International Relations scholars to have focused on the importance of norms 
in international affairs. Friedrich Kratochwil, talks about the "premature fascination" 
186 
of regime scholars with regime change as failing to develop criteria by which regime 
adaption (changes to rules and decision-making procedures) can be distinguished from 
regime change itself (changes to norms and principles) or from regime decline. since 
regime change was originally identified with regime decay and associated with 
reflections of hegemonic power. S If regimes are simply to be associated with notions 
of hegemonic power then they can have no independent impact on international affairs 
and so the answer to Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons cry, in their 1987 overview 
of regime literature, "Do regimes "matter"?" would have to be a negative one.6 As 
Oran Young states, one of the most surprising features of the emerging literature on 
regimes is the relative absence of sustained discussions of the significance of regimes 
as determinants of collective outcomes at the international level. Indeed as Young asks, 
why bother to study regimes, if you give them no impact on institutional behaviour? 
But as Young states, the proposition that regimes do matter and effect behaviour "is 
- - . 
relegated to the realm of assumptions rather than brought to the forefront as a focus 
for analytical and empirical investigations". 7 Whether regimes matter depends on the 
role allotted to norms in international affairs. Many analysts agree that norms are a 
central feature of international regimes. However, recent regime literature can be seen 
to have moved even further away from an understanding of the importance of norms 
and principles in regime creation. A recent description of regimes by Robert Keohane 
as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to 
particular sets of issues in International Relations"8, makes no reference to norms. In 
this he makes little distinction between regime theory and work on international 
institutions. With such an approach, as Arthur Stein amongst others have pointed out, 
in criticism on much of the work on international regimes, the concept adds little to our 
understanding of global politics. 9 
Krasner states that norms and principles, and not rules and decision-making 
procedures are fundamental for understanding regime change and therefore by 
implication regime creation and decline. In this sense the phenomenon of regime 
continuation after the removal of hegemonic support (of interest to several regime 
theorists 'O) can be explained. But the Krasner volume fails to develop this side of the 
definition and to explain the nature of norms, with "norms" and "rules" not clearly 
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distinguished from each other in much of the volume. Research into international 
regimes has concentrated on hegemonic power explanations of regimes, which dismiss 
totally, or sideline, the importance of norms. In this way regimes are denied any 
independent impact in world politics and cannot, as Haggard and Simmons ponder 
"matter". This work has based itself on the premise that regimes do matter, and 
therefore we need a clearer understanding of the nature, role and impact of norms in 
International Relations as this chapter will demonstrate. Again, problems over 
terminology, highlighted in previous chapters will be addressed. Problems concerning 
the use of the term "norm" strike at the heart of the concerns over regime theory, that 
there is still no fundamental answer to Krasner's first question, "What is a regime?", 11 
because as Haas points out "theorists of regimes disagree widely because the words 
they use ... come from different normative and philosophical traditions".12 These 
traditions therefore have to be explored. 
Issue-Systems, norms, and international regimes 
The last chapter referred to the relationship between the concept of issue-systems and 
international regimes as different stages in the same process of agenda formation. 
Critics of regime theory have attacked international regimes for simply being systems 
"in disguise". i3 Both Arthur Stein and Jack Donnelly have commented on the fact that 
much of the current regime literature simply adds to the already overstocked store of 
jargon that makes up contemporary International Relations.I-I However, this writer 
believes the two concepts to be analytically distinct and this distinction can be 
comprehended by an understanding of the concept of norms. 
As Chapter Three explained, values are abstract aspirations for improving the 
human condition that can only be pursued indirectly by the acquisition of concrete 
objects, or stakes. As Mansbach and Ferguson write, "Abstract values are sought as 
consummatory ends with intrinsic worth, while the stakes that represent them are 
merely instrumental in terms of their satisfaction"15. When a high level of consensus 
is reached over the disposition of stakes, we can see norm emergence. Issue-systems 
can be seen to generate norms if and when the process of contention over values leads 
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to consensus around a norm. Then regimes can be seen to enforce and regulate norms. 
(See Figure 5) 
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The norm-regulated rules of a regime are implemented in \\'hat can be seen as 
a drugs policy-system, as referred to in Chapter Two. A policy-system can be seen as 
a set of issues conceptually different but behaviourally linked. The issue of money-
laundering, for example, involves contention among actors for whom the issue IS 
salient forming an issue-system. The issue-system generates a norm which is 
implemented within the banking and finance policy-system as the next chapter will 
explain further. 
As the previous chapter on the changing attitudes towards drug use in the 
nineteenth-century demonstrated, contention among actors over values led to the 
formation of various issue-systems with economic efficiency and economic welfare, as 
values, overriding anti-drug values. There was no agreement on the value position that 
drugs were evil and dangerous and therefore no norm emerged to be enforced and 
regulated by a drug-control regime. With the decline in the relative salience of the 
economic welfare value, for the actors concerned during the first half of the twentieth 
century, the anti-drug value position increased in importance. As a result a number of 
anti-drug norms were formed along with a weak drug-control regime. In this sense 
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issue-systems and regimes can be seen as producing the same process of behaviour 
modification, with norms forming the link in understanding both the conceptual world 
of issues and the behavioural world of policy formation. 
It is therefore necessary to identify norms in the present day politics of drugs 
in order to understand regime creation and regime absence. To identify the norms 
concerned with drug-related activity, and to understand the role norms play in regime 
creation and significance, it is necessary to reach a suitable definition of a norm. 
As has already been emphasised in this work and in the work of others. the 
apparently haphazard aggregation of disparate phenomena in the Krasner definition of 
an international regime, such as implicit rules, principles and norms, adds to the 
confusion in understanding the nature of international regimes. 16 The difficulty of 
distinguishing an "implicit rule" from a "norm" or from a "principle", has led to the 
role of norms not being explicitly explored by regime theorists. A clearer 
understanding of the role of norms in international regimes IS needed. distinct from 
rules and decision-making procedures. 
nle nature of norms 
The concept of a norm is not expanded in the Krasner \vork beyond the initial 
description as outlined above. despite the emphasis of the importance of norms in the 
introduction to the book. Neither does Kratochwil present us with a definitive 
understanding of the concept. He states, "Norms are used to make demands. rally 
support, justify actions, ascribe responsibility, and assess the praiseworthy or 
blameworthy character of an action. "17 This is an extensive list of characteristics. that 
will be refined later in the chapter. But Kratochwil emphasises that his purpose is not 
to understand the nature of norms: "I shall use the terms "norms" and "rules" 
interchangeably, since I am mainly concerned with the force of prescriptions" . 18 One 
of the difficulties involved in understanding norms is that the term is often used 
interchangeably with both "rules", as the work of Kratochwil emphasises. and 
"values" . 
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As Kratochwil states he is not interested in distinguishing between rules and 
norms. The sociologist Ullmann-Margalit, in her work, The Emergence of Norms, 
hypothesises a lack of clarity over the two terms may be due to the different 
backgrounds of writers: that the term "norm" tends to be used by Continental authors, 
whereas the term "rule" and "law" is preferred by Anglo-Saxons to cover more or less 
the same domain of discourse. 19 Although the Krasner definition does blur the two by 
talking about "implicit rules" and "explicit norms", and although, at the margin, they 
can be seen to merge into one another, it is clear that there is a difference between the 
two. As will be shown, it is important to distinguish between the two for an 
understanding of the importance of norms for international regimes. In order to 
understand the impact of regimes, we need to separate out the norms from the rules 
and from the actual behaviour. That is, in asking whether regimes matter we need to 
know if norms change an actor's behaviour. 
Norms are often used interchangeably with values in International Relations 
literature with little methodological consistency. This can be seen to be due to the 
dominance of the Realist paradigm in the discipline which dismisses norms and values 
as of little importance in international affairs, concentrating instead on notions of power 
and status. It is however common to find both terms in the disciplines of anthropology, 
sociology and political science with the study of comparative politics. However, as 
James Rosenau states in his work, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, neither 
students of comparative politics nor those in international politics are "drawn by 
conceptual necessity to find a theoretical home for the external behaviour of 
societies" .20 Students of comparative politics, concerned with pO,litical functions, goal 
attainment and political culture, focus primarily on processes within societies. As such, 
they have generally not accounted for the penetration of national societies by 
international systems21 • This penetration is clearly demonstrated by international drug 
control, where international legislation at the turn of the century preceded national 
legislation in many cases. Similarly, one reason many national governments now give 
as to why the legalisation of cannabis cannot be considered is their commitment to 
international control. Students of the traditional approach to International Relations 
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have focused on processes of interactions that occur benveen national systems. 
However, in the Globalist paradigm, adopted by this work, the boundary between the 
national and the international is challenged. An exploration of recent literature in the 
discipline of sociology, beginning with the work of Amitai Etzioni (as referred to in 
Chapter Three), can be seen to have begun to illuminate the relationship between the 
national and the international, and the discipline of sociology generally can be used to 
illuminate the concept of norms. 
The Krasner description of norms as "standards of behaviour defined in terms 
of rights and obligations" and Milton Rokeach's description of values as " an enduring 
belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially 
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" ,12 
obviously share some common ground. But it is important to differentiate_between 
them. Norms are not the same as values. Values are abstract: they can exist 
independently of a specific situation. In contrast norms are "role-specific and context 
specific" modes of behaviour. 23 When norms are used in general terms, detached from 
specific issues and circumstances, they can be difficult to distinguish from values, 
adding to the confusion. Values however can be seen as more general. and norms more 
specific. A single value can be translated into and codified into a great number and 
variety of different norms. As the sociologist Robin Williams describes it, "The same 
value may be a point of reference for a great many specific norms; a particular norm 
may represent the simultaneous application of several separable values ... Values as 
standards (criteria) for establishing what should be regarded as desirable, provide the 
grounds for accepting or rejecting particular norms. "24 
A fundamental difficulty with reaching an understanding of a norm is that the 
concept has different meanings in the literature of different fields, as suggested above. 
In the discipline of International Relations, the term would appear to be naturally 
associated with "normative theory", which has become increasingly popular in the last 
decade, in the same period that the concept of international regimes has also become 
popular-. 25 Normative theory asks of world pol itics a question that pol itical theory has 
asked of politics in domestic societies for centuries, "What is the good life?". In this 
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sense, it stands in the tradition of ethical political philosophy and seeks to warrant or 
justify alternative ethical positions. Therefore, although it concerns itself with values 
and norms, as do those studying comparative politics, the current debate between 
"cosmopolitanism and communitarianism "26 in asking whether present structures of 
the international system promote or detract from the living of "the good life", does 
little to explain behaviour and impact on decision-making, but rather restricts itself to 
philosophical considerations, and works in isolation from regime theorists. For 
normative theorists, norms are seen as standards of behaviour that are considered 
"right", and are a standard by which behaviour can be considered and judged. 
The term "legal norm" is widely understood to refer to those norms embodied 
in formal documents such as written constitutions or legal codes in what is known as 
International Law. Legal norms are therefore often institutionalised and can be seen as 
. 
instruments for the joint pursuit of shared purposes by states. The concept of a norm 
however is not clarified by its use in International Law since the discipline of law also 
makes a sharp distinction between the domestic and the international. In the theory of 
law there are two broad schools of thought about the nature of law, and therefore of 
norms. On the one hand, there are those, especially within the Anglo-American legal 
tradition, who see all law as positive, as direct commands from someone or something 
to enforce them. This school clearly differentiates between law and morality. They also 
deny the status of "law" to non-enforceable rules, such as norms making up the body 
of conventions and expectations known as "International" law. On the other hand, there 
is the "Natural Law" school which sees law as somehow representing binding 
obligations arising from a prior moral sphere, to which the actual positive laws merely 
give effect (or ought to). Therefore, norms playa significant role. Until quite recently 
the "positive law" tradition was dominant in American and English legal thinking and 
most common amongst practitioners of law, if not theorists, everywhere, but this 
position is increasingly challenged, especially by writers in the new liberal tradition 
following philosophers such as John Rawls, whose influence will be discussed later. 
Kratochwil, in writing about the role of norms in international life refers a great 
deal to concepts from international law. In talking about the concept of "rights", used 
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by Krasner to define norms, along with the idea of "obligations", Kratochwil makes 
a distinction between rights as "it is right that" and "having rights". As Kratochwil 
argues in his book, international law has been clearly divorced from conceptions of 
morality. In writing about the wars of religion he states, 
"After all, it was no accident that a legal conceptual ization of 
international relations attained importance when attempts to use "the 
right way of life" as an organizing principle of political life had to be 
abandoned" . 27 
Norms as morals can be seen to have been replaced by norms as rules in modern 
political thinking. 
In sociology the general reference to "cultural norms" or "social norms", as the 
general conceptions about right and wrong ways of behaving in political life shade off 
into "technical or cognitive norms" (how to boil an egg, the most effective way to 
manufacture a car) to "moral" norms (Thou shalt not kill). Between these, as Williams 
points out, come others such as "conventional" norms ("custom", "etiquette", etc.) and 
aesthetic norms (standards of taste, beauty, etcYs, adding a further element to our 
understanding of the concept. As Williams states, norms always carry some 
prescriptive or proscriptive quality, although there is an enormous variation in the kind 
of normative emphasis. He cites as examples the difference between the conformity 
accompanying fashions and the most deeply ingrained taboos. 
As emphasised by the first chapter in this work, analysis of regime norms can 
draw on all three disciplines as described above and further emphasise the connections 
between these various artificially separated areas. Writers on regimes however have, 
for the most part, avoided exploring the notion of "justice and fairness" , as emphasised 
by normative theory. More attention could be paid to this, as the current interests 
within International Relations theory demonstrate. The concept of values, evoking as 
they do domestic social, cultural and political factors necessitates some accounting for 
concepts of fairness and equity since values are closely related to distinct domestic 
histories and cultures. From the legal tradition, we can see that international regimes 
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also involve the idea of commonly accepted behaviour in order to reached shared goals, 
or to use Terry Nardin's phrase of "purposive associations". 29 The 1990 Keohane 
definition of a regime, already mentioned, stresses the explicit, persistent and 
connected sets of rules rather than implicit rules or norms. In so doing, regime theory 
and international law are brought very closely together. Kratochwil has emphasised 
what he sees as the neglect of the legal bases of the regime concept, among those from 
an international politics perspective.30 For regimes there is overlap between these 
different uses. Many international conventions provide the framework of legal norms 
under which international regimes may develop. From the discipline of sociology, we 
can see that norms can be understood as commonly accepted type of behaviour outside 
an institutionalised context. This is an important modification to the use of the term by 
many regime theorists and international lawyers. Sociology also shows us that there is 
an enormous difference in types of norms, a point made by Kratochwil in a recent 
work. He stresses the importance of making "careful distinctions oetween norms which 
are clear and whose duty-imposing character is easily established and other norms such 
as "comity" or tacit understandings which carry no such obligations" .31 This 
distinction is necessary for understanding regime norms or "norms of obligation" as 
will be explained later. 
As the previous chapter has illustrated, the concept of regimes can be traced 
back to David Easton. His work can also be used to give a clearer understanding of the 
nature of regime norms. For Easton, normative theory means the adoption of a value 
as an objective and the evolution of an explanation in terms of the conditions necessary 
to maximize the selected value, rather than an understanding of the "good life" as in 
the tradition of ethical philosophy.32 The concept of a norm th~refore can be see to 
mean different things for different disciplines, but a widely acceptable definition of the 
concept comes from the sociologist Robin Williams. Norms are described as "rules of 
conduct; they specify what should and should not be done by various kinds of social 
actors in various kinds of situations" .33 
These "norms of obligation" are described by the sociologist Edna Ullmann-
Margalit as a "sub-class" of "social norm".34 Ullmann-Margalit describes a "social 
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norm" as a "prescribed guide for conduct or action which is generally complied with 
by the members of a society" .35 This broad definition, which emphasises the idea of 
collective consensus, is then refined by focusing on a sub-class of social norms. For 
this purpose she utilises H L A Hart's, The Concept of Law'6. In his work, Hart 
describes "social norms" as "rules of obligation". In order to maintain uniform 
terminology, Ullmann-Margalit substitutes norms for rules in utilising Hart's 
description. This sub-class of norms is characterized as follows: 
1. "[Norms] are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when 
the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure 
brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great. 
2. "The [norms] supported by [a] serious pressure are thought important 
because they are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social 
life or some highly prized feature of it". 
3. "It is generally recognized that the conduct required by these [norms] 
may, while benefitting others, confl ict with what the person who owes 
the duty may wish to do". 37 
These features however are not intended to provide the necessary conditions for norms 
of obligation. As Ullmann-Margalit writes, "examples can be found of norms of 
obligation to which one, or more, of these features does not apply.38 
It is the third characteristic which highlights the fact that actors do not 
necessarily act in their own interests, contrary to Realist understanding of regime 
creation and change. The first characteristic, concerned with the process of 
"socialisation", shows that power as force cannot adequately explain actor behaviour. 
United Kingdom drug control policy emphasises the importance of norms for actors' 
decision-making, "In all instances, UK drug law has been strengthened to comply with 
international treaty obligations rather than to combat British drug problems "39 
This diversity over the concept of "norm" in normative theory, international law 
and sociology is significant when we consider the question of what impact norms have: 
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that is whether they do change the behaviour of actors, as suggested by the features 
above. Whether actions are guided solely by self-interest or whether values and/or 
morality also playa part is a central question for political philosophy. It also must be 
a central question for regime theorists, as highlighted by the use of the term "norm" 
in the Krasner definition. 
The role of norms 
There are several contending schools of thought on the role of norms in international 
affairs which can be broadly viewed in relation to the inter-paradigm debate in 
International Relations: that is the debate between Realism and Globalism as explained 
in this work. These approaches in turn relate clearly to the philosophical debate which 
underpins much of International Relations, as to whether the "rules of conduct" 
described above by Robin Williams, are derived from the interests-of the actors or have 
an independent influence and constrain such interests. The former position was 
espoused by the nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham who considered moral 
truths "nonsense on stilts", while the latter was adopted by John Locke in the 
seventeenth century and this century by John Rawls. The contending schools of thought 
are reflected in the debate amongst regime theorists over why states obey rules of a 
regime that are usually unenforced and mostly unenforceable: that is explanations of 
power, coercion, egoistic self-interest and reciprocal benefits contrasted with the role 
of values, morality, and a sense of justice. 
The dominant approach to International Relations, Realism, has traditionally 
been seen as exemplified by the work of Thomas Hobbes writjng more than three-
hundred years ago. His philosophy on the nature of life as a struggle for power in an 
anarchic world underlines much Realist thought. Hobbes argued that before 
governments existed, the state of nature was dominated by the problem of selfish 
individuals who competed on such ruthless terms that life was "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short".40 In his view, states could not function without a central 
authority, and consequently a strong government (a Leviathan/Hegemon) was 
necessary. An the people commit themselves to transfer authority to the sovereign by 
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a "social contract" or covenant and in so doing the sovereign becomes possessed of 
unlimited right of sanction. His word is then the law and therefore there is no higher 
moral authority. This philosophy makes the assumption that international life is almost 
norm-free. States are condemned to anarchy and the constant threat of war: there is no 
escape from the struggle for power. 
A variation on this theme acknowledges the existence of norms, but argues that 
they are the servants and not the masters, of national interest. For Realists such as E 
H Carr, norms are merely "the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a 
particular interpretation of national interests at a particular time" .41 There can be no 
norms, guaranteeing stability and order. David Hume's description of the emergence 
of convention and co-operation within domestic society illustrates this: 
"I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in possession 
of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to 
me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. 
When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed. and is 
known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this 
may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt 
us ..... repeated experience of the inconvenience of transgressing [the 
convention] .. assures us still more that the sense of interest has become 
common to alL ... and gives us confidence of the future regularity of their 
conduct; and it is only on the expectation of this that our moderation 
and abstinence are founded". 42 
A modification of this approach views norm compliance, not in terms of 
hegemonic power, but in terms of the long-term, calculations of actors interests. This 
approach, developed by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, from the work of Hobbes 
and Hume, has been termed utilitarianism. 43 Bentham's work covered many areas, but 
his utilitarian position was most fully developed in his political theory and moral 
philosophy. His general argument was that pleasure and pain were the two driving 
forces of mankind and that moral or political values had to be translated into these 
terms. Treating man as selfish, Bentham argued that the only way to judge any policy, 
choice. or decision was to discover whether it produced a positive or negative balance 
of pleasure over pain. Whatever maximises the positive balance of pleasure over pain 
across a group or for a single individual, if only one person is concerned, is what is 
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"good" and therefore "right". There have of course been many adjustments and 
refinements to this basic approach. One problem has been that what tends to maximise 
the interests or happiness of a single individual might, were everyone to act in the same 
way, be disastrous as a public policy. Therefore there has come about a distinction 
between "Rule" versus "Act" utilitarianism. An act-utilitarian requires that each 
individual ensures that his every act maximises his own utility, whereas a rule-
utilitarian requires that laws and regulations be decided so that, on balance, the rule 
maximises the sum of individual utilities, even though in particular cases individuals 
would not, as selfish utility maximisers, choose to act as the rule requires. 
Utilitarianism is a further move away from relying on any source of moral authority 
or "natural law" appealing instead to rational self-interest. 
An alternative approach to norms, and a challenge to the utilitarianism of 
Bentham, has been the functionalist school in sociology from Durl&eim to Parsons 
which contrasts with the above approaches in seeing norms as "givens" in any social 
system, including the international system, and stresses the consensus-generating and 
order-maintaining functions of norms - a direct challenge to the Hobbesian/Realist 
anarchic world. As Talcott Parsons writes, 
"In most current sociological theory, order is conceived as the ex istence 
of normative control over a range of the action of acting units, whether 
these be individuals or collectives, so that, on the one hand, their action 
is kept within limits which are compatible with at least the minimum 
stability of the system as a whole and, on the other hand, there is a 
basis for at least certain types of concerted action when the occasion 
requires. "44 
Durkheim contrasts with both Hobbes and Hume, in conceptualizing norms and 
rules as "social facts" existing objectively and constraining individual choices. In other 
words, as Durkheim and Parsons and others have argued, it is norms, rather than 
"social contracts" which should be postulated as primitives in explaining how 
international co-operation comes about. 45 According to Durkheim and Parsons, 
interaction presupposes convergent expectations based on some sort of common value 
orientation. The increase in interactions under conditions of interdependence also 
199 
fosters the convergence of value orientations which allows for further 
institutional isation of co-operation. Th is is in contrast to the "rational ist approach" of 
Bentham. Interactions do not presuppose, yet create a demand for normative institutions 
which can reduce the probability of undesirable outcomes.46 
This view influenced the philosophy of John Rawls. His major book, A Theory 
of Justice, publ ished at the beginning of the 1970s, was a major attack on the 
prevailing utilitarian theories of political obligation and social order, and attempted to 
revivify the "social contract" approach to political theorl7 • The essential points of 
Rawls' work are two-fold. He argued for the re-establishment of some form of "natural 
rights" so that there would be some values to be held as absolute, principally the right 
to liberty and developed the "justice as fairness" argument in challenge to the cost-
accounting approach of the utilitarians. 
Rawls developed his ideas from the political theory of John Locke, who was the 
contemporary of Hobbes, whose work he opposed. Despite the work of Locke, there 
has been very little opposition to the idea of utilitarianism since its inception 
(dominating western political parties and governments, most economic theory, policy 
analysis and until recently law and jurisprudence). Only in the nineteen seventies did 
political theorists of a non-Marxist kind even begin to develop non-utilitarian general 
political philosophies, so total was the hold of the Benthamite tradition over Western 
intellectuals. 
The role of norms in decision-making for the Realist present no problem since 
his or her conception of the world is state-centric and power political. The 
Hobbesian/Realist decision-maker acts in a rational self-interested manner. Given that 
society is composed of extremely self-interested individuals, co-operation is based on 
the concept of social covenant. As Hobbes writes, individuals are driven to 
covenant/contract with each other by the dominant element of fear common to them all. 
However, for the Globalist, understanding decision-making is more complex. 
Rosenau's work, already referred to, has gone some way in showing just how complex. 
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Kratochwil challenges the Hobbesian/Realist notion of rationality outlined 
above. As Kratochwil states, the problem with the modified structuralist (or Utilitarian) 
approach is that norms are conceived "largely in instrumental terms" and as such the 
approach does not take into account the other important functions served by norms. 
Norms define social settings within which actors operate: they "simplify choices and 
impart "rationality" to situations by delineating the factors that a decision-maker has 
to take into account" .48 The "rational "choice of the modified structuralist actor, is 
possible only after the actor has interpreted the situation, and as Kratochwil states, the 
interpretations themselves are "largely governed by the actor's attitudes, which in turn 
are informed by general social "values"". 49 Kratochwil illustrates this with the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. The dilemma of whether to give evidence against the other 
prisoner is caused by the attitude of the two players towards each other, derived from 
a lack of trust. As Kratochwil states, where mutual trust exists it would be "rational" 
to co-operate, and "irrational" to defect.so Therefore, values can be seen as 
establishing a "general medium which makes co-ordination of choices and co-operation 
possible. 51 
As has been suggested, the different approaches to norms amongst International 
Relations theorists have been influenced by different philosophical traditions. Hobbe's, 
Hume's, and Durkheim's theories of norms have been shown to be roughly identifiable 
with the Realist, modified Realist (or Utilitarian) and Globalist positions respectively. 
The domination of the Realist and Utilitarian approaches have limited the use of norms 
to explain international co-operation in the form of international regimes. One of the 
reasons for this limitation is due to the concept of a norm being firmly established in 
domestic politics. It is not investigated thoroughly in an internatiQnal setting due to the 
separation of the domestic and the international by Realist writers. The understanding 
of the role of norms in regime theory has in the main been associated with international 
law by regime theorists, and therefore concern with both the nature of norms and with 
their role has been limited. Regime norms however evoke both custom and Jaw in 
understanding the nature of international regimes. The concept of a "norm" 
encompasses both rule-like characteristics, and standards of behaviour appropriate to 
a particular role or situation, elaborated or codified in accordance with the vaJue-
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system of international society. In this sense it is possible to imagine that there are 
thousands and thousands of norms in international affairs, rather than the absence of 
norms claimed by the Realists. Furthermore, these norms can be seen to affect the 
behaviour of actors in decision-making. 
The norms of drug control 
If we take on board the complexity of the concept of norms as illustrated above we can 
see that, 
"Norms do not as a rule come into existence at a definitive point in 
time, nor are they the result of a manageable number of identifiable 
acts. They are, rather, the resultant of complex patterns of behaviour of 
a large number of people over a protracted period of time. "52 
Such a description does not suggest that straightforward utilitarian calculations of 
interest can explain the existence of norms. Their emergence requires the utilisation of 
the concept of salience as described in this research. This concept of salience has been 
utilized in contrast to the Realist hegemonic-power theory of agenda-building. When 
actors in an issue-system reach consensus over values, they will try to realise those 
values by the creation of a norm. 
As we have seen, norms can be seen to contain t\VO ideas, the specification of 
a more general value and the formation of consensus. I will now proceed to identify 
the norms in the politics of drugs. Why I have chosen the particular norms is due to 
the high-level of consensus within the international system, over the last ten years, and 
the salience to many political actors of the values under threat. The following 
propositions now would appear to have the status of being global norms. 
1. Private associations should not seek to prevent governments from exercising their 
authority, or to seek to exercise the authority of legitimate governments. 
2. Activities should not be engaged in which lead to the corruption of the due process 
of government whether by financial inducements or threats. 
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3. Activities should not be engaged in which would damage the emotional, mental or 
physical growth of a minor. 
4. Banks should not profit from criminal finance. 
The norm that "Private associations should not seek to prevent governments 
from exercising their authority, or seek to exercise the authority of legitimate 
governments" can be seen to have emerged due to the alliance of terrorist and 
insurgency movements with drug production. The adverse effects of the drug 
phenomenon on political and economic dimensions of domestic and international 
security in an increasing number of countries throughout the eighties has been 
explained in Chapter Two. Colombia in particular throughout the eighties experienced 
"narco-terrorism", with an open war declared by the Medellin cartel. The huge 
increase in organized crime of a non-drug-related nature such as illicit arms trading, 
- . 
the trafficking in transplant organs, insurance fraud etc, by groups such as the Cosa 
Nostra, Triads, Yakusa, Yardies and others, is seen as constituting a grave threat to 
public security, the rule of law and other fundamental social, economic and political 
institutions by nearly every country. The evolution of organized crime can be regarded 
as a process of rational reorganisation on an international basis of criminal 
"enterprises", following the same patterns as legal enterprises. As the United Nations 
report on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice states, 
"This "transnationalization" of organised crime represents a situation 
that is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from that which 
prevailed in the past and which, needless to say, complicates the 
implementation of effective prevention and control measures. "S3 
The break-up of the former Soviet Union and the downfall of one-party regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe has opened up extensive possibilities to both domestic 
and "imported" organized crime threatening the still frail political institutions. Concern 
was reflected in the recent International Seminar on Organised Crime, held in Moscow 
in October 1991.54 
Throughout the eighties there have been increasing examples of how the vast 
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profits to be made from organized crime have corrupted the governments. military and 
judiciary of various states throughout the world. This has led to the acceptance of the 
norm that" Activities should not be engaged in which lead to the corruption of the due 
process of government whether by financial inducements or threats". The interface with 
political power is an integral part of the phenomenon of organised crime. Preventing 
corruption has therefore increased in importance in recent years. The assassinations of 
Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paulo Borsellino in Italy and numerous other senior law-
enforcement figures around the world, committed to uncovering corruption. serve as 
an illustration of organized crimes's influence and perseverance. The expansion of 
transnational and organized crime outlined above, has led to the concern being placed 
higher up the political agenda. Resolution seven of the Eighth United Nations Congress 
on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders55 entitled "corruption in 
government" recommended that Member States devise a variety of administrative-and 
regulatory mechanisms to prevent corrupt practises involving the abuse of power. 
The Mafia, as important actors in all areas of drug-related activity, obviously 
do not support the first and second norms. However the th ird norm is universally 
accepted by all actors for whom the questions involved in drug-related activity are 
salient. that children and youth should not have access to potentially harmful 
psychoactive substances. Unlike the attitude towards adults, the sale of all such 
substances to children is prohibited by law, including the sale of alcohol and tobacco. 
in most Western industrialised countries while their use is prohibited by social norm 
in most countries. 
The recognition of the importance of protecting the young in this manner is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The assertion of John Ruskin in 1851 that it was 
"indisputable" that the first duty of a state was to ensure the well-being of every child 
"til it attain years of discetion"S6 went against nineteenth-century reality. However by 
the end of the century, as Jordan notes, "a powerless minority, exploited and then cast 
aside, came to enjoy schooling and the protection of effective, enforced legislation by 
the end· of the century" .57 The protection of children's welfare was soon to be 
extended to include protection from potential harm arising from their own choices and 
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actions. Beatrice and Sydney Webb point to the law passed in England at the end of 
the nineteenth century prohibiting the sale of liquor to children for consumption on the 
premises as representing "an entirely new departure". 58 In America too, the 
restrictions of "youthful drinking" was not seen as a problem for much of the 
nineteenth century and the intervention of the state was seen as a major break with the 
past. 
The oft-quoted statement of justification for this action comes from John Stuart 
Mill's On Uberty, as quoted in Chapter One. Although Mill said "over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign", he qualified this doctrine by 
adding, 
"It is perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to 
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not 
speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law 
may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a 
state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against 
their own actions as well as external injury" .59 
As Chapter Three argued, pressure to legislate over drug use in the nineteenth 
century came from various sources including concern over widespread opiate use 
among the working classes. In particular, the public was outraged by a spate of infant 
deaths from overdoses of preparations of opium-soothing syrups, commonly 
administered to infants. 60 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the question of child drug-use 
was of minimal concern. Drug users were seen as a criminal 'and sick minority of 
foreign elements, hoods and hookers. Then in the nineteen sixties, it seemed that an 
entire generation of white, well-educated youth were smoking marijuana, "turning on, 
tuning in and dropping out". With the sixties came a new era of "recreational drug 
use" and drug users were viewed as challenging the values of society. Similarly, during 
the eighties and early nineties the increase in drug use for recreational purposes among 
increasingly younger groups has led to fears over law and order, strengthening the 
norm that activities should not be engaged in which would damage the emotional, 
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mental or physical growth of a minor. 61 
Consensus over child drug-use evokes different values from the question of 
adult drug use. The norm that activities should not be engaged in which would damage 
the emotional, mental or physical growth of a minor has emerged because there is a 
high-level of consensus over the values that the actors share. On the other hand, there 
is no consensus on adult drug-use. There is no agreement, within most societies, on 
whether adults should be free to take drugs or not. 
Actors for whom the issue of adult drug use is salient disagree on the values 
under contention. Some believe that adults should be free to choose which drugs they 
do or do not take, in line with the nineteenth-century liberalism of John Stuart Mill, 
described in Chapter One. A recent Colombian Supreme Court decision., to 
decriminalise the personal use of small amounts, found that it \vas unconstitutional to 
violate a person's freedom to decide whether to use drugsY Supporters of the 
legalisation of cannabis argue that the drug is not harmful, despite the claims of those 
that advocate its continued criminalisation, and indeed emphasise the medical benefits 
that legalisation of the drug would bring (see Chapter One). Supporters also emphasise 
that the continued criminalisation of cannabis is putting undue pressure on the forces 
of law and order. They also claim that the criminalisation of cannabis along with other 
substances such as cocaine, crack and heroin makes a mockery of law enforcement, 
due to its inability to control the problem, and is therefore creating a challenge to the 
status of enforcement authorities. There is also the view that the knowledge 
surrounding the dangers of certain substances is umel iable (see Chapters One and 
Three). There is no consensus on adult drug use amongst users, policy-makers and 
traffickers. The conflicting values can be seen to form an issue-system of actors for 
whom the issue of adult drug-use is salient, but no norm and therefore no regime is 
possible. 
Because there was no consensus on the use of drugs by adults, there was no 
widespread direct support, until the 1980's, for an international norm that "trade in 
drugs should be stopped". It is only since drug gangs have challenged government 
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authority and corrupted government processes, that support for a ban on trafficking has 
grown. However, as we will see in examination of the debate on the legalisation of 
drugs, in the last chapter, a ban on trafficking is not the only way of promoting this 
norm. 
Of the four norms it is the one concerned with the tracing, freezing and 
confiscation of traffickers assets that can be seen most clearly to be regulated by an 
international regime, as the next chapter will demonstrate. The norm that banks should 
not profit from criminal finance concerns the problem of money laundering of 
traffickers illicit funds. The norm has emerged since the increase in drug trafficking 
with the subsequent flourishing of organised criminal networks, explained earlier in this 
work, has made the issue salient to many actors who previously were not active in the 
area. The anti-laundering norm has gained support from many actors, for example the 
. 
Swiss government, who were important for achieving results. Contested values, 
regarding banking secrecy and the need for banking regulation not to interfere with 
criminal investigations in the context of international co-operation, have led to the 
acceptance of the norm that banks should not profit from illicit funds. The next chapter 
will look at the emergence of a money-laundering control regime. 
Conclusion 
The answer to the question of regime significance, raised at the beginning of this 
chapter, depends on the behavioural assumptions that underlie the different theoretical 
models of International Relations. Commitment to one or other understanding of the 
nature and role of norms in international affairs clearly illustrates this. Despite the fact 
that what can be seen to distinguish regimes from other international phenomenon is 
their specifically normative element, the nature and role of norms have been glossed 
over by most writers in the field. This is so even though the consensus-definition of an 
international regime by Stephen Krasner emphasises the importance of norms, along 
with principles, as the defining characteristics of any regime. This writer believes that 
the Krasner definition forces us to consider norms and decision-making procedures in 
world politics. 
207 
The different approaches to norms among International Relations theorists have 
been influenced by different philosophical traditions. The dominance of the Realist 
rational-actor approach, stated by Krasner in his volume as regarded by the majority 
of writers as the most important determinant of regimes, has limited the use of norms 
to explain international co-operation and the creation of international regimes. Norm 
emergence has been explained in terms of the power of actors writing the rules in their 
own interests. This chapter however emphasises the role of values in norm emergence. 
Norms can be seen to evolve within a framework defined and legitimated by the value 
system of a group. By looking at values and norms our attention is drawn to the 
importance of understanding the aspect of norms as the setting of standards, in terms 
of the "right" and the "good" of current normative theory which is lacking in current 
understanding of regime theory. But for this study on international drug control. 
perhaps more importantly, norms draw our attention to the study of how standards are 
set. 
Regime theory to date has concerned itself with asking "Why and how regimes 
come about and vanish ?" rather than "Why and how they ought to come about in the 
service of a normative principle of world order" .63 As Susan Strange says, Krasner's 
common question is about order - how in an international system of territorial states 
claiming sovereignty within their respective territories can order be achieved and 
maintained (a Hobbesian view) rather than a concern with justice or efficiency, nor 
legitimacy, nor any other moral value. 64 Strange argues that we need to answer the 
question "How to achieve change?", which she sees as no less important than "How 
to keep order?". This work has shown that in order to understand change we need to 
understand values and norms, but our understanding of the role of values and norms 
must not be restricted by notions of morality on the one hand, and power politics on 
the other. 
Norms can be seen to evolve within a framework defined and legitimated by the 
value system of a group. As Kim writes, "The common political science definition of 
politics· as described as the authoritative allocation of values indicates that societies' 
value system guides what social roles and functions are to be legitimated by what kind 
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of norms. "65 In this way we can see international politics as a "value-realizing, norm-
setting process". 66 Norms are real and do influence behaviour and outcomes. 
Furthermore, a focus on regime norms emphasises the increasingly fragmented, issue-
specific character of world politics in the nineteen-nineties. 
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Chapter 6 
The International Money-Laundering Control Regime 
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Introduction 
Money laundering is not a new phenomenon. Techniques have always been used to 
dispose of the proceeds of a variety of criminal offences that involve payments for 
contraband goods (such as during Prohibition). Historically, a variety of banking and 
money-laundering services outside normal banking channels have been available for the 
"washing" of money from illicit activities. However, the dramatic increase in drug use 
in the early eighties substantially increased money-laundering activity and brought 
about increased international interest and concern. Interest was first awakened to the 
problem of drug-money laundering in 1979 with the opening up of a suitcase containing 
600,000 dollars at Palermo airport leading to the Italian-American "Pizza Connection" 
case that came to trial in 1985. An estimated 1.6 billion dollars of illicit profits from 
five heroin refining laboratories in Sicily was laundered through Mafia-run pizzerias 
in New York, passing through Canada and the Caribbean to Switzerland and Italy, and 
ending up in banks in Hong Kong, Singapore and Bangkok. The trial exposed the huge 
amounts of money involved as well as demonstrating the transnationalisation of the 
phenomenon. As an issue, money laundering is truly international. 
The increased integration of financial markets and the removal of barriers to the 
free movement of capital during the eighties has led to increased activity in the world 
economy, enhanced the ease with which criminal money can be laundered, and 
complicated the tracing process. As McClean has pointed out: "The facility with which 
assets, particularly in the form of financial credits of some sort, can be passed across 
national boundaries means that an order enforceable only in the country of origin may 
be of limited value."1 The need for enhanced international co-operation in this area 
was thus evident to the actors for whom the issue was salient. Domestic and 
transnational law-enforcement strategies have increasingly emphasised the need to focus 
on the financial aspects of the drug trade with the object of more effectively disrupting 
the major trafficking networks. As Nadelmann has pointed out, a number of rationales 
support the view that "going after the money" is the best way to tackle drug 
trafficking: 
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"The most basic of these is that insofar as criminals ... act as they do for 
the money, the best deterrent and punishment is to confiscate their 
incentive. A second rationale is that, while the higher level and more 
powerful criminals rarely come into contact with illicit goods, such as 
drugs, from which they derive their profits, they do come into contact 
with the proceeds from the sale of goods. That contact often provides 
a "paper trail" or other evidence, which constitutes the only connection 
with a violation of the law. A third rationale is that confiscating the 
proceeds of criminal activities is a good way to make law enforcement 
pay for itself". 2 
Various international conferences such as the United Nations Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances at Vienna in December 1988, 3 the 1990 World Ministerial 
Summit to Reduce Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat,4 the 9th 
Non-Aligned summit, Belgrade, 1989', the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
, - . 
Meetings, held in Kuala Lumpur, October 19896, and Harare, October 19917 , and the 
Second Interregional Meeting of Heads of National Law Enforcement Agencies 
convened in Vienna in September, 1989s, all emphasised growing awareness of the 
vast profits generated by this form of criminal activity and the need for international 
co-operation. 
The accumulation of illicit profits can be seen as perhaps the most politically 
and economically destabilising element of the international drugs trade: it gives 
traffickers the means to buy arms, property, companies, political power, and 
protection. Estimates of the size of the drug trade vary enormously from $76 - $800 
billion. 9 Illegal drugs have been estimated to have overtaken oil as a source of revenue 
globally and to be, after armaments, the second biggest trading .commodity according 
to the Director-General of the United Nations Office in Vienna.1o Profits from drugs 
are huge - so much so that a relatively small group of criminals were estimated to have 
a bigger turnover than the income of 150 of the world's 170 countries in 1989.11 
Some individuals are even believed to have a personal worth that exceeds their 
country's national debt. 12 Profits from drug trafficking erode and distort the legal 
economies of public institutions and entire societies. Furthermore, the free circulation 
of untaxed funds can be seen to distort freedom of competition and undermine 
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legitimate business. 
In this sense, drug-money laundering has created problems in the financial 
world. Drug traffickers seek out countries and territories with weak central banks, 
restrictive bank secrecy practices and limited controls on foreign exchange. Experience 
indicates that even when jurisdictions have enacted laws to control money laundering, 
such laws are likely to be ineffective unless bank, corporate and official secrecy 
requirements are relaxed. Financial institutions have been reluctant to do this in the 
past. However, the salience of the money-laundering issue has increased in importance 
for all actors involved during the last decade due to the recognition of the negative 
impact that such vast flows of "dirty money" can have on the financial sector. As the 
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices stated in December 
1988: 
"Public confidence in banks, and hence their stability, can be 
undermined by adverse publicity as a result of inadvertent association by 
banks with criminals. In addition, banks may lay themselves open to 
direct losses from fraud, either through negligence in screening 
undesirable customers or where the integrity of their own officers has 
been undermined through association with criminals. "13 
The salience of the money-laundering issue as it has emerged in the last decade 
arises from the amount of money being laundered due to the increase in drug 
trafficking. The international politics of the issue becomes complicated as the forum 
for debate at various times involves the Basle Committee, the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, the European Community, the Group of Seven industrialised 
countries and a Financial Action Task Force. This chapter will look at the changing 
attitudes towards money laundering among actors for whom the issue is salient and the 
emergence of the norm that "Banks should not profit from ill icit funds". The fact that 
this norm is adhered to by the actors for whom the issue is salient (except the drug 
barons) has led to the emergence of an international regime to regulate the issue. 
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The money-laundering issue 
"Money laundering" is a widely used term that is difficult to define concisely. The 
term itself is reputed to have originated from the nineteen twenties, when Al Capone 
and Bugsy Moran literally opened up laundry companies in Chicago in order to 
disguise their illicit earnings. The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, discussed in the previous 
chapter, limits the definition of money laundering solely to drug related offences, 
unlike the later European Economic Community Directive (see Appendix H). The 
Directive defines it as: 
"the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such 
activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit. origin of 
the property or of assisting any person who is involved in committing 
such activity to evade the legal consequences of his actions; the 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing 
that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of 
participation in such activity; the acquisition, possession or use of 
property, knowing at the time of receipt, that such property was derived 
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such 
activity". 14 
Any attempt to counsel, facilitate or assist the commission of such actions is also an 
offence. The Article concludes by stating that money laundering is to be considered as 
such even when the activities which generated the property to be laundered were 
perpetrated in the territory of another Member State or third country. This somewhat 
long-winded description reflects the long-winded process of money laundering which 
makes it difficult to control. As the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 
1988 stated: "The techniques of money laundering are innumerable, diverse, complex, 
subtle and secret. "15 The broadening of the definition of money laundering to 
include all criminal funds and not simply drug money is a significant change in attitude 
among financial actors, the importance of which will be explained later. 
Cash lends anonymity to many forms of criminal activity and is the normal 
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medium of exchange in drug trafficking. This gives rise to three common factors: 
- drug dealers need to conceal the true ownership and origin of the money 
- they need to control the money 
- they need to change the form of the money 
Money laundering can therefore be summarised as "the conversion of illicit cash to 
another asset, the concealment of the true source or ownership of the illegally acquired 
proceeds, and the creation of the perception of legitimacy of source and ownership" .16 
There are three stages of money laundering during which there may be 
numerous transactions made by money launderers that could alert a financial business 
to criminal activity -
a) Placement - the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from illegal activity. 
b) La.vering - separating illicit proceeds from their source by creating complex layers 
of financial transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity. 
c) Integration - the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. If 
the layering process has succeeded, integration schemes place the laundered proceeds 
back into the economy in such a way that they re-enter the financial system appearing 
to be normal business funds. The following diagram illustrates the laundering stages 
in more detail. (See Figure 6) 
T71e scale of the problem 
As has been already stated, illicit drug traffic has been estimated as generating an 
annual income of between $76 and $800 billion. The Financial Action Task Force 
(F A TF), created on the recommendation of the seven major industrial ised nations at 
the July 1989 Paris Economic Summit,17 estimated the sales of cocaine, heroin and 
cannabis to be approximately $122 billions per year in the United States and Europe. 
The Group estimated that as much as $85 billion per year could be available for 
laundering and investment. 18 Profit margins in drug trafficking are huge, and all the 
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more so because profits are untaxed . In 1993, a single gramme of heroin cost the 
Brit ish National Health Sen 'ice £5.86, which has been estimated as about 3 % of (he 
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price on the illicit market. 19 Some studies claim that the street prices of drugs such 
as heroin and cocaine are 60-100 times higher than licit pharmaceutical prices.~o As 
has already been mentioned in this study, the power that drug money bestows on the 
major traffickers has been seen in many Latin American countries (See Chapter Two). 
The reason why it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the amount of drug 
money being laundered was explored by the Financial Action Task Force. Their report 
points to the fact that the financial flows arising from drug trafficking might be 
estimated directly or indirectly. A direct estimation would involve the measuring of 
these flows from the international banking statistics and capital account statistics for the 
balance of payments. This would involve an analysis of errors and omissions and other 
discrepancies. The Task Force concluded however that this method was not viable. 
Although deposits covered by international banking statistics may include a substantial 
amount of drug money, this aspect cannot be singled out and was believed to account 
for only a small percentage of the totals. Instead, three indirect methods of estimation 
were used to assess the scale of financial flows arising from drug traffic: estimations 
of world drug production; consumption needs of drug users; and seizures of illicit 
drugs. All these methods have their weaknesses. Using the first method, estimated drug 
trafficking proceeds worldwide were put at $300 billion in 1987 by the United 
Nations. 21 But the figure remains very uncertain. The second method also has a 
fundamental flaw. The consumption needs of drug abusers obtained through surveys, 
is frequently of doubtful reliability since the activity is illegal: sample populations 
surveyed for example in homes or schools may miss a significant proportion of drug 
users. The final estimate projects the total amounts of drugs available for sale by the 
application of a multiplier to recorded seizures, which is estimated on the basis of a 
law-enforcement seizure rate. This varies between 5 % and 20% according to the type 
of drug considered, and which, on a weighted average, could be approximately 10%. 
This approach, too, raises significant methodological problems as the Task Force 
Report points out. 
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Washing the money 
As has already been emphasised in this work, the numerous methods drug traffickers 
use to transport drugs is a significant problem for enforcement authorities. Similarly, 
it is impossible to detail, and difficult for enforcement authorities to anticipate, the 
entire range of methods used to launder money. However, all the methods outlined 
share some common factors, regarding the role of cash domestically, of various kinds 
of financial institutions, of international cash transfers, and of corporate techniques. 
The form of money generated through drug trafficking needs to be changed in 
order to shrink the huge volumes of cash generated. Because of the huge sums 
involved, often largely in small denomination notes, the physical volume of notes 
received from street dealing in heroin and cocaine has been estimated at being much 
larger than the volume of the drugs themselves.22 This accounts for the view that the 
proceeds from drugs should be more detectable than the drugs themselves. These large 
amounts of cash present drug traffickers with major difficulties. The complications 
involved with dealing with such large amounts of cash is illustrated by the example of 
drug traffickers in Colombia reportedly having to regularly dig up plastic-covered 
bundles of cash hidden in the Colombian jungle and dry it with battery-powered 
hairdriers before the money disintegrates in the humidity. The money is buried again 
to await its injection at some future date into the international banking system.23 The 
transporting of suitcases full of money, so fundamental to the money-launderers 
activities in the past, have been replaced by other techniques as regulators in various 
countries have tried to control the problem by specifying an upper limit for a single 
cash transaction, leading to the use of "smurfs" by launderers, (see later) and more 
sophisticated techniques as the volume of money involved has become too great to 
handle. 
Banks and other deposit-taking financial institutions are the main transmitters 
of money internationally. The stage of depositing money in institutions (placement) is 
therefore obviously a key one for money launderers. Deposits have to be disguised to 
avoid the currency reporting systems in many countries, or laws that allow or require 
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the reponing of suspicious transactions. In countries where there is cash transaction 
reporting, deposits have to be broken down into sizes which are lower than the 
threshold for that reporting ("smurfing") in order to escape attention. However, as the 
sums of money became larger and larger, this method proved too cumbersome for 
some of the larger operations and new methods to launder their illicit funds have been 
utilised. 
One method utilised by money launderers has been the depositing of funds in 
the name of a company whose beneficial owners do not have to be disclosed in the 
country in which it is headquartered. In some countries, bank accounts were opened 
in the name of trustees, and the beneficiaries under the trust kept secret. Deposits could 
also be made by the legal profession in the name of clients for whom the rules of 
attorney confidentiality may apply. 
Another method often utilised by launderers is currency exchange. It is easier 
for the launderer if the cash in which he operates can be directly accepted abroad as 
a means of exchange. The US dollar is acceptable as a means of exchange in large 
amounts in many parts of the world. Federal Reserve Board staff estimated that adult 
residents in the United States held only 11-12 per cent of issued notes and coins in 
1984. The remainder were held by legitimate and illegitimate business enterprises, 
residents of foreign countries, and persons less than 18 years 0Id.~4 
Formal financial institutions are of course not the only avenue open to 
launderers. Informal and largely unregulated financial institutions, which under the law 
are not supposed to accept deposits, can also be used. The first category of these are 
the Bureaux de Change. Bureaux de Change accept money in one currency and 
exchange it for another. Although still working in cash, a first transformation has taken 
place which makes it more difficult to detect the origin of the funds. The identity of 
the transactor is often not recorded. Increasing use of gamblingllottery facilities is 
another example. Large sums of small denomination notes can be exchanged for 
gambling chips or winning lottery tickets, then turned in for clean notes. 
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The informal system of "hawalla", evolved and is used perfectly legally, mainly 
by Indians and Pakistanis. Hawalla, which means "reference" in Urdu, is a centuries-
old banking system. It relies on a system of trust between families and ethnic groups 
who may be thousands of miles apart. A merchant travelling overseas would take with 
him a letter of credit issued by a hawalla banker in his own country which would be 
honoured by a hawalla banker in the other country. This tradition has continued to the 
present day and has been used by Asian immigrants in Europe who have used it to 
transfer money to their families in Pakistan or India. Hawalla banking does not 
necessarily require a letter of credit, any agreed form of recognition in the form of a 
secret code or simple object, such as a half playing card or a bus ticket, can be a 
binding instrument of exchange for cash. Hawalla bankers are often involved in the 
gold bullion, gold jewellery or currency exchange business. The scale of their 
operations vary from families with similar businesses in several countries, to a single 
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trader in a street corner confectionary shop. Hawalla banking has been utilised by the 
drug traffickers to launder their illicit funds. 
Another method of laundering drug proceeds is the depositing of funds abroad 
in jurisdictions where the banking system is insufficiently regulated and where the 
establishment of "letter box" companies is permitted. These jurisdictions may include 
countries attempting to establish a financial services industry, since the sale of banking 
licenses can constitute a major source of revenue to the authorities, as well as countries 
known as tax-havens. Cash is integrated into the financial system of these countries and 
can then be returned by means of wire transfers for example. Offshore fiscal havens 
offer banking anonymity to the money launderer, unregulated financial transactions, 
and often judicial protection. The financial sanctuaries of the C.aribbean in particular 
have been important centres for money laundering since its island archipelagos are 
geographically well situated for cocaine transit from South America to Europe and 
North America. The spectacular growth of the Cayman Islands as an offshore financial 
centre illustrates the problem for those attempting to stem the illicit flow of drug 
money: 
"In 1964 the Cayman Islands had two banks and no offshore business. 
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By 1981 the Caymans had 360 branches of American and foreign banks, 
over 8,000 registered companies, and more telex machines per 
capita ... than any other country. "~s 
But fiscal havens exist within and on the periphery of Europe too. Monaco, Andorra, 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, Malta and Ireland 
all offer considerable tax incentives to outside investors and opportunities to the money 
launderer. 
Various corporate techniques can also be used to launder money. Offshore 
companies can be used by launderers in ways other than simply as depositories for 
cash. Launderers can set up or buy corporations in a tax haven for example, using a 
local lawyer or nominee owner with an account at a local bank. They can then finance 
the purchase of a similar business at home through a loan from their corporation 
abroad (or the bank), in effect borrowing their own money and paying it back as if it 
were a legitimate loan. 
The technique known as "double invoicing" is another example of a corporate 
technique used by launderers. Goods are purchased at inflated prices by domestic 
companies owned by money launderers from offshore corporations which they also 
own. The difference between the price and the true value is then deposited offshore and 
paid to the offshore company and repatriated at will. For instance, researchers have 
found that raw cane sugar exported from Britain to America at $1,407 a kilogramme, 
was 282,530 per cent higher than the average world price of 50 cents. Similarly, pine 
wood moulding was being shipped from England at $828 a metre, a mark up of 
176,213 per cent. Commodities fraud is not a new phenomenon. In the 1970s, Iranians 
sold sets of tyres for $20,000 to get their money out of Iran when the Shah was 
overthrown. 26 
As the Financial Action Task Force report states, all these techniques involve 
going through stages where detection is possible. Cash has either to be exported over 
a territorial frontier and then deposited in a foreign financial institution, or it requires 
the knowing or unknowing complicity of someone at home not connected with the drug 
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trade. or it requires convincing a domestic financial institution that a large cash deposit 
is legitimate. As has been discussed above, key stages for the detection of money-
laundering operations are those where cash enters the domestic financial system, 
formally or informally, where it is sent abroad to be integrated into the financial 
systems of regulatory havens, and where it is repatriated in the form of transfers of 
legitimate appearance. Identifying these stages is quite simple, finding the money much 
less so and preventing the utilisation of the financial services in this way even less so. 
The diverse methods used to launder illicit funds has made the job of enforcement 
agencies very difficult. This has become worse due to the changing conditions of the 
financial marketplace. 
The nineteen eighties saw many of the boundaries between national financial 
markets dissolve and a truly global capital market emerge. The "globalisation" of the 
world economy - expanding international trade, the growth of multinational businesses, 
the rise in international joint ventures and increasing interdependence through capital 
flows - have all led to problems for those concerned with combatting money 
laundering. Although the scale of this internationalisation has increased 
fundamentally in recent times, paralleling the expansion of multinational corporations, 
banking has been international almost from the very beginning of the institution, circa 
1000 A.D. Bankers soon settled outside their home countries to serve clients better, to 
simplify funds transfers, to meet the requirements of international trade that began 
expanding in the thirteenth century, and to profit from differences in exchange rates. 27 
The development of rules and norms from this period can be seen in the rules, norms 
and values of modern day banking. 
The increased integration of financial markets and the removal of barriers to the 
free movement of capital that we have witnessed in the second half of the eighties and 
the early nineties, such as in Europe, have enhanced the ease with which criminal 
money can be laundered. Money-laundering channels generally involve international 
operations. As the Commission of the European Communities noted: 
" Internationalisation of economies and financial services are 
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opportunities which are seized by money launderers to carry out their 
criminal activities, since the origin of funds can be better disguised in 
an international context. "28 
This enables money launderers to use differences in national laws, regulations and 
enforcement practices. When funds are repatriated after laundering abroad and 
detected, these differences in national laws, regulations and enforcement practices 
seriously impair the efficiency of enquiries and law enforcement measures. 
The "globalisation" of the world economy has been driven by the forces of 
innovation, technology and deregulation acting together, and each multiplying the 
effects of the other. The links between telecommunications and technology and the 
foreign expansion of banks have been fundamental. When foreign branches came into 
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existence on a wide scale, a telephone call or telex message to a branch bank could 
often accomplish in a few minutes what might have taken at least a day through a 
correspondence bank. Banks have not been slow to real ise the importance of technology 
to banking. When the first experimental telephone exchange began operation in Boston 
in 1877, one of the three corporate clients was a banking firm.29 Since the spread of 
telephone systems, foreign exchange dealings have come to rely heavily on telephone 
commitments, backed up by exchange of written documentation later. This has meant 
that money can be described as rushing around the world at a furious pace, where 
entire cycles of borrowing and depositing can take place every fifteen minutes or so. 
The rise of telecommunications networks has been accompanied by a rise in 
computer networks. The electronic transfer of funds, not only among banks, or 
between banks and corporate clients, but also between banks and the general public, 
have added a new dimension to money laundering. 30 And, just as with the 
establishment of the first telephone exchange, some of the larger banks are recognized 
leaders in information-processing technology, with research and development 
departments and database subsidiaries. The construction of these international 
computerized information-processing networks such as The Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (Swift), can be seen as one of the major 
technological developments in banking of the past twenty years. Swift was founded in 
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May 1973 by 240 European, American and Canadian Banks, but became operational 
only in May 1977. There were by 1981 about 680 member banks in twenty-six 
countries, which were exchanging over 170,000 messages a day.31 Computerization 
has powered the innovations in techniques that, with rapid communication networks, 
make for an unstoppable combination: 
"Securitization is driven by the IT revolution, and each new payments 
system introduces an almost new form of money as a transactions 
vehicle. "32 
However, a disadvantage of this technology has been that launderers have been able 
to use the systems without giving names and addresses of recipients, making it 
impossible for investigators to trace the money. Traffickers have also been able to 
utilise this technology in avoiding some of the problems o( deal}ng.in large sums of 
cash, as described above. 
The skill and speed with which large-scale traffickers are able to launder their 
profits using this new technology is a problem for judicial and law-enforcement 
authorities. The global nature of financial markets, the new communications and new 
computer technologies means that assets derived from trafficking in one country can 
readily be transferred to another, in contrast to the central Realist axiom of state 
sovereignty. New communications and new computer technologies are together, 
altering the dimensions of markets, the relative importance of location and the 
organization of firms, and destroying the barriers that hitherto have been synonymous 
with specific geographical co-ordinates. As Jackson states: 
"The international flowing of funds information electronically has, 
according to some, resulted in the phenomena of money without a 
country and a supranational banking system. "(emphasis by current 
author)33 
And on the other hand, money launderers are able to exploit the rigidities of state 
sovereignty that limit enforcement agencies and regulators, moving money from one 
country to another less-regulated country with strong bank secrecy laws where their 
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funds will be protected. Money is "a creature of regulation" but it is also adept at 
finding its way around regulation. As O'Brien states "Whatever efforts are made to 
maintain barriers in financial services or to help define the role of money and the rules 
governing it, the job is almost impossible" .34 Attempts to "control" illicit funds are 
complicated by the fact that property and funds for drug trafficking are often 
intermingled with, or converted into, legitimate property and funds. hence posing a 
problem for judicial and law-enforcement officials. It is all too easy for illicit funds to 
be converted into licit funds. 
Another significant problem in attempting to control the money involved in 
laundering is that individual countries have different cultures and values with regard 
to cash. As has been discussed above, traffickers. at the first stage of their operations 
must deal in cash. Controlling the amount of cash transactions by financial institutions 
has been shown to limit fraud, and could be utilised by regulators attempting to control 
drug-money laundering. However, some economies are very cash centred. In Italy. for 
example, credit cards are still relatively rare compared with some other European 
countries. Banks do not formally accept responsibility for customer losses incurred 
when cheques are stolen or forged, even within the clearing system. Therefore cash or 
cash instruments are frequently the preferred option for payment of wages. professional 
services, and a wide variety of commercial transactions. In general therefore, 
substantial cash movements are not likely to arouse suspicion in Italy. 
Another problem for regulators therefore is the sheer volume of financial 
activities and the impossibility of verifying every transaction. The cost of registering 
every large cash transaction over a given sum would signify major cost and resource 
implications for the banks. Every large Currency Transaction Report (CTR) in the 
United States costs 17 dollars, and there are approximately 6 million of them per 
year. 3S Therefore, attempts at moves towards mandatory reporting of cash transactions 
over a certain amount have faced a great deal of opposition. (See later) 
The number and diversity of financial institutions also aids the money launderer. 
Money laundering is not limited to banks and building societies alone. Once illicit 
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funds are in the financial system, they can readily be switched into different types of 
assets and between institutions (the layering and integration stages). Some of those 
utilised by money launderers have been mentioned above, such as bureaux de change, 
cheque cashers, money transmission services, casinos and lotteries. Therefore other 
types of financial institutions need to accept regulation. 
Money laundering is a very sophisticated crime. The increased use of complex 
corporate structures and intricate business transactions involving banks, trust 
companies, firms dealing in real estate and other financial institutions has added to the 
difficulties of the enforcement agencies. Some countries do not have sophisticated 
enough financial institutions to attempt to deal with the problem. It is these countries, 
often dealing predominantly in cash, which are most at risk generally. For more 
developed financial systems, the banking secrecy rule which has governed banking for 
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the greater part of this decade, meant that bankers could not report their suspicions 
even if they wanted to. In order to avoid any involvement in money-laundering 
activities they would simply deny assistance and the funds would go elsewhere, moving 
the problem on, rather than dealing with it. 
Money laundering has been described as "Financial AIDS", once the money 
reaches the system nothing can remove it. Furthermore, as with AIDS, the problem is 
spreading dramatically. Once in the financial system, illicit funds can at best be 
diverted. If money is diverted in its course, as described in the example above of 
financial institutions denying assistance to suspicious transactions, it can simply return 
to the financial flow further down stream. Therefore the only way to control money 
laundering is to prevent the money entering the financial system in the first place by 
truly international co-operation, or in making illicit money licit by legalising drug 
trafficking. The legalisation debate will be looked at in the concluding chapter to this 
study. 
There is a great deal of national legislation in place to combat money 
laundering. The United States pioneered legislation to prevent the flow of illicit profits 
with the requirement from 1971 for documentation of all financial transactions over 
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$10,000 by means of Currency Transaction Report (CTR). That legislation, commonly 
known as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) mandated a series of reporting and record-
keeping requirements designed to help track down money-laundering activity and to 
prevent the veil of secrecy surrounding offshore bank accounts. However, 
implementation of the Act was delayed due to a number of factors. Bankers challenged 
the constitutionality of the law claiming that the BSA reporting requirements violated 
the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. This issue was not settled 
until 1974 when the Supreme Court ruled against the bankers. This unsuccessful 
challenge was followed by a period of massive non-compliance by banks and other 
financial institutions with BSA reporting requirements. The non-compliance problem 
was aggravated by a lack of concern and interest by bank regulatory agencies towards 
BSA compliance issues. It was not seen as a priority issue for the regulators and 
consequently enforcement was minimal between 1974 and 1984. The increase in drug 
use and the increase in funds available for laundering challenged this position. 
In 1979, the Federal Reserve Bank conducted a study that showed that there was 
a $4.3 billion surplus of currency in Florida while the rest of the country were for the 
most part showing currency deficits. 36 This led to increased enforcement activity 
against money laundering.37 In the years that followed there were several amendments 
to the law including the inclusion of non-bank financial institutions and foreign banks 
(including foreign subsidiaries) in the currency reporting requirements. These 
amendments were incorporated into the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986; 
establishing the crime of money laundering where previously no such crime had 
existed. The Act also provided for an amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
that made it easier for banks to report suspicious transactions information to federal 
enforcement agencies without running the risk of being sued by customers. In 1989, 
a federal law was introduced which permits the government to track and to claim 
ownership of laundered drug money. The pre-trial freezing of assets of suspected drug 
traffickers pending judicial forfeiture procedures is also permissable. 
In the United Kingdom a different path was taken to control money laundering. 
The Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (DTOA) obliged anyone handling finances 
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on behalf of a third party - solicitors and accountants as well as banks and financial 
institutions, to disclose suspicious transactions, overriding any confidentiality imposed 
by contract. However, unlike in the United States, there was no obligation to report 
transactions above a certain amount and it was left to the banks discretion as to what 
constituted a suspicious transaction. 
International co-operation 
It is generally accepted that in order to combat the financial aspects of drug trafficking 
and other forms of criminal activity, preventative strategies and not just penal 
measures, as has been the approach, for example, of the Vienna Convention (see 
previous chapter and below), can playa significant and positive role. This belief lay 
at the heart of the Recommendations by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe of 27 June 1980 on measures against the transfer and the safekeeping of funds 
of criminal origin. 38 However, this initiative, prompted in the main by concern over 
a growing number of acts of criminal violence such as kidnapping, did not see its 
recommendations generally implemented. It was not until the late eighties with the 
dramatic increase in drug-money laundering, that attitudes had changed sufficiently to 
consider the measures put forward by this earlier initiative. 
The Statement of Principles for the guidance of bank supervisors issued on 12 
December 1988 by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices encourages the banking sector to adopt a common position in order to ensure 
that banks are not used to hide or launder funds acquired through criminal activities 
and, in particular, through drug trafficking. (See Appendix D) Although the Statement 
refers throughout to "banks" it is applicable to all financial institutions. As the 
Preamble to the text states, the document constitutes; 
"a general statement of ethical principles which encourages bank's 
management to put in place effective procedures to ensure that all 
persons conducting business with their institutions are properly 
identified; that transactions that do not appear legitimate are 
discouraged; and that co-operation with law enforcement agencies IS 
achieved. "39 
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The Statement sets out the following basic principles: 
Customer identification - when establishing a relationship by opening account or 
providing any other service, including safe deposit box facilities, reasonable effort 
should be taken to determine the true identity of the customer requesting the service. 
Compliance with legislation and law-enforcement agencies - business should be 
conducted in conformity with high ethical standards and local laws and regulations 
pertaining to financial transactions. Institutions should co-operate fully with national 
law enforcement authorities to the extent permitted without breaching customer 
confidential ity. 
Record Keeping and Systems - institutions should implement specific procedures for 
retaining internal records of transactions and establish an effective means of testing for 
general compliance with the Statement. 
Staff training - attention should be given to staff training and their on-going education 
in the institution's procedures to facilitate the recognition and reporting of money 
laundering. 
The Basle Statement of Principles is not a treaty in terms of publ ic international law 
and has no direct legal effect in the domestic law of any country. However, as the 
Financial Action Task Force Report pointed out: 
"Although it is not itself a legally binding document, various formulas 
have been used to make its principles an obligation, notably a formal 
agreement among banks that commits them explicitly (Austria, Italy, 
Switzerland), a formal indication by bank regulators that failure to 
comply with these principles could lead to administrative sanctions 
(France, United Kingdom), or legally binding texts with a reference to 
these principles (Luxembourg).40 
!n spite of its relatively recent nature, the FA TF was able to report that practical 
measures towards implementation "have already been taken in many countries. "41 
The first treaty in terms of public international law to attempt to control money 
laundering came with the conclusion in Vienna in December 1988 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.42 (See Appendix B) The Convention recognized the need to define with 
care the specific elements which the notion of the effective control of illicit traffic 
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encompasses. Article 3(1) of the final text, frequently described as the cornerstone of 
the Convention, "requires Parties to legislate as necessary to establish a modern code 
of criminal offences relating to ill icit trafficking in all its different aspects" .43 To that 
end Article 3(1)(a) requires that each state party shall "establish as criminal offences 
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally" a fairly comprehensive list of 
activities which have a major international impact. This includes in Article 3(1)(b) 
requiring the criminalisation of drug related money laundering by each state party. 
They are required to establish as criminal offences: 
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this 
paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose 
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
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who is involved in the commission of such offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions; 
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence 
or offences. 
Also of relevance in this context is Article (l)(c)(i) which requires Parties to 
take measures to render criminal: "The acquisition, possession or use of property, 
knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this ,paragraph or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences." However, the obligation on parties is 
qualified by the constitutional principles and the basic concepts of parties legal systems. 
The Convention created an obligation to criminalize the laundering of money derived 
from drug trafficking, thereby facilitating judicial co-operation and extradition, which 
was seen as hampered by the fact that many countries had not criminalised money 
laundering. 
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Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention requires that each state party 
empowers its courts or other relevant authorities to order that bank, financial or 
commercial records be made available for the investigation of drug-related offences. 
And that, "A Party shall not decl ine to act under the provis ions of th is paragraph on 
the ground of bank secrecy." The inclusion of this affirmative obligation can be seen 
as a major breakthrough. As Sproule and Saint-Denis state: "The exclusion of bank 
secrecy as a justification to decline to act may prove to be one of the most important 
measures in combatting drug money laundering operations".44 
The 1990 Council of Europe Convention represented the final product of an 
initiative taken by European Ministers of Justice in 1986 in order to combat the 
problems in the financial area posed by drug trafficking. (See Appendix G) A Select 
Committee of Experts was established by the European Committee on Crime Problems, 
with fairly wide terms of reference. In particular, it was not obliged to restrict its focus 
to the proceeds derived from drug trafficking alone. Although the Committee of 
Experts made direct reference to the relevant provisions of the 1988 United Nations 
Convention in their study, the willingness of the Council of Europe to go beyond that 
which was agreed in the UN context, is to be found in its much wider scope. The 
Convention states: 
"One of the purposes of the Convention is to facilitate international co-
operation as regards investigative assistance, search, seizure and 
confiscation of the proceeds from all types of criminality, especially 
serious crimes, and in particular drug offences, arms deal ing. terrorist 
offences, trafficking in children and young women ... and other offences 
which generate large profits. "45 
Article 2 of the Convention illustrates the nature of and limits to its ambition. It 
addresses confiscation measures to be taken at the national level. In essence, Article 
2(1) obliges states to enact legislation to permit the confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime and contains an implicit invitation for such legislation to be as broad as possible. 
However, the article did not impose an obligation to require confiscation in relation to 
all forms of criminal conduct, which is not supported by certain participating states 
existing legislation. 
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A further indication of the Council of Europe's intention to go beyond the 1988 
Convention can be seen in Article 6. The basic approach has been summarised in a 
House of Lords Select Committee report as follows: 
"Article 6 of the Convention requires States Parties to establish an 
offence of international money laundering. The property involved in any 
conversion or transfer could be proceeds not only of drug trafficking or 
terrorism but of any criminal offence (described as the "predicate 
offence ") and the State Party prosecuting need not have criminal 
jurisdiction over the predicate offence. Although this constitutes a very 
wide definition of money laundering, it is open to States on signature or 
ratification to limit the definition for themselves to more limited 
categories of predicate offence. "46 
This definition therefore expands money laundering beyond the association with drug 
trafficking as described above, and finds support in the existing legislative practice of 
certain states such as Switzerland.47 This development has the backing of the Financial 
Action Task Force which recommended in its 1990 Report (see later) that countries 
should consider extending the scope of the offence of money laundering to reach any 
other crime for which there is a link to drugs, or to all serious offences.48 This 
approach signals the awareness of many experts of the disadvantages associated with 
drug-specific definitions of money laundering. As Levi points out in the context of the 
United Kingdom Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986: "Sometimes - particularly in 
the laundering sphere and in the case of organised crime groups - the same people are 
involved in drug trafficking, fraud and terrorism. "49 
As with the Vienna Convention, the Council of Europe Convention concentrates 
mainly on penal means to combat money laundering within the framework of 
international co-operation among judicial and law-enforcement authorities. The 
European Economic Community Directive of 10 June 1991 recognises that the financial 
system and actors not associated with law enforcement, can playa highly effective role 
in preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering. (See Appendix H) 
The first paragraph of the preamble to the Directive Jays out its essential objective: 
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" ... when credit and financial institutions are used to launder proceeds 
from criminal activities (hereinafter referred to as "money laundering"), 
the soundness and stability of the particular institution concerned and 
confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously 
jeopardised, thereby losing the trust of the public". 50 
The Directive is primarily a pro-active tool in the sense that it deals with measures to 
be taken before any crime has taken place. This is a deliberate approach since the 
explanatory memorandum states that repressive measures are dealt with by the 1988 
United Nations Convention, described above. The recognition of the importance of 
prevention is central to the work of the European Communities. Community action in 
this area has been prompted by the perceived need to ensure "the integrity and 
cleanliness of the financial system "SI in the light of moves towards the creation of a 
single financial market. As the House of Lords Select Committee observed. the free 
movement of capital and of financial services "offers great scope for organised crime 
as well as for legitimate enterprise. "52 Also, it was felt that "lack of Community 
action against money laundering could lead Member States. for the purpose of 
protecting their financial systems. to adopt measures which could be inconsistent with 
completion of the single market. "53 Like the 1990 Council of Europe Convention 
mentioned above, the Directive recognises the fact that money laundering occurs in 
relation to the proceeds of other criminal activities such as organised crime and 
terrorism and not only in relation to the proceeds of drug trafficking. Thus, while the 
definition of money laundering contained in Article 1 is derived from that used in the 
1988 United Nations Convention. it relates to "criminal activity" rather than merely to 
serious drug-trafficking offences. 
The Directive also recognised the importance of including the whole financial 
system, including for example, the insurance industry and other types of professions 
and undertakings (Article 12 and 13(1)(d», since "partial coverage .. could provoke a 
shift in money laundering from one to another kind of financial institutions .. "54 The 
Directive states that scrutiny of the non-banking sector remains one of the major 
problems facing efforts to combat money laundering. 
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The Directive imposes a number of specific obligations. Firstly, it requires the 
identification of customers and beneficial owners "particularly when opening an account 
or savings account, or when offering safe custody facilities. "(Article 3(1» This 
requirement also applies when transacting business at or above 15,000 ECUs. 
Secondly, provision is made to ensure the due diligence of credit and financial 
institutions (Article 5). Thirdly, obligations are imposed on financial institutions to 
ensure co-operation with the relevant institutions and authorities responsible for 
combatting money laundering. In particular, the financial institutions must "on their 
own initiative" inform such authorities of any fact that might be an indication of money 
laundering. Furthermore, on request, they must furnish those authorities with all 
necessary information (Article 6 and 10), without informing the customer concerned 
or any other third parties (Article 8). The Directive also provides for the legal 
immunity of institutions under such conditions (Article 9). The Directive calls for the 
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establishment of procedures of internal control by credit and financial institutions and 
the creation by them of appropriate training programmes (Article 11). 
In contrast to both the 1988 and 1990 Conventions, the Directive has as a 
primary objective "preventing abuse of the financial system and detecting laundering, 
rather than increasing international co-operation in regard to punishment of offenders 
and confiscation of the proceeds of their crimes" .55 Furthermore, it recognises the 
importance of the participation of non-state actors, banks. insurance companies, 
investment businesses etc .• in controlling money laundering. 
Norm emergence 
As has been emphasised above, in order successfully to prevent illicit funds from 
entering the financial system, and thereby to control money laundering, the co-
operation of banks and other financial institutions is crucial. Up until the nineteen 
eighties banks for the most part did not see money laundering as their concern. The old 
maxim of "see no evil, hear no evil" was prevalent in the financial world. As Brian 
Quinn, Executive Director of the Bank of England said, as recently as February 1991 
in a conference speech, the idea that money laundering is a concern of banks is a 
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recent occurrence: "At first sight it may not be obvious that a Central Bank has an 
important role to play in combatting money laundering."56 But during the eighties 
banking values, such as support for the free market, the dominance of economic 
efficiency, customer confidentiality and the importance of maintaining banking 
soundness and stability, came into conflict with each other. 
Support for the free market meant that financial institutions had been reluctant 
for free capital movements to be disrupted in any way. Support for economic efficiency 
and profit meant that banks \I.'ere not primarily concerned with whether the business 
offered to them was legitimate or not. This reflected the role of banking supervision, 
the primary function of which as the Basle Statement of Principles states was to 
"maintain the overall financial stability and soundness of banks rather than to ensure 
that individual transactions conducted by bank customers are legitil1)ate. "57 
Furthermore, it was difficult to separate "dirty" money from "grey" or "hot" money, 
that is, capital in flight for fiscal reasons - speculation, tax evasion or tax avoidance. 
Banks in Switzerland for example had an estimated 150 bill ion Swiss Francs of tax 
evaders money in 1989.58 The difficulty of separating drug money from other illicit 
funds led to an awareness in the eighties that it was necessary to legislate for all illicit 
funds. 
It has always been the duty of our banker to keep our banking affairs secret. 
Customer confidentiality has been the holiest of holies for the financial sector since its 
creation. Enshrined in banking tradition, the basic principles were accepted and restated 
by the Court of Appeal in the case of Tournier in 1924. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, until the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986, statutory disclosure was 
permitted only rarely and then with strict safeguards. Drug trafficking was seen to be 
a special case where there was a clear need to track down offenders and prevent money 
laundering. The Act made it an offence for a bank official to handle a transaction he 
or she regarded as suspicious without reporting it to the police. 
The Financial Action Task Force, reporting in 1990, called for banks and other 
types of depository institutions such as savings banks and building societies to improve 
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their monitoring of money transactions. The report says this can best be done with a 
"suspicion-based" system by which banks are required to report cash movements which 
they suspected might be drug-related. 
Conflict arose in the financial world between those who wanted the adoption of 
an American system of mandatory reporting of all cash movements above a certain 
amount, in the American case $10,000 and those who thought this was inefficient and 
costly. As Quinn stated in his speech: 
"While we wish to see effective measures taken against money 
laundering on a global basis, it is also important to try to avoid 
recommendations being brought forward that could involve unnecessary 
cost and complexity for financial institutions or be unduly disruptive to 
the efficiency of their operation. "59 
There was also conflict between those who felt that the suspicion-based system 
would lead to banking confidentiality becoming a sham, as officials, facing prosecution 
for failing to report suspicions, would report every irregularity that might conceivably 
relate to crime of any kind, leading to the financial affairs of many innocent people 
being investigated needlessly. The American mandatory reporting system was also 
rejected by the Bank of England. 
The Bank of England opposed the so called Kerry Amendment, whereby Section 
4702 of the 1988 United State's Anti-Drug Abuse Act instructs the Secretary of the 
United States Treasury to negotiate with other countries, whose financial institutions 
do business in US currency, to ensure that they maintain records of their large US 
currency transactions and to establish a mechanism whereby such records may be made 
available to US law enforcement officials. The Bank of England stated that: "In our 
view, this legislation was both extra-territorial in nature and an unnecessary erosion of 
customerlbanker confidentiality". 60 
Mandatory reporting of transactions was also a problem for the emerging 
financial sectors of former Eastern bloc countries. In beginning to build up their 
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financial systems, it was important that these countries participated in money-
laundering initiatives. Some countries however have reservations regarding the 
declarations of suspicious transactions. It was felt that strong bank secrecy laws were 
essential to obtain the confidence of the population in the new financial system, because 
in the old system, a general obligation existed to report any suspicion of illegal 
activity. 
A balance between the different views was struck with consensus reached that 
the mandatory reporting of all cash movements above a certain amount was too 
cumbersome and inefficient and that a suspicion-based system would be more 
appropriate. 
A change in opinion also came about that measures to deter money lauQdering 
through "know your customer" provisions were helpful in the fight against fraud which 
was seen as a growing cause of loss by banks. Concerns over the costs of implementing 
reporting systems (the cost in the United States has already been mentioned) by the 
major financial centres is balanced by the view that every centre will have to do the 
same to avoid their competitive position being damaged. As Quinn comments "the 
various steps being taken to combat money laundering could, over time, enhance the 
UK's reputation for financial honesty and integrity. "61 
The shift in value salience for the financial institutions is due to a number of 
factors. As has already been mentioned the increase in money-laundering due to an 
increase in crime, particularly trafficking in illicit drugs, has meant that it has become 
an issue that financial institutions have not been able to ignore or dismiss as 
unimportant. Furthermore, the idea of society consciously sustaining norms through 
social isation, as described in the previous chapter, led to bankers responding to the 
general concern outside the banking world about a "major social evil". 62 The Basle 
Statement describes itself as "a general statement of ethical principles" to prevent 
institutions becoming associated with criminals. 63 Efficiency, profits and secrecy had 
been· of higher salience than honesty and stability for financial institutions. This had to 
change for a regime to form on money-laundering. 
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Financial deregulation and the fierce battle fought for new accounts that 
developed in the early nineteen eighties led to the erosion of customer identification 
procedures and in particular, the provision of bankers' references. This has led to an 
increase in fraud and loses for the banks. Financial shocks and scandals, the fallout 
after the Big Bang in the UK, the costs of the developing countries debt crisis, the 
savings and loans crisis in the United States, problems with the United States insurance 
industry, the stock market crashes of 1987 and the failure of banking supervisors to 
prevent the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), have 
all undermined public confidence in banks and hence threatened their stability. As 
Richard O'Brien states in his book, Global Financial Integration: The End of 
Geography: "The most worrying aspect of the 1990s for many observers is the 
apparent "financial fragility" of markets".64 These crises have led_ to ~ncreasing efforts 
to develop more global rules and more global co-operation in the market: 
"In the financial marketplace, the trend towards some sort of global 
governance is best represented by the efforts of banking supervisors 
under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle to 
impose common minimum capital requirements on banks, and, in 
conjunction with supervisors and regulators, in other financial sectors 
(security and insurance), to integrate and coordinate the supervision of 
banking, securities markets and insurance" .65 
This increase in international co-operation and action included a focus on efforts 
to combat money laundering and the emergence of an international regime based on the 
Financial Action Task Force. 
The FA TF: a nwney laundering control regime 
On a number of occasions, mention has been made of the work of the Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering. The FATF must be seen as the decision-making 
focus of an international regime on money laundering. 
Various international organisations or groups, including the Council of 
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Europe66 , the Fond provenant des activites criminelles (FOPAC) a division of 
Interpol, and among EEC members, the Mutual Assistance Group (MAG) between 
customs administrations, and the TREYI Group of ministers in charge of security, as 
we11 as the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), have already devoted much attention 
to the money-laundering problem. But none of these organisations deal exclusively with 
the problem of money laundering, concerned as they are with other aspects of the drug 
phenomenon. 
The Task Force was established by the Heads of State or Government of the 
seven major industrial nations (Group of Seven), and the President of the Commission 
of the European Communities, at their fifteenth annual summit in Paris in July 1989. 
(See Appendix E) The resulting Economic Declaration stressed the importance of 
dealing with the financial aspects of drug trafficking and decided on the creation of a 
task force from summit participants and other countries for whom the issue was sal ient. 
Its mandate was: 
"to assess the results of co-operation already undertaken in order to 
prevent the utilisation of the banking system and financial institutions for 
the purpose of money laundering, and to consider additional preventative 
efforts in this field, including the adaptation of the legal and regulatory 
systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance. "67 
In addition to summit participants (United States, Japan, Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and the Commission of the European Communities) 
eight other countries (Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Austria, Spain and Austria) were invited to take part in this initiative. More than one 
hundred and thirty experts from various ministries, law-enforcement authorities and 
bank supervisory and regulatory agencies participated in the production of a report 
containing forty recommendations for action, in February 1990. (See Appendix F) 
These recommendations were viewed as constituting "a minimum standard in the fight 
against money laundering"68 although some of the recommendations failed to attract 
unanimous support. 
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The recommendations, focused on three central areas: i) improvements to 
national legal systems; ii) the enhancement of the role of financial system; and iii) the 
strengthening of international co-operation. Within these broad areas the report 
identified three measures which were unanimously regarded as constituting the overall 
general framework for its many specific proposals. These were: 
1. Each country should take steps to ratify the Vienna Convention and 
proceed to implement it; 
2. Secrecy laws for financial institutions should not inhibit 
implementation of the recommendations of the group; 
3. Increased multi-lateral co-operation and mutual legal assistance, in 
investigations, prosecutions and extradition, is necessary for an effective 
enforcement program. 
At the Houston Summit in July 1990 it was agreed that the FATF process 
should continue in order to "assess and facilitate the implementation of the forty 
recommendations, and to complement them where appropriate". 69 All Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and financial centre 
countries were invited to subscribe to the recommendations and to participate in the 
preparation of the second FA TF report. 70 
The FA TF saw its membership enlarged with Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Hong Kong and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, together with law enforcement specialists of Interpol and the 
Customs Cooperation Council joining the process. With the invo~vement of Hong Kong 
and the Gulf, two of the three most important off-shore banking centres were now 
participating. Singapore, the third most important off-shore financial centre in relation 
to controlling money laundering eventually joined the Task Force at the outset of the 
third session. 71 The most important accomplishment of FATF-2, was the agreement 
reached to move from self-reporting of progress towards the implementation of Task 
Force recommendations, to a system in which mutual assessment or evaluation plays 
a major role. 
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In its second report, the Task Force made special note of the need for its 
regulations to cover not just banks but non-traditional financial institutions or 
professions that might be involved in money-laundering practises. As it becomes harder 
for money launderers to work in established financial centres, the Task Force 
highlighted the importance of looking at businesses that have not traditionally been 
associated with money laundering. These included special mention of bureaux de 
change, casinos, lotteries, precious metal and gem dealers, auction houses, real estate 
agents, automobile, aeroplane and boat dealers and professionals who, in the course 
of providing their professional services, offer. in some countries. client account 
facilities (for example lawyers, accountants, notaries and certain travel agents). 
In FATF-2 it was agreed that the FA TF process should continue for a further 
five years when it would be reviewed again. A Secretariat was established within the 
OECD. In its most recent report, published on June 16th 1994, the Task Force noted 
that its recommendations now form the basis of anti-money laundering laws in all its 
member states. 72 (See Appendix I) 
As has been explained in Chapter Two, where an issue-system features a high 
degree of consensus over its central norm and a high rate of actor compliance with 
rules and decisions designed to uphold that norm, then an international regime can be 
seen to have emerged, regulating the issue. This can be seen to be the case with a high 
degree of consensus over the norm that "Banks should not profit from illicit funds" and 
the formation of the Financial Action Task Force to regulate the issue. 
Conclusion 
As has been mentioned earlier in this study, the drug phenomenon can be seen as a 
number of separate, identifiable issues which can be isolated into distinct issue-systems 
comprised of actors in contention over related values. For the actors in the financial 
issue-system only one of the drug issues is salient, that of the problem of money 
laundering. 
246 
The adherence of the actors to the global norm can be seen to be determined, 
firstly by how salient they perceive the norm to be to them in allocating stakes to 
satisfy a particular value by which they are guided. As has been explained, banking 
stability and soundness was threatened by the increase in drug-money laundering and 
therefore rules such as "know your customer" and "report suspicious transactions" have 
replaced "see no evil, hear no evil" in the pursuit of efficiency and profit, which 
seemed so prevalent in the past. Secondly, an actor may be influenced by other actors 
into adhering to a particular norm. This process of socialisation, explained in the 
previous chapter can be seen to have influenced the banks and financial institutions into 
accepting the "ethical principles" of the Basle Committee and is fundamental to the 
work of the Financial Action Task Force. 
Krasner's definition of a regime as featuring "principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures", is met by the Financial Action Task Force in this "given 
area of international relations". 73 The norm that banks should not profit from illicit 
funds is nearly universally accepted. The norms and the principles of the regime can 
be seen to have been developed by the Basle Committee and the work of the United 
Nations. The Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and the United 
States can be seen to have started to develop regional regimes for the control of money 
laundering. However, the Financial Action Task Force is the only global body whose 
focus is exclusively on money laundering. The emergence of the Task Force can be 
seen as the decision-making focus of a global money-laundering control regime. 
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International Regimes and Drug Control 
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Introduction 
The nineteen eighties saw the wider availability and growing consumption of illicit 
drugs. It also saw the emergence of an international consensus against drug trafficking 
by the international community. The increase in drug trafficking has occurred despite 
increasing international action through the main international control body, the United 
Nations, and other international institutions to prevent it. This research has shown that 
there are many difficulties involved in attempts by legal structures to control an illegal 
activity, especially one which is as multi-faceted and multi-dimensional as thl3 drug 
phenomenon. Suppression of one source of supply, one method of transportation and 
one pattern of abuse has often simply led to the emergence of other forms. This 
research has attempted to set the "drug problem", as it has become known, into a 
theoretical framework which aids our understanding of the phenomenon, by further 
developing theories of regime creation. Because the drug phenomenon is complex and 
multi-faceted, it requires precisely the issue-specific approach of international regimes 
as understood by this research. 
Regime creation 
It has become clear through the course of this study that the prevailing literature on 
international regimes has concentrated on structural models of regimes - the rules and 
decision-making procedures - within a Realist hegemonic-stability framework. 
Hegemonic-stability theory incorporates the central Realist axiom, of states rationally 
aiming to secure themselves through maximising their power, in the face of growing 
interdependence between countries. This view has been expounded by writers such as 
Kindlebergert, Gilpin2, Krasner3 and Keohane4 , principally as an explanation of 
patterns of international economic co-operation. In this area, the theory might be seen 
to have some descriptive utility. The dominance of the United States in the post-v,·ar 
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international economic and military order until the 1970s, exemplified by security 
institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and economically, 
by the Bretton Woods system illustrates this. The other classic example of hegemonic-
stability advanced by the Realists is the international trade system of the second half 
of the nineteenth century, which was dominated by Great Britain by virtue of her vast 
Empire and naval strength. However, as we have seen in Chapter Three, at the turn 
of the century, the United States, which was not then a military power on a par with 
the global empires, was able to put the question of drug control onto the international 
agenda and Britain was forced to accept international legislation. 
While accepting that Great Britain and the United States were often able to 
utilize their capabilities to secure international co-operation to suit their interests in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century respectively, hegemonic-stability theory does not help 
to explain the many international institutions and agreementS in the form of regimes, 
that have survived the decline of the hegemon or been created in the absence of one. 
Despite the decline of US hegemony in the 1970's, most international arrangements can 
be seen to have continued to function, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 
Critics of hegemonic-stability theory have also been able to point to the many 
examples of regime creation in the last thirty years, despite the decline of the US as 
a hegemon, as a challenge to the usefulness of the theory. Much of their work has been 
concerned with environmental and conservation regimes: Oran Young writing about the 
North Pacific fur seals regime and the Svalbard ArchipelagoS; Peter Haas writing 
about the development of a regional regime regulating marine pollution in the 
Mediterranean known as the Mediterranean Action Plan6 and the issue of ozone 
depletion and the emergence of an international regime curbing CFC use and 
production', and most recently Oran Young and Gail Osherenko detail the example of 
the creation of a regime to conserve polar bears in the Arctic. 8 A regime to conserve 
polar bears was set up in 1973 and included both superpowers. The regime can be seen 
to have represented a common (non-security) concern which transcended ideological 
differences, without apparently advancing the economic or military interests of any of 
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the participating governments, in contrast to the hegemonic-stability argument. Other 
regimes that are worthy of investigation with a non-hegemonic approach include marine 
oil pollution, global climate change, preservation of bio-diversity, allocation of 
geostationary satellite orbits, acid rain, conservation of elephants and conservation of 
Antarctica. 
Various explanations have been offered by regime theorists for the failure of 
international institutions and regimes created in the late-1940s to collapse in the 
absence of continued American hegemony. One argument is that, although American 
power can be judged to have declined, the United States still maintains an important 
position and can continue to direct international arrangements in a way which favours 
her interests. 9 Roger Tooze links what can be seen as the continuation of America 
hegemony under a new guise to the predominantly American disco~rse 9f r.egime 
theory, 
"regime analysis allows for the continued articulation of interest by a 
dominant political and economic power. In other words, the concept of 
regime, and its widespread adoption not only changes the way that we 
think about international cooperation, but also enables and legitimises a 
continuation of American power within the "new" regime 
framework. "IO 
This is what Cox refers to as the "process of institutionalization of hegemony~ where 
there is continued acceptance of the values underlying the structure of the world 
political economy. II 
An alternative but related position accepts that American hegemony has declined 
but sees a new hegemon in the form of a trilateral power structure formed by the 
United States, Japan and the European Community. Since both Japan and the EC are 
in broad agreement with the ideology of the post-war economy, the values, beliefs and 
goals of the new hegemonic coalition broadly reflect those of the old. 
Finally, to return to the work of Stephen Krasner, an alternative explanation 
comes from the idea that there is a time-lag between the rise and fall of a regime and 
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the underlying changes in the structure of power. Therefore, regimes can be seen to 
continue and "assume a life of their own"12 despite a realignment of power in 
international society. This phenomena, or time-lag, can be explained as being a result 
of custom and usage, uncertainty and cognitive failing. 13 States which are party to a 
regime may continue to adhere to its rules and principles through habit, and can be 
reluctant to defect in order to maximise short-term interests through fear of incurring 
long-term costs. Although unhappy with the regime to which they are a party, states 
may not wish to bear the costs of constructing an alternative regime. Therefore, a 
regime can be seen to be able to survive the decline of the hegemon through these 
"feedback mechanisms", whose preponderant position had created the conditions for 
the regime's creation. 14 
The above explanations are not however useful for understanding the setting up 
of regimes such as that described for polar bear or fur seal -conservation or the 
protection of the ozone layer or indeed the money laundering control regime described 
in the previous chapter. The polar bear regime cannot be seen to advance the economic 
or military interests of any of the participating governments. In the case of the creation 
of the money laundering control regime, although the world's largest banks are based 
in the United States, they were not able to force the acceptance of a mandatory 
reporting system for all financial transactions over a certain amount, on the other actors 
in the system. 
Supporters of hegemonic-stability theory would say that its lack of application 
to environmental regimes does not matter, since they concern what Realist writers 
would term "low politics" issues and therefore do not challenge the validity of the 
theory. Opponents of hegemonic-stability arguments for regime creation have often 
been criticised for concentrating efforts on areas where their hypotheses are. in the 
words of Jonsson, "doomed to success". that is these "low politics". non-contentious 
issues. IS However. as Chapter One has demonstrated. the drug phenomenon 
challenges the Realist approach to international relations since a social problem. drug-
related activity, is seen as a threat to national and international security by many 
governments and could therefore be described as a "high politics" issue. This research 
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has shown the lack of theoretical applicability of the Realist High/Low politics 
distinction to current developments in international relations. An alternative view, 
advocated by the Globalists, is that in principle any issue may affect security, involve 
the highest decision-makers, produce crises' and be dominated by governments. The 
drug phenomenon clearly demonstrates that while the hegemon may be a factor in 
regime creation, especially in economic issues as described above. it is not the single 
overriding determinant that the hegemonic-stability theorists would have us believe. 
Returning to the description of an international regime given by Krasner, this 
study has focused on the importance of understanding the nature of the principles and 
norms and their dynamics for regime creation rather than the narrower focus on the 
rules and decision-making procedures favoured by hegemonic-stability theory. The 
literature on international regimes suggests that a regime must have an issue ,that it 
seeks to regulate. The concept of an issue however. suffers from lack of clarification 
in current International Relations literature. 
This research has pointed out that the concept of issues forming distinct issue-
systems and the concept of international regimes which emerged from the literature on 
interdependence in the seventies, developed principally in isolation from each other. 
The former within the Globalist paradigm and the latter within the Realist approach to 
International Relations as a response to the challenge of interdependence. Both concepts 
can be seen to have suffered from lack of clarification in the discipline. Important to 
both approaches is the concept of an issue. The concept is central to the Global Politics 
paradigm in the acceptance that there is not a single international system. but instead 
there are multiple issue-based systems, with each system featuring a unique cast of 
actors for whom the issue is salient. However, as we have seen, an authoritative 
theoretical I iterature on the nature of issues is lacking. The use of the term n issue-area" 
in the work of Rosenau, Mansbach and Vasquez and Keohane and Nye has generated 
a great deal of confusion. The use of systems analysis in political science pioneered by 
David Easton defines a political system as wherever one can identify behaviour 
modification in any given area, which is in keeping with Mansbach and Vasquez' 
description of an issue as consisting of "a cluster of values that are to be allocated". 
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The concept of an "issue-system" can be seen as more analytically useful than issue-
area, because it need not evoke the behavioral processes that Rosenau associated with 
the term issue-area. Therefore we can concentrate attention on the contention over 
values of the actors concerned. This understanding of the nature of issues, in terms of 
contention over values being central to the study of politics, described by Easton as 
"the authoritative allocation of values", is quite distinct from the Realist understanding 
of the nature of issues and of politics as the struggle for power in an anarchic world. 
According to the Realist perspective, state power and "state interests" explain which 
issues come on to the agenda (and form international regimes) and which remain on 
the periphery. 
Work on agenda formation has not been taken up in International Relations 
literature. This can be seen to be partly due to the dominance of the Realist paradigm 
in the discipline, and the emphasis on the anarchy of the globar system, rather than 
viewing world politics as co-operation and conflict of actors over efforts to allocate 
values authoritatively in multiple systems. Mansbach and Vasquez' "issue cycle" and 
crisis stage, as discussed in Chapter Two, although useful, does not claim to have 
general application, but is applied to issues that "dominate the attention and energy of 
the major actors" .16 This study believes that the concept of salience, developed by the 
Globalist parad!gm, is a more fundamentally useful theoretical concept for 
understanding issue formation and evolution because it shifts the "critical" property 
from the issue to the actor. Using the concept of salience we can understand how one 
issue can be more salient than another issue for a specific actor at a specific time if it 
optimises the actor's own set of value preferences at that time. The concept of salience 
suggests a dynamic to change, lacking in the emphasis on stability in the state-centric 
approach of Realism. 
Salience can explain the emergence of issue-systems, when actors seek to 
generate support for particular values and seek to allocate them authoritatively. The 
extent to which the actors in an issue-system regulate the issue (by authoritatively 
allocating the value at stake) is variable. A regime is formed, if the issue-system can 
successfully translate values into the form of an agreed norm and if there is a high rate 
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of actor compliance with the rules and decisions designed to uphold that norm. 
Therefore the formation of issue-systems and the creation of regimes can be seen as 
different stages in the same process of global change. This emphasis on understanding 
the nature of issues through an understanding of values is central to systems analysis 
and has been shown in this study to give a firmer theoretical footing for explaining the 
normative nature of international regimes, lacking in the dominant hegemonic approach 
to regime creation. 
A clearer understanding of values and norms, their evolution and role in 
international decision-making has been explored in order to develop a theory of 
international regimes that gave them an independent impact in international relations 
and not simply a role as a reflection of hegemonic interests. Developing theories of 
value and norm emergence can also be seen as central to understanding of ~hange in 
world politics. 
The d.vnamics of change 
For the traditional Realist school, change in world politics is defined in terms of 
changes in state power, and the emergence of regimes is similarly defined. An 
alternative approach to the emergence and role of international regimes challenges this 
established belief by asserting that agendas are determined by the attempt of actors 
individually to maximise the achievement of their preferred values and collectively to 
allocate values authoritatively on specific issues. 
How values emerge, change and influence decision-making in international 
politics has received very little attention in International Relations literature and 
specifically in relation to the field of regimes. The standard Krasner definition of an 
international regime as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations"17 implicitly contains the concept of values with his 
definition of "principles" and "norms". The concept of "values" is evoked with the use 
of "principles" defined as "beliefs of fact causation and rectitude" and "norms" defined 
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as "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations"18 and further 
developed in this research. 
In Chapter Three, this study explained the changing attitudes towards drug use 
in the nineteenth century and emphasised the importance of taking into account the 
advances and concepts from alternative disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy and 
history in our understanding of change. This chapter helps to illustrate how the Realists 
preoccupation with the "struggle for power" does not explain the fact that there are a 
"multiplicity of values and stakes for which actors both cooperate and compete" .19 
Rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and technological advances, with corresponding 
social and economic transformation and increasing social unrest, a rising economic 
group in the form of the medical profession and their attempts to establish monopolistic 
restrictive practices, the attempts by traders to destroy the British monopoly of trade 
. 
with China and to promote free trade, the values of the religious movements and the 
missionaries promoting the end of the opium trade with China, all illustrate that power, 
as understood by the Realist approach to International Relations, was not the sole 
variable for change in the nineteenth century towards drug use. 
Chapter Three illustrated the mix of social and technological change, competing 
domestic interests, changing religious values and competing trade interests which all 
promoted changing norms about drug use. Nineteenth-century society also illustrates 
how the norm towards drug use were sustained through the process of socialisation. By 
the end of the nineteenth century there was widespread consensus that the non-medical 
use of opium in particular and its derivatives (heroin, morphine, methadone) was evil, 
immoral and dangerous. Although contemporary scientific evidence demonstrated that 
opium had no particulary harmful effects other than addiction (Report of the Royal 
Commission on Opium, 1894-95~, there were few moral or political issues which 
were so strongly condemned by public opinion at the time. This was despite the fact 
that opiate use had been quite widespread earlier in the nineteenth century. In the 
twentieth century, anti-opium attitudes can be seen to have been institutionalised by 
national and international agreements, again despite conflicting scientific evidence as 
detailed in Chapter One. 
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An authoritative literature on the source and role of values in the discipl ine of 
International Relations has been shown to be lacking. The work of Mansbach and 
Vasquez, mentioned above, is one of the few examples of an attempt by International 
Relations writers to present an analysis of the nature of values. Mansbach and Vasquez 
illuminate the nature of values, which they say are abstract and intangible, by 
proposing that they are represented by objects or stakes representing the values. They 
make a distinction between "concrete" and "transcendental" stakes in their analysis. 
Concrete stakes represent a means of directly satisfying a value. whereas transcendental 
stakes are, "entirely abstract and non-specific, and which concern beliefs, prescriptions 
or norms about how people should live or behave. "11 Mansbach and Vasquez also talk 
about stakes in relation to their intrinsic and instrumental worth, that is they may be 
sought for the values they represent on the one hand, or they may be sought for the 
instrumental purpose of acquiring values that are actually associated with other stakes, 
on the other. Confusion arises since values are also talked about as either intrinsic or 
instrumental, suggesting that there is a corresponding relationship between intrinsic and 
instrumental stakes and intrinsic and instrumental values. This research has put forward 
the view that since values are abstract and cannot be attained directly. all values must 
be intrinsic. Since stakes are the objects with which value satisfaction can be achieved, 
all stakes can be seen as instrumental, a way of satisfying preferences. As we have 
seen in this research, actors do not always continue to support stakes in a static 
manner. but for the value that supporting the stake may satisfy at the time, or for the 
satisfaction of an alternative stake. Similarly, different actors may contest the same 
stake for the satisfaction of different values. 
In this sense, acting in your self-interest can still be understood as value-guided 
behaviour, a fact commonly overlooked in the traditional Realist approach to 
international politics. As Easton states: 
"Interests is itself a conceptually ambiguous term in political research. 
It might be used to refer to the fundamental value system of an 
individual or group, his basic goals, hopes and aspirations in life. To 
. use it so broadly is to destroy any specific analytic significance it may 
have. It is more helpful to abandon this possible meaning and retain 
"basic goals" or "fundamental values" as concepts for this purpose. "11 
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As Easton goes on to clarify that in this way "Interests can then be more narrowly 
defined to refer to instrumental values"23 (or stakes as described by this author), those 
means through which a person or group seeks to implement what may be considered 
to be his or its fundamental goals. 
The United States' government supported the moral position on drug control in 
the nineteenth century because the British monopoly of trade with China was against 
their interest. On the other hand, the missionaries position derived from the value that 
drugs were evil, immoral and dangerous and the abolition of the trade with China 
partly satisfied this value. The norm "Banks should not profit from illicit activity" 
emerged as a specific interpretation of the value that drugs were evil, immoral and 
. 
dangerous, and that drug trafficking should be prevented, but has come to be salient 
to financial institutions for its role in realizing the very different value of protecting the 
soundness and stability of financial institutions. As Mansbach and Vasquez state, 
"actors may seek the same stake in the name of different values".24 
The role of nomlS 
This study has put forward the view the dominant hegemonic theory for both regime 
creation, change and decline in pursuit of power by state actors cannot adequately 
explain what Krasner talked about as "convergent expectations". The important of 
understanding values, emphasised by the work on issue-systems in political science 
gives us an alternative understanding of why actors co-operate in international affairs -
not for the allocation of power, but for the allocation of values. The shifting values 
and norms of actors must therefore be understood to playa significant role in agenda-
building. 
Norms have received very little attention in the discipline of International 
Relations, with the notable exception of the work of Friedrich Kratochwil. Although 
given as a key element of an international regime in the Krasner definition, regime 
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theorists have by and large not explored the normative nature of international regimes. 
Chapter Five discussed how the different approaches to the nature and the role of 
norms have been influenced by different philosophical traditions. This was seen to have 
led to confusion, with the term "norm" meaning different things in the literature of 
different fields. The use of the concept by regime theorists has been limited to 
explaining their emergence in terms of the utility for powerful actors of writing the 
norms and rules in their own interests. Utilitarian logic and state of nature concepts can 
be seen to have no empirical referents in the complex world of individuals who are 
born into a pre-existing society, have multiple objectives, possess limited information, 
cannot necessarily conceptualise a coherent value calculus and cannot always predict 
the outcome of their actions. 2s The less-logical, less-satisfactory concept of a social 
norm, as explained in Chapter Five does match the reality of a society with organised 
religious groups, competing political parties and subject to socialisation processes .. This 
work has portrayed norms as central to understanding the creation of international 
regimes and their role and impact in international affairs. The significance of norms 
has been shown to be what makes the study of regime theory distinctive from any other 
area of International Relations such as the study of international organisations. 
Fundamentally, if regimes are to have any independent impact on world affairs, they 
must change actors behaviour. In order to do th is they must allocate values 
authoritatively by enforcing norms and implementing their rules and procedures 
amongst state and non-state actors. 
Chapter Four described various norms that have emerged in response to drug-
related activity. However, from the norms listed, only one can be seen to have formed 
an effective international regime. Despite strong consensus around a second norm, only 
a "declaratory regime", to use Donnelly's terminology can be seen to have emerged 
at this present time. Why this is so will be explored in the next section. 
Drug trafficking and money laundering: the focus of international attention 
As we have explained above, norm emergence is not a guarantee of regime emergence. 
As Chapter Four detailed, the emergence of a consensus against drug trafficking by the 
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international community did not lead to the creation of an international regime that 
could effectively enforce the norm to prevent drug trafficking. Consensus over values 
can be seen to have led to the emergence of a norm, but not to international decision-
making procedures. This work has shown that, in the literature on international 
regimes, there is a great deal of definitional confusion about what constitutes a regime. 
The extent to which a regime's norms and its decision-making procedures are 
enforced varies. As Donnelly states, 
"Regime norms may range from binding international standards that are 
generally accepted by states as authoritative to international guidelines 
that are commended in word but rarely in deed. Regime procedures 
likewise may range from full international decision making, including 
generally effective enforcement powers, to procedures that amount to 
little more than international verbal encouragement of sovereign national 
action. International regimes thus come in an immense variety offorms" 
(emphasis added by current author). 26 
For Donnelly, a regime's "strength" increases according to the extent of its decision-
making powers - that is the range of activities available to relevant international 
institutions. Four types of regimes, based on four types of action, are identified by 
Donnelly: Pronwtion - encouraging national implementation of international norms by 
public information activities; Assistance - providing support for national implementation 
of international norms, typically through financial or technical assistance; 
Implementation - playing a direct international role in putting regime norms into 
practice through systems of international information exchange, policy consultation or 
co-ordination, or (unenforceable) international monitoring of national compliance with 
regime norms or recommended policies and finally; Enforcement - binding and 
enforceable international implementation of regime norms.27 
Within each general type, as defined in the first instance by decision-making 
procedures, regimes can be further differentiated by their normative scope. Donnelly 
identifies four types of regime norms running from fuJly international or "authoritative 
international norms: binding international standards, generally accepted as such by 
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states" to entirely national. described as "the absence of substanti\e international 
norms". A fifth type of regime can therefore be identified, a "declaratory regime" 
which involves international norms but has no international decision-making 
procedures. (See Figure 7) The global trafficking regime is an example of a declaratory 
regime. The norms of the regime are coherent, v,:ell-developed, and ~'idely commended 
by state and non-state actors alike. However, implementation of the norm that 
trafficking must be controlled, has remained the responsibility of national and not 
international actors. The regime can be described therefore as a "declaratory regime". 
In as much as governments are beginning to co-operate in the exchange of information 
on trafficking, the declaratory regime may be evolving into a promotional regime. 
National PromOlion or Informal Ion Polley Inle rnaliO,,11 Internationil 
Dec ilion. Aui,'a"ce Eachange COOldln.,ion MonllOl/ng Decis.onl 
Inter/\alional Strong Strong SIlong SIlong 
Norm. Declaralory PromOlional Implemenlllio" Enforcemenl 
Inler/\alional 
Stand.rd, wilh 
Nalional Eaemplion, Wealr. 
Imp1ementllio" 
Inl.rnllion.1 
Guid.~nu W ..... Wealr. Weak 
Oecillalory Promoltonal Enforceme'" 
Nation.1 
SlIndard' No Regime 
O.claratory Promotional Imp'.men,.,io" Enforcemenl 
Reoim. R.gim. R'gima R ........ 
FIGURE 7 Donnelly's regime classification 
Source: J Donnelly, "International human rights: a regime analysis", International 
Organisation, Vol. 40, No.3, Summer 1986, p 603. 
The description of international attempts to control drug trafficking given above 
conforms to the approach to regime formation adopted by the European regime 
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theorists in the late eighties. For them the final criterion for regime formation is that 
the behaviour of international actors must be affected by the regime's norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures. Wolf and Zurn have added the appendage of 
"effectiveness" to Krasner's standard definition of an international regime. 28 As 
Rittberger points out, this enables us to distinguish between regimes and treaties, since 
a regime's rules may be informal. A further distinction can therefore be made between 
rules that are actually observed and those that exist in writing but have no discernable 
influence on actor behaviour. As Rittberger states "norms and rules which do not 
measurably shape the behaviour of states cannot be considered prescriptions". 19 
Commenting on the research by Mendler into the issue of the working conditions of 
foreign journalists, where Krasner's criteria for a regime had been met, Rittberger 
states, 
"norm observance and rule compliance varied so greatly over time and 
across countries, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, that 
- using effectiveness as a criterion - it did not seem warranted to 
acknowledge the existence of a regime. "30 
It can be seen therefore that there is no effective trafficking regime because 
governments cannot implement the norm. Firstly, drug trafficking cannot be effectively 
controlled for practical reasons, since borders of countries have offered limited 
protection from smugglers throughout history, for goods for which there is a high 
demand. Also the nature of the drugs themselves presents practical problems: they are 
not a bulky commodity. Because of the demand for heroin, cocaine and marijuana, 
smuggling small amounts, easily disguisabJe about the person or in a vehicle, can 
generate large profits. Secondly, there is no international institution available that has 
the authority to implement the norm. GATT, the main institution concerned with trade, 
promotes freedom of trade rather than restrictions on trade. 
On the other hand, the norm of the international money-laundering control 
regime is seen as a binding international standard that is generally accepted as 
authoritative, by states and non-state actors for whom the issue is salient. The regime 
can be seen to enforce its decision-making powers effectively through the Financial 
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Action Task Force. 
The dynamics of change in an issue-system means that different actors may 
create norms, but they will not necessarily be able to form a regime. A regime needs 
an appropriate institution to regulate the rules and decision-making procedures. If no 
appropriate institution exists you cannot have a regime. There is currently no 
regulatory body with the global authority necessary for implementation of the drug 
trafficking norm. This is despite the fact that the norm is coherent, well-developed and 
widely commended by state and non-state actors alike. Implementation of the norm 
remains almost entirely in the hands of national actors. The lack of authority of the 
United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the focus of United 
Nations efforts to control trafficking, has been detailed in Chapter Four. 
Other possible global bodies which could be the centre for a global trafficking 
control regime include the International Criminal Police Organization (lCPOlInterpol). 
However, its role has always been one of stimulating the exchange of information 
among national drug law-enforcement services, through the establishment of a data 
bank, and international bodies concerned with drug control, and in aiding the ability 
of national services to control illicit traffic. Its secretariat has no operational role 
independent of national authorities. 
The lack of development of a supranational operational regulatory body for 
controlling drug trafficking is clearly due to the importance states give to their policing 
powers as a core item of their sovereignty. The lack of development of co-ordinated 
policing operations by the international community, despite the increase in transnational 
crime described earlier in this study, illustrates this. Any effective international action 
against drug trafficking would require relinquishing control over parts of the national 
law-enforcement machinery which states are still reluctant to do. Recently there have 
been more examples of successful co-ordinated operations on a global level. A three 
country co-operation over a drug haul was described as unprecedented by police chiefs 
involved. The chief of Italy's anti-drug unit described the haul as marking the end of 
the era of "jealousy and territorial pol icing". 31 On a regional level there have also 
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been important developments. 
The Schengen Convention drawn up in 1985 by France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Holland and Belgium concerned the need for enhanced police co-
operation and information exchange when Europe became frontier-free. However, the 
United Kingdom, the Irish Republic and Denmark have remained outside the Schengen 
Group. It has taken until the recent ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 for 
there to be any moves towards the development of unified policing within the formal 
structures of the European Community. Within Europe, the activities of the Trevi 
Group, a forum for co-operation on law enforcement between the European 
Community member states, remained separate from the work of the European 
Community until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the 
European Union in November 1993. 
The Declaration on Police Co-operation incorporated in the Final Act of the 
Maastricht conference calls for support for national criminal investigation and security 
authorities, in particular in the co-ordination of investigation and search operations; 
creation of data bases; central analysis and assessment of information in order to 
identify investigative approaches; collection and analysis of national prevention 
programmes for drawing up Europe-wide prevention strategies; measures relating to 
further training, research, forensic matters and criminal records departments. 32 
Co-operation on policing is viewed by member states as in the same category 
as co-operation on foreign policy. All decisions concerning provisions on co-operation 
in the fields of justice and home affairs must be decided unanimously, with Britain 
insisting on endorsement by Westminster of any decisions that are taken. This policy 
on immigration and crime is to be decided intergovernmentally and the national veto 
is not removed by qualified majority voting as it is in other areas of policy, which 
shows the lack of willingness of member states to surrender any sovereignty over 
policing. There have however been some recent moves towards greater co-operation 
over policing within Europe. 
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The commitment to a common police information system has led to the creation 
of a European Police Organisation, or Europo!. One of the first steps has been the 
creation of a Drugs Intelligence Unit (DIU) which became operational at the end of 
1992. The future role of Europol is undecided. The German government, for example, 
want Europol to develop into a fully-fledged investigative body with powers of arrest 
in any country, while the British are happier with a Europol that simply exchanges 
information - a role that would mesh neatly with the new National Criminal Intelligence 
System. 33 
There are both practical problems and conflict over values involved in the 
establishment of a European police force and the creation of a regional drug trafficking 
regime. These problems reflect the similar difficulties that would need to be overcome 
in establishing a global trafficking regime. British police and customs officers .. unlike 
most of their European counterparts, are not armed, except in exceptional 
circumstances. Most European police forces are organised nationally and functionally 
and are often answerable to several ministries, whereas the UK police have no central 
political direction: the 52 separate forces operate a tripartite system of accountability 
through the Home Office, the area Chief Constable and local Police Authorities. 
There are problems even at the first stage of Europol's role of data collection 
and information exchange. International drug trafficking has been the major rationale 
for broadening and intensifying international police co-operation and information-
sharing. Britain's National Criminal Intelligence System (as mentioned above) is 
planned to co-operate with similar organisations in other countries but there is concern 
that the structures through which this co-operation occurs are beyond direct democratic 
control at the European level. Data protection requirements may conflict with police 
needs for inteIligence gathering and coIlation. Roger Birch, chair of the chief 
constables' International Committee stated in 1992 that "the policing of Europe cannot 
wait for the total harmonisation of legislation and for the resolution of such thorny 
issues as data protection. "34 Council of Europe member states have been under an 
obliga~ion since 1981 to implement the Council's Convention on Data Processing. 
Despite the 1984 Data Protection Act, police in the United Kingdom have reserved 
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their right not to implement fully a critical recommendation on giving people notice 
that information is held on them. Furthermore they have reserved the right to 
accumulate information on people not directly related to a particular investigation. 
Police co-operation and information sharing therefore raises problems of responsibility 
and accountability in law enforcement. 
The Supplementary Agreement signed at Schengen in 1990 foresaw a 
declaration by each signatory, at the time of ratification, to harmonise procedures for 
cross-border pursuit, rights of arrest, territorial and time limits, and penalties for 
violation of agreed procedures. However, French law has hitherto denied the possibility 
of arrest by a foreign policeman on French territory and hot pursuit is a particularly 
delicate issue in the UK, given that one EC land border is between the Irish Republic 
and Northern Ireland. Nor are matters straightforward between England and Scotland, 
where fundamentally differing legal systems apply and there is no automatic reciprocity 
of powers of arrest or even validity of arrest warrants. The multi-national police 
apparatus, that would compensate for the loss of border checks is not yet in place. 
Despite all the differences in accountability, data protection regulations, issues 
of public order policing (such as whether British policemen should be armed), and 
differing judicial systems the formal arrangements for greater police co-operation 
within Europe are in place. The Trevi Group discussions, the Schengen Convention, 
and developments within Interpol can be seen to have developed the principles and the 
norms of a would-be regional regime. Using Donnelly's regime types described above 
the European trafficking regime can be described as a "promotional regime". The 
regime may become stronger in the future if the salience of drug'trafficking, which has 
already led to increased centralisation of policing in the UK and increased police co-
operation in Europe, reduces the commitment to national sovereignty in the field of law 
enforcement, or rather, if there is a shift in value salience. For the time being, the 
situation for trafficking is best described as being a European promotional regime 
operating within a global declaratory regime. 
The trafficking regime is also a weak regime since as has been shown, it has 
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no relevant international institution to implement the regime's norms. Interpol engages 
in, [0 use Donnelly's classifications, promotional and assistance activities, providing 
support for national implementation of international norms, policy co-ordination, 
international monitoring etc. Neither Interpol nor Trevi have any international decision-
making powers. The regime will remain weak until states are willing to surrender 
decision-making activities to an external authority. Banking has a longer history of co-
operation and more willingness to surrender sovereignty especially in the deregulation 
era of Thatcherite and Reaganite economics during the eighties. Mrs Thatcher's 
government abolished foreign exchange controls within days of taking office in 1979, 
emphasising that governmental regulation of any sort would henceforth be under attack. 
If the problems associated with the creation of a regional or global traffi~king 
regime were solely of a practical nature, development of the regime's strength would 
seem to be forthcoming. However, the conflict over the relative value of national 
sovereignty in law-enforcement activities suggest that it will be much more difficult to 
create an effective regime. 
Value Dynamics 
The twentieth century has seen varIOUS massIve shifts in values. Interest in 
environmental concerns has developed dramatically in the later half of the century with 
the emergence of numerous national, international and global organisations [0 manage 
them. The importance of the environment, not mentioned in the United Nations 
founding Charter, now takes up an increasing part of United Nations time and also 
resources. This shift in value salience can be seen to be due to the re-conceptualising 
of the importance of the value by actors through crises: the Torrey Canyon disaster, 
the discovery of the hole in the ozone layer, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl among 
others. There has also been a shift in the relative prestige of actors, such as the 
environmental group Greenpeace. 
In the United States similar types of crisis situations have led [0 changing 
272 
attitudes towards drug use. Concerns over the use of drugs for human health and drug 
taking amongst young people have shifted to concerns for national security and 
increasing crime rates. The repeated declaration of the "War on Drugs" by the 
American administration has seen the salience of the value shift from a health concern 
to a security and crime concern. The rhetorical war on drugs was militarized with the 
deployment of the armed forces to assist drug enforcement operations, the contribution 
of intelligence operations by the CIA and the involvement of NASA assisting with 
satellite-based surveillance of crops under cultivation (see Chapter Two). Public 
concern in the United States over the use of illicit drugs was critical throughout the 
eighties. Regardless of political affil iation, socio-economic status and ethnicity, or 
geographical and occupational location. the "drug problem" was consistently ranked by 
most Americans as one of the major problems facing the nation. High profile drug 
convictions among prominent Americans such as the mayor of 'Yas~ington • Marion 
Barry, have added to this public sense of urgency. That values are constantly shifting 
and changing is emphasised by Marion Barry standing for re-election in 1994.35 
It is necessary therefore to analyze the values people adhere to and the way they 
affect their approach to politics and ultimately, why co-operation occurs in the form 
of international regimes. The dynamic process occurring at the current time concerning 
drug legalisation emphasises the importance of understanding the dynamics of values. 
The next section will examine the evolving debate on the legalisation of drugs. 
The iegalisation debate 
The increase in international efforts to stem the increase of drug trafficking and use 
throughout the eighties highlighted to many observers that the decades of prohibition 
by the international community and current drug control strategies were doomed to 
failure. In the United States, federal funds paid out for supply and demand reduction 
from 1981 through 1988 tota))ed as much as $16.5 billion, not including state and local 
government spending on law enforcement and other criminal justice system costs, and 
spending on prevention, education, treatment and research.36 Interdiction initiatives 
in the United States have been estimated to have seized only 20% of the marijuana and 
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cocaine coming into the country.37 Despite the interdiction, the growing supply of 
drugs has resulted in increased availability and a dramatic decline in price. In 1982, 
the national wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine ranged from $47,000 to $70,000. 
In 1988 the price ranged from $10,000 to $38,000 per kilogram.38 Purity also 
increased dramatically over this period. This pattern was also reflected in the United 
Kingdom. Between 1979 and 1984 the interception of illicit drugs by customs officials 
in the United Kingdom tripled, seizures by police went up by a factor of ten. Although 
Customs and Excise claim to seize between 10% and 20% of the drugs smuggled into 
the United Kingdom, other studies put the amount of heroin seized at as low as 4 % .39 
During the same period, however, prices decreased by 20% and consumption is 
estimated to have increased by 350%.40 
Chapter Two outlined how the vast profits to be made from drug trafficking 
have corrupted the governments and the military of many countries throughout the 
world. Throughout the eighties, involvement in drug trafficking can be traced to the 
highest officials in governments in Mexico, the Bahamas, Pakistan, Argentina, Peru, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, Colombia and Panama. Most recently, the Zambian government 
has been at the centre of a corruption scandal. The scandal has seen the foreign 
minister, the community affairs minister, the deputy leader of parliament and the legal 
affairs minister all sacked or tendering resignations over involvement in drug 
trafficking. The former ruler, Kenneth Kaunda has described the government of 
President Chilumba as "enriching themselves through corrupt practices and drug-
trafficking. '·41 
In the countries of the industrialised world it is the relationship between drugs 
and the increasing domestic and international crime rate which has added to the call for 
a debate over legalisation by various law-enforcement officials and members of the 
judiciary. The relationship between domestic crime and drugs is one which continues 
to resist coherent analysis because cause and effect are so difficult to distinguish. 
However, the estimated cost of drug-related crime has been put at as much as £2 
billion- a year in the United Kingdom and more than $100 billion in the United States 
where an estimated half of all murders are drug related (see below).4! Internationally, 
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in the Lebanon, Peru, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, drug profits have 
fuelled insurrections. In much of Asia, South and North America and some parts of 
Europe the drug trade is closely associated with organised crime and terrorism. The 
threat of illicit funds corrupting financial institutions has also been of great concern 
during the eighties, with the danger being highlighted by the collapse of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International. 
It is within this context that the debate over the legalisation of drugs first 
emerged in the late eighties, in the United States. Drug legalisation, particularly the 
legalisation of marijuana, has been discussed on and off over the last twenty years. 
However, the range of actors involved differentiates the contemporary debate from past 
debates. Support for the decriminalisation of illicit drugs has traditionally come 
primarily from the conservative end of the political spectrum, disturbed by the 
- . 
infringements on individual liberty and civil rights posed by the drug laws in the 
eighties in particular. 
One of the most consistent and high profile supporters of decriminalisation is 
the economist Milton Friedman. Friedman reaffirms in his work the nineteenth-century 
philosophy of John Stuart Mill that adults should be free to live their lives in their own 
way as long as their conduct is not directly harmful to others (see Chapter One). 
Friedman states that we have no rights in respect of adults 
"to use the machinery of government to prevent an individual from 
becoming an alcoholic or a drug addict. ... Reason with the potential 
addict, yes. Tell him the consequences, yes. Pray for him, yes. But I 
believe that we have no right to use force, directly or indirectly to 
prevent a fellow man from committing suicide, let alone from drinking 
alcohol or taking drugs". 43 
This view can be seen to have been reflected in the recent decision of the Colombian 
Supreme Court to decriminalise the possession of drugs in small amounts. The 
Supreme Court decided that it was unconstitutional to violate a person's freedom to 
decide whether to take drugs. The decision has been criticised as "ingenuous and 
anachronistic, based on 19th century liberalism" by four of the nine judges who 
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opposed the decision. 44 A similar ruling took place in Germany in 1992 which called 
for the recognition of the "constitutional right of individuals to intoxication. "~s 
As Chapter One described, the civil liberties of citizens are seen as seriously 
eroded by the war on drugs. Those on the conservative end of the political spectrum 
dismiss the argument that drug control is necessary for public health. The public health 
risks accepted from alcohol and tobacco are much greater than those for the three 
major illicit drugs - cocaine, heroin and marijuana.46 The dominant argument for 
Friedman is the importance of upholding the value of individual choice: you cannot 
make illegal something which a significant segment of the population in any society is 
committed to doing. In a letter to the American "Drug Czar" William Bennett, 
appointed in 1989 he writes, "The drug war cannot be won by those tactics [referring 
to the increase in law enforcement] without undermining the human liberty. and 
individual freedom that you and I cherish" .47 In the United States, a country with one 
of the most restrictive policies towards drug use, an estimated 33 % of the population 
of 12 years of age and over, admit to using marijuana at some stage in their lives.4~ 
Recent highly publicised examples of enforcement policies conflicting with the civil 
liberties of American citizens include the example of a woman given a life sentence by 
a state court for the possession of 80lbs of cannabis. A similar case in a federal court 
would have received an average of five years in jail.49 Another highly publicised case 
is the example of Donald Scott, a reclusive millionaire who was shot dead after a drug 
raid when a helicopter pilot thought he saw marijuana plants growing on the 
millionaire's property. None were ever found. 50 These examples illustrate the view 
that the freedom of American citizens has been seriously eroded by the war on drugs. 
Furthermore, the defenders of civil rights, the courts, are seen by those concerned with 
the erosion of rights under America's drug laws, as having joined the war on drugs. 
As Steven Wisotsky writes "the U.S. Supreme Court has given its approval to just 
about every challenged drug enforcement technique. "51 
There also emerged in the United States in the later half of the eighties an 
intellectual rationale for legalisation, with the work of Ethan Nadelmann and Arnold 
Trebach amongst others. A series of articles by Nadelmann that appeared in the 
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journals Foreign Policy, The Public Interest, and Science were of particular 
significance. 52 In 1987, Trebach, a university professor, established the Drug Policy 
Foundation in Washington, DC, which became the most significant American 
institutional voice against the drug war. Many of the evils associated with the drug 
problem in the eighties, the increase of domestic crime and international instability, 
were attributed to the fact that drugs were illegal. As Milton Friedman stated "all the 
atrocities associated with the illegal drug trade occur because the United States and 
other Western countries pass anti-drug laws which they cannot enforce. "53 The "drug 
problem" as Edward Brecher states in his influential work, Licit and Illicit Drugs is 
itself a problem. S4 The advantages of legalisation have attracted a great deal of media 
coverage and were discussed on the front pages of leading newspapers and magazines 
and were debated on national television. Editorial support from The Financial World, 
The New Republic and The National Review, and in the United Kingdom The 
. - . 
Economist, The Lancet, The Independent and The Daily Telegraph have guaranteed 
coverage of the debate. S5 
Respected intellectuals and professionals have participated in the discussions. 
The first elected official (a significant development) in the United States to come out 
in favour of broadening the debate was former prosecutor and then major of Baltimore, 
Kurt Schmoke. Speaking to the National Conference of Mayors he asked for the merits 
of legalisation to be debated in congressional hearings. 56 Other prominent participants 
in the debate have included, the head of the American Civil Liberties Union, prominent 
Harvard professors, lawyers, former Attorney Generals, Congressmen and prominent 
businessmens7 who began to voice much publicised alternatives to the drug war. Well-
known Republicans, such as former Secretary of State George' Schultz with a speech 
published in the Wall Street Journal urged that we at least "consider and examine forms 
of controlled legalisation" in order to "take the criminality out of the drug business" .58 
In the United Kingdom several judges and senior policemen (most recently and 
significantly, serving police officers) have spoken on the need to reform drugs laws. 
Among members of the judiciary, Lord Woolf and Judge Pickles have both made much 
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publicised attacks on the current policl9 • Among the police forces, Commander John 
Grieve, head of criminal intelligence at the Metropolitan Police60 , Edward Ellison, 
former Central Drug Squad Detective Chief Superintendent61 , Keith Hellawell, Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire62 and William Nelson, assistant chief constable of 
Hampshire63 have all spoken out in the debate. Internationally, the Head of Interpol, 
Raymond Kendall, recently called for an end to the present drug policy and for the 
decriminalisation of drug use. 64 A conference of police chiefs, burgomasters and 
medical officers from large European cities with major drug problems approved a 
declaration in November 1990 which amounted to a recommendation of 
decriminalisation. Commenting in an editorial, The Lancet said: "the abject failure of 
prevailing policies is now so generally acknowledged that the momentum towards 
decriminalisation is surely becoming unstoppable" .65 
Another group with changing attitudes have been European public health 
authorities as best represented in the Netherlands. They have begun to promote a new 
health paradigm under the slogan of "harm reduction". Harm reduction policy in the 
drug field entails, (1) providing information on safer ways to take drugs for those who 
will continue to take drugs no matter what, (2) offering alternative non-drug methods 
of altering consciousness, (3) recognizing and responding to drug-related problems (eg 
overdosing), and (4) making available injecting equipment and drug treatment with 
minimal restrictions. Harm-reduction policy recognises that abstinence is not a realistic 
short-term goal for most dependent users. Policy therefore proceeds in a pragmatic 
fashion through a hierarchy of more achievable objectives. Before the discovery of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), governments were reluctant to sanction harm-reduction policies which might 
seem to condone drug use and require police co-operation, even though it was known 
that a large proportion of HIV infection was caused through needle sharing amongst 
drug users.66 Police co-operation is essential because, if the law were strictly 
enforced, clients could be arrested in the vicinity of needle-exchange clinics for the 
possession of a prohibited substance (as was the case in France, as outlined in Chapter 
One)Y· The realisation that AIDS posed a greater threat to public health than drug 
addiction removed political objections. 
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Within the United States the Surgeon-General, Dr Jocelyn Elders, identified the 
high murder rate (50% of which is drug-related) as a major menace to public health. 
In December 1993, and again in January 1994, Dr Elders argued that the US 
administration ought at least to study legalisation as a means of reducing violent crime 
and other health risks.68 
Many grass-roots non-governmental organisations have emerged which support 
drug-law reform: mention has already been made of Arnold Trebach's Drug Policy 
Foundation (DPF). Within the UK there is the National Organisation for the Reform 
of Marijuana Laws (NORML), and within Europe there is the European Movement for 
the Normalization of Drug Policy (EMNDP), The International Anti-Prohibition League 
and the Coordinamento Radicale Antiproibizionista (CORA) sponsore~ by and involved 
with Italy's Radical Party. The European groups have successfully lobbied for support 
from members of the European Parliament who now support drug-policy reform. In 
Italy, Marco Taradesh was elected as member to the European Parliament on an anti-
prohibition ticket. 
The relationship between CORA and Italy's Radical Party reflects the 
differences between European and American attitudes towards drug reform. The 
Radical Party places the social integration of marginalised people high on the agenda 
and looks for global and transnational solutions to problems. European arguments for 
drug-policy reform can be seen to be more broadly based than the American 
arguments, encompassing the geo-political, sociological and economic effects of 
prohibition. A different cultural tradition is represented by the Drug Policy Foundation 
which comes out of the American liberal democratic tradition. In this tradition the civil 
liberties arguments dominate. This difference in the political traditions of the two 
cultures is clearly demonstrated in the scope of the collections of papers published from 
the recent conferences of the DPF and CORA.69 These different cultural traditions and 
values demonstrate that for any drug policy reform strategy to succeed, it must be 
couched within the political traditions of that culture. 
279 
Events in countries such as Colombia and Bolivia have led to an urgent 
political need for radical alternatives to current policies. The clash of Bolivian farmers 
with US troops in July 1991, as outlined in Chapter Two, and the Colombian 
governments reversal of its policy of extradition to the United States for drug 
traffickers illustrate this. The decision by the Bolivian government to promote coca 
tea70 and the recent decision by the Colombian judicial system to decriminalise 
personal drug use, despite opposition from the Colombian government can be seen to 
reflect this momentum for change. In Europe, a group of Spanish jurists launched a 
campaign in February 1992 calling for a pragmatic approach to allow sales under strict 
conditions71 ; in May of 1994 the German courts decriminalised the possession of 
small amounts of the "soft drugs", hashish and marijuana (see above); and in June of 
the same year a decree issued in Italy repealed the prohibition of the non-medical use 
of drugs. 
These changes in attitudes towards current drugs policy and illicit drug use can 
be seen in part to be due to the shift in patterns of licit drug consumption. Changing 
attitudes towards both licit and ill icit drug use cannot be seen to be due to government 
legislation and law enforcement. In the United Kingdom, a recent survey for the Home 
Office revealed that thirty percent of people were in favour of limited legalisation of 
drugs such as cannabis.72 The Home Secretary. in recently increasing the fine for the 
possession of drugs five-fold to a maximum of £2,500, has faced extensive criticism 
from all quarters including magistrates and the police who have criticised the decision 
as having I ittle impact on the problem of drug use. 73 The use and abuse of both legal 
and illegal drugs has been recognized as the cause of serious health. social, and 
economic problems for more than a hundred years. Substantial resources have been 
spent on trying to limit drug use and the associated crime problem created by the 
illegalization of certain drugs by both the international community and states. Only the 
decline in the proportion of adults smoking cigarettes can be seen to have been 
moderately successful through education programmes. The decline in the use of licit 
drugs such as tobacco and alcohol is due to changing attitudes within society and the 
recognition of the harmful nature of the substances. This shift has occurred without any 
change in the law. Illicit drug consumption cannot be controlled solely by law-
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enforcement measures but by changes in peoples attitudes towards drug use. Accurate 
information is therefore needed about the dangers associated with particular types of 
drug use rather than the blanket condemnation under current drug policy. 
This debate on reforming the drug laws outlined above is in stark contrast to 
the climate of the early eighties where there was very little resistance to the ideological 
orthodoxy that provided the moral weapons for the campaigns in the drug war begun 
by President Ronald Reagan and continued by George Bush. However, academic works 
such as Berridge and Edwards' Opium and the People and Courtwrights's Dark 
Paradise have, through their analysis of drug use in early industrial society (as 
described in Chapter Three), provoked many into questioning whether our current drug 
policies ameliorate or exacerbate drug problems and has led to the reemergence of the 
legalisation rationale by academics such as Nadelmann as d~scri~ed ~bove. 
What differentiates the debate in the latter half of the eighties and early nineties 
from previous debates has been the perception by the wide range of actors participating 
that the problem is critical. Previously, discussion of legalisation by policy makers was 
deemed irresponsible and dismissed. However, a growing number of people in 
authority, including senior ministers, police officers and members of the judiciary 
worldwide have come to agree that there is a case to be answered and have responded 
with reasoned arguments.74 Perhaps the current debate about drug legalisation will 
achieve results as impressive as the shift in values brought about in part by the British 
anti-opium movement of the 1890s. It is possible there will be a willingness to discard 
prohibitions and criminal penalties against drug users and sellers, as happened with 
alcohol in the 1930s. The challenge to "law and order", "civil rights", "justice and 
fairness" etc by current drug policies can be seen as a value challenge to the belief that 
"drugs are evil and dangerous", just as in the nineteenth century the values of 
economic efficiency and economic welfare overrode the value position that drugs were 
evil and dangerous. The case for legalisation stems from the contention that prohibition 
is wrong in principle and does not work in practice. It is this latter functional link that 
can be seen to be leading to a possible successful value challenge to the current policy. 
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Conclusion 
This research has attempted to show that regIme analysis, which necessitates an 
emphasises on the role of values and norms in agenda-building, rather than 
concentrating on rules and decision-making procedures, is necessary for an 
understanding of the drug phenomenon. The drug phenomenon has been shown to be 
a complex phenomenon which challenges the traditional Realist approach to 
International Relations to explain its complexity. However, the clarification of these 
key terms used in international regimes literature has been necessary due to the 
dominance of hegemonic-stability theory to explain the nature and emergence of 
regimes. 
The attempt by actors to control drug trafficking can be seen to be su1;>-oRtimal, 
when compared to the initial goal of the norm from which co-operation occurred. 
Attempts by actors to control money laundering has led to a high degree of consensus 
over the norm that "Banks should not profit from ill icit funds". Unlike attempts to 
control drug trafficking, the fact that this norm is adhered to by the actors for whom 
the issue is salient has led to the emergence of a strong enforcement regime with the 
Financial Action Task Force emerging as the decision-making focus of the regime. 
Unlike attempts to control drug trafficking, implementation of the regime's policies is 
not entirely in the hands of national, rather than international actors. But an 
international drug-trafficking control regime can be seen to exist since it can still be 
seen to have influenced political behaviour. By adopting this criterion for regime 
creation, the concept of an international regime can be distinguished from that of an 
issue-system in response to Donnelly's criticism of much of regime theory that it is 
simply systems theory in disguise. 7s An issue-system can be seen as an area of 
contention over proposals for the disposition of stakes that each actor perceives as 
being salient for the realisation of their values. An issue-system mayor may not form 
a regime, depending on the success of translating values into the form of an agreed 
norm. Where regulation based on an agreed norm occurs the phenomenon of an 
international regime emerges. 
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The norm of the international money-laundering control regime is seen as a 
binding international standard, accepted as authoritative by states and non-state actors. 
As has been explained in the previous chapter, efficiency, profits and secrecy were of 
higher salience than honesty and stability for financial actors during the early eighties. 
However, the perceived threat to the banking system from drug money and the 
response of bankers to the general concern outside the banking world about drug 
criminality, led to a value shift and norm emergence. 
During the last two decades, there has been strong intergovernmental co-
operation on the need to control illicit drug-use. During the eighties, a new focus 
emerged, emphasising control of demand for illicit drugs and an international consensus 
against drug trafficking. However, expansion of drug trafficking continues to outpace 
the international communities efforts to contain it. In response to this lack of success 
- . 
a shift in attitudes towards current drug policy and illicit drug-use can be seen to have 
occurred. Either the technology for effective enforcement of the drug trafficking norm 
will have to improve or the pressure towards liberalisation of current drugs policy will 
continue. 
This research has shown that the answer to the question of regime significance, 
raised at the beginning of this work, depends on the behavioral assumptions that 
underlie the different theoretical models of International Relations towards the concept 
of values and norms. The Realist explanation of norm emergence in terms of the power 
of a hegemon writing the rules in their own interest has been replaced with the 
importance of the role of values in norm emergence. Norms can be seen to be real and 
to influence behaviour and outcomes in world politics and are central to understanding 
international regimes. An international regime can be seen to emerge when there is an 
authoritative allocation of the values and norms being contended. This authoritative 
allocation of values and norms can be seen to have occurred if a set of rules and 
decision-making procedures have been established by an appropriate institutional 
structure, and that these rules and decisions are then acted upon by the actors within 
the issue-system. 
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Appendix A 
List of targets of the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline 
of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control 
I. PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF THE ILLICIT DEMAND FOR 
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES 
1. Assessment of the extent of drug misuse and abuse. 
2. Organization of comprehensive systems for the collection and evaluation of data. 
3. Prevention through education. 
4. Prevention of drug abuse in the workplace. 
5. Prevention program by civic, community, and special interest groups and law-
enforcement officials. 
6. Leisure-time activities in the service of the continuing campaign against drug 
abuse. 
7. Role of the media. 
II. CONTROL OF SUPPLY 
8. Strengthening of the international system of control of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances. 
9. Rational use of pharmaceuticals containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. 
10. Strengthening the control of international movements of psychotropic 
substances. 
11. Action related to the increase in the number of controlled psychotropic 
substances. 
12. Control of the commercial movement of precursors, specific chemicals, and 
equipment. 
13. Control of analogues of substances under international control. 
14. Identification of illicit narcotic plant cultivation. 
15. Elimination of illicit plantings. 
16. Redevelopment of areas formerly under illicit drug crop cultivation. 
III. SUPPRESSION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 
17. Disruption of major trafficking networks. 
18. Promoting controlled delivery. 
19. Facilitation of extradition. 
20. Mutual judicial and legal assistance. 
21. Admissibility in evidence of samples of bulk seizures of drugs. 
22. Improved efficacy of penal provisions. 
23. Forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of illicit drug trafficking. 
24. Tightening of controls of movement through official points of entry. 
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25. Strengthening of external border controls and of mutual assistance 
machinery within economic unions of sovereign states. 
26. Surveillance of land, water, and air approaches to the frontier. 
27. Controls over the use of the international mails for drug trafficking. 
28. Controls over ships on the high seas and aircraft in international airspace. 
IV. TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION 
29. Towards a policy of treatment. 
30. Inventory of available modalities and techniques of treatment and 
rehabilitation. 
31. Selection of appropriate treatment programmes. 
32. Training for personnel working with drug addicts. 
33. Reduction of the incidence of diseases and the number of infections 
transmitted through drug-using habits. 
34. Care for drug-addicted offenders within the criminal justice and prison 
system. 
35. Social reintegration of persons who have undergone programs for 
treatment and rehabilitation. 
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APPENDIX B 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances 
Adopted in Vienna on 19 December 1988 
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Co::.=:.:l of t!:: t:::i:d Na:,:o:,sj 
(:") 
(5) 
flCO:':!S:2:.!O~" I w:.i::: i:c:!~::s Cor.·:~:-.:.:~ w:::: l?pt!:l':le, r:1:cs t:: F:::c::: 
c!:::::n::o: 0: p~op:~ by 0::::: cf i c:oo,::. 0: 0:':':: co=:?::::~ a:,:~o::=h 
"Co:.=oU:~ d:liv:ry" !:lecs t!:: t:::..:.i;:.:: of al!o. ==g illi::t c: S'.:s?e-:: co:s:r==::::s 0: 
1:2..":::1::: c!...-.:rs, Fs::~o=or:: 5::':S:-":::S, S".!':s:c::s i:: Ta':!: I a.::! Ta:l: II a.:.:::::d to 
c.:s Co:,,:,::::!::::, O~ S".!':sa.::::s $~':s:!,.:::d Co: t:::=:, to Fass c:.:: 0:, C::O\!i~ c: i.:to t!:: 
t:::-::'J:"j' or c::: 0: ::1or: c:~\!::-:~s, "i~ :':: k:!o-:-!::g: cd ~::: t!:: S~?::-r:siQ; c! t.::~: 
c:=:::::::t a~~o~ti:s, 'Ii:'!~ a Tie'=' to i:!:::!iy::g pe:sc:s i.::,;,oln~ i.: ~: I:o=:ss:o: c! 
o::::::s es:1:'i.!s::~ i.: a::::I,:a.:.:: 'li:'i~ a..-.ic!e 3, pa.:ai-2?: 1 o:~: CO:Te:::::j 
(:) "1961 Co:v::::::." ~:cs ~: Si.:gi: Cc:.v::tio: c: Na.:::o:k Dro.!gs, 19~ 1 j 
(:) "1961 Ce::';:::lo: as t=:::c:~" o:a.:.s~: Si:g!: Co:n:::.io:. 0:: N~:oci:: Dro.!iS, 19~1, 
as a=::::d by t!:: 19i2 Protocol A.:,::~g t:: Si:g!: Co:.v:::io: c: Na.::::::!c D:."'.!iS, 
1961j 
(J) "19il Co::\·e:::.io:." c:cs t::: CC::';:::lc: 0: Ps: .. =::o~o:::: 5:'::5:CC::S, 19i1j 
(k) "Cc::.=::l" ~:a::s 0: !=o:e::,":: cd Soc::a.l Co::..::::! of ~: t~c1::: Natio:sj 
(1) "F::::::g" 0:, "s:b.;::" t:'.:~S t:=:FC:a.."i;r F0:':':i:i':j t!:: ~:.:sr::, cO:T::sio:, 
e:s?os::lo: 0: C':O'l':=::: 0: p:O?:=-:: 0: t:=?C~l..-Ui' zss::'::'.i::g c:',:s:o~y or co:::ol of 
F::F:~ 0: U: bas:s or cor::: issued =y a C::l~ 0: a co:::?::::: t\!±or:::i 
(=:) "llli::: e1i:i:" ~:a:s t!:: of::::::s s:: f:l:-.lI i.:: a..-Jc!: 3, p2.."ar:a?cs 1 ~:! 2, ct t!:ls 
Co:: v::ticei 
( ,,) "~--~,,.;~ .J_._" _.:':S '.y 0' pl.. s .. l.s';·"·s '"1-"" o' S-··".,:· : .. S,.\.~ .. I·S 1·"'" II ... • ......... 11 ..... (;."'$ w . __ .~.. ..'" ......... I" " •• oI.,l • ) •• ,, ____ , 1M ... ;11;""........ .. ...
of t.:: Si:g!: CO:l' .. ::::j~: 0: ~a.:cot.i: D:-.:gs, 1~51, cd ~~: Co:,:,::::ic~ IS t=::::!:: by 
t!:e 19i2 P:oco:o! A=:::::!i:g u: Si::g!: CO:'::::lo: 0: Na.::otlc On:gs, 1961; 
(0) "Or:~ PCFFY" a:ea.:s ~: plc~ of U: sre:i:s PaFa\':: so=::::C:~~ Li 
( ~) .. p·oc· .... s .. ~·a.:s cv p·O~·-J ~ • .:.;a..l C·o-" o· 0 .... ··: .. ·..1 .J;.aa·'v or ic..llra-:!T 't;:o\.:"'j .... • •• _.. • ~ :"." . . ...... to _~ ...... _,~." __ '".,, - - .1 a 
t!:: CO::'.=l:ss:o:: of c of::::: es:.~!.is::d i: :lc:o:da.:.c: wi:~ a..-Jc!: 3, pa.:a":lr~ Ij 
(;) UP:o~::":"y" ~el.:S ass::s c! e·,.::: k:"::~1 .,..:::::: c;,:;:o::ll or i=eor'?0r:~, t:"!c·,·a~l~ 0:' 
. .'" . ., b:;O\-l:Ie, t:L:g:~I: :~ i:::a=g::!:, a..:: lei&! C;)c-.;=::::s c: i:.s:.-.;:\::ts e\·l_e:e~"':i :.::.: t:J, 
o~ i:::::s: :::, s'.!c: ass::lj 
~ , 
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u.s. COI/I·cr:::OIl .4s:::!t:sr [.'licir Traffic ill .\'(!rco:ic D/"lI;s - [95S 
(:-) "Psyc!lo,:opic s~:sa~c:" l:l:~S &.::)' s~ba.::c:, C:1"~:~ 0: sy::~::ic, 0: a::.y car..l:a1 
ma::::a1 i: S.:~:dcl:s I, II, III cd IV of t.:: Co::v::::io:l Oil Psyd:oc:opic S~:s::L:l::s, 
19i1 ; 
(5) "Se::::l.-y-Ge:l::al" Clea.::s·th: Se::::a:;·-G::.:=al of t!:: u:.it::! Na:iocs; 
(t) "Ta:l: I" cd IOTa'::!: II" Cl:a.:1 t.:: co:::S?oc::::gly c:!~!::::d lim of s".!'::s:a.::::s l!::.:%::i 
to ~s Co:.>":::.tio:., as a.:::::::d f:o:: tl=1: to ti:::: i:: ac:o:dcc: v;i,ll a.::::!e 12; 
(u) "Trcsit State" IneCS a State lb.:oug: t.:I: te:ritory of w!::ic~ ilLidt ea.::e::: c!:-.!is, 
psyc:oc:opic s~bs:c::s ud s~bs:cc:! i.: Tabl: I cd Ta'::le II a.:e be::g ::ovd, -;;i:i:: 
is o:ith:: th: pIa:: of Onglll cor t.:Ie pIa:: of ulc!.:lat: d:s:::.atioc t1::::of. 
SCOPE OF THE CO~'YE~"TIOS 
1. The PU.7ose of thls Coav:::tioa is to proClOt: co-ope:atio:: a.::::o::g lb.e Pa:-Jes so tht thy 
may addr:!! Clor: eff::th::!y tb: \,l.~OI!! upe::s of illicit c-ufic: b ca.:c:otic c!.."\!gs a::d 
psyc!!ot:'opic s:!bs:a.::c:s ta\'bg u i::.:::::atio::al c!L::le:.sioc. I:: c:a.":)'::.g Ol!t thei: obLigatio::s 
I!::d:: t.:: Co::y:::tio::, ti:: P;.:-J:s s:all tu: c:::ss;.")' c::Ul!!'es, i:lc!:!cii::g lets!ati ... : a::d 
ad~~s=ati\·: C::1SU::S, i.!l c:o:.!'or-J:y w;~ tbe f~da.::::e:l:al p:o\'isio::s of t!::i: r:s?::::".': 
co::::s::: leg:slath': 5,5::::5. 
2. Th: Pa.:-Jes s!:all c:a.-:-y Ol!t t.:ei: obliga::o:.s I!.:.der ~s Co:..-:::tiO:1 i: a ca.::.:::: c:)::5is:::: 
~i:;h th: .pri~c:i?l:s of sov~::i~. eql!ality a.:ld t:::ito:ial i::::tt .:.-, of Sates cd ~at of co:-
~:=::·v:::t:o:: u: the do::est:c: a.::3.!:S of o~:: St.::s. 
3. A Pl. ... )' s:all ::lot I!.:.d::-:u: i.:l tb: te:rito17 of a.:lot!!:: Pl."":), the e%::eise ofju.~s:!idoQ cd 
pe::"o::::c:e of f~c:tio:s 'II.":U:h a.:: e:c:I~sh':!Y r:s::"7:o fo: t!l: al:~o:iti:s of tba: other Pa.-;y 
by its docestic: law. 
A.-Jc:le 3 
OFFE:SCES :\ .. ' "0 s .. \..'\cno:ss 
1. Eac:h Pl.'"t")' sball adopt S:!:~ :::::U1!:es as :::ay be c:::su.-y to eS:lblls~ as c:=::al of::::::s 
I!.:.de: itS doc:estic: law, w~:::l c::)c:Urteo i.:lt:::tio::ally: 
(:I) (i) !be p::)d:!c:io:l, ma::l.!!'ac::u:e, er.:aetioll, p::;:a:atioll, off::i::i. oiie:-:"::J fo: sal:, 
C:Su-:bl!tiOIl, sal:, d:!h'e:y 0:: a::y t:::lS 'II."ea:soeve:, brok:::1ge, dis?atc::, c:!ispa:;~ i:l 
tra::sit, t.-a:lSp0:-.. i:::?or:atio:: 0: c%j)o:-:atio:l of Lay ca.:::oti: c!.."\!g or a::y 
p5yc:hot:opic substu::: eocea.")' to e:: pro\'isio::s of the 1961 Co:n:tio:l, the 1961 
Cocvectioll IS a::le::d:d or t!:: 19i1 Co::ve:tio:j 
(li) Th: c:'~lti\'ltioll of opil.!::l poppy, coca bl!sb or ca::::abis pla.:1t (or c: P~70S: of t.:e 
p:odudoll ofca.:;otic drugs ccee;.,,), to the pro\'isio:s oftbc 1961 Co:v::tioll cd 
the 1961 Cocv:::tioc IS a::l:::de:!; 
(iii) Tb: possessioQ 0: p1!::base of a::.y ca:eotic: Cnll or psyc!lo::opic: s:!cs:1::1c: for the 
pu:,?ose of a.:y of the ac::!viti:s e:l!~e::1::d ic (i) above; 
(iv) T:e :::a:lUr~c:ru:e, tra.:spo:-: or dis=:bu:ioc of equip::le:lt, cate:ia!s 0: of su:Sta.:1C::s 
listed in Table I a.:1d rabl: II, bowUlg cat tbey a.:e to be used ill or (or ~: illicit 
cu!tiV:1tiOIl, proc!::ctio:: or caJ:u!a::".!:e of cuc:otic: drogs or psyc:hot:opic subs:a.:1c:esj 
(v) The or,a.::i::ltioll, Cla.:ag:::le:lt 0: fl:a.:1c:::g of ~y of the off:::!e:s e::u:::::a:::1 i:: (i), 
(ii), (iii) or (iv) above; 
(!:l) (i) The c:o::\'::sio:l or :::L:Srer of prope:.y, \t::o'll.·i:lS t.:~t suc:!l p:ope:.y is d~:ived froc 
uy off:::c:: or oif::c::s emciis:eo in ac:orda.a:: ""itll SI!=P:l:~r:~;:!I (a) of tl:is 
p~rar:.p!:, or froc 1::1 ac:t of pa.:-.ic:ipa:ioll i:l sue!: o(fe:lC:: or oiieo;:s, fer the 
pl!rpos: of c:occ:~:ui::g or disr.:isi::g t!le illicit ori,ill of tbe prope:":)' or of usis:illi 
a.::y pe:so~ 1Ii!l0 is i:voh'eo ill t:: '::):::::::ss:o:l of sue: a:: oire:c:: or o:f::c::s to ~\'l':e 
t:e Ic:gll c:o::s=ql::::C::s oi 1:;: a::io:s; 
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(U) 
hi:; .. :;, cs L'lIdar..;:';cl; by li:( L'/;:':,'d .\':::;OI:S 
T!l: C:O:::::,I::1:::: 0: ~sr.!:s: 0: ~: t:-.I: Cl:".!::, s~\.!~::, IOC:l:io::, c:!;s?os::!c::, 
rlC~':::::=:, rig::s w:~ r:sFe:C co, or o-:r::::~s::? of p::;:=::y, bo ... ·:::g t:l: s:'::: 
F='?'!:7j is c:::\-e: f:o::1 a.!l or::::~: CI:' o:t::::s cS::l:Lis::: i.:l a::::-:a..::c: w:::: 
5:'::?Car--?: (a) of c::':s ;:a:ar-1?: 0: f:o::1 ~ ac:: or pa:-..ic:i?a:io: i::: 5\!:: ~ 0::::1:: 
or 0:::::::5j 
(::) SI!:j::: to i:s c:o::s:!:".!::c::al p~::c::?l:s ;.:::! t~: Cas:: co::::;,s of i:s l:i4 5YS:::::: 
(i) T:: a:~·.!.!s:::o::, P:SS:5S:::1 0: \!s: of FC?:;-::', k..:::-=:::g, a: t:.: t!:::: of r::::?c, c&: 
s:.::: ;::o;::~ ';:'15 e:::-;-::! f:o::: ;.:: 0::::::: 0: 0:::::::5 eS:l:!:S::: i:: 1::0::;':::: 
v;i~ s:.::;a.:ag:l?: (I) 0: t:.:s po:ar-a;: 0: (:0::: 1..:1 a:: of pa:-"':c::?a:':o: i: 5;::: 
0::::::: 0: 0:::::::5; 
(U) 
(~) 
(:-:) 
T:: pcssessi:::: of eq~?::1:::: 0: c:a::::;.!5 O~ 5'.!':5:1::::5 tis:::! i: Ta:!: I a.=:! Ta:l: 
II, cc-=:::g t:a: l::y c: c:~g c: a:: to b: I.!S::! b 0: fo: t:.: illi::: c:~:;n:!c:, 
F~c:,::::c: or =1:::.:.;a::-~: of ::c:o::c: c!.-.;g5 0: ;5:::'0:::;:: 5:'::S:1::C::Sj 
P-,::U:!i i.:::::':g c: i.:c'.:c~g o~::s, by ;.::y C::3.:.5, to co=="':: cy of c.:: C:::::::5 
eS::i~t!s~=: i.=:. l::~::a.:.c: w~~ ~s a...-J:!: 0: to t:.s: :a:::l:.!: r!..-.:gs 0: psy::o::~;i:: 
5:::5:l.::C::S illic::.!y; 
Pa:-":c:pa::::l i.:, a550C:.::0:1 c: c::::s~::a:: :0 c::::-..=:!; a::::::p:s to c:::::-.:..:: c: 
21:l::gJ ~:::-..!=il f3:ili:.:':": 5 2.:~ c:o.:.:s.::!.!=.g t:: c:::::-...:ss~c:. C! iI.:: c! t:::: o::::::s 
es:a:Us::: i::. a::~:,:a.::: ';;'!~ l::..!S a...-":C:Co 
2. S;;':i=-=t to i:s :::s:::'.!::::a.! pf,,:::p!:5 c:! t:.: ':a5:: c:-:::?:s 0: i:s !:pl sys:::::, e1:: P;..--:; 
s:a!! a::p: s--.::: =:~S'':'::S 1S C":ay be c:::!s;..-: to es;.:~!s: as a c:::"-"':':i! ocr::::: c.:.~:: i:s 
c:!:=::s:1e !"':', '=::: c~=-=1:-:~: !::::::::c::'i..!:, ~::: pcss:ss~::., ~:.:.:::.s: c: ~·..:.!:!':".~c:, 0::1::::':: 
c!:-.:is 0:' ps:::o::~pie s:!:s::&.:::s to: ?e:so:l! c:):.s~=?t1c: c:: ::1... . y to ~: ;::=c·,is~o:s Q:- t::: 1961 
Cc:;::';o:,~: 1961 Co:-::::::::: :u 1:::::e:: 0: ~c 19i1 CO:';:::ic:, 
3. K.:c71~i:, i::::: cr pt:.."?CS: r:~;;::::! 1S c e!:::::::: or c or:::c: se: f'0:-.11 i: PL."tP;~ 
1 c: Cis a..-"'::!: ~a: b: ~::;::! f:::=: c':;:-::':';: fa::-.;a.! C:::=-':'::5:3.:::$, 
4. (a) Ea-I, O;.."":'\' s~ill C:l.:~. t:.- C:l--:ss:c~ o~ c.:- o:':':·_-s es·1"'l!5~-..l i~ a"·~·..lcc:- r.'~ ~~.~-::~ 1 ~'';s ~:-,: ':1~1· ;;;:.:.:~.; -~-:c:~"t:~:-:-'o·a:·-~:: .~. ;:~: ~~:·,:c~ r"-! .• :"- to _ ........ - .. &..-- - ".- - ........ - -. ----........... -_._ .. .. 
c~s: c:':e:lc:s, s~e! as b;:-:se==::: c:' 0:::':: r~r=s c: e:?:O:V':I:.!o: c( lr::~, p::-.:.:!L'J 
S3..:::':o:s a..::! C:~::!'!SCl:.!O=. 
C:) T:: Pa:-"'::s :;:1: p:;)";'ie:, b ac:.::;c: t;) C::l:-:idc: c: p'':::S:=::~, f;): CO:::::: 
CS:l:t:S:~: i: ae::r:1.::: '=::.: p-.:.r.ap~ 1 or ~s a..-J:!:, t:l: t.:: oITe::e: s:~l U:~::i'l 
::15-':'::$ S~:: ~s t::'l:.:'le:; e-:'.l:l:1e:, c::::..::, r::l·:ili:l:'!O:' 0: soc:a.! r:::.::r.J:iQ:. 
(:) ~cr;i:':s:l.:1c!.::g ~: p::::-:i=g s~:;a.:3.g:-.p:sJ i= a~r:'C?~a:: as:s 0: a c-l:c: ca:u::, t:le 
Pa..-J:s :::~i P~;)·.-i=:, as a.!:::-:a:.l·;:s to c:o:vidc: 0: P'':'':':S::l::::, :;::3.5-';::5 S''::l as 
ec\!:a::o:, r::i:!!i:l:.lO: 0: s~::a.! r::'::::g-:a:io:, as ;;0::1 as, ';:'::: t::: c:::::!:: is :& c!.-.:g 
a:l!se:, t::1:.:::t cd a.:::::c:. 
(:!) T!l: Pa..-"'::s c:a: pr:vid:, e:~:: as a.: a,!:::-:l:':';: to C:~:"':do: 0: P\!::5::::::t, or i:: 
a::!:.!o~ to c=:yic:.!o:1 oeo Ft.!::..is::~::: or a.: 0::::::: e5: .. ':I!$~e-: i: I:;::~a.:~: w::': 
pa:2r:1?: 2 of t.!.!s a..-J:!~, =::3S""":'::S rc~ :':: t:=:l:=:::, e:'.!:a:.io:, af:::;.::, r::l:!!'::It!O:t 
0: soc:;.! r:::t:g-:a::o: 0: t!l: 0(::::::. 
s. Th: Pl.'":::s 5:;'!1 e::5;;:: t:a: ~::: C:::I!::S cd 0:::: C:l:::;::::c al!:..ior.:i:s b\'i=i 
j~-i5:!ic::jo: Ca.:l u .. '~: i::C;) 1C::lI!:C fl::".!;.! c::::',;:::s:a:c:s ~'~j:: C:;..~: c: c:or::~ssio:: or t!:: 
cf':e:l::S es:~~!iS:::! it: a::or:3.:.c: o;.'i~ pa:3g:':I;: 1 or ~:s ;..-"':c:!: pa:-"'::',;!cly sdol!s, 51:cb as: 
(a) TIe i:';oh':::::::: 0 ~: 0:::::: of a.: c:p .. -:::::! c:~:'::::::l! &-09 t:l ""!l::: ~: o::::~:: 
be!0:g5: 
( "') T\,. ·1~"oIY·-··· or ,I,. cr ... ~.1 •• U 0'1,·, i~t·-a';o~" c··.·:·· .... C:':"'l:~a.! a":-:i':es' .... "," ... ' -_ .... _ ... '--'- ~ .. - .. --. .. .......... - ....... &.I. .r,--.• - ..... - -- .. - _ .. , 
(c) Te: i:';ol ... ::::::t of t!l: 0::::::: i: c:::: i!!:ia.! l::i·,'::.l:s :1::1.::1::-: by c:c::::::ss:o: oft:: 
o::::e:j 
316 
<e) Tbe f3:: tbt t~c o:"f::c:: l:oi::s a p:.::c: oi:i:: a..:: t:'lt t!:: 0:::::: is C::l:l::::e:i v .. it~ t:: 
offie: i::: q~es:io::; 
(f) Tb: "'icti~Z3tiC~ o~ us: o~ ~::0:5i 
(g) It: fae: ::3: ::: 0::::::: is c~:::::i:-::: i: ; pe:.a1 i:,s:;:-Jt:c: c!" b c e:!:.::.:io:a! i::s:it"..:do~ 
0: s::lc:a.! s::vi::: fad:::; 0: i.: t!:::: i=:::-::~ia:: vi.:i::iry Ot i:l Ot::: pla::s t::l w!:ic!: s::o:1 
c:iE:::l a.:::d s:-.:::::s ::50~ f::l: e::'::lt!oc21. S?c:-;s a.:::d socia.! a::iviti:s; 
(0) P:iot co::vido::. pa..-Je-J\a.:!y for sbil:.: ofi::lc:s ..... ·!:e~e: fo:::p. 0: cO::-::':::, to t!:: 
e:::::t p:::-.!:.:: u:::: t~: CO::l:S:!C 1&-;; of a Pa..~. 
6. To: Pa.:-;i:s s:all e:::;\'o:,:: to e::5:'::: t::a: a..:y c!is.::::So::a.."y l:g21 po~ .. e:s u::c:: eel: 
do::.:s.ic 1 • ."" r:!a:i.:g t::l t::: p:05:::-..::1::. of p::~:::s for of::::::s :s:.bEs:::d i:: a::::l::a.:::c: v.it!: 
t.:.!S 1!"""'ic!: a.:: el::::ise: to r::.uL-u:: t!:: c::"f:::1v:::ss of 1a-::.- e:,:o::::lc:.t =:2.S~:S i:;. r:spe:: 
of ~cse of::::::s a..:d wi:!: d:.:: r::p=d to e: ::ed to c:!:::: t::: c:o:::::-:issio:. of S;.::: offe::c:s. 
i. T:: Pa..-.i:s s:a.!l :::s:.::: :::a: t::::: COI.:::S 0: 0:::: co:::::e:::t a:.::'::o:ities bu: i:1 Cli::d t:: 
S·..;o .. s .. a .. ••• of -'-. O"-:-·~~·s .~I·-.-·.~ : .. "'·"1--"!.. 1 of' _I.:s ·-:c1• '~d .!... c:"-·-st·-~·s _ ...  _ .. __ ..... - •• - ...... 100 ___ .... __ ..... r- S-&:-;;l ~ __ .100... t..,;l ____ .......... 
e::l!.:e:.::d i:: pa.:3S-.j:~ 5 of t::.!s a..-:::!: w:::: c~::s::::-:~i ~: c·;e:: ... a!i:y of n:!y release 0: 
pa.:::l!: of pe:so::s ::::vi:~:: of s~:~ c::~::=:s. 
S. Ea:!: Pl.-ry sb.U. w:::: aj:?::?:ia::, es:a:Us: \:.:l::: i:s do=::s":: law a lo::g s;a .. .;;: of 
c...-i:a:.!o:s p:::oc! ~ -.::.i:: :0 c~==::c: p:-o~:::i:p f~r a.:1 c:f::c: es:a:i.!s::i i: ac::o:-ca.:c: 
~'i~ pa.,t-a?c 1 of t.!:is a..-.ic:!:, ..::: a l:::g:: p::iod Vo'b::: tb: alleg:d oi:"::ld~ bs end:d t::: 
a==,::::s:=:I:1o:: cf j-=s:::::. 
9. E3::h Pl.""":), s:&11 tu: a??~cF:-:.:: ::l:3S:':'::S, C;)::S:S:::, wi~ its I:gal s1s::=:. to e::sl::: t!:.t 
a pe:so:: c::'a.:g:d ';I.·it!: 0: c::l:vi:::::! ef a.::: of:"::::: csabl.!sb::1 i.: ac:o~::a..::: w:± pa.:a .. _p: 1 of 
t.:::s a..-..ic!:. v,·::,o is fot:;:! wi:!:i.:: i:s t: .• ::o:-j, is pr:se:t a: e:: c:::ssa..-y c:-:=':::al p:oc:::i.:gs. 
10. For U: p~,,?ose of co-o?e:.:.io: a.:::::::g uc Pa..-'::s \:.:lee: t:.:s CO::VI:::iOIl, bc:1uei:g. i:: 
pa..-.ie-.!la.:, c:o-Q?e~tio:: t:;c!:: a.:-Jc!:s 5. 6. i a:d 9, of:-e:c:s cs:abt:sb~ i:l a::::.da.::::e witb t~is 
a..-,icle sba.!lllot be :o::si::::: as f!s:a.! of::::::5 or u political o::e::c::s or rega.:de:1 as poEtically 
:0:.: .... :::. v,·i~o:.:t p::jl!:i:: to ~: :o::s"::-..::io:21 !!:.i:atio::s a..:d tb: f,,:::ca=le:::a.1 CO::lcs:ic law 
of C:: Pa..-.i:s. 
11. ?'o~g co:t1i::ed i: thls a..-Jc:!: sball cf::: e:: p:-:'::c::pl: t::a: e:e d:s::-:;:ticll of e:: 
off:::c:s to 'lIo'bi:: it ::f::s a:d oflega.! c!:f:::c:s t.!le:c:o is r:se!'Tc: to te: dO::lcs:ic law of a Pa..-.y 
a..:e t:at suc!: of:::::s sb.ll b: p:::s:::-Jte: a:d p'.!::!s::d i:: co~o:::-.i:y .... ·ith e:at law. 
A .. -tic:1: 4 
JliRISDICnO:-i 
1. Eac!: Pl."";)": 
(a) Scail tue sue: t::CU:l:es as :::ay be C:::5Sa..-j to es~ablisb its ju:is~idoc 0"':: :!:: offccc:s 
it bs cHablis:ed ill ac:crd..:::e wi:':: C':ic:l: 3, pua .. apc 1, ..... !l::1: 
(i) The offe::c:: is cOC'.Qie-::d ill its t:::i:o:y, 
(ii) To: oiie::c: is COlr.t::ie-::d Oil Coa.::1 a vessel flyi::g its flag or a: aircraft which is 
registered u::dc: its la':l.·s at tb: tbe the: oire:l:: is c:olr.::litt::!j 
(b) May t~: su:!l ::leas:.:::s as cay be ce::ssa.."'Y to cstablisb its jurisc!ic:io:: ove:: tbe orr::c:s 
it b:u eS:3blisb:d in aceo::!:!,'::: ..... itb a::ic:\: 3. Fa.::lg:aph 1, w:e::1: 
(i) Th: offe::::e is co::::::i:-::d by 0:: o( its :1:1::o:::I.1s or by :I ?e:soll .... ·ho bs !:is habirua.1 
r:sid::lc: in its t:::itO:-ii 
(ii) The off::ce: is coc::li:-::d 0:: boa.::d a vessel cocc::~i:g w!:icb t~:lt Pl.-ry bas be::l 
a:.:t.'lon::d to t:lke :lrr::l;::o:a:: 2':::0:1 pU:S:':1::t to a:-Jclc 17. p:o..-ic::i tht s'Jc~ 
j:.:.:is.:iictioQ s!:~1 be ex::::ised o::!y 0: t:: b:lsis of :lg:-::=:e:u or 3::a:g:::-:c::ts 
r:fe::-::! to ic P:1:3s.:I?:S -\ :a..::: 9 ot" t!:;t ... -:i::!ei 
317 
T:: 0:::::: is e:: of ":es: :s:a'::!:sbd i: a:::oc:a::::: 'l<·i:: a.::ic!: j, y:L:;;~l?: I, 
S:'::Fa:1g71;a (c)Ov), z.::~ is c:~=:!:::: ol:tsic: i:s t::-:-::o:-"/ 'l<·i:: 3. vi:-=: to t::: 
c~=-.=J!S!c::, wt:.:.!.= i:s t:::-:t:::,,;, or a...: e::~:.':: eS:l:t!s::-: i: a::~:::&.:::: . .;'~:~ a..-J:!: 
3, pa:ag-:-l;: 1. 
2. EI::~ p....-.y: 
(I) S:::2.!l also ti::: 5:':::: :',:lS".!::S 1; ~;y b: o::::sH_7 to :S:l'::!S!:l i:s j:.:~s:!::::o: e\·::- :::: 
o[!'::c:s it tlS eS:l::!.!S~:~ i~ a:::~!":!::..::::: o;:i:: ~..!~!: 3, S:2.:1r._;J 1, v..~::: ~= a.!!:i~: 
o::·~.:::= is p::s::.: i.:l i:s t:~:::-"f a..::: ~: c!::5 Clot c:::a::::: :.~ tJ a..:o~:: P....-::· 0:' t:: 
.. 0::"::::: 
(:) T: .. : t:: 0::::::: hs :::: c:=-=-:::::: i.:: i:s t::-:-::o:-"I c: e:: bc;.:d 1 V:5;:! C:y:::! i:s 
~lg or c a.:.::;...:: .... ~:J v ... s ::g:s::::: I:.::C:: i:s I.-=: .: t:: :;~: t.::: e::::-:: -::-as 
co=--=..i::::~; 0: 
("::0) Mar also t .. ~: s:.:::: t:::l~:':::S 1S ~4: b: ::::::SSl..7 to eS:l:::S: i:s j'.:..-:s:i::;c: 0-;-:: :.:.: 
o::::::s it bs eS:l:!!S::~ i.:: 1:::1::1:.:: ~:6 ~.l:!: 3, pa.:ag:'l?: 1, ":<"::: t:: L..!:i:: 
0::::::: is p::s::.: b ~:s t:::-::~:7 ;.:: :: :::5 :0: e:::;.:i:: ::~ to a.::c~:: P"'-:-fo 
3, T':':s Cc:.:::::: bes :~: :::::.::: ..:: ::::::s: of c: c::'::::::": j~:s::::::c: :s:.:~s::~ by 
a Fa..-:: i=. a::o::3.::: ~::.:. i:s c~:::s:.i: l;;.~o 
A.-J::!e 5 
CO :-\FlS c..i. TIO:-\ 
(a) P:~-::::s cd-;-~ f:o: o::::::s :S:l"::;S:::: i:. a:::l:-:::-.=::: -;..:~ a..-..l:!: 3, ;:a.:1).'_;::' I, o~ 
p::J;e~ ~: \,i.!'.!: of ";:"~:: c~:::s::o::::s to t:a: or $'.::: r:-~ce::si 
(~) ~C':::Jti: c...-.:;s c:! p;:::=o;=;: 5:.:':S:2.::::5, C':_::~i.!s a..:::! e~·.:i;:~::t c: c:'::: 
1:.s:..-.:..:::::1!i:::s I:se: i:: e: i:::::::: :0: \!s: i:l cy :::~:.:: i: 0:::::::5 ~s:lbt;s::: 1:. 
ae::~:J.:e: iI"":6 -a..-J:.!e 3, p..:zg:l?~ 10 
2, El:: PL'"':j' s::!l also a:C?t 51;:: ~:.s;.:::s as ~a: b: :::::5sa.:7 to ~:lb:: i:s c:~;::::::: 
a~~or:t!:s to i:~:::.!::, t:"1::, ;.:~ !::::: c: S:?:: F:-oc:::s, P:-0l='::'":'Y, i:s:.-.!=::::a.E:';~s c: 2.::-
c:!:: t:.i:gs r:::::e: to b fa.:&g:1;: 1 cf t:..!s a,.-ic!:, rc~ ~~ F'..:.:"?cs: 0: CO,"::::;l1 '0:::S:2:':0:. 
3, I:. 0:::: to C:l..'7j' 0:;: t:: ~:.s".!::s r::::-:-:: to !: t:'::s 1.-.1:1:, :1::' Pa.: .: s:lll :~?o":<":: i:s 
c~~s or 0:':':: c::=:?::==: ao,;:=c:::!:s :J c=~:: :=.: :a.:.k, ~:c::a! ~~ C:~=::::~l! :::~:,:s:e ::1:: 
l":'A!!a:i: c: b: 5:::::. A p~. s:ll) C':l: e::!.!:: :: I:: '.!::::: ~: ?:o\,:s:c:s or t::.:s ;:a:1r:a;:: e:. 
t!:: .. oc.:~ 0: bc.k se-::::y. 
4, (a) FoUo;i:g 1 r:~'.!:s: t::a:~ y',:,:!".!;,:: to :::s •. :-::::1: by ;.:o:::~ Par.:' ~;':::i j;:::5;!ide: 
c-::: a.: 0:::::: :s:l:Es::~ i:::! a:::::'~l::: -;'.~:': a..-J~!e 3, p:':l!-"a?~ 1, ~~ f.:::; i: w:ese 
t:::-i:~ry p::)ce:':s, p:-ep~:-:;J i~s:.-..:=.~:.:a~::.!~s 0:' Cj· e~:: t!.~:is :~!e:,=:: to :!: ?a:ai=4~:: 
1 0: t.::is a..-Jcle a.:: si~a:e: s:&!!: 
(i) S'.:bd~ t:: r:;'.::s: to its c:~r:::::: .'.!:::I~:ci:s for ~e ?'.!:res: of o:t11:i:i u o~:e: 
0: C:l~S:l:iO:: a..::::, ii s:.::: c:::!:: is g:-a..:::te::!, gh'e e:f::: to itj or 
(ii) $'..::=-1: to i:s co~;~:::: a:.::':o~;:::s, ":<"i~" a \.;:";:" to g:\'i:'i eff::t to it :0 the e::e:: 
r:q'.!es::d, 1.:. o:cl:: or c~:.!1s;:3.:.!c: ~ss-.;::: :. t.::: :::~:s:;r.g PL.-=; in ae:~:d1.::~ W!:.: 
Fa:3g-:'1::: 1 0: this t..-.l:!:, i:: so fa.:· as it ·r:!.::s to p~~c::~s, 1':01'==-::, 
i.::S::-.!:le::ili:.i:s 0: a::y o":~:- ci::gs r::e:-:-:~ to i: Fa.:a).'a::~ 1 si'.!l:::! ic t:: 
t:=:-:to,:" of the r:~'~~s::: ?l.'"':j', 
(~) Fo:!o.,.·:::g a :::;'..::s: ::-:a:: F1;'S'..:1.:: to :::$ I:-:i::!: by co:::: 1':I.:":'j hat·::! ;I!::s:!:c:::o: 0"':: 
a.: 0::-:::: eS:3b!is:~~ i~ 1::0t:!l..::: O;:"!:~ 2.:":!c!e 3, F1!'Jr::;~ 1, t:: r:~IJ:s::: P1."':y S:l!! 
tir.: C-::lSu.::S to iC::l:'::y, t:a::, 2..::: :::::: 0[' s:~:: Ft'oc::':s, PCO?:~, i:s::-.!=::ltl!i::es 
o~ a..:: ... o~:~ th::gs r::e:::: to it: ;:6.:3;::-::-: I or t:is a.::::!: ror t:: F'..::'j)os: or c\·::::-..:l! 
C:l~r,;-l:.iO" ·0 c· e'~"'~ e:·1.,·· "'\' t:: ·;·"·s·:"s tla:-' o· -u·S"l;:··O 3. •• ..... ·s· ... ~ •• S.'~:·.~a-3:b (3)' cr~;;:.i;:i:~ .. \~ :~:'::A:::S':~ p':';'.' r . W •• " ••• " -_ ..... --1''''- ~. r • r~o r-, VJ \0_ ..... ., .. - .... ... ••• 
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C.S. COI:I cnlion A~ail:s: 1/!,e;'1 Traffic ill Sareolie OrliSS - HISS 
(c) T:: :1:::$:0::$ or ac:io::$ rrovi:C::! ier L: sU'::?:l.,~a?l:s (a) ~d (b) of~s pC2~arh s:111 
ce tJ...\::::l cy ~e r:;\!:H:: PJ..."7:', i.:l a::o.:1.::C: ""i~ ~d subject to ~: pr~yisiocs of i:s 
do::::s:i: lao;r; ~d its p.oc:c~l.! :-~!:s e~ c:y bi1a:::~ 0: :::cltila:::al t:::I:j, ag=::::l:::: or 
a..-:-l.::g::::e::t to "":UCJ it c:ay t:: boe::: i:l ::! .. ::oo to t:e reques:i=g Pa..~. 
(c) T:: rroyisie!:s of a..-.ide 7, pC.g:-i:::S 6 :0 19 c: l;:plica'::l: =:u:u:s :::ua~c:s. I:: ac~:t:o:: 
to t:: i:.fc:-:::acio:l s?e::ii:d i.:: a..-::C:: i, Fca~a;:~ 10, ::;u:s:s :::3:1: P\!~sua;::: to t:.is 
a..-.i::1: s:a!l co:::a:~ ~: foUow:::~ 
(i) 1:1 ~: cas: of a r:qu:s: p::::1:-:-5 to su':pcag:-aph (a)(i) of ~s pa.:a~arh, a 
d:s:::p:io:: of ~e ;:~o?:::y :0 ':: e~::::s:a:d a.::! a s:a:::::e::t of~: fae:s rei:e: I!pCO 
bY ue r:::u:s:':':g Pa..-:)' su::::::::: :0 :::a'::;: ~e r::u:s::: Pa.::-j to seek ~: o::!:: 
I!;d:: its dOl:lmic 101""; • 
(ii) b~: cas: cia ::qu:s: pe::':-:-g:~ S\!:pcar:ap: (a)(u), a legally a:::::ssible copy 
of 1.:: 0:::: of c~c::s:a:i:::: issue: by 0: r:qu:s:i.::g Pa:-:-j upo:: w~ch ~: request 
is 'c.sd, a s:a:e::::::t of t!::: fa::s c:d i:.fo::a:io:: as ro ~: u::::t to whlc:h ~: 
ex::-.;:i:::l of t.:: 0:::: is r:ques:::; 
(ili) I:: tbe cas: ofa :::::.::s: ;::::,:_:_g t~ S-.!'::p;.':l~ar: ('::), a s:at:=:::t ofo: facts retid 
I:?O~ t:y ~: ::::;u:s:':':g Pa..-:y a.:: 3. d:s::-:?t!oc of t::c ade::s r:;u:std. 
(:) E.::!l Pa..-:y s!:ill f..:.:-..is!:::o:!:: Se:.:::a.:-G::c~~: t:r: o!"C:j ofies !6-;;-s 1.::: ::r.:.!atio:s 
w:ic::' pve e:fe:t to ~s pCi~.;: c:: ~: ter: 0: a.:y s:.;::s:;u:::: c::a.:g:s to s;.:c~ 1:1-:.·s 
a.:d r:r~&:io:s. 
(i) If a Pa..'":j d:::s to :::u: t::: :u.::g o::!:: ::::asu.::s r::":::d to i.:l S;'::pC1PP:S (a) a.:: 
(~) of ~s ;:~2~3?: C::l:~:ic::u 0:: t::: :::s::::: of a ::::\'a.:: t::3:J, ~3.: Pa..-:)' s:ill 
cocsid:: ~s Co::">":::ti:: as 0: :e::!sa..: ~d sufiid:::: r:::1:"j bas:s. 
(g) T:e Pr.i:s sb.ll seek to C::lc::u:e bi!a:::al a.:d cl!l:ib:::al t::ac:s, a~::=e:u e: 
a..-:-a.:g::::e::s to e:':a.:c: :!:: ::::::1o::::ss of i::t:::a:io:al c::I-ope:aoc:1 PI!.'"S1!c:t to ~s 
a..-..iel:. 
S. (a) P:oc::o::s or p:o?e:.y co::'!s~t:d by a Pa..-:y pl!.'"Sua.:: to pa.:ar:aph 1 or pa.:3Faph -4 of 
~s L-:.ic!C shall be disposed or by ~a: Pa..-t"j ac:o:di::g to its dOQcstic law a.:d 
ac-':-:st:at!ve p:oced\!les. 
(b) W":c:: ac:i::g 0:1 ~c rcql:cs: ofa.:o~:: Pa..-:y b ac:eo::a.:c:: wi:!: ~s a..-Jc:!c, a Pa..-.y cay 
r.\·e speei~ cKsid::-atio:: to co::c!udi::g a"::::le:lts 0::: 
(i) Co:::'ol::i::g oe n1u: of s::c!l p:oc::eds a.:d p:opc:-ty, or f'.:..:~s d::h·~ (:o: Cle nl: 
of SI:c:!1 proe:eds or prope=-:, 0: a s:.1bstc:tial pa.:"< o:::of. to il:t::ioT::::le::al 
boc!.ics spe::all:i.::g i.:l 0: fig:t ai~s;: illicit t:a!:ic: b a.:d a!)'Js: of cceotie c...""Jgs 
&.Od psyc!::o~opie Sl!bstc:c::s; 
(U) SCL-i::g ,..i~ ot:e: Pa..-'::s, 0: a r:~!a.: or cau-by-asc basis, sue:: p:oc:::es or 
prope:'ry', or ~ds d::h"e: fro::! ~: sue of sue!:: p:oc:::s 0: prope:ty, i.e a::or:2.:lce 
wiu its docestic law, a"'-:-;s=a~ye proc::~:s or bilatc:al or :::clti1at::al 
ag;:::::::lU e:m::d i::.to for tr.!s pl!:ros:. 
6. (a) If proc::::!s I:a .. ·c be:ll t:':I.::s!"o:-::::d 0: c:ollYC:.:d il:tQ ot:e: prope:ty, S'..:c!1 prope:":"' 
s!la.ll b: liable to tl:: rnc3S-':'::S r:r:::d to ill this a..-Jclc i:s::aci of t!lc Froe:::s. 
(b) It" proceeds bave bC::l i:t=:::i.:gl:c wi:!! prope:'ty ac!\ui:ed (:0:: ler.ti::2:: 501.1:::5. suc~ 
propc:ty shill, wi~o'Jt prejudice to c:y powe:s re!:lci:le to scb::: or Cre::!.:" be liabl: to 
c:oc.f:SI:.tiO:l up to ~: assessed ".a.!u: of oc i:te:-::u:glcd proceeds. 
(c) Itlcoce or o~e: bc:=fits de:h'ed f:o:.: 
(i) Proc::ds; 
(ii) P:op::ty i::o whic!l p:oc:::!s b,;: be:: C'a.:s:o:::ed or cO:\'e:-:::j or 
(iii) P:op:::)' wi~ whic!l FOc:::!s 1:3';: bC:::l itlte::::i:s!d 
s!:ill also b: l.i3t:l: to t.:: 1:l::l4J!~:~r::::::d to i: t!:is J...'"".ic!e, ill ::c s~e :::..:::e: a=d to C;C sa::: 
ex:::::t :u p:oc:e:!s. 
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i. El:: ?:L..-::' ~;: co:.:::: c:.~-::g t.:l: t=: C:'';S of ;:C:OL b: ::· .. ::s:: n;c:!::l; ::: b-:.·:·':'! 
crii~:l or allei:: ~:~:::~s 0: oc.::: F~:J?:::-y l!l":l: :Q :~:.:~s:a:.!c:, t= ~: e::::: ~at s-..::: 2::;:: 
is co:s:s,::: wi:: t.:: p:~::?I:s 0: i:s ::!O~:S:!I: \;..:- c: W:~ ~: Cl:'';:: of t.:: j-.::l:::ll 1.:: 0::::: 
F:oc:::!i::~s. 
S. T:: Ft'O\"isio=s or c=1s a::i.:!: s:ill ::: be c=':s:..-.:~-: as ?=:;~:!:!:i t:': ::;::s 0: :e:a fic: 
~d p.-"::s. 
9. ~:~~:i C::J::a..l::d i.:: t::.!s a..-J:!: s:a..!! a::"~:: t:: ~:'~=::~!: ~t: t=: ~:lS::::S t~ __ :i:: i: 
r:~::s s':a!1 be c:!:::: a.=.~ i=~!~=:=::: :.:. a:::::1.::: ";:';::: a..::: s:.!:j::: to t~: p:~v~si~:s c::=: 
c!O::1:s~: I:l.w of a PL.-::·. 
EXTRAD 111 0 ~ 
1. T:is ~,.;c!: s:3.!..! a:?!y t: :':: :(:-::::5 es:":~s::: ":y :.=.: P"'-"::5 :.:: a:::::&.::: ~.~:.: :...-i:!: 
3, F2:a~3?: 1. 
2. El:= of ~: c::-:::::s t:l ... ::i:: ~s a.,.-"::!: :Io??:'::s s:i.l 'e: :::=:::! ::l :: i.::::.::!:: as c 
e:::.:';:2~i: c:::::: L:. 4:: e.I:.:a:;:':c:: ::l=7 ::.!s:!:.~ :::-:::.: Pa....-J:s. T:~ p~..!~s c.=:e::l:C: !j 
i:::!~:~ s-..::= o:::::~s 15 e:=l~:.:!: o::::::s i: :-;-::: ::::~~:.:o: ::.:: t,~:: :::::";::: ::::-:::::: 
t;' •• --_. 
3. 1:"3, p~ -:'!c: =1..":5 e:=l:';:!~:' c:::C:~:':c:1!::~: ::.!S:::l:: era :::.:j :::=:· .. :S a ::~·..!:S: 
f~c e:::a:';:':c: (:0= 2..:C:!:::~ Pa..-:y -;;-;~ ... :::: i~ :15 :-: ::-":l::::O: :::1:::, i: ::.y c:::.s:::: t::s 
Co::.:::::o: as :':: l:il! i.:as:s f:, :'::.::::0: ~: ::!:=:~: c: l:J c::-:::: :: ~:::~: ~s .... -Jc:!: 3?;!i:S. 
n: P:l.:""::s w:.;c: ::~''':::: c::~:~ I:~s!a~c~ i:. e:~:: t= -.:s: ~:s Co:· .. ::~e: :l.S a I:il! :is:S Co: 
Cr=l':'::::: s::ill c::si::: c:..:::.:; s''':::'' I:~s!a::c: u '::2; b: c:::ss..:;. 
S E--..r;';o- S\,·II b· 5"'-)'··- t- ..... ·--,,::~;,,·s - ...... ;..: • ..: ~o· '-~ '''.1·- .. 1" ..... ·.-··.s··...r :J._" •• _~_ ... , .... _ ..... ~ .... _ .. _Io.W~ ___ ... :--_.:- ,.v' . .. ...... : -:-._ ..... . __ ..... ,,\ __ -_ ... . .
cr by a~Ft!e.':.: e=:.:l:!o: ::-:.:.::s, l:C!-"::":":S t.:: .. ~-..::.:s '..:?o:. w:.::: ~: ::~".!:s::d Fa..-:-] ::;: 
r:!t..!s: ::::l~~e:. 
6. I: c:::sid~:=-=g r:q-.::s:s :'::::\.:~ p-l:'s-..:.1=.: to ~s :...-J:!e. t:: ::~~:s::~ Stat: :::a:: :::...:s: t~ 
c:=::! ...... :~ S'';:: :::'''::':S w::~: t.!:::: a.:: s·..:·::s:<..::::3.1 .. =-.:::s I::a::q its j\:::c:a! 0: ot!::: 
,. ... -:.: •••• a .. ··~e-:·:·' :0 '-c:!j.~. t.:2· c ... -_1:<..:: •• -:.·~ .. 1.1 C··:::_··· -I, ... • .. s·~ .. ·:~· or _··_:s"-·-· ,. .... _.:' ..... _10 .. _ ., __ 10 ~ .. ' 10 ... _.;-_ _. ___ •• _.a ... __ , . ..- ..... __ 'oJ_ r-- _0._.
of cy f::-S::: 0: a::e~t 0: ~s :1::, r:~~c:, ca::e:l.!::: e: Fe!i:::1! Q;i::io:s, 0: we:.:!: ca''':s: 
p::;~:.l:: (0: cy c: t!:cse r:1SC:'S to a.::y p::s:: a..::-::::-: :y t!!: :eq~:s:.. 
i., T:: Pr"''';:s s:2.!l e=::a·;~~: to e~?e:::: :!::l:~:.!::' ;::~~::"..!::s a.::~ to s~;!:;y :,;,,:::::':'-7 
r:q~:.r:~:::l r:!a:l.:g l::=:::> ,i.: res?::: or a::.y or;"~::: to w::::' t!:.!s a...-"':c~: ar~ties. 
S. S·..::je:: to t!:: ;:r~.!$:O::5 0: i:s d::-;s:.!,: 1.-;;0 a::: i:s ::::a:i::c:. :::1:1:5. ~: ::~·.!:S::~ Pa::y 
c:-:a:, I!?e: b:~g sa::s::::! t.!: .. : ~: c:::o.;=:s:1:C:S S':) WL.-:'C: C:! a.:: l::i::C, c:! a: ~: ::~u:s; 
c: t.!:: r:~-.::s::':g PL.-::, tJ.h a p::se:: ... :"cs: er=a:!i::o: is sou!~c a.::d w:o is F::s::: i:: i:s 
t:::i:cry i:.:o c:-.;s::cy c: tu: ot:c:: a??:op:l:l.:: O::I.$·':::S te c::s:::: ~s F~:s:::: .at c:::2:i::o:: 
F:jC::£:~5. 
9. Wi:;o\!: p:-:j\!:i:: to ~~ :l::::S: o:;.:y ':~~:l.! jt.:::s:!:c::'::: :s:a:tis~e~ i: 1=:~::1.::: -::i~ 
i:s dooestic la-;;, t Pa:::: i:1 ~~cs: t:::::ory a.:. ~~i:: o(:e:::: is fo\!:: s:ill: 
(a) I: i: does r:ot e:::lc!:~ c.:.:. i: r:sre:: 0: 1.:: 0:::::: :S:3:1iS::~ i: a::~:~1!!:: 'a·i~ a::::!: 
3, !=~a~3?: 1,0: 6: 6-"e:::J::!l se: LO;-:~ i:: :I.:":::.:!: 4, FC3i7:a;:~ 2, s'.!b?c:r-a::!: (a), S~==::: 
t.::: C15e to its ceo;::::::t a'.!-:o~:~:s Co: t:: p-.::-;ose or f:es::"'.::ioc, u:.!ess o::::-=-:s: 
a~:d w:~ t:: r:q1.!:s:l::g P:L..-:;·j 
I ·· .J .I' \" • rl,·..r I. • ,.. .I'. • '..1' • r:) : 1: ~o:s ::0: :l::l~l:: ";::11: r:s;-e:: o. S-.I: ... :l,;! 0:::::: 2.:\001 .25 :S:l:.:S::. hS Jt!::s_::::o: 
J' ••• l".;,,~ t .. t ... •• or.~.~ •• i" a··~·":·--· .,..: ..... -:~'. ' ,..··:-l~!: 2, s:.:':c:a:~:-~": (I.) ......... t."O ...... v .............. - __ •• _J.... .. _ ...... __ ._ "'I. r ..... .,· r ..-,.,. , 
s~:=:i: t:: Clse tei:s co~::e:::: a\:~:o::ti:s f:: t~e FC.-:cs: of !=~os:~:i=:l, u:!:1$ 
O·I...-·:s ••• A.,.\' • .J 1., •• t:...~1~·· •• ·:· .. p.- I"~- ......... -os·; orp~·s::-'·i:" i:s h~;·:-"·. ~- ............... ., .......... - 'oJ.' -.J ,~- ... --:J .... : .\W~ 10 __ r-·:- - _. ~ '"'~.-- .... . 
j\:::s.:!:c:::o:. 
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la, Ii eIt:ad.itiO:l. so\:g!lt for ;:1l.70s:s of e::io::ieg a s:::::::::. is r:f''.!sed b::J'.!se 0: PC:SO:l 
soug:t is a cuioaal of tl:: r:;u:5:::: ? .... 7j. t!:: r:ql::s::d PL.-:Y s:all. if its l~'ao' so pc~:s a.::d 
i.:l e:ocfo:-:1i:-y with th: r:qci::::l::::s et" s:.:c: la-a,', I:?OQ a::;:!.icu!OQ of the r:=iu:s:~, P~j, 
C ~CSI''':·· .1, .... ~1·0·~·~· ... t oftl.· S·~·""'~· n':":,:.. I.· s b·· ... I'-?CS·'" .. ~"' •• tl.·l·~ o;t"'· -·~,,·s':~'" .., ....... 10._- __ ... ;--"__ __ ..................... _ ..... 1;;.. .. __ .... _. _____ ........ " • __ ... "\ ..... __ :.
Pu:y. 0: th: r:::laJ..:ld:: 0:::0:, 
11. T::: P;L."":i:s s:al! seek to coacb:!: :i!a:::u :t=d ~',,!!:i!l:::al 2~::::1:::s to c: .... -:-j CI:: or :0 
c:,Ca.:lc: t:: eff::t:veacss oi er':ld.itio::. 
12, T::: P2:"oies !:lay e:oe5id:: e:.t:~::g ::':0 bi!a:::al or ::l'.!l:!la:::al ag-:-::::::::ts, v.'h:~:: ad 
coe: 0: g:::::al, 0:: the t:a.:s::: to t!:::: co:.:.:.:.)' of pe:socs s:.:.:::::d to i::1prisoc:::::: a.::d ot!::: 
fo::::s of d:?r:ntioa of lib:=-,! for of:':::::s :0 r-'~::: t!:is a..-J:;: a??!!:s, i::l or:!:: t!:at th:y cay 
co=?le:~ tbe:: se:~:::::: t::::. 
..\...-Jde 7 
MLTI7AL LEGAL ASSIST .. \...,\CE 
1. Te: Pa..-oi:s sb.ll aifod o:e :t=o~::, ?ll.-s'.!:t=t to :!:ls a..-oic!:, t!:: widest O:lS;::: of =u:,.!al 
l:gll 2S5:S::t=C: i::l i.:.ns::gl:!O::S, F::5::::';:!C::s a.::! jl.!~c:al ;::o:::::!:..:.gs i.:. r::a::o:: to e::-:::!.:1l 
0[::::C:5 esablis:::d i.:. ac:o:::J..:.C:: v.i:: a..-.1:1: 3, p~a~?b 1. 
2, M'.!:1.:2.! legal :m:s:a.::: :0 be ai:'c:::::! i.= a:::::::t=::: -a,'::= :!:ls a::ic:: ~3y be ::~I.!:s:::! fo. 
cy of t::: foUor-':eg pU,?os:s: 
(a) TUi::g e\'ide:::: 0: sa::::l::::.s (:::l: p::S::S; 
(':I) Effe::i::g s::-"i:: of jl.!::':::al e::l:-':'::::s; 
(::) Ex:,:..: t!::g s:l:':hes :t=:l s:::-.!::!; 
(::) Eu=..i.:i::g o~j:::s a.:d si::s; 
(:) P:o\'iCi::g i:!'o::::atio!l :t=d e\·id::t:L.} i::::s; 
(f) P:o .... iCi:g o:ir.::a!s 0: c::-.l!:ed co?::s 0: r:!en.::: :!o;:-.!~:::s a.:.d r::o::!s, i::c!udi.:.g ba.:.k, 
f~:L::l::al, c:o,?ooa or bl.!si:ess r::::l::!s; 
(g) Ide::cf)-i:g or t.~::i.=g p:oc::::s, p:c;:e::-y, i.:.s::-.!~::::ali:::s 0: o~:: t:.l:gs fo: cvic:::!L."j' 
pll.,?oses, 
3, TI: Pa...-ies c:ay ai;ord ece a.:c~e: a.:.y Ot~:: for::s 0: ::'I::\.!allegal ass:s:a.:.c: allowed by 
t::: c!o;::es:ic law of tbe reql.!:s:ed Pl.,":)', 
4. Upo:. request, t::e PL.-ies seal! fa::e:.:: or e:col.!rag:, to t!le ute:r ,0:,s:5,e::t ... :t~ tlle:: 
dOr:l:stic law a.:d pnc::c:, t.!:: p:es:::: O~ avallabili:-y o!' pe:so:s, i::e:!l.!ci:li pe!"So::s i:: custody, 
v.bo :::les:::t to assist i.:. Ulvestigatioas or F2:"Jdpa:e ill proc:::diogs. 
S, A Pl.,":), sha!! COt d:di:: to rc:dc: curuallcgal assim.::e:: WlC:: tb:s 2:":idc 0:' tb: r-ol!cd 
of ba.:.k 5::::::y. 
6. TIe pro\'isiocs oCt:.is u-icle s:all :lot ~!f::t rll: obliiuiocs u:de: 3:.1 otl:e: t:nty. bilat::al 
or, C':,:.Il:iIa:::al, v.'!:ic~ 10v:~s or v.'ill 10v:~, ic who I: or i:l pl:'t, cUr'J:U legal asS:S:3:.C: i:l 
c:-:~!:3.l C"::l:":e:"S. 
7, Pl:':lr-ai'ts 8 to 19 oftb:s l:tic!: s:all a?p!y to r::;u:m :::ad: punl!3.:t to teis a::ic!e if tb: 
Pl:t:es ::1 qu:stioc :1:: :lOt bOI.!:.d by a t:::I:j of :::I.!r'..:allcga! assis:~c:, If :bes: Pa:-:::s a:: bOI:::;.! 
by s-.::!l :1 t:::lt)', tl:e :::l::'es?o:l:!:::g ;:ro\'isio::s or t::lt t:=:I~' sbll a??ly 1::1:$$ the Pu:i:s ag-:-:: 
to a;:;:ly F:1:~r-~;:!:s S :0 lruais u:i:!: i:: lieu ttc::o:, 
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8. Pa.-:::s s::Lli c!:s:p:::: c a·.;~o:::::, 0: ~.::: c:~:sn .. :y a~~c:::::s, v;:::: s:;'!1 !:o\.: ~:: 
r:s:o:lSi:il;:y a..:: p:-:":: to :1::·'::: ::~~:S:S f;;: t:":~~l! I:i;.! assis:a..::: 0: :0 ~cs~i: t::::: to 
0:- c:o:::?e:~::l: a::!:o:i:ies (0: C~:-:·';:!O:. T:~ ;'';::C:'!:j" 0:' t~: ~'';~C:::!:S c:s:g-:a:::! f~:, t:~! 
p~:-:OS: S:2!1 b: ::::f::= to ~: S:~:::a...: .. G::::;'!. T:cs~:sS:C: ~r ::~".!:S:s (0: :":".!:-..:11 I:i;.! 
asS:~:a..::: a..::: a..:y C:l=-.::~:"::l:io: r::.::: [:::::~ 5:8 b: err::::: e::--::::: t::: a·.::::o~:.i:s 
~.s:-,,·.A b· .l.. P·-:·s· ·l.:s •••.. : •• - ••• S ... ·:I 10,. -;··~o'·· ,.. .• : .. .:: •• '''' .l.. ·:·l.t .. r • :1.- t.,. 
'"'- '~-."7" : ~- --.. , ,",-, .-"'\_ .. --: .... -: -~ ""- ... - ...... '"':'-.-." • .... .J -:- .. ·:1;- ,.-. ~. :-.: .., 
r:~'..!!:: :.:a: SUC.l ::q'.!:s:s a.:~ C~::=''.;:'~:l:';::S :0: ;::::lS:~ tJ 1: :..::o'..:!~ :.:~ ~:?t:=:1:':: c:a.:::.:! 
Cld, i.: c:s::t c::':::!~s:z.:.::sJ '=':::: :.;: F....-..l:s a~::J t:::o·,;g= '::1.:.:=!5 0: ~: I:'::~4:i~:.2.! 
C:i=:l=a! Poli:: O:~~3::0:, if ?css;":::. 
9. F.:~~:s:s s:8 b: ~a:: i.: ;;-~:!.!:i ::: a !4:.r.:ai: a:::~:.":l: [~ ~: r:~'.!:s::= ?...-:;. T:: 
l...:r':2~: c: l1!:r.;.g:s 2:::~:a":,: to ea:: ?a.-:y s:~ :: :o:::i::! to ::: S::~::a.:·G:::::~. I:: 
l!.:i~::'! c::::-':='s:2.!!::s, c~ v.'=~:: ar:-::::! ::; t:~ F~"!::sJ ~:;'''::s:s =:1: e: ::a:: c:1!.!y, ':~: s::a.!.i 
b: C::l::~d b ~.:ti=$ fo:--=-:-i:::. 
10. A ::q:::s: :0: r::".!:".!a! l:~l! 2SS:S:"'::: s:;.!l C:~::~: 
(2) T~: i::=:':::; 0: ~: a'.!::::J:::; =i~i t:: r:~''::s:; 
<:) T:: r.!bj::t =:a:::: C: :1:::':: 0::'=: t:.o,;:S:':gl:;C:, -:::s:':'.!:!:: c:' =::'::::::£::J ,=,,:'i:: ::: 
r·····s· r·'a··s a..:'"' ~. ca.=· .~ '"' .10,. ,.··~-·:~..:s c: ..•• •··· ... ·0..:- c:.,..:: .••. :.~ s····· .. "'!-- II> ...... , ... .. ... ____ t... . ,I, ___ w_ 110 l .- .. --- .. . J . . ______ --_
b-;-:s:':g.:':o:, ~:ose:-.:::c: c: p:cc::::::S; 
(:) .J... S~:'l..7 or~: ::::-;-4:.: fl::S, e:::;: ::: ~:s:::: 0: ::q·.::s:s Ie: ~: ~·';=7cs: of s::-:-ic:: 
of iu;!ic:~ eo:'.::.:::s; 
( 01) .I. c!.S-":~·:~~ or t::;. a5S:S·1:-· s~··O""'· .~001 e.·,:'s or .~- ~.-:-.. ' •• ~.--.~ ..•• - .. .. -:'r-,.:- ". ," ... :-, "'.".-. ~- ... - ...... : " .... _ .. - .. r·-·"---
r:;'.::s:.:..=g r ... -:y -;;o:!::s :: :: !:.!:-::::'j 
... 
'--
11. T.:: ::~"::$t:: Pl.-=; =:1: ::;'.:es: a:=~:1e:a.1 :::-,::-=:a:.!~:: ~::: i: 1~~e1." :~:!SL7 :~: t=e 
e:~:·.!:':,:: Or ~~ r:;..::s: i.: a::~:,:!.:.=:: ~::.: i:s c~~:s::: 1.-:- O~ '"tit::: i: e..: !.:~:.:: s"..!::' 
e:::=-.:::o::. 
12 .. A.. ~:~-.:es: s:::a..!..l ee :.::=-,;:::!= ae::~:1.::~ ':':~ ~~ ::=::5:':: 1.-:: or t::: ~:~·.::s::: '?a::-/ 
•• ..1 to .1. •• --.-. "ot C:~··-.-·o .l.. oI~_·S·:- 1-- or .10, • •• _ ••• $' • ..1 :1 __ -~..1 _ .•••• ~~s.:-·: • 
... _, \.000 ........... --: ... w ""-_ .... :'" -.....- ~~: •• :-- .......... 110... •• -""':.- ............ : ~- "'_ .... r"" _ •••• , 
i.: a::~~:!1::: W!!..: ~: p~oc:-:-.:.::s S?:-::..:.::: 1: t:: ':q'..!:.S!. 
13. T:: ::qt!~s::':5 ?a...-:: s:1!! ::: ::&'::s:::: :0:' '.!s: i:::~l::C: c:' e·:~c:::: f..:..-::s::: =: ::: 
r:~~:5::-: Pl.-:y fc: i::o;-:s:.iga::o::s, F:::s::-,,::.ic:s 0:- :::~<:::~:iS c::::: t::;4:. ~cs: s:.::: b ~: 
r:~1.::s: ~::;o~t ~: p::Q: c~:se:, of" ~: r:q".!~s:d Pa.-::. 
14. T:: ~:~'.::s::=s Pa::: ~:ly :e~'.!.!:: ::2: t:~ .:~·.!:S::: PL-::.· k::? c:::::::::21 ~: fa:: a..:: 
5'''::5:1.::: or 6: ::;:;:s:, e:::?, to t::: e:::=: ::::ssa...7 to e~::·.:.:: ~: ::q~:s:. I: t::: ::~:.::s::: 
P.::j cc..::'J: c::=:p!y lit::': t.:'! r:~-.:.!::~::: e! c:::::::.;;..:!::, i: s:ill p:c::;:.!:: i:.!'::::l ~: 
r:~~:s:!.!:g F.::y. 
1,• H,._ •• ll···t ·55:S·· 4 " ..... '\" \,. r·:·:s·":· • j ........ -, ....... -. ... - ••• , _. - •• -_. 
(-) Ir .l.. r·~ .. ·s· :5 cot __ A. :~ ·"-"0-:- -:.~ .~ ... -... ·:5:0 .. $ .. r ·l.:s ·-:C·I:· . • • ~- -"1-.". ... .• _- - \., .. - .-.... : ... - '--- ro"'- • • - "" ... 110.-. -- '., 
(.~) It· .l.. r·~"·s··A p-- c:~·s:.j··s ...... a ...... :" .. ct- .l.a r.~ ... s· I'S 1; •• '\ .• .,. p;~: .. A:,.. ,··s ... ..... ... _,"\10. .... __ ...... : .. _ ........ _6 ... _ .. __ .......... ~ .. _"'\._" M4"_I. '''' •• , .... _ .... .. 
(:) 
SO-:::::g:ry, S::-.::::y, C:t:: F~:L1: 0:' c:::: e!s::::;6! 1:::::5:S; 
If ~e :a:.::;c:it!:, of ~= r:q:.::s::: Pl.,)" wOl!le be p~::l::'::i::= by its c!o:::s:i: b-:v (:0::: 
c:a...-:;bg o~t t!:: :&::10: r:::'::5:::: ;;-i:!: r:il::! to c ... s:::i!J..: C~!=::;:, hd it 0:::: s".!=i::: 
. .. .' . .., .~'." . to t:\"est:ia:!c::, p:cs::~:!c: 0: F:oc::~=i~ c::c:: t!::r o':C'~ Jt:::s ... Je.:o:, 
( 01) If I·' -0··!..1 b· .~ •. -.- '" ..... l··~' S··5··- or .'~. ······s··) £'3:":": ::!l:l:: .. ::l -.... - .• , 1 ••• ' ~ .. "' ......... ..... "" ......... ) ........ -- .5-" .' ... _" .. 1oM_ ... ,,-- .... - • :I •• "." _I" 
ass:s:l:l:: (or ~: :~~:st to := r.;..:::~. 
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1 i. Mt!C'.!allegll ass:s:l.:le: oay be pos:?o:ld by ~: r::;:::s:::1 P;)"-;'j Oil t!:: .. ou::::! t:a: it 
i:::::::::s ~:i:: a:: o::goi:::g i:::v:s:ip:i:1:::, ;::::s::'.!t:c::: 0: p:-oe:::ii.:::s. b s'.!:~ a else, t!:: r:;:::s::: 
P~-.y s:all eocsdt wit~ t!l: r:q~:s::.::g P ... --:y to c::::=:i::c if t:c us:s:l.:l:: c:~ still bc ,i';e:: 
s~bje:t to s~c: t:~s a.:~ ::::!i::c:s as t~: :,:~~:s:::i Pa.-:y de::;s n:::!sa.. ... Y. 
1 S. ,J... v;it:.ess, u?e:t or ot!l:: p::s:::: "':0 ::::I::se:::s :0 f,\': cv:ce::e: i!l a p~oe::::i:i or to assis: 
i::: 1:1 i::v:sdga:io:::, pr::s::-.!tio:: or j:.::i:::a! Fo:::~i::g i:1 tbe t::r:tory of t!:: r::;I.::s:i!lg P:!..~·, 
s::111 cot be prcsec::.mc, d::li::e:!, P:::51::d or subject::: to 1:ly o~::, ::s:..-ido: of ::s pe:so::al 
li~:::y i::: that t:~:or'j ill :es?:: of a::5, o=!ssio::s o~ cc::victio::s pdce to ~s :!:?~-:-.:.:: ::0::: th: 
t:,.:toc'j of the r:::u:sr::! Pa.-;-,·. Si.::!: sa:": ::;):::!:.::: s!:ill c::ase '\lo'::e:: t!l: Vo·i::.:ss, e:tje:t or ot:e: 
p::soa : • ..-i:::g cad; for a ?e:iod 0: i::':::::: c:o:se::.:ci ... e days, or foe a::y pe:-iod ar-:::!·I:.?OQ by t!:: 
Pa.:-..ies, f:-~c ce :;:e 0: ';to:;:: t~ ~lS be:: o:fi:;a.lly i:f~:':"4ed ~a: ~s p::s:::: is :itO 10:,:: 
r:;"':":'::d by the jt.!:icial l\!:.!:O:-::.i:s, a.: O??o::-.:::1ry of le • ..,-i,=.g, cas n:\-::-;!::!:ss r::a,;::: 
vo!:.:.:m ... "i!y i:l. t!l: t::ri:c,), or, ca·,':":g Ie:', it, las r::'\!:::d of b..ls o~ f::: will. 
19. Tll: o:di!l~"'i c::s:s of u::-.!~::i a r:c.u:st s~ill be bo:-:::: bye:: request:: ?....-:y, u:less 
o~::-;;,:s: as:::: by t!l: Pa.-Jes e::::::-:::e:. If e:t?c::s:s cf a S"..::St1::ial or cr.;ao~~a.j· ca:-.l:: 
a:: or will be r:qci:e: to fu!::i tZ: r:~u:s:, tZ: Pa.-.i:s s:'a.ll c:o::su!: to c!e:e:=:::: tZc ::::s 1:: 
:oc:.itiocs I.:.::d:: v;llic:!l ~e ::ques: ~'ill be ex::-.::::! as ';1;':11 u the =~:: i:: w!:i:: :!:: C::lS:S s:'ill 
be be::::. 
20. TI: Pa.-Jes s:'all c:o::si::::, as =ay b: c:::ss"'j'. th: poss::ili:y of c:::::!u~i b:la:::2.! c: 
c:.:!illat::al a5-':::::::s C~ ~-:o..::i:::::::S r.:a: wo:.:.l:! se:n ~c p~7oses oi, g:';: ;::.:::i::~ e::::: 
to, or e:1:o.:.c:: t!le prov:sio::s 0: ~s a.-Jc:l: . 
• £:Jc:1e S 
TRA .. 'iSFER OF PROCEEDtSGS 
T:: Pa.-Jes sbill g:v: c:o::s:d::a:io: to tZ: peu;':ili:y or ;:-..::s::.,~g ,0 0::: I.::Ot::: 
p::,o:::~L:is for c:-i=!.=a1 p::se'::l:.!o: of o::::::s CS:l:l!s::e~ b 1;:;:"::2.:,: wi:: c-":c!: 3, 
pa.-as:a?:' 1, in cses v;:e:: su::!: t:'~s::: is c::::si:!::::! to be i::: th: ::::::s:s or a ;::o;:e: 
ac.:"!:':s=a:':o: of jl:stic::. 
.£:Jc:le 9 
OTHER FOR..,\lS OF CO ... OPER.'-\TIOS .~'\"D TR.U'\"DiG 
1. Th: Pa.-Jes s:all co-ope:a:: clos:!y ~·i:.j 0:: 1:1o:!l::" co:sist:::t ,.:~ t!le~ :es?e:::vc 
co::::s::C: !:3al L:ld a::::i.:::s::a::\': s),s::=:s, wi~ a \'::o;v to :~~:i.::i the e:"::c:i ... :::ss or law 
::ior;::ne::lt action to SI!?P::ss c: :o:=.!ssiC::l of off:::;:5 csab!:s:e:! !:I a::o::1:::: v.·i~ a:-:ic:!c 
3, ;:a:ar:a?l: 1. Th:y s:'all, in pa.-J:-.. :..l1:. c: tZe basis of bi!a:::~ 0: ocltila:::il ai-::::::;$ ot' 
L -:a.:g~::l:::ts: 
(a) EHablis:' a::d c:al:.:alll :::'1:1:::1s or :::I::::u:ic:a::o:l be:-;;e:: t!le:: co:::?:::::: ag::c!cs 1:1d 
se:-.. ic::s to facili:at: tZe s::-.!:: a::d rapid u::a::g: of icro:-:::ucioc C:::Ioc::::i::g U\ upec:s 
or o::e::c:s embI:s::: i: aC:::I:cA.:C:: 'Idtb a.-..iclc 3, puar.;;:h I, i:lcluci::g, if tll: Pa.:'tics 
coc:::':Ic:! de::: it ap?:opn:It:, li::ks witll ot!l:: dC'.lcal ac:io.·itiesj 
(0) Co-ope:at: wi~ OQe ~otbe: i::: COQduc:i:, eoqui..-ies, wi:: :cspc::t to o:::::c::s established 
b accorda::c: wi~ a:-:id: 3, p:I!ag:':lph I, l:avi..:i 1:l i:te:-:::atiocal C:~:I!3C::::-, cOlle::-:::g: 
(i) The ic!:::l::::, w:::::100I:ts aod a;:h'i:ies or pe~o::s slJspe::::d of b:::g i:\'olv~ i: 
Cii) 
.. : 
(iii) 
off::c:s est:~lished i: ~c:::cr:!::c: w::1l a...-Jc:lc :3, p:l!~":1pll 1; 
The 1:10\'e:1::t of p~o.:::::!s or p:ope:-:y d::i ... e:! f:o:n the co:::=::ssioQ of suc:l:I 
ofie:::s; 
Tbe :nov::n::t of o:l!:otic c!:-.!gs, psy::o:~opic: sl:bst"-=c::s, sl:bs:;l..:;:s in Table I a:d 
Tabl: .II. of t=:is,~:~·::tiO::l a.::d i:s::-.::::::al::.ics us:: or i:::::!d for us: i:1 t~C 
COO::'l:SSlOQ ot's'c?J 01 :eoc:si 
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(c) 1= a;:i=ro;:~a:: c;u:s a..:: i::c: c::::1.. . Y to ::~:s~: la,=" :s:l:Es: jc::: t:a.::s, tu~s i::o 
aC::'.::1: ~: c::d to Fot::: t~: 5::-':':::: of p::s::s a:.:f of O?::.:io:s, to Ol..-=7 ot.:: t::: 
p:ov:s:o::s 0: t::s P':l;::'l::::. O:::::a!s c: a:.-: Pa..-:-; tl..~g 0"'-: i: S~:::: t:a.::s s:L! a:: as 
a'·' ... ~.:··,./ "'y , .... ·~-:~-::a·· a· ..... ~·:·:·s or' ,,-. ':1:- I· ... v.:"'~s· t·....;·~,.... ..... 0 ... ··1·:0 ... :s .............. -- \;' ~ • • :': ... r".'O- --"" .. _- 10..- • -'to: - _ ........... ""'.,,~ .. r·. - - .. 
to tl..\: pia::; i:: t!! s~:: c:.s:s,~: P .... i:s i:';:!';:: s::o!l ::s-.:.:: ~.: t:: SO\·::::;-::: or 
t:: p~/ 0: 'Ili':CS: t:::::::l:Y ~: 0;:::1:'::: is to :l..",: ;:1:1:: is f·.!lJy r:s;::::-:; 
(d) Pr::l';ic:, '1":::: a??:::l;:~.::, :::::ssa..-: q''!''::'::'::s of s~:s:a:.::s :0: a:.~:.-..:~ e: 
L:;':S:;gl:;7: pt.:.:;:CS:Sj 
(:) Fad.!:.:: c::::::i-:: C::'O:~l:':::: Co::;:-:::: t:::~ c:=~;:::::: '15:::::5 a..:: s::-::::s a:.: 
p:c~o(: t:: eI:::a:.g: of P::5:::.::1 a.:l: C::::: ::.:?:::s, i:::,!·.!:!i::j t..:: FCS~j e: I.:~s:: 
0::1:::1. 
2. El::!l Pl..7;' s:t!!, to t:: e.:-::::: ::::U1..-:, i.:.::':.::, C:·;:::? 0: i=:;:o;': s;:::.::: t.:~:;::g 
P:'0r-a=:::::s f:: i:s la-::: e:.:::::::::::: ..:: 0:;:: pe:1::':::, i::!I!::::g C".!S::=S, c::..:rd 0;;::':' t:: 
St!FC'::ssic::. or of:::e:s eS:l:!is::: b a::~:~a..::: ':;~:.:: 1..-.1:!: 3, Fa.:&i7':'z:: 1. Sl.!:~ p:,:~;--:s 
$ ... -i. ~ .. 1 : ... "'.-;~"a: 0;;-:'1. ..... r~ll"o;;:~- - • _~ \,,;. ..... , a- r""-- - J ."... --- • -- -:" 
(a) ].t~~ocs t:S!: i:. t:: ::::::!::: a..::! s''':=:~:ss~:: ::e::"'~:~:s es:.:~s~:: i.:: a::~::1.::: ... ~:! 
a.:-"::!: 3, pa.;lS:&~~ Ij .. 
(~) RJ!!!:s~: t:::..:.!~·"::s~:-: :j ;::S::5 5:':5;:::::-: ~::::':'g i..:-::l..-:: ::. O:::::::S :S:l:;';1::: 
b a:::::~c.=:: ~i~ a...-:i:!: 3, F;,,: .. g-:-a:= 1, r....-.;:~..:!y b ::-l,;:S;: 5:2::5, C: a?r:;?~l:: 
c:...:.:: :::=::..st:.::S; 
(:) Mo::':::::-:'::s o:~: ::::;:c:-: a:.: e:?c:: c: :..::::::: c!.-':iS, PS;'C:O::O?:C S·.!:S:l':::S a:.: 
s~':s::o..:::, i.:. Ta':i: I a:.: Ta:!: II; 
(:) D:::;::::c a:.: cc:"::c::':g o:~: ::::-:e~::: c: j:::::::s a:.: F=;::::-; e:::-:'::: r=:~, ..:: 
"a:·~·;c c!.-·-s .. s-·I.~-o-i· S ..... s·· ... ··s a:.../ s .. l. s·:o..:··s i~ Ta"' l • I a:.../ Tl"'i· IT a.:..1 :- --- -~.' r ;-........ r - -- .. _ .. - .- .--" ..... -: -' ... - -..... :' .-
s.=s:.-.:..:::::a.!.!:::s \:S:: 0:' :.:.!::::: :0:" t:s: !:, t.:: c:=::..:!s:o: c! o~;::::s es:.:.:s::: t.:. 
a::o::;::c:: -:::i::: a.:-":::!: 3, Pa.:1P;: 1; 
(:) M::::::s 1!.S:: fo~ c: :=..:s:::, c::::e::: 0: e.:sg".!:s: 0: S~:: P::lc:::s, p:o;:::; c: 
i=s=-..:.:::=:.:ili~:s; 
(!) Co!.!::::c:: cr :-:ic::::j 
(i) Co:::ol t:--~q~:s i.:: f::: t:'1:!: :~:::$ a:.c! f::: ;::::Sj 
(~) Moc:~ 1.':0" c::ro:::::::t t:::.::Jq~:$. 
3. T:: P..:-J:s s:a.!l assist 0:: c-::::: to pIa.: cd i=:;:!:~:::: r:s:1::: a..:d t:a.:::':i 
p:'o!-'L--:.=:es des:r:e: t~ s:1:: e!;::-':s: t: :.:~ 2.:::S ~:r:::~~ to i: ;:c2r:a::: 2 e:~s a..-J:!e :a.::, 
to ~s ::~, s:'a.!.! 1!s~J 0;;:::: a~;:~?:-:.::J '.!s: :=i::::l ;.:: t::t:::a:.!e:l.! e~cr::::::s &.::! 1==::2:$ 
t, r=·~=:ot: e~~?~:a:.i,:= 2..::: 5:':'::-.:.11:: C!S:~SS:C: e: r:~":l:::s of c'..::-.:a.! C:~:::::J il::h::~i t::: 
$;:::-.1 p:oc!e::s a.::! ceeds 0: t:1:.S:: Sa::!. 
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L'iTER..'iAno~.U CO·OPER.~110~ A..'iD .-'s.SSIST .. \ .. 'iCE fOR TR.-\..'iSIT STATES 
1. T:: Pa..-"'::s s:a!.! co-c:e:.::, c:::::1v c:' ~::n:i: C~=::::::: i::::-:2:'!O:a! O~ reiie:1! 
C--1 -:··':""'s t~ ·ss:s· .-,./ $ .. :. ... 0- ·"-s:· S:···s ... ../ 1' .. "'a.:-:··:I·· ~ .... IOC:~" ....... ~·..;·s: ...... ,./ . .5--"'-"'-' ""' •. to ........ "':'l' ",,,,'-4-.110 '-' .... - ~-, -" - ... - .... , ... ~ •••• -~ .. --..... "-.---
0: s;::!l ass:sa::: a:.d S'':F?o:-t, to t..:: eI:::t pcss::I:, t::~t.:i: P:0r-a.=::::s or t:::::i:1! 
c~-OP::4:':O:' 0: i.::::,:!ie:jo: a.:::! 0:':::- r:!at::! a::.i·,·i:l:s. 
2. T:1: P1...-"'::$ C':ay t.:.:::~ ... 't::J Ci::::!: c: t.::o~i: c::-:pe:::t i:t:::.de:2.1 0: r:i:~:a! 
0'i':'::3:io:s, to p=:l';ic: rt=a:.,:-.1 aS$:s:1:.c: t~ S~:: t:a:.s:: 5:3::$ fo: t!:: pt.::;:cs: o!a::p:::::j 
a.::d s:::=s~::':':j t:: ::::3S:'-'::::-"::: ::::::1 f~: c::·::::·:: c::::ol ~d P::\'::I:':o: Otill.ic:: C'a::i:. 
3. T:: Pa..-J~s ~ay co=~h::!: bi!l:::2.! 0:' ~t.!!t.!!:.:::l! 2i7':':::1:::S 0: L-:':1!:g::te:ts to :::~.:: 
..... er~···:\·· ... ·ss A( ;~··-a·:""·' C ... ·~ .. ····;~~ .... ·s .. ·:· t" t'-:s 4-:C'· c,./ r::'v t'''· ,._ .... ~_ ............. _..... '- .... ~ •• _ ....... _~ - .:- ...... _""'"" ,.._ ........... "" _ ......... .. ''', .-"... _ .. '0/ 
c:::S:C::l:':O: f::a.:::11 l..-::..:g:=Sl:S ::: t!:.:s ~:El::. 
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C.s. COlli CIItioll AglliIlJt//iicir Tr.I.f-;)c it/ .\";11 (o:i, Dr:'.::r -/9$5 
...... -t.icle 11 
CO~-rROLLED DELIVERY 
1. Ii pe::'ir::d by ~: b:u:c ?~i:lc;?!:s oi ~::: ::s?e::i.,.e co=::s:k I:gal s)"s::=:s, ~: Pa.::::s 
s:::r.!l t1.'::: ce ce~:ssa..-y C'le~s-,;:~sJ -=:i:':':: c::: ,o!si:i!!:1:s, to &!!o-:r; fo~ t!::: ~?r::?::l:: U!: c:-
c:o::l=ol1ed celi';::)' at ~: ~te::a~o:o.! Ie';:!, 0:: t:: basis of ag':':::::e:ts or a..-:-ug:=:::::s 
cut\!ally c:o::!e::::d to, v.it.!! a "'iew to i:!::~fy::g p:~so::s ~"'ol';:d i: ofi::c:s eS:l::iis::d i:l 
a::o::&:::: 'W'i~ a..-Jcl: 3, pa.:ag':'l?O I, ud to t;J:,!::g I:gl! a::io:1 agal:s: d:::::. 
2. De-::sio::s to use c:o::lt:o!l:d d:li.,.::: s::all be Cl:: 0: a cas:-by-cas: basis a=d ::ay, w::::1 
o::::ssa.,:. td:: ic:o cocsid:~ado::l f:.::a.::::a.! a.-:-a.::g:=::::s cd \!:::::s:2.:::!i::gs v.-it.!! ::S?::t to :h: 
exercise of ju.:is.:!.ictioo by d:: Pa."';:s c:o:c::-:::. 
3. Illic:t c::::s:g:: .... e:m WJos: c:o::=o:1:: c:ll';::)' is ag:-:::i .0 cay, v .. i~ ~: co:s::t of ~: 
Pa..-,j:s C:O:1C:::-:::!, be ~,e::::?::d a:.d allo-:;-:: to c:o::i:.~: 'W·it.!! t::: :a.:;Jt:: cr.;gs c:-
psyc:::oc=opic: sa::s:A.:l;:s btac:: 0: re=:c.,.:: or r:?la:d b v .. :oie 0: ~ Pa..-M 
.-\...-Jc:!e: 12 
SL""BST.-\..."CES FREQL"E~lI.Y t:SED L" THE ILLICIT ~1.-\"''''1.''F . .t,.Cn."R.E OF 
}i.-\.RCOnC DRt:GS OR PSYCHOTROPIC Sti13ST.-\..."iCES 
1. T:: Pa.-J:s sb.!l tu: ~: c:as-.:.::s ~e1 c:e:::J ac,:~ocf.:l:: to p:: ... e:t ci:\'::s;o:l of 
s·· ... s··~-·s;~ "'r-1..1· I .-~ Ta ... •• II .. s-..1 1'0- ..... -··....,05· o:'l'il:_:'t -'~";'C:-'-. ot-~a.:-o-:c: c""~s -_ ................. .,; .. -- ..... ---"._-:' -1''' .. _ .. _ ........ " .... ~ -'- -·1iI 
0: FsY'~o::opic: s~!::s.cc::s, a::d s:;.!l c:o·o?::a:: V,1:': o:e a=o:'::: to t!:is e::. 
2. I: a Pa.-:j or ~: Boa.:: tas i:!'c:=a:io: w:::: b its opi~o: cay r:;~::: ~: bc:h:s:o: of 
a s\:l::s:a.:c:: b Ta:l: lor Table II, it shall cotiiy tl:: Se::m.-y·G::::al a.:c! f.:..-:isb := "'i:!: t.:: 
~:o:-:a:lc:l ~ S~??or.: ot d:a: :o:if::a:!o:l. T.:: ?:oc:::u:: c!:s:~b:d i: ;:a.:ag:-ai':s 2 to 7 of t!:is 
a..-Jd: shall also a??!y woe:l a Pa.-:y 0: ~: Soa:d 1m bfor::atio:l justifybg ~: c!:!:tiC:l 0: a 
S~::5ta.::c:: f:o: Ta!::le I 0:- Tabl: II. or e:: :'''1:5::: of a s\:!::s:A.:lC: !ro:n O:l: Ta!::le to t!l: ot::::. 
3. Tee Sec::::a.-y-Ge:::1! s:;.!l t;a=s::-';t r.:::~ :o:':::c:atio:l, a::d a.:y b!or::atio: "':1c:: 1:: 
c:o:sic!::s r:!:\'a:::, to t.!!: Pa..-.iu, to c.e Co::-.=issic!1. a.:::!. w:::: :otiiieacio:l is :::ad: by a Pl.,",:)', 
to ~: Bca:d. n: Pa..-.ies s:all c:oC".::~i:2.t: c.::r c:o::::::::s c:oac::"':!:i ~: :ocifi::1tio: to C:: 
S::::::a.;·-G::e=:U, tog::.!:::- wi~ all sUi'?le=e::t:I • ., i:.:"o:=atic: wl:ic:: cay lSsist C:: Boa:d i:l 
es:abl.is~i a:: asseSS::le:t a.::d c:e Co--:ssio:l in :cac:l:i:.g a ce:isio:. 
4. If :ll: Boa::!, tu:::.g i::.:o a::o:::t :1:: er.:::, i::?o:'ta.:c:: cd c!i..-e:si:y of ~e lic::. us: ot t!:: 
s::bs;a:::::, a.::d the poss:b:llry a.:d ease 0: ::sbg alt:::at: Sl!!::s:~c:s bo~ {or lic::t p..:..-poses a.:ld 
Co: ~: illici: Ca.:Iufacn::c: ot ::a.::Ot::: c!..-.:gs 0: psy:::o~o?ic s:::s:a::c::s. fi:c!s: 
(a) Teat t::: subs:~c:: is £::;:::::1)' I:se: i: :1:e illic:it c:t=~!a::u:: of a Ila::o:i: crug 0: 
psyc:llot:opic: 5ubsu:C::j 
(:l) nat the "'olu::: a::d ex:::: of:1::: ill.idt ::c1:ia:::u:: of a :a::ocic: c:-.:g 0:- psyc:!lot:opic: 
substl.nc:: C:::1::S 5::10I.:S pu::lic: h:al~ 0: soeil! p:obl:::s. so as to ""a:ra::t i:te::atio:~ 
ic::ioa, 
it s:all c:0::'.:lu:iC:3te to tile Co::::nissio:: a.:: lSsm:::e:t o{ the subst~c:e. i:c:luc!i::g ~e likely 
efiec: oC addi:g t!:e 5ubs':1!lc: to eit.!:e: Tabl: I or Tabie II 0:1 both licit \:s: &.::ld illicit 
c:cufac:u::. tog:th:: wi~ re:occ::datio:s ot co::'::ori:g C::15U::S, if a=y, tl:a: "'ould be 
a?proj):1:lte ia t!l: ligbt of its asseSS::le::t. 
5. The Co:n....ussioc, U,):i::g i:1to ac:cou:: t.!:: c:o:::::::m sU!::::lir:ed by t:e Pa:-:i:s :md c:e 
c:o:::::::::ts a.::d r:c:otn:te::!:ltiOC5 of tbe Boa:d, whose asseSS::le:t sball be d::e::::i:ati ... e IS to 
s:ie::titic ~:m::s, ~d :uso tui::! ieto d\l: co::side::stio: a.::y otb::- r:l:va.::t fac:to:s, ~ay de:ide: 
by a t'7o'o-tl:i::s C'lajoriry of its ce:no::s 10 Fla:: a subs::1:lc: ie Table I or T:1l:I: II. 
.. 
6 .• a..:y ccdsioo of tbe Co::::::ssio: tu:: p,,::s::2.::t to ~:s a.-;ic:1e s!lall be c:cC-::'l:.::i:a::d by 
t!l: SC::~::l.,:-Ge::e:allo all States l::d 0:::: e::::ies "'bi::!! 1::, or "'hic:!!a:: e::titl:d to bec:oc-:e. 
P~-":=s 10 t~s Coc~'c:liQQ, ;r~ 10 t!:c: Bca::!. Su::!! d::::sio: sb.!1 bc:co::e f:.:lIy c::-ec:h'c "'it!! 
res?:::: :0 elc: P:1.'":"J oe: !l\.~~ a.:~ e:i=:: c.:;s ~::c: t:: cat: o( suc!! C:O::l=:u::;c:1r.ioa. 
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7. (a) TIe d:::s:::s of t.:: Cc=---":ssi:: :1.":: t:.=:::: t~:s a..-'::!: s:l!! :e s'~~j::: t:J :: ... ::,:, =:: 
u: Co~d U?OC t!:: r:q;::s: of CJ Pa:-:: f:l:: w:~i: 0:: !:~:::: a.::! e:i::: days aft:: 
u: da:: of co-wca:ioc o~ t.:: d:::sio:. n: r::;~:s: f:r r:· .. i:o;r s:l.!..l b: s::: tJ :.~: 
Se::::a:j-G::l::a!, tog:::::: wi::: ill r:l:n:: i.::c::::.:i:: C?o: w::.i:: u: c:q''!:!: f:: 
r:":'iew is bas::. 
(b) 1i~. S·~-··1!""'"-G·~··a1 s'·a.:I t;cs":' c~~:·s or , ...... ~ ..... rc' ··V:·T a.:..1 ....... t ...... loA- "' .... W. J ---. :-. --"'_ 1'0. .. -- ... :-_ ..... "." -: ':. :- ~- .... -.'~'" 
i::1:r.:a::oc to t.!:: Co:-.:.!ss::c, t:J t.!:e !):a:~ ~d t~ all t..::: ?a..-.!:s, ::"'::':':i :::~ to s:.:::-..;: 
u:~ C:J=:::$ ..,.it!l!::l c.:.:::; c!a;·s .• .l..!.l co:-...:::.:s r::::''':: s:all be s:.:':::-"::::: tJ t:e 
Cot:.=:U for co:s::::a:ic:. 
(~) ...... ~. CO .. ~_:I ~"- c:~-r:- o· r·-·-s· • ... ··..I·-:S1·0~ 0 .. • ... • Co""=ss:'" "'·C·:··I···:C" 0" .:. • .. " .. . _ .. ~ ..... : w_. __ .... I ........ .. ~ .. _. .. ... .. _. __ ...... " ..... _ ... & __ .~_
Cou=:U's de::sio: s:ill be ::cs:-J:::: :~ ill Sa::s c:! 0::::: ::.:'::'::s w::!c~ a::, 0: -;;-::.i~:: 
a:: e::::!:-: to 1::::0::::, Pa..-J:s to ~s Co:.:::io:, t:l :::: C==---":ss:o: c: ::J :::: 5:6.::. 
8. (a) W:c:ot:: p:ei".!:!!:: t:l t!:: g::.::..!.::: c::::: Fe.:s:·::s :0::":':::: i:: :;a:ar-a:;: 1 O::.!:.:l 
._:.1 •• ~..1 .:.. "'=\':SI'O~S or.:.. 10"t C~~ .. ·-·:~- ,:.. 10"t Co--'-·:·· as .... -..1 • ..1 .~..1 
.... ---_-- ........ r .... . - .~. :",J. ;-_.,._----,'--- ....... _'. ____ ..... ~.-- .. -:----
~e 19 J 1 Co: ... :::~oc, t.:: Pa..-..:.~ s.:cl tu: :.:: ~:as"..:::s :.::":' c::~ a:::":':'~l:: ::1 :0:::(1: 
0: =C'~a;~: ~d dls~':::.::!c: c: s:.:":s:a.::::s :: To"::: I ~:! Ta:!; 'II ';'::.i:: a:: CL-:;:: 
oc: r.:::i:. ~:!.: t: .. :::I=7. 
(:) To :::is e::, ~: Pa..-J:s =~;. 
(i) Cc:=o! a.!l p::;":s a.:: e::::r~!:s ::Pi::! :: :=: =:a.::::a::-.!:: a.:: ~s::-:":'';::c: of' 
r.:c: s':!:s:uc~s; 
(Ii) CO:=:Jl ..:..::::: lk::c: :=: :s:"::.1s==::: C: ;::=::5:S :.::. ~::.i:: Sl.!:: =:~.~;::-.!:: ::: 
c!;s::f:II'::':o: cal tu: p:a::; 
(:li) R:q'.!!:: :::3: lic::s::s 0:':":'::' a p::::::t !::: c::::'.!::l.:g ~: a!o::s~:! o;:::-1:1o:s; 
(i\'") P::-;-::c 0: aC::-':'=:~l::o: 0: Sl.!:~ s::~s:c::s :: ~: :oss:!sio: 0: =:a.:t.:!a::-.!:::-s a::: 
..I:s-"~"·o:; i:: e1-'SS 0" .... ""a::':':'s •• ~ .. : • ...l [~: ,:.. ~ ... _.t c~·ol .. ~. 0,. .... S:··S1 \,0,,; .... w ...... J _. • r..- • .,,_ _ __ ._ ___ w. r..-. _\oi. ___ ..1 ___ ••• "" __ _ 
~: ~: F::-:~g =~~:: eo::!!:;o:s. 
9. Ea:: pa.-:y s:ill, wi:!: res;::: to s·.;':S:"::::5 :: Ta':l: I cd T~':i: l!, :u: ~: [0110-;;-::. 
C::lS~:S: 
(a) ES'a"'::s~ a.:..1 -al.::.'ai.: a S-S"" to ~o·:·~· :-··-a·:~·a! t;;..I. i:: S"~'S""::C'S i:l Ta""- I .-~ -T-a"'!· 1-1 7: 0:..1·· t .. ;f:~-;~:"···· -t''':-I:;:::-:::J::':~:-or S .. S-:I·-:0.· .. sw-·.~sa·-·;~ .. s S-:·:", .... _ _ ..... • __ • w .... _..... _______ .... _ .. _ .. . . _ •• _ ......... ___ •• __ ... 
-o·:·· .. ..:_g 5-S··-5 sl:ill 1::. a~-l:·d i.: c'OS· -:J·O-··.·; ... • w,·· ... • -~· .... ·~-····s ;-~o-··s 
.... _ ...... - : •••. - :':-.. . - '-' :'-- _..... ~ ........... ----- •. ' ..... 'r .•• - J 
~?O:-:::"1, w::l:sa!::-s a.:~ r::ill::-s, w:o s:~ L:!o:::: t!:: I::J=:;::::: a·.;;':c'::l:s of 
Sl.!s?iC:ot!s o~:!::s a.:~ t.-~sa:::o:s. 
C::) P:o-:k!: fc: t!:: S:::-.!:: ofa.:y s;:::..:::: i: Tab:: I o:1"a::: II !f~:::e is st:!"fi::e:.: :-;-i(;!:::: 
. ~a: it is ior cs: i.:. 6: illi::t c;..::".!!"a:~: 0: a :1::0:':: :!:-.:g 0: ps;c:o::c;ic 5;::'5:"::::. 
(:) ~o:i.:-y, 2.S soc:. as possr:!eJ t:e ::=::=:::::t a:::':::::1:s cd sc:-;oices o:::e Pa.-"::s :~:::~e~ 
if ~::: is r:aso: to b:!i:,': t!:a: t!:: boo:":, :1:>0:-: 0: ::a.:s:t of a St:~5:a.:C: i: T~:i: I 0: 
Ta:'[: II is Ce5t!.::d ro~ t:: illic:~ i::,-=l.;:a~:".!:: of ca.::o':: c:-.:gs 0: psy::~o:=O?ie 
$::'::S::.:1::5, b:b:!:'::'g i:: pa..-.::-.!la: i:f'o::::a:lo: abc·.!t ~: :::2.:5 of py=:=:c 2.:~ a::y O~::: 
css::::ia! :::::::::5 w~c: Id to t!:ac 1::::!i:!. 
(:) R:q·.!::: t!::lC br0:-:! a.:~ ex?o:-:s be P~o?::!y IJ:e;l:~ a.:d dOC-Jo:::::!. COC'l=:::dl.! 
coc".!:::::! S1.:C:: as i:';oi::s, C:1:iO I:':":':::s:s, C:':5:0::', t:..::s?or; a:: ot::: s:i?p:::g 
coc·.!=::::s s:ill i.:.cb~: 6: ::L=::S,2S 5:l::: i:: Ta':!: 1 orTa:!: II,e::!:: s".!:sca.:::s ~e:=i 
i:.?o:-:d er ex?o:-:d, t.!:: q:.:ctiry be::g i=:?c:-::: c: e~?or:::, a.:c t.!:: ::L:le a::d ~(;!c!:::S5 
c: c;: e:?c~::, t:: L=:yo::::- a.=d, ...-::: ; ... a!!.:!:, t:: co:sipc:. 
(:) 
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10. (a) b a:::::oo to .~: FO\':1lO:::S of pL"l$oa;:!l 9, cd I!?c: r:;~:s: to ~:: 
Se:;:tL"y·G:!l:::ll by .be i::::c::s.::i Pa.-::;, Cl:::' Pa.-.y f:O::1 "':05: 1::::;0;')' a s:.:::S;cc:: i::. 
Tabl: I is to be Cl:?o~:d 5:ill e:s~:: t:at, F::or to s:.::!l el:?o~, t!l: fo!1oQ.·i:g i::::"o:-:::a::o: 
is s:.:ppue:i by i:s cO::1?e:::: .. -.:t::0:::::5 to tb: co::::::::.t a~:,::0.::i:5 of t::: i::?c:-:::'g 
COU=:"j": 
(i) Na:::: a:::d ad.i::ss oft::: :%?o::::: a.::d L=:;:o::::: a.::d, " .. :::. ava.!!l:!:, ::: ::o:.s:g-:::j 
(ii) N&::c of th: substa:::c: i::: Ta:l: Ii 
(iii) Qucticy of tJ:e s:.:bsta.::c:: to b: c:-;:c:::::j 
(iv) El:?:::d pOiLt o( e:,:=y a.::d e::?c::d cat: o( cis?at:::j 
(v) .£.::.y orb:: i=.:o:-=a:ioc w~::: is ::.:t'.!a!.iy a$o:d I!?O: by t::: Pa.:-':es. 
(:) A Pa.--ry c:ay adopt me:: s:.--i::: 0: s:o;::: :l:"S~::S of co:.=ol t::a.:: t::ose ?:o\'i::: :y t::.:s 
F"'i='3.?= if, i: i:s c?~o:::., $~C: ~:lS·':'::S a..:: d:st:~bl: c: ::::ss .. :;:. 
11. ~c:: a Pl.~ r.:.:-..is::s idO:=.l:iO:':O a.::.c":':; Pa.~ i::: a::o::a.::.:: with ?a...-ag-:-a?Cs 9 a::d 
10 of L:.!S a.:-Jde, t::.e P~ f':"~5~g 5Uc:!l i:fO:::l:':O:' ::ay r:q''±: i:at i:: Pa:':'l r::::·'·::'E it 
ke:? co:.!i::~tia.l a::y r;ade, busi.:e5s, co=-~::::a.! 0: p:of:!s:::a.! s::::: oc t:.c: process. 
12. Ea:!l Pa.::-j s:all fi.:..-=is!! a.::.:.:.:ally to t::: SCL":, i.: i:: fo:-::: a::: :a.::.:.:: Fovi.:!:: fo. 'cy 
it cd 0: fo:-=s Cl:: anibble by it, i:.:o:=:a:io:. c:::: 
(a) T!l: l.:oc..:;:s se~:d of su'::s:cc:s i.:. T.bl: I a.::: Ta':1: II c:, w::: ):.:00;;-:, ~:~ o::r':j 
(;,) .1.::.y s~bs:a.::c: :lot i.::el'.::!::! ::. Tab1: I or T.':1: II ""~:!l is id::.t!.f::::! :u h.\,::g be:!lI:.S::i 
i.: illicit C'l:l!lu:ac:'J.!: of CL":otic c!.."\!gs oc psyc:o::c?ic s::'::s::l!lc:s, c:d w~c~ is d::::1e:i 
by t::: Pa. .. y to be s:.:ffi::::t!y s:p:i:ct to be b:o-..:,:t to t::: a::::.:io:l of~: ECL":ii 
(c) M:t!locs of Civet'S:o:1 l:d illici: ::::L::::!'a::-.:::. 
13. T:e BoC'd s!:ill r:?o:t ~::ally tQ ~: Co=--":ssio: 0:' ~: :::?I:::::1m:o: of thls a..-;:c!: 
a.::d t!:: Co-""'issio:l s:a.ll pdodicilly r:\'ie:w t::.e ac:q::ac}' cd p~c::::e~ of Tabl: I cd 
Table n. 
14. T:: p:Q\"isio:s of L:.!S a:-.. ic!: shI! :c: a;:?ly to ph_-:a::·.!:!e:l1 p:e?a:a:io:s, co: :0 orb:: 
P::;:L"ltiO:S c:ocu; ... j ... g s:.::s:a.::c:s b Tabl: 10: Ta::le II ~a: L": cQ::pou=ded i.:: s\:c!: a ""ay i:a: 
S\:::~ s::::Sa::.c:s C::a.::..:lot b: easUy I!s:d c: r::cv::d by r:atlly l??!i::l':I: ::::L::S • 
• -\rJcle 13 
M.ATEliUS .-\...,,-0 EQL'lP~lES" 
The Pa.:-J:s shall tu: sue!! c:as~:s as t::.:y c::::1 a??rQ?~l:: to pr:n:.t t:a:e: i.:: a::.d t!:: 
Ci ... ·c:sio: of =a:::ials a:ld c~1!ir:1:!lt for illicit p:-o::!uetic: or =;.:~rac::'"-::: 0: :2::::1: c:ugs a.:.:! 
psyc:ot:opic s::bs:a.::<::s a::.d shall co-opera:: :0 ~5 eo: . 
• v-Jcl: 14 
ME..-\S lI"RES TO ERADICATE ILLICIT ClI"I.. TIVA TIOS Of NARCOTIC 
PI--\..".,.S .0\.,,-0 TO ELIMISATE ILLICIT DE.\o1.o\."iD FOR N.-\RCOTIC DRUGS 
.-\...,,-0 PSYCHOTROPIC Sv-SST.-\..."CES 
1. A:.y m::lsur:s tU:!l pursua.:lt to this Cocv:::iOQ by Pa..-J:s shallllot be: less st:".l:g::t U:C 
t::e proyisiocs applicable: to the: c:adic:.tio:: of illicit C\lltiyatioa of pl:l!lts coc:~;"':"'g C:l:;otic: a::.d 
psycbor;opic SUbS:UlC:S a.=Id to t.l::e: el::::;:a":o: of illic:it c!:::1alld for aa:;Q:ic C:"..!IS a:d 
psyc:o::opic subst:l!lc:s under tll: p:-ov:sio:s of':: 19S 1 Co:."e:tio:1, th: 1961 Co:v::t:oa as 
~~oc~d a.=Id the 19i1 Coave:atioa. 
2. E3C:: Pa...--ry s:ill tu: ~?propr:~:e c::elS\.:::S to p::vc:t illicit c:-.:.I:ivacoo o( c:d to e:ldi::~t: 
pi:u::s COQt~g C:l:couc: 0:- psyc:o::opic s:.::s:~:::s, 5:'::: as opill:l poppy, coca bus!! a.=Id 
Cl.:lllb:s p! a.::ts , co.:JtiYat:d illicitly io its t:::i:o~. Tl1c C:::lS:':::S a:!optc:! shall respect 
(\.::ca:.c:::11 b:.:::u: rig:ltS ;,:)0 s!::all'tl.k: (be a::~I:;: o( t:~:!itic::u licit uses, ";~c:: tbe:: is 
bsto:i:: (vic::..:: or s'.!,~ use, lS ""ell as t!::: p:Q:::~C:l of t:: c:.."i:oc::e:t 
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3. (a) Tb: Pa..-..i:s :,uy C:l'o;:::,:: t~ i.::l:::lse ~: e:::::':·::::ss 0: C:l::;l:::::l e::::m. SI.!:= 
c'" O~"'a:io~ z:;:av i::'.' lIla ~~IU"'· s\:--c- ...... ~ a---;)-·:"· fo' i···-a·· ... r'-~ 
.... - Z'.. ..... _0' .... J ...... -- ... :-:- "1 -0-· :- ...... , .:": ..... ,. " ....... !: ...... - - .. 
c!:~':!c::-::::=c l:ld!.::g to e:~=o=-.l::~'" ... :a::l: :l!:::=.a::v:s ,01::1::: c·.!!:.:n::o:. Fl::~:S s-.::::. 
15 a::':ss to C:1:h:s, 6: an:.la~u.::: cf r:so'.!:::s a::: F:·:c:i.::~ s~::o·::o:o~: 
c:" ... ·.I;·;o ... s s~ocld ,.... t~~·.., i,.·o a .... ot.:-~ ~ .. :"o·· S"-~ ~·-al C:-···!o--·~· ~- .... -~- .. s c-
• __ ._ - - _. "'- .. -- _. .... -. "" ... ~~ ___ •••• w' ... :- ...... _ .. r ..... !. '.0_.. .. 
brl~=::1::-i. J. a: ?a...-~:s oay 157:: O~ 1.:: c:.::: a;-?:,:~:-:.:: :~:lS~:S c: CQ-C?:::l:.!O::. 
(b) Tb: Pa..-J:s s:ill also fa::li:a:: t..:: u::cg: of se::::"::";: a::: ::=:::'::11 ::!~:::.:.:c:: a..:::: 
t:: c:J::'J:: of r:s:a::: C~:l::~g e=2~cl::C~. 
(:) W::::v::- they ::1.,.: C~::"-=C:: f:o:::::s, t:: Pa..-Jes S:W s::k. :.~ e~ .. c?:.:.:: :.:. ::'!!:.:;~:l 
FO~-:-..=les ~ ~::: r:s?:::!.: a::as &!o:g :':05: (:o~:i::s. 
4. To: p~jes s:ill a:o~t ~?p::?::a:: c::as°..!.::s al=.:~ .: e=:':'.:i.:g c: ;::-':''::::i ~!=:: 
c!:::a.::d to: =l::~cic c!....-.!g' a.:.~ ;:s;::o::O?:: s-.:.:s:a.:.::!a -=::: ~ -d=-::.- :~ ::~t..!e!.::g :::'=:2..:: s::!:-:::'::E 
a.::~ eli='!=1::":g ~a.:lc:a.l b::::E";":s f~~ i.!!l:~: t:l!:!:. n:S! ~:4.S:':'::S cay ~: :15::, i.::::= a.''':3., 
C~ t!!~ r:~:)=.=l=:ld.tic:'$ of t:~ t:':i::: ~·a:'!c:'St sp:-::~::: age::::s c!'t.:: l~::1::~ S.:io:s S~:~ 
2.S t..::: V:od: H:l!:h Orga=.!=a:':c:, a.=: 06:: c::~::::=: i.:.:::=.a:;ccl.! e:i~:.:':o::s, ~: e: :.:: 
Co -~··I,·~s:-· ~1 .. l":c'iS::"!:~·- 0'''::-· a..:o··· ... co; ,I... 1 ... ··-1·;"··1 Co······ ... •• c· D-·· -1'."---:.':-: . . -~_ , ... :,-~.:. -::--:- -. :- .. - .. ~- _ .... - ......... 4L.i. _ •••• _ ..... - "'-50 
A~1.!se 1:ld l:).:::t Tra::l:~g, e::: t.:l 1"5,, as I: F:::~5 :0 g().:~:::ol a::: i:o:·p.::--=:::::4! 
... _ .. ;. ..J ,....:- .. , •• r-r .... - s ; ... f'~. r;.~..:s 0:- ......... · .... ·: - ...... -._. _..l ... ~ .... :t: .... : .... ""t ...,.-. tJ .. -:_ '5: .......... 5 z.::.'::' •• '~"- ........ 110. ~ ----: .......... - -1' •• '--_':1_, -:-_a_ .... _ .. c_ ... _.3. .... _ •• _ .. -: •. .I..we ....... __ 5 
elY c::::: 1:::0 b:!a:e:a! c: c::.:..;:~h:::l.! ab=::=::::S c: a.::--=g:=::::s a:..=::! ~: :;,:",-":;:l::.::g c: 
r:-:'.!~~g i!l,;d: c!::::a.:: ro~ :3.!':~:ic c--..:gs 2.:: F!::::=:~!: 5:::S:"':::5. 
S. TIe P...-J:s :::ay 2.!SCI t ... ::.: ::-::ss...-y =::15::'::S fo~ :~::: ces:-.:.::lc: C~ ll;;':-';! c:s;:csa..! c::':: 
£:1:::::';: <i:'.!~, Fs:::ot:';:~ic S;!':s::t.:::s :&.:l: s".;':s:~::s :.: T.':i: 1 ;.::! T.':i: II ,;:,:'::: ca.e be:: 
se!.::::! c: co:.!!s~::d a.::d fc: ~e 2:..::1ss::ili::.· :lS evi:!~:.:: or ,!:.:.1: e~:-'::;=:' :!::SS":7 ~:!:.:.:l:'::s 
c! s"..!;:' S"~:s::..:::s. 
A:-Jcle lS 
CO.'ri..\1.ERCLU C."-~tUERS 
1. T~: Pa...-'::s s:ill :2.:~: ;'r~~:F:-!l:: :'l:lS~~:$ to ::s::.:: :..! .. : C-::1.:S or t:e.:s~o:-: op~:a::: b~' 
c::-":':::!U cl..--:1::s 2:: cot \:s:': i: t:: c::::-.=.!SS:C: 0: 0::'"'::::5 es~a:tis::: t: a::::=~:: ~::.: 
c-J':!: 3, pa:ar:-4?~ 1; 5~:: =:~S'':'::S =..: i.:::h::: sr,:::a! 2..-:;'::5:=::::5 w~~ :~:,,~:::!1! :.1.::1::S. 
2. Ea:: Pa.::y s:ill r:;o.!!:: :0:=::::-.1 c:....-::~::s to :U: ::lS0:"':!: ?:'!:~~:;c:s :~ p:!":::': :!: 
\:s: of i:e:: =:e~s or ::-a.=s;c:-: ro~ t:~ c:~=:!ss::: of c::e:c:s es:i:l!s:e: i.: a::~::~:: wl~ 
a:-J:1: 3, F1:ai-a?: 1. S'.!:~ p:::a~:':c~s ::ly i:c!.:.::: 
(a) 1: t..:: p:L:::~l.! p!a:: or b;!s~:ss cf a c::::=:::::l.! C:l.:";"::: is ";:':~ ~: t:~:c:y cf ~: 
Pa:::;: 
(i) T:li..:;jcg of pe~c:.:::! to i~:=:.:.£l s-.:S?:::~\:s c:::s:g-:.=::::s 0: ;:::s::Sj 
(ii) P:o:::cti:: 0: i::::~.::: c: p:~o:=e!j 
(i) SI.!:::,Jssioc of ::0:50 c:&.::.i!:s:s i:: a:n::::, o;:::~: ... :: pOlSibi:j 
(u) Use of ta=.?e:.r:5:s:~:, bd!vi:'.!l!!y ve~!!:l:ie seals 0: c::::~::::5j 
(u.:) R:?o:-J=g to 0: 3;prop:-:ate a'.!~o~:'::s a: t!:: e:.:::es: c??c:-=-.::::y a.!l s\,;spi::io:.:s 
C::::-':=:S:::I.:::S ~l: c:a~' be r:13::~ to 0: C:::::-.15;:0: or o!:::::s CS:l:::s!:e:! i:: 
a::::J:c,,::: 0;:::': a.-J:1: 3, Fa.:'ai':'l?: 1. 
3. El:: ?a."7j s:ill s:::-: :0 ::S:1:: :':l: c::-=:=:::::11 c:::..-:-:::-s 1.:::: :':: :I;F:=;~~:: a·.!:~o~:::s a: 
pc:'::s or e~':.. .. 1:l: e:lt 1.::: 0:::: C:·.!S:o~s c~::::I1:::s C:::'c:::~::, ';:':::: a ,;,::-:..' to F::':::::iq 
.·~· .. · ... C·I·-· ... ~-~·ss to _·1.::S cr t:::I.:S~C- ::1.:-' ~ •• -'" .--' to I·':"~:·-···:-- l-~·~-·:l·· s·· .. ·:~· r..-1II_i...oJ • ~... ........ ....~ 1"." ... "-"'b""" ...... _.l",._ .... _-s. .-:0 ro' 110 ............ '
C::lS;!::S. 
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COli\1ERCLU DOCU.\1E~"'TS .-\.'i1> LO\BELLI~G OF EXPORTS 
1. El:: PL"tj' sb.!l r:qul:: t.::at !~o;.7.:l ~:?or:s of ::12.::0:':: ~-':iS a.:: pSj'::o=o;:i: S'..::S:l:::S 
b: prope:!y dO::..:=l::lt:d. I:l :1::::':::0: t~ t::: ::q::.i:::::a i:r CO:'..:=:::l:i~: 1.!!l::: a.-..id: ; 1 of 
t:: 1961 Cocv:::tio::, a.-Jde 31 oi6: 1;:1 Co:v:::tio: as a.=:::::d a.::: a.-J:!: 12 ot:=e i.9il 
Co::v:::~o::, co=::l:ial cOC'.!:l::::s s::.:: as i: ... oic:s, ::1:&0 ca.:::::sa, C''':s:c:s, =-=S?~:: c: 
o~:: s~??i:g dO::..:=l::m s~ill i:::!d: t:: l:~es of t:e ca.::oti: c!.."1.:gs a.:d psy:::oC:'o:::i: 
subs:a.:Jc:s bei:g eX?o:::ed as s:t out b 6: r:sp:::h': S:::::b.!:s of t:: 1961 Co::v::tio:, t:: 
1961 Cocvectioc as a.:n::d:d cd 6: 19i1 Co:ve::tioc, ~: q1.!a.::':ry b:i:g el:?o:-:d, a.:d t:: 
ca.:: a.:Jd address oi Cl: CX?o,,::, 6e bro,,:: a.:d, Vo'::: an!la'~l:, t:: ::ocs:r-::. 
2. El::h Pa:tj' scall r:qul:: t::at c::si~::::s of :a.:cot!c c!..-':is a.:d psy:::o:;c;:ic r..::sta.:::s 
be:'::g eX?on:d be Dot c.:s!abelled. 
:\'-.i::le 11 
n.LIcrr TR.AFFIC BY SEA 
1. Te: Pa.-J:s sl::all co-epe:.:: to the full:s: er.:::t poss::!: to s;;;::::::ss illicit =-..!::c by sel, 
i.a co::for:::iry ... itb ~e iotc:-::atio:al1:o7 of c: sea. 
2. A PL"'ty Vo·i:.i::!l has r:aso:.a':!: r-~1.!:ds to s::.s;::::: 6at a v:ssel flyi:g i:s fllg 0: cct 
c!is;::layi:g a f1:li or ca:ks of r:t.s=: is e::ps:: i: il:.::::t =-..:"iic =lj' ::q~cs: t!:: aH!S:a.::c: cf 
o~:: PL-.ies ill s~ppr:sst::g ia I!S: for t!:i; p~,,?cse. TI: Pa.-';:s so r:q;;:s;::! s::&!l ::::d:: $;'::: 
ass:s:~:: wit!±:l t.l::: ce:l::S inil.b!: to t!:::. 
3. A Pa."'Y wb.icll !:as reuella'::le r-Ol!.:lc!s to s::.spect t:at a ":ssel e::::ist:, f:::doo of 
1l2~"igatioll b ae:orda:lc: ... it!: mt:::atiocal b7 a:ld flri:g t.l::c !iag or displayi:g =a.:ks of::iis=1' 
of a.:ot!:!e: P~ is e:gagd in i.llic;: :."6!::i: :.y S:l ::o:;fy t.l::: £las S;.:e, r:,ues; c:o"-!L-=:ati:lll of 
regist:)' a:ld, if cOa!i.'":lcd, re;~:st a::.~o:i::ado: f:c::l t::: flag Stat: to :u: a;::p:op::a:e C::lS~es 
b r:ga:d to t.l::at vessel. 
4. I: ac:orda.::c: wi~ ;:L""app: 3 0: i: ac::e::!a::: .... :~ ::-:a:::s !.:I fe::: be:w::: t::= 0: i: 
ac::er:!~c: with a:J.y Ir-::::le:t or a..-.a.::I-::::t ot.!::~·:s: rnc::d ce:owe:: those Pa:ties, ~e flag 
5:.:: cay au:ho:iz: t.l::e r:;~esti:g S::o:: to, bt:: alia: 
(a) Boud t.l::: vess:l; 
(0) Sea.::b ~e vessel; 
(c) If evide::: of i:voln:c:t i: illicit c1!:ic: is fo~:d, tu: ap?:op::a:c a:tioll wi~ r:spe:: 
to t.l::e vessel, persc::s a:d c:a:go oc boud. 
S. W:l::: ac:tio: is tue: p~-Sl!a.::t to t.l::is a.-Jc!e, t:: Pa.-Ju c:o::::::::: sl::all tu: due ac:cou:t 
of t.!:: a::d DOC to e:lca::.gc: ~e nte:)' 0: life at SU, 6e se:~-:t"i of t1:: vessel ad t.l::: ca:go or 
to pr:judic: t.l::e c:oc=e:cial a:d legal i:te::m of t.l::e flag Stat: 0: a.::y ot.l::er i::t::est:d Star:. 
6. The flag Stat: Clay, c:ocsiste:t wit!! it! obligatiocs in pa.::lr-aph 1 oftl:is a.-Jc:le, subjC(:t its 
aut!!o:::atlo:: to CO::ciiUOllS to be ClU:'.1:illy ar:::d be:-;\':::1 it a:l:! t.l::c ::,uest!:g pL'"tj, bc:luc!!:g 
c:oocitiocs rclaci:lg to respocsibw:y. 
7. For the pu..-poSeS of pa.""ag:'2phs 3 a:ld " of t.!:is a:-J:1e, a Pa.-ry still respolld elpeciitiously 
to a request f:oc a.coCler P:L.~ to dete::li:: wee:':e: a vess:l t.l::at is flyi::g its C!:iS is e:1u:le:! 
to do so, I.!ld to requests for autho:i:ltioc ::ac: p\!tsu~: to P:L.~it';PQ 3 .• o\t Cl: ti:::e ofb~ot:'l::g 
a Pa."':')' to cis Coc"C::tioa, cac:!:! PL"'Y sball desip:1t: a:l au~o:ir)' or, Vo':e:: aeC:SSL"Y, at: tho cities 
to rec:ive a:ld respocd to such reql!csts. S\,Ic:b desifC:ltioc sl::ill be coc.:£id c::ougo t:e 
Se::::a.ry-Ge::cral to all o~e: Pa.-Jes 9,'ithl:: oce ::oct!:! or t.!:e desir-~tiol1. 
8. A P:t."'ty wb.icb has t:Ut::: a.:y actio:: i:: aC;Qrd:L!lc: ,.,it!:! t!::!s a:-Jc:l: s~2.ll p~~::pt!y i:!Or::'l 
t.l::e £!ag St:lte cocc:c::c:d of !.be results of t.!:at adell. 
9. Thc Pu-Jcs shall c:ocsid:r e:t:::::g i=to bilate:u or rerio:~ ~r-:::::ts er a..-.-":i::'ICI1:s tQ 
ca.'":} Ol.:t, or to ecl::u:c:e t:e c::e:tive::ss or, t!le pro\'isio:s of ~is a:-..icle. 
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10. Ac:!oQ pc:s:.:a.:: t:l p.:~;:a;::: 4 cf ~:s :a..-'::!: s:l1 b: C::l..7.::! O-":C 0::1: b: ~·t.:s~?S c: 
oili:1.:)" e:::1!:, 0: o~:: s:;;:s c: ~::1!t C:!:l::Y ::t.:k::! a.:d i::::i!i:l:!: :lS b:::~ 0: iO\':::='::: 
s::-;i:: a.::i a::~o:ised to l::lC e:::::. 
11. A=." ado: u.::::: i: ac:o::!c:: <;;":~ .:;s a::i::: s:1!l tl.'::: c'':: a::o'.!:l: o:t::: ::::! :lot:o 
i::c:::::: ;'i~ oc er::c :be ::~:.:s a.:: O:!.!gl :;::s a.::! t::: ::::::s: of it:::s~do: d' c::.u:11 St.::s 
i::I a:::I::!c:: 'III":~ ~: i:::::1::0:11 h.":;' cf l::: S:l. 
A.-.lel: 13 
FREE TR.-\DE ZO~"ES .-\'''\"D FREE PORTS 
1. Te: P:a..-..ies s:'a.!l a;:;:!] c::asc::s to s-.:~::::ss i!.:.i::: ::-&!:ic: i=. :t.::o-:: c!..-.:~, ;:s: .. ::o::~;-:: 
$:;':s:a.:::s 1.:: $\!':s:uc::s 1: Ta':!: I cd T.·::: II 1: f::: ::.:: ::::s c:! :.: f::: ?c::s :;.: t.:: 
:::1 I:ss s::::g::: l::1.: t::os: a;:;:li:: 1: 0:;:: pa::s of t::::: t::-:::o:::s. 
2. Th: P:a..-'::s s:~ e'::!:l'o::,-: 
(a) To co::'::oc t::: ::o\":=::t 0: poes :.:: F::s::s i:: f.:: ::-a:: :o::s 1.:: :::: pc::s, c:, 
to :=at e=:=, s:'a.ll e=~o-::: :':: c::=:;:::!:: ;'..!~o:::'::s to sec::' C:1:i':S a.:c i:~c:::l:i a.:~ 
O\!:go:':g v:ss:!s, i.:C:!!.l:":.:g p!:lS:;:: c::o.;': 1.:: f!s~.:g T:SS:!S, as <;;":!l as Il:c:o.;°: a.:~ 
1'::':,1:$ cd, ow:':: a?r:,::?~a::, tJ 5:1::: :::-::,' c:~:::s, pass::i::-S c:~ :=::: :aii1i:j 
C::) To es:i:Es: 1.:: c:z.:.::~ a s:s::= to c!::::: c:::s:g-:.=::::s S~S?::::~ 0: c:::li::i:g 
ct.::o::c c!..-.:gs, FS:::::=CF:: S\!:s:~:::s a.:::! s".!:s:o=.::s b Ta:!: I 1.:: Ta::: I! pass:":g 
b:o 0:' ot!: of f~:: t:4:: :~~:s a..:: f::: ;o~si 
(c) To eS:l·:!;S: c:! ::l.!.:::6 s:.:.:t":~~:: s:s::~s 1: :a::o!..:.: cc e~~j: c:::u a..:: 1: i..:::::s 
c.::! co:::: c:==~l pc:':':s b :::: :=.:: ::::s c:.: :::: ::c:-:s. 
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Tr:.E t:SE OF THE M.ULS 
1. I: c~:!::-::-J:: <;;":~ u::: 0::ii~1::C:5 u=.:!:: u: ee:-;-::::':o:s of';:: t'"ci\'::sa! P:s:a! C::i::, 
a:: b a:::I~:!a.::: ":;'::; ~: basic: r:-:'::!fl:s of u::: c::::s:':c: I:ia! sys::::s, 6: ?:a..-'::s s:a!! :a:!o;~ 
C:1S\:.::S to sU:=f~:sS u: us: o! u: =~5 Co: u.:.::i: ::-.!"!i; 1.:::1 s:~ C::I'o;:e:;:: ... l~ 0:: l:O~:: 
t:l t!:a: C::l::!. 
2. T~: C::lS::::S :::::::~ to i: pt.:lr:a~: 1 of ~s :a..-"::::: shU i.::!'':::, i:: p:a..-J:-J!1.-: 
(a) Cooo:~a::::! :ad:: C:: t.:: p:cn:-::: 1:: r:?::ss::: of t.:: \:s: of c: c3.!1s fe: i!lic:~ 
c1!:;C:j 
C~) I.:=oc::do: 1:: c:z.:.::::a.:l:: by a''::;o::::~ lao;;" e::o:c:::::: pe:s::::! ef ::· .. :5::ia::\·: 
a.:: co:=ol t::':.::..i;-.::s c:s:g:::: to c::::: i1li::t co:s:i"""::::~s cf ct.:c::ic c:-":is, 
ps:c:o=:;i: 5-.:':S:1::::5 l:d 5-'::S:'::::s i:: Ta:l: I a.:d Ta::: Ii i:: cc =:3l1Sj 
(c) Ler.s!;:':>: l:'l:lS::::S to :':l':!: t.:: 1.:S: 0: a~::=o;::a:: 1:::3.:S to se::'.::: c\"'i::!::c: r:;'.:l:d 
fo: ju:!ic:a! p:oc:::~gs. 
A.-Jc:le 20 
L'tFOR.'tL-\ TIO~ TO BE n·R.'iISHED BY TEE PARTIES 
1. T:: P:a..-j:s sbll C-..:.-:;s:, t!::O\!i: t.:: 5::::::1.7·0:::1::a!, i.:Co~a::o: to c: Co=::::ss:"o 
O:l t::: worki..:g of Uis CO:\'e:::o: i!! t.::i: t:::-::O:-::$ a.::, b pa::ic-.!!l:. 
(a) Tb: t::: cf la":O"s &::~ ':~.lla::o:s FO::::.!i1::: i:: o:~:: to ii ... : :ff:~: to t:: CO:ln:t:c:1j 
(0) Pl.:"..ic-.:!t.:s of C:1S:S of illidt t:l:!iC ':""i:~: ~::. ju:isdic:ic: 'lI.'!::C:: t!::\· c:,:sl::: i~Te~3.:: 
"'--l·'S· 0" c..~' t:-~cs CiS·IOS·"" .... o'····:·:·s ,· .. \·o!'··"" .\.. 50":'·$ Coo'" ,;1..:-: t!:-c ___ ... 11. .. ...- -- .... _, ..... _~_.....  '_., r..-_ ..... .... _ . • 
s'.:'::s:..:::s 1:: 0~:J.!.::~, c: t!:: ::-:::::0':5 e::;::loyd by f::so::$ so e:Slg:~. 
2. T:: P..-:::s s~l!l f".!..-:;s: S\!C: i::!:::=:3:.iC: i: S~:: a =:3.::2:: a=.d by s;:=:: c!lt:S as t::: 
Co::=::ssic:: ~:y r:q-.::s:. 
.'..:.. 
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Fti'~';CTIO~S OF TIlE COM!,USSIOS 
TI: Co::-:':s5ioll is a::.:ori:::i to cO:5id:: illl:':a,,::s pe::a.i::':g [0 th: C::5 of:~s Co:.\'::::o: 
&.::, ~ pa..-Jcul:Jr. 
(a) The Co=--.issioQ shill, 0: e:e basis of the bfor:ado: S1!bci~e:! by ~e Pa..-..ies b 
accor::!a.!lc: with A:-Jcl: 20, review the ope:atioll of ~s CO:l\'::::OIl; 
(b) Th: CO::l--llssio:1 cay cue s::sges:lo:,s a:ld g::e:al r:::lC",:=c:1datio:s bas:: OQ ~: 
CI1.::l~atiO:1 of the i:for:uio:1 r::::';::i froo ~: Pa..-J:s; 
(c) To: Cocc.issioQ t:lay call t.:e m::.:io:. orch: Bocd [0 c:y :a::::5 w~ch c::!y b: ::I:';c:, 
to th: r.!!lctiotls of th: Bcc~ 
(d) To: Co ....... issio:l shill, 0:1 a.:.y ca,,:: ref:::::! to it by c: Bocd 1;:::: a..-"::!: 22, 
pcag:aph 1 (b), take such actio:. as it e:::::s a?p:o?~a::; 
(:) Toe Co=':;ssioa cay, i: codc:=::y witb t.:: p:oe:::!1.!:':s laid dCTol b a..-":c:: 12,1:::':: 
Tabl: I a.:d Table II; 
(f) T:.: Co::::.:!ssiOQ cay cL-aw c: a::::tiOQ 0: J:o:'·Pa..-.i:s to c!::is:o:s a.:d 
r::o=::catio:s w~ch it acop:s l!:::!:: ~s Co:\,::tio:, wi:!'! a .... i:w to c:il c;,:sid::-=..:g 
t&k!.::g a::lctl in ac:o:::!~:= c::::wi~ 
.".rJcle 22 
Fl.i")iCTIO~S OF THE BOARD 
1. ~-i:!'!out pr:jl!dice to the r.!!:C':io!:s of the Co:'.::!ssioll U!lde: a:-Jcle 21, a.:d wi~o~: 
p::judic: to the r.!!letiocs of the Board c:d the Co:::.::::llssioll u::d:: the 1951 COllve:tio:., the 1961 
COIlV:::C:OIl as a::l::d:d a.:d the 19i1 Coc .... e:tio~ 
(1) If, oe Cl: basis of its e·;;-;-do: of i::or:atioQ availabl: to it, to the S~:::a.."Y-Ge:::ll 
0: to tl:: Co-,..;ssioC; or of i:fo::ac:oc c:l=l!.:.ica::~ by U:lit:~ Natio::s o:gc:s, c: 
Bocd bas re~O:1 to bell:\'e Cat Cle cs of :!tis Coc-;:::.iOQ i.::I car;e:s relat::! to its 
e;,c:pet::c: a:: cot bei:g c::. c: Becd cay i:';~:: a P~' or Pa.."ties to f~::!s~ a.:y 
r:lev;.::t i:for::atioc; 
(0) Wi:h resp::: to a..-..icl:s 12, 13 a.:d 16: 
(i) Af::: taki::S aecioa Il.:lc:: s~bpa.."'lPilh (a) or:=.is c-oic:l:,~: Bou:!, if satisfied tl:a: 
it is cec:ssa.-y to do so, cay call u?oa the Pa..-:v c:o:e:::ed to adopt suc~ re:::edial 
eeas::.:es as s!::all s::o \!:ld:: the ci:::Qs:c:c:; to be Ilec::ssa..-y for tl:: u:c:-.:tiOtl of 
tl:: p:ovisioes or a:-Jclcs 12, 13 a.:d 16; " 
(li) Prior to takleg adoa Il.:l::r (ill) belo,; .. , tl:e Bo:a:d s!::a1l t:eat as c:a=!id::dal i:s 
co=~catiocs -a.'i:h the Pa..~ c:o:lc:::ed \:.:lce: Cle pr:c::db, subpa:app!:s; 
(ili) If tl:: Bocd f:::ds tbt t!:e Pa..oo:y c:o:lc:e::ed 1m DOt take: re:::ledial measures which 
it h:l$ becQ c:all:d I!pO:l to tue \!:ld:: tl:is subpc2ppb. it cay call the ar:e:tio:1 of' 
Cle Pc-Jes, Cle COU:ldl a.:d t!:e Co:'.:r.issio:: to the ::a:::: .• A.:y r:?o:t pubHs!::ed by 
ce Bocd under thls subpcar-a;:h sball also co!::a!tI the views of the Pa..-:y 
COQc:::::! if tlle lane: so r=~u7sts. 
2, }..:y P1r.Y shall be invited to be r:prese:1t:d at a' meeti::, 'oCtb: Board at wb.icl:: a quescioll 
of di:::: i:lte::st to it is to be caesid:::d u:d:r this &:'tiele.· 
3, If ill a.:j c:u: a dec:isioa of the Bocd wl:.ic:h is adopted I!::d:: this a:tlcl: i$ Dot l!::L:i::nol!s, 
tbc vie':l.'s of tbe aU:lority s!:~ be stated. 
4, Dec:sioas of the Board ullder this a.-Jc\e s!::all be tak:e by a two·tbirds r::~joriry of the whole 
!:\!:.be: oi t!:e Board. 
S, b c~.:·:y::g out its fi.:::e:.io:s pl.::su~t to $\I~par:aF:a?b 1 (a) of thls a.-Je!e, the Board sh:a.!l 
e::su:: c: cOIl!id:::ti:iliry of ~l infOr:'latioe -a.'hic:!:: r:::ay cot:le i:to its possessio:l. 
331 
G. To: Boa::!'s r:s?o::s:':i!!~ ~::: t:is co'::!: s:1J :ot ar;:ly to ~: i:.pl:~:::l:'::l:: ci 
t:ed::s oc ar-::::1:::::s c::::d i:to be:-;::::: P1:.i::s i: 2::0::C:: .,,;-i~ ~: p:ov:s:o::s cd t::..!s 
CO::7::::iO::. 
i. To: F:::v:sic:s of c.::.:s co.ic:l:: s:ill cct be a;:;:ii:a:l: to c!:S?:.:::s :::-;c:::: Pa:-':::s !";!J:·S 
\!.::::: ~e F::7:S:0:S of co'::!: 32. 
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REPORTS OF rrlE BO.-LW 
1. T:: Bca:: s:~ F:?a:: c c.=:.:1! :::o~ 0:: i:s ";:'c::~ c::::.:.:_g 7.:l c~ys:s c:" ...... 
'-:"0-.':-- a' i's ..I:s- cs" C./ i: a-·--·":l·· ~l$'S C a~'o"-' cr ..... ·-·la=a·:o-s ira-v ~": •• t=, •• - - .... - .... -~...... -, ='r:""'Z'''· .. -.... -'.. -- - ............ _4Io r- • - -,! : -;-' =" --
bv or req'.!!.::-: 0: P1..~:s, tog::::: ~!~ &::j 0::5:':-:.::::'5 a.::d ~::~=-=~:'Cl::O:S ':':.I::l t.:.: 3ca.:~ 
c!;s:::s to c":~:. T:: Boa:: c:aJ c.j:: S'.!:~ ;:!::;:':::a.! r:?c~s as ie c::::sj:!:~ ce::ssa.::. n: 
r:-::c,.s s::1!l ce s:,:':=l=:d to t.:: Co:.:.::cl t.::.:o:.:g~ ~: Co~-Jss:o: .,,;-:.i::: C':l: cu: s·.!::. 
. ,-
c~::--=!=~';s ;s 1t Se!s t!:. 
.., T:-. -··o-s 0:" ..... B---./ s"ill\..· C:"'--"-;~l··./ '" .... l).-:.s .... ..1 s ..... s ..... -·,- ...... ;:, .... ..1 
tI.. _"._:' ••• _- we... - ~ .. :--:-.--......... - •• ~-- .... - .• .... -.--.. -~-: .. --:t'-- ... - .. -
Co: u: S::::::.l.:y·G::::::a!... T::: Pl.""::::s s:1.:.1 ?e:=.!: t:::.: I:.:.::s=::::: c.:s::-::·,,:::o::, 
APPLIC.-\TIO:-; OF STRICTER ?-1..£:-\Sl"RES rrl.A .. 'i nmSE REQlL.'"'~D BY 
1F..IS CO!\",,"E!\-nO:-; 
A P;...-:y =2: a::;ot ~c:: s~:: c:' 5:-;::: ~:lS::'::S t!1.:: ~cs: p:C"iici:: :y t!:ls CC:-::::!Q: if, 
1: i:s crt::.!o::, $."::= =:~S~:.$ 3..:': d:s:':.:!: 0: :::-::$$3..7 (:: r.:: ;::"-::::0:' c: s-..:??::ssk::: c!i!.!l::: 
--~­....... -
.".:-':c:!e lS 
NO:-;-DEROGATIO:-; FRO.~ E.-\..UIER TRE..-\TI RlGHTS .~'iD OBLIGATIO:"'S 
T:: ;::o';:s:o:s o::':':s Co:n::;o:: s:::ill cct e::~r-:: r::I~ a.:r r.i::S e::;cyd 0: 0':Ui1::e:s 
\!.:::~u::: by Fz..:-:::s to t:is CO:"i"::::o:: 1.:..:::: ~: 1;51 Co:';:::1o:, t!:: 1951 CO:"i"::::c: as 
:a=:::::: a=::! c.:: 1 til CC:"i"::::c:. 
A..-Je!e lS 
Tcis CC:"i":::':o: sb.!..! be O?::: fo: S:'-:1:-":':: a:~: eci::: Sa:lo:s om:: a: Vi::::a, f:o~ 20 
De:::::e: 1955 t~ 25 F:::-":l.7 1959, ~d ~:::l!t:: ae ~: H:l:!;~a:t:~ of~: Vel:::! Na:':o::s 
at 1':'10' Yo:;:, \!.::l! 20 D:::::1':::: 1959, by: . 
(a) .-'.11 S:a::sj 
(b) ?-: .... -J·:ia, r:?r:s:::::: by:':: U::l:d ~l:':O:S Co:.:.::;::! fer ?-:.:.i:iaj 
(:) R:g:'O:ll e:::c::i: i::::~.::c: O:i~b:':o=s "':'::: b-:: eo::;::::::: i:: res?::: or t!l: 
C:g'::':l:'!C:, C~:C!~S:O:l 2.!lc! 3;op!iel:':C: c! i:::~l::O:a.! ag;::::-:::a ic :-:a~::-s e~\·e!':~ cy 
t:.;s Cc:-::::::c::, r::::::::s l!::!:: :':: Co:';:::'::: eo P~::s, S:~c:s or C3:iC:~ s::-;i::s 
ce~g 2::-:=1::::!: to t.::s: c:gl.:...!:~:.!c:s w::'::": t!:: l!::l::S c~ t::i: c:~~p::::-::. 
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R.-\TIFlCATIOS, ACCEPT.-\..'\CE •• ~PPROVAL OR 
ACT OF FOR..'riAL COSFlR.\UnOS 
1. T:::s Cocv:::iO:1 is s:;1:j::: to :"a::!i:;::O:1, ae:::p:a::::: 0: I,;::onl by Sra::s IJld by 
l'c:;icia, .r:;:::s::md. by 0: Ucit:d !'a:io::s. CO~:1e:l !'or .Na...""li"oil, a::d to ~e:s o~ {Or::lU 
eo:mr:.uO:l by r:glocal :eo:o:::.:: t::Ci=6:lC::I o:,&:.::a::o::s ref:::::! to 1:1 L.":2:1: 26. 
s".!opa:l,""a?h (c:). Tbe i:!s::-.:::::s of' :"a::!i::a:io:, le:::pta:le: or Ipproval a::d cose rebdn, to 
a::s of ior:::al eC:::l..-:::atio::l s~all be c!:?Csit:d wi~ ~e S::::t;"7·GC::I::a1. 
2. I: tb::r i.:s:'-.:..:lc:ts of fcr:al eo::t!..-::::do~ ::tic::al ::occdc i:mV1:io::l o:.ci:atio::s 
sboll ce:la:: tlle cxtc::t o( e::tr co:?e:::::: wiu r:spe:t to ~c ca:te:s ICvc:::::! by t:Js 
Coovc:::.loc.. T:es: or5~.t.:o:S s:all also i.:!'C:-:l ~e S:e:::;"'"j·G::e:a1 o! 1:1 :lo;!::i:atio: i:l 
e:e er.c:t c{ ~:tr co:.?et::::: wi~ ::!?::t t::l e:: :.::::s iove:::ed by ~e Co:ve:::iO!1. 
A.:-Jclc lS 
.~CCESSIOS 
I. ~:::s Cc,:\·.::::!o:! s:a.!l. r::a.:.::, C?:'::I. fo: ac::mio:: ~y a.:y S:.:e, ~y.Na=ro:.l, ::p::se:!t~ by 
t!:: U~:d ~.::o:s COl:.!ldl fcr 1'a.:.:::1, a.:d by ::iIC:al e:::I:o:Je t:::ptzO::l o:i1:!:aco:s 
r:f:~:-: to b z:-id: 26, s~b?a."'F6?~ (c). 
,-\e::ssio: ,:all be e:":'c::d by t!:: cc?os:e ot a:: i.:s::-..:.:e:t c( a:::ss:c~ ~.-iu e:: 
Se:,cta.j'·Gc:::-J. 
2. 1: e:e:r !::s:.-..:.:::ts ot 1l:::!Sic::, ::t.o:~ c:::c:::; i:::r:atiO::l orp:.!:a:':o:s s!:1l!l d~!:l.:: 
t!:: e::::t of tZ::: c:=?c::::::: wi:.h r:!?::t to e:e ca:te:s 10VC."::Ied by t!:ls Cc::lvc:::O:l. The:: 
O:ga:::lt:O:S shU! also i:.!0:':l ~e SC"~::;"'"j·Ge::e:a1 oC a:.y ::looili!atio: i:l e:e er.:::It ot ~e:.r 
c:l:?et:::: ... :~ ::S?~: to e:e Cl:t::s iove:::cd by e:c Cc::vc::lO:1. 
.~Jc:le 19 
:E~'TRY ~-rO FORCE 
1. T::s Co:v:::tio: s:a.!l e:t:: i.:to (or:: 0: the' :l::tie~ ~1l1 e.c: ~I ~at= o{th: c!:?Csit 'With 
e:c S~,c:;"1·Ge:e:al of t!:: t7::t!:~ i.:st.-.:.=::t of' n:i5atio::l, IC::,ta.::lcc. I;,ro\'u 0: 
a:::!sio: by SCIl::S or ~1 Nll:.Icia. r:?r~::tcd by ~c COl:.!lcU Cor N&:lcia. 
2. Fo: ue~ ScIl:: or for Na.:J'bia, ::i'::sc::cd bye:: Col:::il tor Na.=ibil, n:if)i:r. 
ac:::;:ti.:g, a?p", .. 'i..:g or a::::~i.:1 to C:ls Cc:vc:::jo: C't:: ~= c!ci'osi: of:!!c rw::::t~ i:s:.-.m:c:t 
of .ati!i::a:.io~ a:::::pta.::::, a;:?:o\'u 0: ae::ssio:, ~e CO:VC!ltiOQ s:all c:tc: i:tO Co:cc I)C the 
ilictie:h c!ay l!h: tbc c!~tc oC ~c c!:?osit of its bt:"..:.::::t of ratificatio:, IC::?ta.!lCC, IPP:O\'u 
or ac:cssio:1. 
3. Fo: eae~ r:gio::al ~::oC'Jc i.:t: ... tio: o:ia.:!:a.tio: refe::e:f to i:1 a.-dcle 26. S'.1bpuappc 
(c) d:?ositi::, l!l ios:..-.=::t rdat!.:s to a:l act of Cor-al cocrtr:natiol1 or ~ i::s:'-.1::le:lc of 
a:::cssio:, t:J, CO:VC::ltlOQ ,:all e:te: into ro:c:: 0: ~: =.i::tie~ da)' after suc:!! c!:j)Osit, Or at th: 
c!.:c tl:c Co:vc:tiOtl e:t::s i::o fore: p~"'$ua.:t to pL.-aFap~ 1 o( ~is ..-Jclc, w!:ie~cve: is late: • 
• o\n.icle 30 
DE~1J'1'iCUnON 
1. A P.'1 c .. ), dc:ol.l:C:: C:ls CO:\'c::iOQ at a.::I)' ul:'le b)' a wri:tc: COtifiC2tiO:: Ic!~cued to 
tl:c Sc::ct;..")'·GC!)c:~. 
2. suc~ c!c:l!:ci:luOQ s~ill t:lt: c!:"c:t ror c: P.-:y COQc:::::d o:c 7eu 1Il::r ~c date of 
r::::?t oi tl:c :!otHicltioa by t!:c S:e:e:.")'·G::c~. 
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1. !-.::.; P2:":j cay pr~rose l: a:l::"'::1::t to C:S Coc\"::::oa. The t::: cr cy S~:~ 
I::e::o::: a!ld t!:: r:150:'S t!:::::o: sl:ill be c:o::1::':l!:ica::: by t!:at PC:: to t~: 
Se::::u-;-G::::al, 0;::0 s!:a!.l co=--=::::i:a:: it to t!:: o~:: Pa..-"::s cd s~a!! uk t!:::l w::~:: ~:: 
t .~. ~·"''''cs·.3 ...... ~.3~. __ I' a !"· ...... os·..1 .~ ... .3_ ..... s'" c:: .... I ••• ..1 "'as "ot ...... r·l·--·"" IC::~ "'-_ r"-r -~ ...... -~.--... • r loW :' .. - ..... -~.--~ IJ _ .. _ ....... - .. 1; ....... -.---
bv C1 Pa::j wi~ C-=:::'C;·(o\!.: coc~s et:r it !:as bC:::1 d::".:h::~ it s:a!.l be d:::::: to !:a\': 
b:.:: ac::::td a:::d s::ill e:.t~: i.:::o (or:: i.:: r:so::: or a Pa.'1 ci:.::; ea';s e::: cat Pa.--:y has 
c!;?osi::: -0;"::': t!:: S~:::a.7-G::.::-J l: i.::s:'-::~:::1t u;:essi.::g i:.s c:;:s:~t to be OOI!::! by t!:at 
a:::=~:.:~ 
2. If a p:~posd a.::::~::: !:as be::. r:;:::d by cy Pa.-:y, t!:: S~:::l.J-G::.::a! sl:a!l 
c:~:.s:.:.!: <;:';:!: t!:: P~:s 1!::, if 1 cljor:rr so requests, 1:: s:a!.ll:~..:s t!:: CI"::, t~i::!::: wi:': 
a:::i co=:::a ::IC: by:!:: P&..-J:s, I:e~~:: :!:: COl!:lcil <;:,:.i:!l cuy e::l:!: to ca!! a c:od:::::: i.:: 
a::o::1.::: ;10 A..-i:!e 62, pa.-ar-I?: 4, 0: t!:: Ch::e: or t!:e Uel::: NI:i~cs. ~y &.::::6::t 
r:s:':'!C=i f::::l s~:: 1 Co~::::.:: s::a!! b: e::':o~::! b a P:otoc:ol or ."..:::6::t. Co:.s::: to b: 
bOl!:: by S'.;:l: 1 P:o:oc:o! s:a.!l be ::qci:::! to b: ex?r:s!::! spe::i!c:a!!r to tl!: S~::::&..}-G::::a.!. 
SE1TI.E.'ri.EXT OF DISPuTES 
1. If t.:::: s~ct!!: I.-:S: b:::-;;-::: [":;'~ c: :::0:: Pa:-Jes a e:s;:1.I:: ::!a:'::, to t!:: i.:::::r:::I-jC)~ 
c: 1,-;11:.:'::: Q(:':";S Cc:.::::e:. t!: P..-J~s s:2.!l c::.sclt :oi::.!~: w!:.! a Ti=:T:O ~: s::-J~:l::t 
nt• .i.: .J~s-·'~· b}- 0.-:0·;.-:0'" t'"'I"""':-;O c ... ..r: a·:""' ... e~ .... :1:4':""'"'" III·~:-"'l·:o'" r ...... ·'·':s-·o "·rlo"'z.! .... - ~ :-....... -., - - -., -"'\-., .. - ----, _ .._----, ....... _.- -, .-.- .. .. ~ -
boc.::s, jl.::!l:h1 p:0::S5 0: 06:: pelc:~ ::1.:S of t!:::: 0';;'; c:::ic:. 
2. I-.::.y S'.::c c!..:sFl.::e 'II'::c:!l c:~o: be s:=-'!ed b t!:: ca::::::: pm:::~ed i:: Pa.-aP?~ 1 o{ t!:!s 
a.-"::!: s::~ t-: r:~:~::!, I: t!:: r:q''::s: or a!lY 0:: or t!l: Stl::S Pa..-J:s to t!:: c!lsFlm, to t!:: 
1=.:::::a::::l1 Co~ ot Jo.;s:::: (:: ee':!sic:. 
3. If a r:~o:.a! ~o:o=-Jc: i.::::Fo::O: o:ic.!:a:1oa r:~:~:::! 10 i: ar-Jcle 26, $-..::;:a.-a .. a;:: (c:) 
is a Pa..-;: to a c!..:sp..::: w::c:l: c:c.:o~ b: s::=-Je: i: t!:: ::1.:::: F::s:::~d i: pa:~p;:~ 1 or t!:ls 
a.-Jc:!:, i~ C1:, t!::O\!g: a 5Clt: M:::~:: of t.:: tJ::.i::d l'atio:s, r:q·.::st ~: Co::.::c:U to r:-;'.::s: 
&.:: ac,;,:so:j op:':':c: 0: t.:: 1::=:-:1:10:'::.1 Coe.:;: or Ius:::: i: a::::::l:c: w:~ a..-":c:!: 65 o~ t!:: 
Sa::::: ot t.:: Co\!.:'., w::c:: o;:L:.ic: s:;Lll be r:g1:::!:::! u e:dsin . 
. 
4. £IC:: S:I::, a: t!:: ti.:::: 0: sir-a:l!:: 0: n:i!ic3:!0::, a:::j)ta!!:: or 1;:;::on1 o! C:S 
Co:.,;,:::'::: 0: a:::ss:C:l t!:::::o, 0: :~:: r:g!c:a! C':oac::i: i:::r-itio: oric.!:a:io:, at t!:: ti.::: 
cf .s:r-a:o.;:: or c:?os:t 0: 1:: a:~ or !cr::::a! C:O:!!:=:I::O: 0: 1:::S5:0:. C:IY d::!a:: t!:3: it co:s co~ 
c:ocsic!:= its:!f bot:=d by pa.-ar-a?Cs 2 a:::d 3 or t!:is a..-Jc:!:. T:: o~:: Pa.-Jes s:3.!l cot be bo~d 
by. P~Ir-I;:J 2 a.:~ 3 'll'i6 :~s?e:: to 1.:1 Pa."1 ~a ... i:g cad: s'JC:: a c!:--Ja:a::cc. 
S. /0.::.] P a::j bvi:g ca:!e a d::!1:do:l i.:: ac::o~:!l::: ""i~ pa:ls-aF~ " or t!:!s a..-.ic:!: cay a: 
&.::i ti.=: O;;-;~=="l';;' ~: c!:--Ja:a::o: by ~oti!iea::o:l to t!::e Se::::a.'j'-Ge:::a!. 
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Au"THE~"TIC TEXTS 
10: .A..:I~i:. C!:i::c:se, £:gUs:, Fr::::, R~!5il!1 a.d S?cis~ t:::s or U!S Cc:".::cic: &:: 
c::;.uilly 31!t.:le::i:. . 
A:tic:1e 34 
DEPOSITARY 
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U.S. COIllC'l/rioll Agi7illsr midr Traffic ill Sarcoric DrllSs -/9SS 
T:1ble I 
E:lbec:ine 
E;gome::ine 
ErgoCl::1:::e 
Lyse:gic add 
}.ph:nyl·2-propanone 
Pse:Jdoephed:ine 
The salts or the 
s\!:stlnc:s listed i:l t.!!S 
Table wbeneve: the 
exist:nc:: of such 51!:5 is 
possible. 
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Table II 
• .l..eetic anhydride 
.~c:eton: 
.~r.thrar.mc acid 
E:hyl c:!le: 
Phe::ylac:etic add 
Piperidine 
The salts of tbe 
sl.:bsta:lc:s lis::d i:l t:is 
Table wbe:leve: tbe 
exist:nc: of s::c:h salts is 
possible. 
' ... ",. 
APPE)\DIX C 
"JITED 
4TIONS A 
General Assembly 
)Jt!S/S-~7/2 
15 ~a:-~: 1B:-
Seve:.:ee:~ $?eci!.~ sessie: 
~;e=!a ite~s 14 ~! 15 
[C: ~e =f?C:-: c~ u:e ~ Co=~::ee o~ u:e Seve::ee:~ 
S?e:il.l Sezsie: (k1S-~'/ll») 
S-li/2. p;;~:~=!" p·el~-t:ic~ ,;~ C:c~,l P;OSj~~r c: l;;!c: 
I~e~;t~ bv tnr Gc;c;~l A!S.~;:v c; ih~ J:v,~t··-·h 
~?c;i2.~ c: .. ~e:e;:, ¢.;' .. ei';,t!c., t2 'b'";- £:;r!~ie; p! 
i;;:;;'A~ie;~1 ,o-ext~':;s- De,;;,; i11ieit p;~Cy;;ie", 
S~?~:V, ,:~!;¢, tj!::icki;; ~=¢ Cis;ii~i:to; c! 
;,-eQ~i£ (rye! &~~ c3v ,het-pr:, 3~'t2;efs 
~ ~e Political ~ec:l.:a:ic: ~~ ~e C:o~al P=o~=~~~e o~ ~c:ic: c: 
:'::e::&:io::&l Co-o?~:a::'o: ~~!i:s: illicit r:o!'.;c:ic:. s\:??~~. 'e~,t.:!. t:l.~!iclti;; 
a;! !is:=i~\::ic: c~ ;a:co::'c !:1:;5 ~! ;:syc~c::cr:'c 5~s:t.:ceS ~ezt! to ~e 
r~es!:: :esel~~!c=. 
E;~ pl';l~v ~t';;;; 
V Tf"-Hiv lccg 
bss:~;1re a': ~~e seve:tet:~ s?tci~l sessio: c~ ~e Ge:e:al ~sse~l! to 
cc;si!e: ~e ~I:estie; of i:te:-:&tio;&: ~o-e?e:&:ie; ~;&i:st illicit p:o!u::ic:. 
s~:?:y. ~e~~=!. tr~!!icki;; t.:~ 'is::i~\:tio: of ~~:cotic ~=u,s ~:e F~y~~ot:C?~C 
s";stt.:ces. 
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.. 
;'1?!S/S .. lil: 
f'a;e 
p •• =~v t;e-~.~ ~y t~! ~t;~i:~~e c! the ~isi~g t~e~~ i~ the illici: ~e~A~~. 
F~D~uctic:. s~??ly. t:~!!icki=; a=~ ~ist:ib~tio= of :arc~ti: ~russ a=~ psychotropic 
s~~s:~:ces. ~'~i:h ~:e ~ i~!ve ~~~ pe:siste~t th:ttt to t~! he2:t~ &~~ ~e~l-~~i=g o! 
me~xi~~, t~e s~~~ilit~ c! ~t:io~s. the ?e;itic~l, eco~emi:. so:itl e~~ c~lt~~tl 
J 
st.ruct ... :u of all societies e:~ tr.! lives a!l~ ~i;:ity c! I".illic:'.$ 0: l':~.,..a:: bei::;s. 
mest es?t:it:1y c! yc~=S ?ee~:t, 
~ c! t:'e c.!.~;!:s ?e$!~ !e=- e.~: ~,",·...:.=t=-ies ~!ikt ~v the illicit c~~ti\'~:io=, 
pro~uctie:. s~?ply. ~e~a:e. tra!!icki::; e::e ~ist:ib~tic: ~! :a:cotic ~:u9s e:~ 
psyehot:o?:'c ,cste::e,. e.::~ ewa:e alse e! the =ee~ fo: a co",?:ehe::si"e a??:oach 1= 
c:o.,..bat:'=:; the.,. .. 
C~-'hie., that the ext:&o:~i:a:i:1 hi:;h leve~s o! illicit co:s~~rtio::. 
c: ... ltivatic: a=e p:o~uctic: o! :a:cotic ~:u:;s a=~ o! ill:'cit t:u; tra!ficki::; 
::e:essi:t:e a mere co",?rehe::sive a==:et:h to :'::e:::&tie::&: co-operatic:: i:: ~:u; 
abuse oc=::cl a::~ ccu=te:-c!!e::sives a: ~he :tt~c~al. :ei:'c:al a:~ i::er::t:ie~tl 
~~ .. ·t~S • 
r·.:!:-".::-. cu: ~ettr:.~~&':.ic= to eo~~a: t.:t seo~rie cf ~:u9 ~uSt e=~ i:licit 
t:t!!ick~~; ;.:. :.!:c:~ic ~=-.;s I.:~ ?sye.:.ot.:cP!C I~~st!.=ees i:: s::ic: cc:!e:-~.it.y ,,·i~. 
t~e ?:i~cir:es o~ t~e Ctt=-te: c! ~~t O:ite~ ~a:io:s, ~he r:i~:icles e! 
i=:e:r.atic~al la~. i:: parti~~lar :es?tct fer the sevtrtii~ty a::d territc:ial 
i~':.e;:i:y cf States. ~~~ ?:i::=i?lt e! nen-i::t!r!e:e::e~ i: tht internal affairs c! 
S:t~es &~~ :o~-~se c! !::ce C~ ~~e t~:ee: e! !e:ce i= i:~e::e:ic~&l :e~a~ic~s. I.~~ 
~~e p:ov!sio:s.c! t~e i~te~:atiQ~al ~:~; cc:t:cl co=ver.~!c:s, 
F-t:"-:":".:",,,s t;cQ t.~e r:c\-"~sic:s set fC:'t~ i: the Si=;~t Co:,,'e:tic:. 0:". t'&:cctie 
DruS' of l;!l. 11 a:~ I:: t~t: Ccnve::ic: as L~~:de~ by tht 1.i2 P:otocol ~~er.~in9 
t.r.e Si~;l' C:=ve::ie~ c= Marc::ic C:~;s cf lS!l. 11 t~e Cc:ve::tion 0: Psyche:::pic 
Su~sta~ces cf 1;71 l' e.r.~ :b~ U::it.t~ "tt!?r.s Ce~ve::ic:: a;ai:s; Illicit 7r~!!ic i~ 
l'a:cotic ~:'.:;s e:e Psyc~o::c:ic S~st.a=ces t~o?:el! i: He!. il 
p .... :..".:;)S ' .. -."'.- the p::'::cip:, e! sha:e~ :u?c::si~ilit!' i:: co~a:i:l; ~ru; 
abese .e:~ illicit trt!!ic i: :a:c::ic ~:u9' I.::t rsyc~ctrc?ic scste:ces. 
p.-"",>-:;:~; t.:.t li:.is ~e:""et~ t~e illicit c!e::.&.:~, c~~s'.:..~?~io:. p:oc!-..:e:io:.. 
~~??ly. t:a!!icki::; a=~ cis~~:'b\!ticr. c! r.l.rcc:ic ~:\!;S a=~ Fsy,~ot:c?ic s~sta:cts 
~~e t~e e:::~~!c, socia: a~~ e~::~:~: ce=~i:i:~s i~ the co~:::its a!!ecte~ by th~~. 
1.1 ~ ...... 0:. ~;~. ~c. H152. 
I . .• 
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p __ -'v ,e~~.--a~ ~e~~ t~~ vic:e~c~ ~~! c::~~r~ic: ~~ ~:t~e~ ~y th~ i!liei~ 
~ema~~. p=o~~ctic:. t=a!!icki=; a=~ ~is::-i~~:ic: e! :e=co: c ~=~,s a~~ FS~'c~e:rep:: 
s~s:a:c:es a:d Ue !:iS~ b=.a:. ?cli:ic:aL ece:-.e".;c c:~ s:-c a! cos:s c! ~=:.:; ,,~".:s, 
,,:e. c! the fig!:';. as"i:st Ue ~:-\j, ?=c~!e::'.. e::ti!i:; t::e ~i ... e=sic:: e! s:t:-ce 
reso-.;:ces !:o:r. o":-~e: :atiC'~&l ?~ic:-i~i~s, v~i:: i: t.h~ ees~ c! ~~\'"~~C'ri::; cc\,;:':.:-:'es 
iDChl~es ~evelc?",e:: activitiu. 
L~~<~.9~$ t:.at i::e:~&tic~~l C~-o?t:atie: !C~ t~t ~eve:=~e~: e! t:.! 
~eve!oii:; c~u=t:ies ,~O~:~ ~e 't:e~;t~e:e~, ~::owi=; &!: e:\,;~::ies to ?~~ti:irt:~ 
mo:e !~l!y i: L: e!!ective fi;ht a;ti~s: :he ~~c; p:c::e~, 
f-C;oS;-:;: ;;,. tJ:e li:ks be:"ee: ~:-u, ~~se a..:6 a ~i~e ra:;, of a~\'e :se he t~ ':.h 
coz:secsue::c:es. i=c:ll.:~i:, the t=,,:sr::!ssie:. c! b~.,..a:. i.~,",:-.:l6e!icie~c:y ",i=lo:$ (:,,:V) 
i:.!ec::ic:: a:d t.'le sp=ea~ of aC:~l.:i=e~ i:r.~.~:.;~e!ieie:cy s~'=~=c"'e 1'.:'5). 
~-~O~-:·:;H; t'$"1 t.:.t: ilEc:i: ta!!iclti:; i= :.t:cctic ~:~;s a::~ pS::'c:het:epie 
,\lbs~a;c:es is a c::L.,..:':.tl aC:::'\'ity a;~ ~,,: :':$ s'"'P?assie:: ~.Ii\:i=es a l'.i;::e~ 
prlo:ity ~:~ c~:ee:te~ actio: at t~e =~tio=~:, :e;!c:~l ~=~ i::e::a:ie:&l levels ~y 
ell S:~~es. i:c:~\:~i:S ~t?i~ ~a~i!ic:t~ie~ ~! e:~ e:eessic:: te ~he U~it~~ ~t:ic:~s 
Co:.ve:tic: asa!:.s: Illic:it 7~t!!ic: i:. ~,,:c:o~ie P:-uiS e~~ Psye::~t=e?ic ~,",~s~e~:es. 
tiC''';-'; t.:.2.:' t.be 12.:';~ !i:.t.::eit~ p:e!its ~~:,i ... e~ !:C~, i!!:,:':'t ~:-..:; t:e!!ici:!!":; 
a:l~ :ele.te~ c::i::".i.:.a.l ect.ivities e:c:e t:t.:s:.&:ic:.al c~ir.'.i:l.~ c:sa:!.:.a:ic:"';s to 
penet:ete. c:o:';.:. .... i:ete ~~ c:e::I.:?t t.'Ie ,t:l.:ctlo::-e e! Cove::"."'e::ts. l.;itl:11a:e 
c:o:=e=ciel ac:hoities a..:~ society a: all levt!s. t.'lea~y ... iti,:i~; ecc::: ... ic: a::~ 
sociel ~evelo?"'e:t. ~iste=ti:i t.'le f:,oc:ess e! la ... · a:~ \::~e~.i:-.i:i tht !c\::~'tic::s 
of States. 
f a ,:",;:.!;!;-; t~2: a i:,ovi:S :\::"'::'e: c! ce~:-:..:i~s, i: pe.:tie'.;l~: ttve:c?!:; 
c:o~t:ies. are e!!ec::e~ :y illicit t:a~si: t:e!ficki::; i~ r.l:c:o~ic: ~:u;s bec:elo:st c:! 
t.'lei: geoc::-a:~icel lcc:e~io: 0: ecc:o~ic: sitl.:e~ie:. v~ic:!'l i~eests se:icl.:s b~:ee:s c:: 
the ~:us lava e:!o:c:e~e:.t mac:~i=ery cf ~ose c:~\::t:-itS a:e !~rc:es ~ive~s:c: c! 
sca=c~ :eso\:rees from p~e,sl:s develcrme:tel:~e~s a:~ cthe: netio:."l F:ie:itles. 
c~- ... :-··~ ~he: ~he fiS~t acei:s: illicit t:-e!!ieki:c i: na:c:otic: ~:~;s a::~ 
psychot:o?ie '~'te:C:t!s bas to ~~:::?:ise e!!e:::. ... e mets".::;, time~. ;_ • .- t': 2.. a~ 
eli~,i:tti:; illicit cOtlS'"o.:.'1?~io=, e~ltivt-;iQ: e~~ r:"'ct".1et.ic::. e~ r.a:'co:.ic t:u;s ~~~ 
psy=~et:-e?ic: ,~stL::es; F:-eve:ti::~ the ~ive:sie: f:o~ l.;iti~.:. ~ses e~ p:-te~:sc:= 
che:..ic:tls. st>ed!ic: s\lbs:a..:ces. lIIete:-ials a:l~ eC'l.:i':)n\t!:.: !:ec-ue::t1v \.:se~ i:. the 
illic:i~ III=-..:!actl.:rt! c! :a:c:otic ~:~;s a:e PSyC:h~t:~?ic: s-.:.!:s:a::ees~ a::~ p:eve::~i::; 
the ~se o! t.'le ~a;ki:s syste~ a:~ o~:: fi:a:cial i:stitu~ic::s fc: t!'lt l'I.:::~e:ir.; 
o! p=oeee~s ~e=ive~ !:o~ i~lieit ~=u9 taa!!ic:ki::; by lIIaki:9 su:~ ec~ivities 
c:~.i=tl c!!e::es, 
k;t~·~ at the ,:o~i:l; lick bt~wee:. illic:it trt!!ieki::; i: :a:ceti: ~:u;s a::~ 
te=:orist ac~i\·itie,. vhic~ is a9;:t\o.:e~ by i:s·.:!~ic:iec: c:c:t:-cl c! eo~e:ee i:: 
a~s a:~ by illic:it c: ceve:t a:-l!Is t:a::s~e=s. as well as by ille9al activities c! 
lIIerc:e:.e.:ies. 
I . .• 
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Pb;~ " 
~:je!\i~ c! t.~t' ~es".,;.::'s c.~:!'t~y a:~le\'e<! by t.:-.e U:ite~ ~~:ic=s i: t.!'le !ie:o:: c: 
crus e~~se co:~:cl. in:lucin; t~e Decl~r~~ion ~I e:~ ~~e Co~?:ehe:sive 
~~:~i~isci?~i:~:~ O~~li:e c~ r~:~:e A:~iv~ties i: P:~; A~~se Con~:ol. fl adop~ed et 
t~e I~ternatic:a: Co:!e:e:ce c: ~:~; ~~~St ~~~ :llicit ~r~:!ickini' as ~ell &S th~ 
u~ited ~atic:s Cc:ve:tio: a;ai:s~ l::icit ~:~!!icki:; i: ~a:cotic trugs ~~d 
PS:'cho'>:opic S~s:2o:ces. 
c ... -,·: :J"-';: t.hat actio:'! a;~i:s':. e::.:; u ... se a:c illicit Froductic: e! a:d 
tr2o!!ickitlS ill ::.~rcotic e:",ss 2o:'~ psyc~.e':.:0i'ic ,"'::'sta::ces she:.:l!. as 20 sh~:ed 
respc:si=ility. be accorded a ~i;he: p:ierity by ~e i:te::e:io:al co~~i:y L:~ 
co::"i:ce!! 2olso t:.2ot the tJ:itec t'~tic:s sho:.:!~ ~e t.he m20in !oc:.:s !o: ce:ee:te! 
actio:: ~d sho:.:ld pl20y L: e~2o:ced role i:: ~at !iel~, 
c~-s:~-·:-s ~~a: ~e 90a1s o! i:te:si!ie~ l::e::at:'o:al co-operatio: ~d 
i::c:eued e!!orts c! St~:es i: tha: eiactio:: "'o\;:e be Se:vec ~y t!le p:ecla. ... ,atic:-. 
'~I a U::ited t\~tio::s decade ag~l=s: cruS' u\.:st. 
1. ~e resolve to p:otec,> mankind !:o~ the seo:'::ge o~ er\;; a~:.:se L:d illicit 
t.:a!!ieki:l, i: :~:cotic erl.:,s a::c psyc:.:'>:"';ic s·';:s':.a:ces; 
2. ~e ~!!i~ t:.~: ~~e !!S~: ai~i:s: ~~~; ~~se ~~~ illici: t:&!!ieki~~ i~ 
r.~rco~ie ~~uss ~d psychotropic s~s:anees sho\;ld be 6eco:~ed hii~ priority =y 
Ceve~~~e~:s a:e ~y 1.:1 releva:: re;ior.~l a:~ i:ter:atio:al o:;~i:&:ic:s; 
3. ~e a:e dete~,i::ee to take t~e nrcess~:y a:tio:s t.o co"~a: t.~e ~:ui 
?:c~!e~. t.~ki:; i::o a:co~:: :~e !:.:=ea.~e::~l :espe:si~i:i~y res':.i:; vi:h ea:~ S:~~e 
!n t~,a: re;a:~; 
C. ~e ,~all e%?~nd ~e sce?e ar.~ i~:reast ~~e e~~tctive=e's o! i:ter:ttie:al 
co-o?era:ic: asai:st illicit ~ema:~, r:o~~ct.ie:, '~rrly, tr&!!icki=9 a.:~ 
~ist:i~l.:tio: o! :~:co:ie e:",ss a:d psyc~etro?ie s~sta.:ees, wi~~ s:.ict respect !or 
the seve:e!s::y a:~ te::!to:ial i:te;:ity o! S:~~es &=~ t.he pri:ciple of 
r.~~-i:ter!e:e::~ i: ~~e!: i:te::&l ~!!~i:s: 
5. ~e s~~:l i:c:e~se 0\;: e!!erts ~~ :e'o~:ce, i: cr~e: to i::te::s!!y 
i::,>e:r.a:ie:al co-ope ratio: a:e co:::e:tec ac,>lo:. ~asec ~?o: ~e p:i:eiple c! sharee 
res?c:s!~ili:y, i:e:I.:~;':; ~~e ::eeessa:y co-o?e:&:io: a.:e assistL:ee to .!!ec':.e~ 
Staas, "'~e= re;'"lu':.e~, i: t:'e eco:or:',ic. hea!:r .. social. ';",dicial a.:c lav 
er.!e:ceme:t secte:s i: o:ee: to st:en)~~t: ~it c&?ui1ities o! Stttes to dt201 with 
the p:oble~ i: all its as?ects; 
~I F.?~-· e' t~. I~·.·~t·;~·.' C~~'.·-~~. e: p~u, A'~$· t~~ !";~~. 
;~c";~k!;c. \':-:-:!, p-u .'.-- lCE~ (1::ite~ Na:ie:s p~licatio:, Sales 
ti~. 1:',5:.1.1£). c~.~? 1. sect. e. 
if ~ .• see,>. ~, 
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Pe~e E 
1:. ~e c~ge the i~~e=~t~io~l! cc~~~~i~: to st:e=;:~f~ i~tt~~tt!:~e: 
co-oper~~ic: ~de: ~~:~~lly ~~reec cc~c;tic=s th:ou;~ ~il~:e;~1. ;e;;e~el e~~ 
m~ltil~:e;el mech~:isms: 
l7. ~e s:~ess t:.~~ ell l:i:l~tives ~~ce::ake= Yi~~l: t~e ~~i~e~ ~~:ie~s i: 
~he fielc c! i::e;:atic:al c;ug ~~se cc~:;cl s~all ~ake i::c cc~sice;a:ic~ t~e 
eompete:ce c! its or;~:s es ce!i=ec i~ t~e Ch~:ter o! L~e ~:itec ~atie~s: 
lB. \o-'e s~all f1.!:t.~e: d~vt)c? a:&:! \!tili:e, to the r.'.t.%i~1:.'I ex~e::':.. existin; 
bil~teral a:c c~,er i::er:a:ic:el i:str~~e~:s 0: e:;~;eme:ts fer e:he:ci~; 
i::e;:~tio=el leg~! e:o le~ e:!o;;eme:t co-o?e:etio~: 
19. We :t~:!i~ t~e p~i~ci?les set fe:t~ i~ the Oee!&~atic: c: the 
I::er:etic:el Co:!e;ence e: D;ug ~use e:c Illicit ~;e!ficki=g ~I e~c ~~certeke to 
e??ly. as t??ro?ria:e. the reeo~~e:cetio:s o! the Com?;ehe:s!ve ~ultieis:i~lina;: 
Outli:e of future .l.cti .... itits i: Dru; ~~se Co~trol: ~I 
20. ~e urge S:ates to rat!!y or ecceee to the U:ite~ ~e:ic~s co:vent!o~s .-
th~ fiele of crug e..=~se co:tro1 e~e illicit tre!ficii:; t::c. to ~~e ~xa:.';. they t.re 
ule to de IC. tc tpply pre\'isio:ellr t.he te=.s e! t.he U::.it~c Natio:s Ce::\·e~';.ic~ 
~gt.in$t Illicit' .;affie i: ~erc:otic Dr\lers tn6 Psrc:hot:oepie S~stt~cu: 
:21. 'We eo:=e:~ the :'r.-.?e:tt::';. "'c;lt cardee ou';. by the e;ga:i:atie:s e! t)a 
I.'r.ite~ Na';.ie:s system i:: t.':e fiel~ of ir.ter:atic:tl er\:~ c,\:se co::t:ol ",i t)') r~;ar~ 
t.o cor.-~~ti:~ t.~e ~U$e tnd procuc';.ic: ef e~~ trafficki:g in illicit trugs a~d 
psyehot.;o;ic: sU::-$t~:ee$. es "'ell as t.he "'c:lt ec~e i~ ether ",~:';.iltte:tl !o;~"'s: 
22. "e co:=e:~ also t.h~ pcsit.ive ec:ic: ~:~~rtt.k= ~y the Division c! ~&:eetie 
D:\lgs ef t.~e Secretariat. t.~e I:t.er:t:e:al ~t:c:c';.ic:s Ce:t.;el Sotre t:~ its 
secreta:iat. t::e the U::itee };~:io=s fun~ fer o:\:; ~~s~ Coctrol: 
23. We cell \ICC: the U~itec Netio:s. the ,~eeiali:ed agencies a:~ ether 
o:c:~i:&tio:s of ~~~ U:itee Nttic:s svste~ to ci~e ~ic:he: prierity i: their 
p:~~r~es ef v:rlt. i: tCcc;ce=:e Yit.~ exis';.i:i Froce~\lres. tei:~e::at.icnt.1 
",.etS\I;es to c:c"'~t';. ill:':it. ?ro~'-!:t.ic·:. s"'P?lr. ee:llt:e. trt.f!icki::9 ene ~istri!)~tio:: 
c! nt~ee:i: ~:~iS ~:~ ?sy~~:t:e?ic s~s~l~ees; 
~~. '-ie e~,?~~si:~ t.~! i~.?c::'t.::e c! t.~! f!~\·elo?",e~~ e..:~ i~r:t~.e~te':.ic:: o! e 
"'dac Natio:s s~·s:e.':\-"·!~e actio: plC'. aimee at t.'le !\:Hilme:t o! all existi::C; 
"'tn~ates for ~:\:C; ~\:~e co:t:ol ~~ ;~e i~pleme:ta';.io: of s~Ieq\le:t tecisior.s of 
in';.er9cve;~e:t.tl ~ocies tr.:ouerhc:ut t.he "':itee Nations syst~: 
25. We '~t.ll stre:~t.'e: a::e e::'t::ce t.he cap~ility of t.he U:itet I'&tie:s to 
achieve mere e!!ective a::e cQ-o:ei:tte~ eo-operatio: tt the i:terr.ational. re;ior.11 
t~e ~Itic:tl levels I;ai~s';. the thret:s pese~ ~: 5111cit pro~u::io~ a~~ illicit 
trl!!ickl:g ~c ~~se c! r.t.rco~lc tru;s and psrehotrcpic s~sta~ces: . 
. . 26., We stress the =ee~ to rei:!orct rn!te~ Natio:s Itr\lct\:res fer ~ryg a~~se 
co~trol in c;~er to increase their e!!ective:ess a=d status: 
I . .. 
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5. T~~ G~~~:t! Assem~ly. i~ its resel~:io: "/l5 c! 1 ~ovem~~r lS!9. ~~:i~f~ to 
co~ve~e t s?e:!t! sessie= o! the Assem~ly to co:si~e:. tS t mtt:~: o! ~:9~~cy. the 
~~~s:ic~ o! i::~::~!ic=~: co-c?e:a:ic~ a;ei~s: illi~i: F:c~~c:!o~, S~??~~. ~~~~~~. 
t:a!!icki:; ~=~ ei$::i~~:!:= e! :e:coti: e:~is, wlt~ & ~iew t~ ex?a=~i~; t~e !:c~e 
~n~ i~::~~si:; :~e e!:e::ive~e$s c! su~~ c=-c?e~~:lo:. 
6. Co~:~~t:.: c! t.he ~ove. t.=~ !cllo~i:; e:~e:s!vf del:'~~:t~!c:s t: its 
st\'e:':.ee::t~ s?e:ial sess!o:, t..:~e Ce:e~al ~sse~~~y, i: e::!t: to te~.i!\'t t~e ~~a~ c~ 
t..= i::e:=t:!c:t! society fae o! illlc!: ~::.:<;s =~ ~:\:S ~:.:u. t~O?t.s t!'le ~:ese:.: 
Clobtl P:os:~e o! Actie: ~~ co~its itself to it.s !:.:ll t:~ s?ee~y 
i~pleme:ta:ic:, ~~e:e =eee$'&~y !c!lo~i:; e~~ e~:si~~=e:ie= c! the ~o~&lities ty 
the co,,",?ete:t tec~!et.l bo~ies. 
7. I: t.~c:ti:; ~e G:e~t.l P:o;:~~e ef ~:~ie:. e.;~ vi~~~~t r:t5u~ice to t~t 
exis:i~S ?:oce~~:es.~e Ge~ert.l Assem~ly also ~e:i~es to ac:::~. vit.~i~ ~~e ~~ite~ 
'~'. ·.e::5 system. a hiiher priority to ~e z.lloCt':.ic::l of ~e :ltcesst.:y !i:e:eieL 
pe.50:::e~ t.::~ e':.~e: reso~::es. 7be:e is a :ee~ !o: all pt:tS of ~he U:ite~ ~t:ie=s 
s~'s:e::: to ~tl\"t:.i:e ef!e:~s to i::-.:;::I:'ve !:te::tti::tl ce-c?e:atio:: to s':.~"'p o;;t ~::e 
sco~:;e of il!icit e:~;s t.:d e:uS ~~se. ~he :e~:.:i:eme:t fe: Ideitie:.&l resl:';;::es 
for t::et p;;:pose is ex?lieit.ly reeos:i:ee. i: t..":e !~n ex?eeatio:: t::a: t::e: "'ill 
be ref:eet~~ ts a hiS~ priority i: ~e me~i~-te~ plt.: fe: t~e pe:io~ l~;~-:~~i 
t~.~ i= t.::e ?:o;:2:'","'e ~-.:~set !o: t~.e hie::!-= 1;;2-:;n. as ... ·ell u !u::;:e 
mecil!..,,-~e:::-, plt:.s t.:~ hie::it: h~eset.s. 7:e Ge:e:t.l ~sse:,:.~:y t!so re:oi::':tS t:-.a~ 
the ef!eet.:ve i,,".?leme~~at.io: of t.he Glohel Pro;:~"""e co! '\ct.:'O:l .... i!! :elillire 
eXL."i::ttie: of t.he st:~:~u:e o! tbe exist.i:; d:u; eo:t.:ol ~it.s beset at t:.e ~:ite~ 
~~t!=:s O~!i:e ~~ Vie:=a vith a vi~~ to c~~ci:i ~ti: c!!ettlve:css ~~ S~l~~S i~ 
the system. 
e. :1le Co::-.:::e::e:!:'ve I'!ult.ieiscipl:.:t.:i o\:~li:e cf iu';u:e l.:ti,·!ties i~ D:1.I9 ~~se 
CI:':t::l il ,;'tll be used ~y :.t:ic:el t.:.:~o:itie, t:~ i:t.e:este: o:9e.;i:t.tie~s as z. 
buis fe: ~e\'e:c?i:s e.;d t:e.;sleti=; i::o aetie:. r.t t..'le :atio:.al. ;-es:'c::t.l t:~ 
~r ·:=t~ie~~l levels. t.o the vides: ex:e::t. possible. bela:ced st:et.e;!es t.i",e~ t.t 
eo .... a::.::; t.:l upee:s Q! e:-u; ~\:se a~d ill:'c:i: t:e.!!icki::.;. ';!'lose s~:t.:e;ies 
s~.t.: l i:.: >.!ce I i: pt::;' C~: a:, t.~t ~s?te~s 6! s:: :'~f~ ~f ~c..,. 
~. ?r-Y.-·!~; C~~ t.~~~ti~~ t 6 ~-~; t~~$. v:~~ & v:.v t, 
t~~~:~::!o~ e' t~· illi~it ~.~.~~ t~r nc·e~·:~ C·y;s 
C~~ ;sv~~~:-e;!~ $~~~ •• -~.~ 
;. S:tttS 21 shtll ~!ve ~:';her p:io:ity tQ ?:evt:::io: &:~ re~llctiQn of t:~; &~Ilse 
.... it:: II ... ie ... · to elil'",i:t:io: of ~e illicit t~.A:~ fe: za:eotic: ~r\:<;' &:~ 
21 ~e!e:e:ee, to St.ttes i: L'le prese:t G1Q~t.l ProS:L~~e of ~:tio:: 'hQ~l~ ~e 
~~~f~S:OO~ to ~e!e: ~lso to rt;io~~l ecc:o~!e i:tei:~~!c= c:s~ni:&tic=s wi~~l: tht 
~.ir:-,';':.s c! t..'lei: co,,",?ete:ee. 
I • .• 
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rS:'c~c:;rc?ic s~s:;2.::.ctS ~~ t!:e r.atio~2.1 l!.:~ i~te~::atio~al levels. l'a:le::2.1 
stretelOies. ph::s e::.~ p~o~:e."""es for eo"'.~ati:; ~:I:; l!.!::l:se ,~.all be e~&~ca:e':. 
a~o?te~ t.::.~ i::-.?~e"'e::te~ ~:o";h t.be ::ecessa:-y po~icy l!.::~ 1e;1s1&t1\'e a~)\:s:..":\e:.:s. 
i:::l,,~i::.; t.he ~:loca:ic: e! &?p:op:iate reso~:ees l!.:~ se:v:'ees !=: i:eve:::i:::. 
t:,ea:.."':'\e~!. :e~~i!itt.tic: 2.:d soei2.1 rei:.t.e;:-lt.ic~. 
10. 7he ca"ses ;e::.e:ati::'9 illicit ~em&:~ for ::&:eotic ~r\:;s a=~ Fsychotropic 
s\:~sta::.ces. i::.clu~ins its reee:.t i::lc:ease. s~a.ll tie &.:It.lyse<: a=~ t.he :le:essa~y 
~ees\:=es sha~l pe i~e:tifie~ i:l order to co~~at ~rl:; ~I:se lot t.he root of the 
problem. 1: v.is re;a:~. specil!.l l!.tte:.tio:: s~.&ll tie ~ive:l t.o ue soei&l c:&-.;stS 
I:=~e:lyi=; the ~:~; F:o~lem. vhich sboyl~ be a~ei\:ately re!le:te~ i:: ::at10::a: 
social policies. 
ll. I:.!o:-:r.atio:. a:~ e~"catio: p:oc;:e.-.:"!Ies s~a.l1 be \.:se~ t.o p:eve::t t.bt e.J:,,,,se c! 
narcotic l:",;s a:~ psychotropic s~sta:ces a:~ to i::crease a~a:e:ess o! thei: 
har=!~l e!!e:!s. I: ~his Co:text. States, reltv&:t s?eci&li~e~ a;e:elts &~~ 
::cn-;ove:~":\e::al o:;&;i:atio::s sht.11 co-o:~i::&:e L:~ e~ch~;e i~!~~m&t!o: vlt~ & 
vie'" to i::itiat:':; ve~l-t&:-;e:e~ ct..~?&!c;:s i: uis fiel~. 
l2. 7!le rcle o! t..he \l:.ite~ )-;~tio:s toS t.:l a~\'is~ry ee::::e fo: eelleet:':;. t.:.alysir.; 
t.::~ <:lsse:d:&ti:; i::!o=atio::. 2o::~ expe:ie:ce i: t-'a !iel~ ef ·re~:.:e:ie:: e! i:1icit 
clelT.2.~~. fer H\'ie",i::; a:"l~ e\·al\.:ati::l; r.atio:al seie:t.i!ie ?~o;re.~ .... es ill the !ie~~ of 
eo".,~&tb; ~ru; ~:.:se &:~ Io: ee-er~i::~t!:; e!!orts ef Sta:es eo:et::i:; t~ese 
act.:sities s~.lll tie !I.:rt~e: e:~2.::ee~. !o~itS e! t-':e U::i:e~ !\atie::s syster.". s',;e~ as 
the C::i:e~ ~atic::s t~yea:io::al. Scie::i!ie 2o:~ Cultural O:C;2.:i:atie:. t.he U::i:t~ 
!\a:ic::s Chil~re:.·s Fu:~ (i::lelu~i:; its r.at.ie::t.l eo~~itttes). t.~. U:i:e~ I'a:ic:s 
Pevelc~e~t Pro;:t..~e. tbe Worl~ Heal~': O:;2.::':2.tio::. the l:::e::2.:ie:al Le.J:,ol:: 
O:;a:il&::'e: Lr.~ ~':e V::ite~ !\a:io:s i:.!o~&tio: ee::::es shall playa more a:tive 
role i:: eolleeti::.; to=~ ~i,se~i=&ti:; i=!o~&:io: t..::~ excha=;:':; ez?e::'e:ce .. 
13. States shlll e,:~l!.'h t.:~ premo:e :atio::t.l sv'stems ~e assess the elia:-.t. c! 
~:'.:; ~\:st t.:~ to co:lect c!.&t& 0: tre:c!.s of ~\;.se.· Fo: C-.a: ru:?e·sc. t.hey shall 
e5tt.:lis~ c!.ata blses t.ht.: sbo\.:l~ be base~ e: :;e i:ter:atie:al c!.:u; abuse 
assessme::: system ~i:; 6evelc?ec!. b)' t.be Oivislo: o! !\a:eo:ie Pruss of t-.... 
Sec::e:a:it: vit-'l !i:to:ci&~ support. from the \!:.it.e~ Nat-i"o::s r\.::c!. '!or D:u; ),!l\:sc·. 
Cc~::ol.· Tnt Di\'isic:. i:: ecllc>c:atie:: Yi~'l O~':e: \l::itec!. t'&:iQ:s '~ru; co::t:tl 
~c~its t.:~ ~'le ;;o:l~ Eealt-': O:;t..::i:.a:ie::. s~l.l1 assist Cover~ ... e:':s· in es:z.:::ishir.; 
suc~ c!.tta bues t.::~ ,):toll vork t.o es:~lis~ to ~I.:a btose eo:c:e:'::i:; ~'le r.a~l:re t.:I~ 
ex":.~=t. c! ~:,u; a,;,~$e to: t...'-lt i:.~e=:.ttic:.z.l level. . 
H. 'r:"le Div~sic: c! t;a:c:o'dc D:I.IC;s sh~ll p~lis~ a.::~ u?~ate pe:ioc!.ieally a c!.i;u: 
listi:; ::I~tio=t.: focal poi~ts t:'&: 6e2ol ~i~': vt.rious as?tets of ~e ~:I.I; F:o~lem. 
i:cl\.:~i::l; i:!o~.atic:: c: ~ireet c:'a~els of eomm~ic.tio=. 
15. 1: c:~er :0 asiess the level of ::atie:al a::~ i::te::atio~1.1 p:o;fess tow&r~s 
p:eve:tic: t.:~ re~uc:ic: cf th~ 6em&~d for :t.r:ctlc <:ruc;s an~ psychotr~;l: 
su~sta:c:es wi~ a view t.o its elimi:at.ic::. a::~ i:: L~pleme=ti~g ~"'e. seve:: targets 
set Ollt i: chapter I of the COr:l?:ehe::sive ~y:tic!.is..c:ipli::a:y Out1l:e ef Fl:t\.::e 
'!'·c:t.ivl:ies i: D:I:; ).!)..:5t Co~::cl. t.he Divisic:: e! t'a:eotie O:u«;s shall s\.:!lmit • . ~r 
31 Drcempe: eac:' year. a s",cc:':c:t ~uestio::.t.ire to all Ccve:~":\e:::I. reyio::al 
I .•• 
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;':-::.e:~o\"e:~ .. ~e~:al oI';a:':':!:.io::s t.::~ no:-.-;c\1e:-:" .. -ne~':.t.l c:-;I.!".~:'l-;ic~s in C'o:".s\;l:'t:i\·, 
s~a~~s wi~h ~~f tco~o~lc ~:~ So~ial Co~n~il. ~~~ ~ues~io:~aire s~all rt;~es~ 
~f~a!!s c! ac:ion t~ke= i: t~is re~a~~ t~ tht :at10:al a:~ re~ic:al levels. the 
~tsu!:s ac~itv.d ~y t~t meas~~es take:. and ~ttails o! a:y p~acti~ll di!!i~~l:ies 
e=cou::~t:tc. 7!'lt Stcreta~y-Ct:t~al is reC;·,.lested to pa?aa a report. i:: 
~cll~c:~tlc: ~i~~ ~~e !:~~~~~~io~&: L~c_:- O~S~:!s~:.ic:, ~he Ueite~ ~a~i~=s 
tcucatlo::al. Scie::i!:': a:d C~lto.;:~l Cr;~::i~ttion and the ~o:ld r.etlt~ 
O:;a:l:atie::. to be s~itted to tht Ce~.iss:'o: e: ~~:~o:i~ D:~;s at its re;~ltr 
a::~ s?edal Hssio:s =tlysi:,. the i:!of'll'.etic: ,~m:'tted a:d assessing. i: 
pa~tic~:a:. the best mea:s e! p:e\'idi:C; assista:~e to S';.etes i:. fu::.~e:i::c; 
~emand-reductio: st:ete;ies. 
15. States a:d a;io:al i::t:90ve:: ... "e:t~1 c:;=i~a';.ie:s Shall co-o?e:&te !I:ll~' in 
t~e p:epaa:io: o! that repe:t l:oy p:ovidi::C; i:: c;ood ti:ne t-'1e i::!o:-:1'.atic:: re~"ired 
Py the c;uestle::ai:e. 
1 •. 1n the 1lC;h: cf the ex?e:ie:ce c! o?e:a~i:; ~~at ~~estio~ai:e &::~ repo:ti:; 
syst~". .. th~ Co". .... ~ssic: 0: I'a:cot.i~ Or~c;s shall eo::sice: ~e :ecessity ~::d 
!eui:i1itr e! e:~o:ati:;. =~er t~e aus?!ces o! t.~e U:i~e~ ~&t.i::s. e.:. 
i::t.e:r.at.:'e::el i=.st:u.'TIe:: Uat ""o~~~ cell es?edal1y .... it.h the re:\:ct.io: o! t.he 
DUdt Qe:u:~ for dr\:ss e.:: that .... o\:l~ p:e\·i~e. i-·(;- cHao comr:ahe::sive a::: 
specific meas~:eS for the c::tro1 a=~ elimi::atio:: of illicit de~a::~ !o: :arcotic 
c~~;s t~~ ?s::~o::c?ie s~s~~=ees, ~s veJ! ~s fo~ t:e~~~t:t L=~ :t~L:~lit&~ie~ c! 
~rus ad~icts. 
15. ~e recom:ne:~a:io:s c! all i:ter:atio::el hi;h-leve1 ~eeti=;s ai~e~ at the 
reductio: ~:d eve::~~l e1~i=atio:: of illicit ceme.::d for ::a:co';.io d:uc;s e.::~ 
psycho::o?lc s~s:&:~es, i:cludi:; ~'1ose o! ~~e ~o:lc ~i=is';.e:ia1 S~~~t to ~eQ\:ce 
Oe"..&:= !o: t'r~;s a::~ to Co:r~at U,e Coc:p.l::e noaat., t.o be 1:,1c i: Lc:co: f:c'" S to 
11 ~?:il 1~;~. shell ~e s~it.';.ec to St&':.es !o: re!e:e:ce, i! re~ueste=. i:: cree: 
to ",aie it ?essi::e fe: t-~e~ to c:o:siee: s\:~~ :e~o~e:da';.io:s i: the e~~or&tie:: c! 
~hei: :atic:a1 a::i-d:u9 ca,'''pai;:s e.=>C policies. 
1.. ~e U:.i ttd t\ &tiO:5 td\:ca tio:a1. Scie:';.!! ie e.::d Cu.1 to.;:&l C:;a:i:a tio:. :.= 
cclla:oratio: with ~e Worle Eeal~ O:;a:i:&tie:: L::C c~er app:opriet.e U::ited 
I'&tio::s bo=~u. shall be e:eoll:lI;e= to soli~it.. oempile a=: =alrse i:!oflT'a:lo: 0: 
e!!ecti ... e p:eve:tio: $::t~e;ies. i:cllldi::; p~lio ir.!tl:·:r.~t.io::. e~~c&tio:: p:o;ra.-=es 
&::: Frc!essie::&l t:&i::'::;. L::d 0: p:o;:a.=-e e'l.':.lu:.';.io: tech.::i~ues a:: to 
cisse"..i:~te ::.at r..~:e:i2.~ t.o Steas \:po:: relO',Iest. 
20. ~~ U:ite~ Natic:s C:i1d:e:" F== s~all ~e e:~c\::e;e~ t.o 9ive fi::a.::cial 
s~~~e:~ to develc~i:; co~~=ies i: o:~e= to c~~~e their c~~?ai9:' to p:eve:t ~~U~ 
al:o~~e by c~~ld:e:· a:c ~e \:u o! C:.i1~:e= !o: ~e i~licit p:o~\:c:tio: a.::d tra!!ic ill 
:a~co~ic ~ru~$ a::d psycbot:opie s~st.~ces. as vell e.s for imple:ne::i:; p:o;:a.~es 
to reh~~ili~att such c~i1d:e:. 
'-
21. 7he :!:::ter:::a~io:&l La::.o· .... ~ O:«;=':'satio:: shall be i:"ite~ t.o provide, upor. 
re~\lest, a~"ice 0: edu~atic:: p:cc;r~'mIes to reCuce dru; a!luse i: the .... o:k-place all~ 
mo::l~o: t~eir ef!e~tive::ess. 
I • •. 
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22. !-\el.sl.:as fe~ t!le ?rtve~.~;~:: c! e!!'-.:, t..:-I:st sl-.~~l be ce'.'e:cpec! ~::c! i::>:::,,:ec! to 
the ex~e~~ ?cssi~~e i~ t~e c~~:ic~~t e~ ~~l @~~c~~io~!l i~stit~~io~s i~ 
ci~c',:,,"'sta!'lCeS so rt~-.:~a, ';!l! expt!'tist c! relH·~!'.t U:.~ttc! "~tic!'.s boc!ies s!lo-.:le! 
~e r.-.!Ce ev!!1e..::e tc toll cot..:.:.~:-ies. i~ ?e.:-;.:':~!a:- ~:l ~~ve:C'?ir.,,; ec'..:.:::.:-ies, i~ 
o~ce:, to essis';. t.~er:'. i~ el~c:,,~:.i:-:; s'..:c~ c~:-:,i:\.!~a. 
23. l:!c~.a':io:l 0: t.!:e :ati=:e.l F:-~sc=i~i:g ~~~ \:ose o! :~:c~tic e:-uc;s a.:!~ 
Flyc!':otro?i:: s~stt.:lc:es 2.!)c! F~~=l!.ce'~tic~l p:epa:atio::s co:.ai:.i:9 sl:c!l S~str..::.:es 
s~~ll be i::>cc::?o~l!.tec! i:to t~e c-.:::icl.::. e! t:ai:.i=9 i:.stitl:tio:s !o: htalt~-ca~e 
P!~s~!'.!'leL 
2<. ~e ~o:!= ~ea:~~ O:gr..::.i;atio:. i: co11~o:atio: vi~ ~:.itee! Natic:s e!~-.:; 
cO:lt:01 boe!ils. =0!"-90ven::,:T\e:.t~1 or .. a:.:';atio:.s 2.:e! oUler o!,lja:.i:atio:s i!'lvc:vec! in 
the rl!.tio::~l use o! ?!ll!.~l!.ce"ticl!.l p:epa:atie::s co::ta:'::i!'); narcotic e!:ugs ane! 
Fsychet:oFic s-.:!:lsta.::ces. s~al1 be e:col.:.:agee! to assist r.atic:al ee!ucttional 
l!.-.:t!le:ities i: c!evelop~= .. t:ai:i: .. ~l!.terials a:.~ ee:e!ucti=; t:2.i:.i=q eo~:ses to 
e~s,,~e t~~t ~ec!ic~l p:aetitie:.e:s ~:~ o~he: heLltt pe:so~e1 a:e well t:&ine~ i~ 
retie::el ?:es::i~i:; ~~ I.:.se c! ~a:eo~ic ~rygs ~c! psyeho~:crie s~s~a:ces. 
~S. ':'!':e I':.ass lTIe!ie s!a.:'l be e:co-.:rage: to p~list a:: !isst:r.i:aa i:'!Q~,ttic:: i: 
s~??e:t e! ~~t~o:al a:: i:tt::ttic:al s~:a~e;ie$ !o: the el~.i~atie: of illicit 
e!e:r.a~e! to: :arcotic ~:,,;s =: rsyc:hctrc::ic s~st2.!)c:es. 
2~. ~~e est~:is~~e=: c! =t:ie:t~ co~~i::ees c: c~ht~ ~ s:~~:t~:es ai~~~ &~ 
~o~ili:i:9 p~:ic su?pert =c! ~e ?ar~ieipatio: o! eO~~l.:.:ities ~~ at co-c?e:.~i:9 
i:: l!.::: 3,:r.?le .... e:.:i: .. ~~e acti"ities e::-.a:ati:c; f:o:n t!:t Clo~&l P:09:&::'.~e of ).c~ien 
shl!.ll be c:o:sic!e:e~. 
~7. Ste~es s~~ll. as aiP:c?:ia:t. p:o~otei:.c:etse: cc-o?er&~ic: ~ith a:: 
ir.velve~e:t of :e:-g~ve:~~t::al or .. =i:atio:.s i: ~~e fi~lt! of rte"etic: of illicit 
e!e:r.a:;t!. t-'l~s e:;o",:agi:; i:.i:i.tti"es e.:e! P:0C;:L.,.,."es at the C;:ass-:OOtS level. 
2!. ).??ro?ria~e V:ite~ Natic:s boe!ies shall be i~vitee t~ c:c1l~orate vith 
nc:-c;ove:=-~e::t~l o:C;~=.i.:atio:s "'it!: special expertise ir. ~e !itl~ o! ~a:c:tic 
~:uS's 2.::c! ?syc:hc~re?ic s~stL:ees to ie!e:ti!y e.:t! ~l!.~e avai1~lt tech:i:a1 
expertise 0:: st:ate;ies e.:~ ~etho:s fc: :ee!-.:ction o! illicit c!e::-.&:e!. 
2;. ':'he ~:~tec! "I:io:s shl!.ll u:t!e:take a :tviev e! a:~ivities of t!le U:itt: 
~&t~ens sys~e:r. a:: ~e s?tciali:t: a;t::cies to: the :ee!-.:::ic:: o! illicit ~e:r.I::~ i:: 
c:~e: ~o i~e::i!r the :ee!s !c: i::e~si!ie~ ae:ie~ cc~sis:t~: wit~ t~t ~:i~:i~lfs 
e! t~e G~c~2.1 P:,o~:a.~.e of ~:!.ic:. 
~O. ~atio:.a1 't~a~e~ies i: the ~eal~h. 50ci&1. 1e9a1 2.:~ ?e:.a~ fiele!s I~a:l 
cC:ltl!.i!'l p~o;r~~es fer ~'le social rti::~e .. r.tio:. reh~ilit&tic: a:e! trea~e~t or 
~r~; ~-.:sers a:l: C:::\l;-Ilt!t!ic~tC:: oHen:t:s. S~ch p:o .. :~""",es s~l!.ll bl i: cC):~o:~.ity 
"'i~!': T.Il~ie::l!.l 1a"'s a:C:: rec;-.:lHio:.s a::c! be basee! 0: respect fer ~uic h=·a:: ris~ .... s 
I • • , 
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~nd ~he ~i~:i:y of ~he i~~i~i~~~~. s~owiog ~ .• :e=~:~ fer ~he ~ive:,e =ee~s o! 
in'ivi~~~~ ~:~; ~~~ic:s. 
31. 'rhe U:i~e~ l\!:ions sl':~ll ~c:t ~s a cle~:i:;-ho\:st fe: i:~o:T..a:ioo on effective 
pc:icies ~:~ te:~~i~~es. ?::;~~~e ~:~~li~ies ~~C :es:~~ce ma:e~i~ls !e~ the 
t:et~en:. :tl':~ili:~tio: ~:~ o~c:~?~:ional rti::t~:a:ion of fo~e: ~:~S ~~:i::s. 
~he ~o:l~ neal~ O:g~i:~tic: ~:: ~~e !::t::t:ie:!l ~~C~: C:c;a:isa:ie:. i: 
c:ellc>o:a:ie: ,,:'t.."1 e:her c:;~:.i:.a:io=$ of ~he U:i,:;e~ Na::'o:s c;,s:e'" a:~ 
nen-90ve:~~t::~1 c:s~i:.a:io:s. shall ~e e:c:o\:ra~e~ ~o co:tri~u:e ~o ~a: t:~. 
3:. 7he releva:: ~:i:e~ ~~:i=n$ ~o~ie$ 5hou:~ :e:de: assista:ee ~o in:e:es:e~ 
S:~:es. i: partic\:la: develc?ioc; c:o=:ries. i: t.:.eir ?:o;:a.~.~es for ~:e~':.:~\e:: a:'\~ 
reh~ilita:io: of drug ~\:ser$. 
3). 'r:~i::':g p:osr~~es rel~:i:g ~o tht latest devele~ents a:~ tec~i~ues i: the 
!iel~ of t:ea~~e:t of drug a~~ic::io: and rel':~ilitatie: a:d rti:te;ra:io: of fo~t: 
~::icts s~~ll be co:~uc:ed more :eg\:la:ly ~':; t..~e :~ticnal. re;io:a1 a:~ 
in:t::~:ic:al levels. Gove:~~e::s. ~e releva:: U:ited ~a~io:s bodieS. ~l':~ 
s?~:i2.1i:ee 2;e:cies, i:t.e:-;cve=:,,_~e::e.~ e:~l~l:ltic:.s &:"t~ r.c~-t;~'te=:" .. -:'It:::e.~ 
o:ga:i:atic:s i: a positic: to 00 se s~all. \:?o: re~~es:. Frovi~e a~v~ee. 
i~!o~.~t~c: a:~ p~o?o,als 0: e%ls~i:; t:ai:i:; p:o;:~~~es. new methocs a~~ 
t~:h:i;~es ~:'\d o~er ge:eral q~i6e~i:es Ior S:a:es wishing to develop their 
t:ai~i:; p:o;:a.=,es f~:~he:. 
::~. 7he "o:lc l:iealt.!'l O:;~=i:~~ic: s:::!ll lle t::e'~a;e~ to vcrk with C;o ... e:~."e:ts 
"i:h ~ view to facilitati:s ~ccess to ~:~;-:rea~"'e:t r:OS:a.,~eS ~c to 
st:ensthe:i=; ~e c~?~eity o! r:i~~~y heal~"1 c!re to res?o:~ to d:us-=ela~ed he~lth 
p:c~:e::".s. 
35. ~he "orl~ Ee~l~ Orsa:l:~tic: s~~ll be e:co~rased to continue to e:plo:e vith 
Gever~"'e:t' ~e ~eve!o?me:: of hea1~~ ed~:t~ic: ?ros:~~e, ~d policies Ior the 
:e~~c:ic: o~ risk a:~ ht~ of d:~S ~~se as a ~et:s of preve:tir.g the t~a:s~issicn 
by ~:~; ~~,er' of t..~e h~a: ~u~odt!icie:ey virus (E.V) t:d of 'ecuri:s 
~?r:o;:iate trea~~e~~ ~~ ce~:stlli=; to: ~~~; L:~s.:, v:o a~e n:v-pcsitive c: ~~o 
lavt d~velo?ed ae~uired i==o~e!icie:oy cy:dro::l' (l.!::lS)'· &:ld to report Uleree:. 
;~. 7he I:ter:a:io:tl L~o~r C:;a:isatic: she~l~ p:e?t:e a:~ ?~;is!'l s~i~e:ines 
!c: p:os:~~es to ~ei::e;:t:e fO~e: addicts i::o oC:~?t~io=tl aetivi:ies or 
v~catie:!l tr~i=i=;. 
~i. S:&tes ,~al~, t.s &??:cr;ia,;~, !a.:ilit2.~e z..::.~ p:omote t-"1t i=\'clve~e:.-=. c~ 
:o~-;ever~~e:tal c:;~i:~::c:s i= ~ll ~~t!S of tre~~~e:~ ~:d re~~ilitt~lon a:~ 
i:~e=s~fy t..~eir c:o-o?ea::o: vit-h ~"le rele~'~: \J:ite~ ~!tic:s bo~ies. 
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3E. S,:~~es ,~.~:l ce::side:, ~:. t..~e :l~!=:.!.l ~:~ :':te::z.tie:&.l ltve:s, r,\t&:s ~y 
\o·~ic~. the i::'t:::2.~ stete!" 'c! ";.~:se eec::.o:":".;'es t:..l.":. a:e a!!ee:'t~ ~y t.~e illic:t 
p=o~u:tie~ ~~~ p:c:essin9 e~ :a:cctie ~!"~;s &~~ ?sye~o::c?!c ,~~s:&.~etS mi;~t bf 
st:e=st.~e:lee, i: C':~~: to S~??o!"t e.:~ s"::e:;';.!:c: ~e i:r,;1 e:o:\t:t.a.:.io:, ~y cC:":",?t:e:::. 
:.a:.io:1.1 a\,;:..~:!"i:ies, c! e!!t::.ive &=-:.i-~!"\:S ;::Q~:L~es, !=el\:.~i=; t..~e !cl!o ... ·i:g: 
r..elos~:es : 
<.~) p!"o~.?: i~e:t!!i:!:.!e=, e:e~!c2.~ie~ &:~ s~stit~tie: 0: illi:,it 
C~~:iVlo:io: c! :!:cc:i:: pl~:~s. tloki:; i:~o t:ce~~ t~e :ee~ to r:e~t:t t~t 
e:.v:':or.-n~:t; !c:, L"le p~:?cse c! e:o? s"..::-veys t.~~ rnc:.lte:i::; e!!e::.s, s~e~ 
~t:~:el~;~tS loS ~!;~-:tscl~~ie: st~tlli:~ i~t;t:r a:~ ae:~lol p~oto;:lo?:y co~:~ ~t 
\.:se~ "·~e:' ~'i~ee!'l'le:.t l"'.~s bee: :-t~c~ec! "'i~~ '=-~t Ccve::"'_~t:t co~ee:=.~: 
<:::) F~:~':t: eev~le?"'e:: lo:e ir.:?:~me:.:'lo:.ic: c! CO~?:e)-;t:si ... e a:~ 
"·ell-e.:t.ie".!ll~e~ :e~-..:c~!.e~ z:o;!'a.~.~es ... ·i!.!':. t. V!!' .. · to elil':'.i:a:.l:; !.!li:i: r:o~·.::tie~ 
e! :-.lo::c~ic ~:~;-s a:~ ?s~'c~e~:e?!c s'~s'a:,:cu i.: co~::ies a!!ec:t~ ~y illicit 
r:o~uctlc=. tloki:; ?lo::ic~:t: t:cou:,:~ e! t:a~i:.!e:al 11ci~ ~s~s of suo~ c~l:.i ... a:.lc=; 
(~) Asuss",e:t a:l~ st~ey. by t~e t::i:'t~ Nlo~ie:s t:vlrc::. .. ~:: P:o;:a:~~e. c! 
t!!t::~S c: t:t e:d:e::.":\e:~ o! t::e ex?a:~i:; c~:t!vt~ic: &:~ rro~uctlc: of :lo::otie 
c:u;s lo:~ t~t UH a:l~ CiS?eSlol o! c~e:d.ca:' s:';;s~a=ces :el~~e~ to ueu acti"iti~s. 
as w~~l as r.:~~~o~s \:s~~ !:: ~~t ~:a~iclotie: c! illicit p:o~u:tie: o! :&:cot10 ~:uqs; 
(:.J !:rte:sie: c! t~e SCO?t o! ece=o~.i: e.:~ ttc)"-=lclol CO-o?~:e.tic: i: Sl:??c:t 
c! c:e? s~sti';~tie: .e.:~ i:~e;:r.te~ :I::e.l ct\·~le? .... e:~ p:o;:a:':~es a:c o:..'1e: tcc=e~.ic 
~:~ te::~:ic~l ?:o;:e..-=es aL.,.,ee at :tc\:c:':; i:::'dt p:ceuctic·: z.:~ i:eeess:':; c! 
:a:ce~ic ~:u~s z.:~ ?syc~e~:e?!c s~s:.z.:ces; 
(!) !:s~~:is~~e~:. e! e:~?:'t!':ie=:.&.:-y :F=o~:-~~.~es i: ~t !it~:!s c! e::-:?:e;~e:t., . 
htlo~~~. housi:; z.:~ e~_c~:.ie:; 
(~) !l~e:~tic: a-' i~:leme:tlo~ic: e! ::OS:L~.,.,tS fo: a;:o-i=~us::ilo~ 
cevelc:>me: t : 
(!:!) !luc:at:e: e.:~ i· .... ?le:':le·:t·atic·;; o! F:o;:a::''':'u fo: ecc:e:::~c :eco"~:y o! t~e 
socilol a=~ ~ce=Q~ic ,~c:e:s i~ ce~~t:if' t~lt a:e e.cve:,e~y e.!!tcte~ ~y ~~~ 
~ive:sic~ !e: s~r?ly-:t~~etic: r:Q;:L~":\~S c! resources ~at wo_l~ otherv1se be ~Ste 
!er ~ev~:e?me:~. 
I • .• 
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J;. =~! er~~~=t: ste~::s e! those ecc:c~!!S t~t: ~:e &!!t::~~ ~y il~ici: 
F:od~ctlo~ a~~ ?:ocessi~; c! ~a:cc:ic ~:~;s &~! ?syc~o::c?i; s~~$ta=:es sh~l! be 
s~~e~;~~e~e~ i~ c~~e: to 5~??C~t ~~~ s~:e;;t~e~ the i~?:e~e;t~tio~ by eo~?e~e~~ 
::.atio:l~~ ~·~-::~:~itiu c~ e!!eC:tiv~ ~:.~i-~:~; ?:o;:l-.,..."es by t..":e !ollo .... i~; ,..·e~~s: 
(~l Cc~sic~~atic= o! ~eas~:es to st~e=;t~e~ i:te:~!tic:!~ eo-c?e:ltic~ to 
!acilit!~e t:ace !:o .... s. i: ?!~ticu1!: me!s~~es to create e%?!~~e~ O??c:~~:l:ies to: 
t:lce ~=~ i~ves~."e::t :.~ o:-6e:- to p:-c\'ice !::e55 to i:te:-~!tio:!~ m~:-kets !c:-
C~O?-s~5th~tic~ ?:oc'~cts ~:lC ct!'le: goo~s ?:o~~cec ~y cc".!~t:ies I.!!eete~ b~' the 
illicit p:oc".!c~ic: !:c p:-ocessin; c! ::.a:cctic c:u;s; 
(~) Ccr.siee:ati:~ by S:a~e$ e! e~te:i~; i:to ~~l~!~att:al. ~ila:t:&l c: 
re;io:~l a;:ee~e~ts vit~ co".!::t:ies &f!eetec by illicit ~:Uy p:o~uction anc 
p:o,essi~s, ~it~ a view to !aei:it&:i~; aceess by those cc~~~~i.s to i~te~=a~io~i: 
m!:iets l-:C to 1.55istio; t~em io st:e~;t!'le:i~y a:c ac!?tioy t..~ei: i:tt:~al c!?acity 
to F:o~\.!ee ex?o::!~~e ;oo~s; 
c:) Cc~si~!:!':.l::: c~ eee:o::-.l: ~::~ e:.!'l~:- fe=s o! cc-o?e:-t:.ic: ... i';...': ~e"e!o?l~; 
c:-\.:...~::!~s ~~:~:-;.:y 2.!!'e::.!'~ ::y t.~e i~liei: t:r...:S!-:' c! :.&.::C'~ic ~:\J.'s t.~:~uS!'t t~ei: 
te:-:-ite:-ies. i~:!~:i~; me!s~=es to c:e!te tx?!~ce~ c??e:':.~~ities ~e:- t:-t:e &nc 
i~,,·es:...~e:.:; 
(~) j\e~·.!!t: s-.:.!:::-.issi::: l:::' S:.t':.es to t!':t =e~t· .. &:':. 1::::'tt: ti~:.ic:s ~:-\:C; tc:.,::e1 
be::'ts e~ i~!e:-::'.!ti.c:: c~ t!'lt tx:'e~~ o! t!':, ro.L:".!!&::':.'..::t. t\'&l~&!lllity &~: ~1..:st e~ 
illici':. s~-:t)':e:.ic ::·.:;s i: t!':ti: tt::itcries. 
2. t;,.: .. c ....... -:·,;,.·· .... ;"· ~,t-··'! ... ·;;;· c .... c·ws;"·~' j,,-"'e";"" S:"\.is~ t.0~ 
;:sv::"';".,t;;"'~t;e ~'¢~"!i"'''c 
~O. ~ b!~!::e, s!':!:! be m!l::':.!i:ec be':. ... e': ce~!~c ~::c s1..:??lr c! :~w ~!':.e:i!ls. 
i::te=e:it:.es &::: !i::!l p:e~\:cts te: lec;i':.i~a':.t \:ses. i:::lu~i=C; me~ical I.::: 
scie~tl!it p-.::?cses. 
(1. l~':.t:-~ttic~tl CO-c?t:-&':ic~ .. scli~!:-:'':.yt.:: Usl,':L::ee a:e ttl1,: fo:, to 
ove:-ecrne the ?::~~e~ c! ex:ess stock e! tiit':, :tV ~a:.e=i&ls I:: t:~citie::&l 
S".!i?lie: ec".!~t:ies. ~~is mty i::cl-.:~e i~tt:-:~tic:&l I.ssis:.a:ee. pa:tie~ll.:ly to 
~!velo?i::; ce'..:~':.:les. to he:? t..':e:":\ estt::llis!'l t..':e :ecuu:y 0;11.':.' ::u; ~.a:ase:.le~.':. 
~esi~e to e:~:! ~~e~ to met~ ~el: pote~ti~l les!~L~&~e :te~ fe: c:i&~ts. 
42. 7be U~ltec ~!tio:s r'..:::: to:' P:uC; ~use Ce:t:ol. i: cell~c:t,:ic:. V~trt 
&?p:o?ri!':.e. vi:.~ ';...~e·U:ite~ tiatie~s Pevtlopmeot P:oi:l-~e &:d c~e: U~ltec tittie:s 
bo~ies. is i~vi~e~ to elt::lcrate for ec:si~erat!.oo by Stltes a s~reyio:&l strate;-y 
coverin; ~ll ~s?ects ef ::-uy ~\:se eo:tro1 a:~ ce~ce:t:-'tinc; co the ~Olt af!tcte: 
a~eas ... here t!'le ?~e~lems &:t ~est cC:.l?ltx &::~ ~:ave. St&tes ,)':a11 i=crease thtir 
co~o?eretio~ with the F'..:n~ i: su??crt c! such ! s~:e;ie:!l strateqy. 
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C!. Sta~es s~c~l~ e~~e~vo~: to e~:al: the s~??c:: ef i~:er:atio~el. re;ie~el &~~ 
:-.a~ic::.a! !:':.a=:i2.~ i::.s~l::\J::io::s, .. ·l:.~i: t..~e':': :-~s?e:~ive &.~eas c! eo~?'te=:e, ... it~ 
t~e geel e! i~e::i!yi~S el:e:~etive ~ev!lo?~e:: e:c ero?-s~stit~tion Frosr~es to 
s''':??o:: eo:.::::le5 50 the: ~'ley c:e.: carry 0\:: s:~::c! eoo::o:...1c: policies a:c ef!e:tive 
p:og:~~~es ege:'::st i11iei: c:~gs. States &~o~lc elso e:::o:.:rage those i::s:it~tic::s 
to oc::sict: t~e eco=o~ic: ~C soc:iel eo::se;:.:t::es ef cr~s t:ef!ic:ki~g vhe:: a:a1ysi~9 
the ecc::o",ic: "'ste",s e!' :!lese co\::::les. !:: ~:'s ~ece:~. t:ose i:stit\,lt:'o~s sho:.:lc 
ce::sic~: ava.ili:; t..~~~.se~\'es c! t.ssis~2..:cf! ~:-c~, 2..:~ ~o-c?e:z.:.io~ vith t!".e l':'li':.t~ 
~a:io::s f~::c !cr ~r:.:g ~\:se Co:t:01. 
~C. S?ecieli:ec ase::::'es ~c othe: U::i:ec ~e:ie::s ~ocies s~eh as the C::itec 
~atio:.s i:>evelo?",.e:: Prosr~~e aoc t-~e fooc e::~ "';:ie~lt:.:re Or;!::i:e:iero o! the 
C::itec Netio::s. es well as t:e l::te:::e::'o::e1 !i::e~eiel i:s::'t:.::io::s. in ac:co:ce::c:e 
with their mence:es. sho:.:ld ee::sice: t:e pessi:ility of ",::c!ertekio; !,,:thtr 
activities i~ th~ !ie~~ o! F:eve:tio: L:~ S~s~!t~~ic: o! i~lici: r:oc~c:ic~ c! 
:'O~~co':.;.:: c:"l.:ss. 
~s. S~e~es s~~:l t~ke ~11 :ecesse:y ~e~s~res. s~c~ as t~e c:o:c~~sic: e! ~ila:e~a: 
a!'lC reg:'e::~~ ag:ee"'e::s. to esta~l.is~ ",o::i~::ri:; e..::e eo::trol sys:ems to F~tve:.~ 
c'.i .... e~si~:: !~o~. le;i:i",.~:e P"~?::ses of s?eei!ic: e~e"'.lc:al s~s:e:ees. ",e~erie:s a:::! 
e~\;!?r.1e::.: :=e;\:e::.~y use:! i:. : .. .''''le i:li:.lt rr,t..:o.:!~::\:.:e c! :.&!"ectie ~:\:;s a=~ 
?s~cho~~o?ic: s~sta::ces. i:: p&:tic:.:~e: ~:o~;~ ~e a?p1icatio: of a:tiele$ 12 a::~ 
13 o! ~~e U::itec ~atie::s Co:vc::tio:: a;al::s: l"!ic:it 7:e!!ic i: ~a:eotic D~~;s a::c 
Psycbot:opie S~ste:ces a~o?ted i:: lSU. i' 
~:. Co::sice:a:ie: s~a~l ~t ;;ve: to t~t e:: .... t::i::; of I.:: i:.ter:.atio:al co:-.:e:e::ce 
0: t~e p:o:!"etio: ~~ ~ist:i~,,:ie: o! e~e~ic&l F:od"ets ~se~ i:: ~~e illici:· 
?rod~e:ioo of :a:cotie d:~;s t.:c ?sye~ot~o?ic s~st~ces. i:: or6e: to eo-erei::a:. 
e!!o::s !e: mere e!!eetive prtve:~ic: of ~e clve:sic: of F:ee~rso: cbe:T.iee~s. 
s?eC:.!iC: s~s:e=ces. lut-erie:s e.::d e~ ... iz>me::':. !o: i:lidt F~:?ostS. It is 6tSl:~'le 
t)';e: Staas i::l-.c!e uprese::e:ives of ",.e: .. !t:t~:i:; ~c 'istd~~tioo e:::trp:ises 
.i:: t~ei: ~e~t'~2.tie:.s to t.~at co:!t:e::t .. 
~i. 7!':e ~orlc lo:e~~t!: O~ge::iatio:. i:: c::l~:a~io:: vit.!: ::'e ti"isio: o! t'ercotic 
D:u;s a:'l:! t-~e l:::e~::atioroel ~e~cotie$ Co:::r:l !oerc. shol.l.lc assist :1:io::11 crus 
:e,,,lato:y e.:.:-:':'ori':.its i: deve~o:i::; e::c s:a:"t-":e:.:':; :!lei: p~a:":T.eet"tie&1 
ec. ... i:is~:&tio:s &::~ eo::ro1 l~orato:its i:: o~ce: to e:a.!::e the~ to co::t:o! 
p~.I:'1!'.lee:.:ti'l.l p:e?e:l.tlor.s eo:::a:':.1::; ::a:e~':.il: ':11,' &tlC psye:::ot:opi;: I~st&::ces. 
~!. Gove~r~ ... e:tel. i::tersever::. ... e:.t.:.l t.:~ ::l:--;c'·e:::. ... e:tel o:C;e.::i:etio:s L":~ the 
U:ited ~a':.io::s ,~all bt e:c:ol.l.:a~e~ to eo-o?e:ltei: mees~:e, vit-~i: ~~e c;~ideli:es 
set 0": i: t-~e Co~?:ehe::sive ~~lticis:ipli:&:y ~~tli:e o! rl.l.t~:e ... etivititl i: D~\lC; 
~\lse Co::':..ol il to st:eo;t-~e: :e::'o::e1 t.!:c i:::troat.io:e! svstems o! eo::tro1 o! 
r.arcotic: d:uss ~~ psyc:hot:opio I~sta::c:es. io partic",le. those e'tablis~ed 'under 
t-~e Sio;le Co::ve~:io: 0: ~e:cotic: Dr,,;, o! l'~l. II ~c t-~a: Co:veotio: 1.1 L ... cnded 
'b'y t.he lP2 Protocol ,\./!Ie:di::9 :!le Si:lI;le Co:ve:.:io: 0: NU'cotil: O:~Ss .of lS61 11 
a!'l~ t.he Co:,:vt::~ion 0:: Psyche::o?ie S\:!:s:a:ces o! 1971. ,ll 
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c;. =he !:te:~~tie:al ~a:cctics Cc:::ol 5ca:e is invite! to a~vise States. at 
their recuest. a~e to exte~~ its lec~=ica: co-e~eretien a::!vities ~ith • view to 
!~rtheri;; the .i~s c! the Si:;1e 'Conve::ion c:·~arcot!c ~ru;s c!'l~El an~ thet 
Ccnve:t!on as L~e:cee =y the 1,72 Pretoco! ~~.:!in; the Si~;~e Convention on 
"trcotic Pru;s o! 19H. the Co:ve::ic: on Psvcho::::!c S~stances o! l>7l ancl the 
C~i:ec ~~tie:s Ce=ve=t!o~ e9~1~$: !~~i:!: :;~!~ic i; ~&;eetic ~;~;s &~~ 
Fsycho:ropic S~sta:ces .eop:e~ i~ l;ES. 
~O. Special at:e:tie: s~all =e pei~ to co-o?e:etio: thet ~ill e:~le Stetes to 
s::e:l;the: thei: c:u; detection an:' p:-.e:":ace\:t:'cel ceotrol lz.!,oreter!es. as "'e:l as 
their pelice a:' c\:stoms activities i: the !ielc e! 'r\:g co:':.:ol. 
o. 5~?;·.$~:~- e' i":~;~ t·t":~ki~; :n r=-t~·!~ ~Pysc 
t-~ ?$'·e ... ~tr,..;: ~ ~ . .::cte-h.S 
5:. States shall procee:' rapicly a::' ~tke every e!!er: to rati!y or a:ce:'e te the 
~:i:ee ~ttie::s Coove:tio:: a;ains: Illic!: :re!!ic i: ~ercctic tru;s anc 
Fsyc~ot:c?.te S~stt.:ces, .. =!e?te~ i: l;!!, i: e:~t: to e:.~le t.~t e~:!'y i~to !o:"C:t 
o! the Co~ve::io:. p:e!er~~y ~y t~e e:~ o~ 1;;0. 
52. 7he U~ite~ ~atie:s. i~ pa:tic~~a: the tivisio: e! ~treotic ~r~is. the 
l~te::atio:tl ~arcotics Co:tro1 Ecar~ a:a the U:itec Nat:'o~s r~n~ !or O:~i ~~use 
Co~trol. sh~ll Froviee er?ertile &:c arsirta::e to Sta~es. a: their ree~est. to 
e:z.!,le the::l to est~lish the le;!.s~~ti\'e· a:c a~'T.i:istra~i\'e lI\eu~res !~: the 
:a:i!ict~io: &:~ e~!!::iye i~~le~e::t:ic: c! :~t U:i:t~ Sa:ic:s Cc:ve~tie~. 
~::.. States sha~l. te ~e exte:t &:c "·~.ert they ere ~le to to 10. 'apply 
p:ovisie:~:ly t:e me~S~:es set fert: i: ~e ~:ite~ ~atie:s Cc:ve:tic:. 
5<. Co:s!.s~e:t ~ith the Uoitec Natie:s Ce:ve:tie:. coosi:'eretie: shall be iiven to 
the co:cl~sio~ c! ~iltte:tl, :t;iO~t: t:~ ~~::i~~:e:t~ t;~~e~e:ts &=~ c:~e: 
~::a~~e~e:ts &i~e~ ~: s~:?:tssi~q illi:it t:t!!icki~q i: :a:cetie ~:U~S &~~ 
psychet:opic s~sta:CeS. 
~5. States t.:.at l".ave lOot yet cc:e so shall c:osi:!er r&':.i!icatio~ c! 0: eccess:o:'l 
to the 5i:<;le Cc: ... e:tie~ c: liarcotic trll;s o! 19H 11 a::! thtt Co:ve:tie: u 
~~encec ~y tbe 1;72 P:etocel ~~e:ci:i t:.e Si:;le Co~v.e:tio: e: ~arcotic ~r~;s o! 
1961 11 LeC tbe Co:vt:tie: c: P,y~~otropic S~st~ces o! 1;71. 11 
56. States i: a pesitio: to to se a:c ~~e c:C;L:i:atie:s c! ~~e C:itec Natie:, 
s~·stem. i: particu.lar tlle iJ:itec ~atio:1 ru.:~ fer ~:\,I9 c>\.:se Co:trol. shall provice 
appropriate tec~;icil a~c fi:a:ci&l sup?or: to e~~le Stetes. at ~~ei: re,uest. to 
este.blish ef!ecth'e mecla.::isms a .. ai:st illicit tra!!iclti:; in :areotic c!ruc;s .::e! 
psychotropic s~stLeces. Partic\.:la: a:te:tie: ,~all ~e c;ive:. i: that reiare!. to 
the 't:e:;~e:i~9 c! i:te:c!ictie~ ea?~ilities of tra:si: States. i:eluc!i=co co:t:ol 
~!. la::~. sea ,~c air bo\.::~aries. ~o tha~ e::~. States she~lc un~ert,ke an analysis 
o! the metho!s a~:' routes \.:Sec! for illlci~ tranSit tra!!i: i: ~areotic. c!ruc;s anc 
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?s:c~c~ro?!.c s~st.~:.c~s. l.:.i! 
l cc~~i~~ing besis, b~l:ing 
~re~~e~~ly l=~ l!fect l g:o~ 
~?F~O?!"ia~e i:!c:"7o'.at.ic::-$~2.:. 
mwlti!l~e:ll blSis. 
s~~~:~ ~~~~:e: :~~~ i~ t~ei: respective te::i~c:i~s 
:: ~!=~ t~l: t~~ :c~~es ~::~ methoes ~sce ~hl~ge 
~.; :\,!.."'r.:'!:' e~ Stz.tts. S:t.tes s~2.11 ce!".si~e: 
. i:: t~is :es?e:t c: l bill:e:al, :egicnal c: 
5i. !:~e:es~et S~l:es IT,ay cc:sioe:. 'in cc:!c=.i:y ,,.it!: i::e::;a:io:;a1 1e ... e::t tla 
Cr.a:te: c! t..""e U:i:e! 1'atio:s, Ule pcssi:ility c! joi:t1y est~lisl:i!); bc:oe: 
i:s?e:ti:: C~~ck-?oi:ts, with a view to s~?p:ess!=; i~!i,i: t:&:s-~c~~~t~y ~eve~e=t 
e! :a.:c:otic: ~r ... :;s a.:t psyc:hot:op!c: SOs~~::lc:es. \o'i:~o~~ l!!ec~i::l9 the =a~ic::~1 
sove:ei~:ty ~=~ tt::itc:i~l i::e;:ity o~ St~~es. 
5!. S?cc:illi:e~ a:;e:cies s\:ch ~s t.he I:~e::&~io:e: Civil ).o."i&~ic: O:<;I.:i::&::'c:: I.::~ 
t.he lr.te:::.etio:el Ha:itime O::;e.:i;&~io:. in coll~c:a~!c: with me",.be: Stl~es a:;~ 
i::te::;cve:r_""e:~ll a::l~ ~o::l-90ve::::"lIe:ta1 c:ga.:i::t:ic:s. s~.e11· be i::vite~ to el[pt:'l~ 
t.!>:e de"elcpme~t cf p:o<;:a.-.:lIes w~e:e~~' so,.::!': o~~t:i::etic:s t.::l~ melT~e: S:ates v::k 
"'i~!'l t~e t:"L:.5?c:'~t:ic~ i:l'! .. ..!st~y to se,.:?:?:-ess i:llcit t:t.!!.iexin; i::. : . .e.:eQtic ~:\'!';s 
t~~ psyc:~ot:cric s~s:t.::ces. 
5:. S~e~e$ s~all ~~xt i~e:e&s~~ ~se c! t~e met:!:;s c! ~fa~s c! ~a:ic:ll ~:~i Lt~ 
!::!o~ce:ne:: .1.;e:cies a:l~ o:he~ i::e:90\·e::::lIe:':.e:' e::;a:i.:t:ic:s. sl:ch as t.ht C\:5tO"',' 
Cc-c?e:l':.ic:: Coo,.::cil t.:~ t.he 1:te::e:io::e1 C:imi:e:' Pelice O~<;t.ni:e:ic:'l (::::e:pcll. 
:-e<;~c:.t.l c:o-e?e:e.:ie~ !.:=t.:;~:":'Ie:~s e.:.~ et.he: :elt· .. a:: :':st;i':.t.,:~iQ:&~ !!"e..~~ .. ·::&s. !e: 
the F~:?cse o! cc-c:fi::ati::lS co-o?e:&~ic: i: ltv e:!::ctme:: t.:~ expa::~i::; 
F:o<;~a."'.":\es c! t~li::i::lg !or ltv e:!o:c:e~e:: pe:se::e1 i:: i:·.·estiit~ive r.,a:te:s a:'l~ 
methc~s, i:::e~fic:tio: a.:~ ::a:co':.ics i:telli;e:ce. 
~O. ~e \,i:ia~ };t:ie:s, i: pa:':.i.cl:;'~: :;, t::i:e~ t\e:io::s r~:~ fc: O:-':i .1.bl:se 
Cc~::cl. ,hol:~~ assist S:e~es, tt their :e~o,.:es~. i:: e~~ir?i::l; &:~ st:e::;:he:i::; 
t~ei: lav e:!e:ce~e:: &~~~Q:itits L=~ c:imi:tl 5~st!et systt~s. 
f~. S:ttes s!:~~l s::e:;~~e: t.~!i: :&tie:a;' e!!e:ts to c~:~ ~::f e:e~ic:a~e ~o:nesti: 
i:lielt co~~~;ee ~~~ ~!s::i~~':.ie= c! ~~:ecti: ~~~is ~:~ Fsye~c::c?ic '~~I~&::tS. 
t. M·.s~~.~ to b- t~~.- te.;,c~ .~- •• '.~.$ e l ~a~-v C-::v.~ 
!:O~! ~$.~ i; c: i-··O~.' !e- ~C. ~r ill:~c~ ~-ve 
t_;:I!:b'k:~;c !"-C;-' f;-p'-;::'~ !''''''''S t-'!·"1.;!~ lie. e! 
t~. b~oli~; IV$~.~ 
~2. P~io~ity s~ell he a:eo~~e~ to ~~e imp~t~e:~t:io: e! the C:itef ~atio~s 
Ce:>,'e~~io~ ac;t.';':st Illicit !:e!!ie i: ~e.~eotie t):\1!is a.::~ Psyehotropic Sost&:>ces. 
a~o?tec i: l;SE, L:~ t.he concl\:sio: c! biltte:al, reiio::tl a=~ m\:ltilate:al 
a;:eeme::ts c: t~aci:9' f:ee:i:; a:f ,ei:l::e ~:~ !e:!eit~:e e: co:!isc&tio: of 
F:o?e:ty a:~ procee~s ~e:iv!~ !ro~. \1se~ i~ e: i:te=~e~ fo: \1se i: illicit t~\1; 
t.·:r.!~ic:):i:::;. 
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63. Mecha~isms s~al1 be eeveloped to Frevent the banking system and other 
financial institutiocs from being used for ~~e processing and la~de:in9 of 
drug-related money. ~o this end. consideration should be given by States to 
entering ieto bilateral. regioeal ~d multilateral agreemeets and developing 
~echa=isms to trace property and proceeds derived from. used in or intended for use 
in drug-related activities through the international banking system. facilitate 
access to banking records and provide for tbe exchange of icformation betveen law 
eeforcemeet. regulatory or investigative agencies concer~ing the fieancial flow of 
property or proceeds related to illicit drug traffiCking. 
64. The Division of Narcotic Drugs of the Secretariat. in co-operation vith the 
Customs Co-operation Council and the International Cri~inal Police'Or;ani:ation 
(Interpol). should promote bilateral or regional eXChanges of information between 
gov,ramental regulatory 0: investigative agencies conce:ein; the financial flow of 
illicit drug proceeds. 
65. The Oi\'ision of Narcotic Drugs and Iroterpol shall be i:vited to develop a 
repository of lav, and regulations on money launde:ine;. currency reporting: bank 
secrecy and forfeiture of property and proceeds. as vell as procedurts and 
practices designed to prevent banking systems and otber financial institutions from 
~oney laun~ering. and shall make this i~fo~.ation avail~le to States. at their 
request. 
66. hall consider enactin le islation to revent the us. 0: the banking 
system for the processing and la~de:ing of ~ru9-related money. Inter '.1'. t ro~gh 
declarinq such act~v~t~es c:~~nal offences. 
67. States shall consider enacting legislation to permit the sei:ure and 
forfeiture of property and proceedS derived from. used in or intended for use in 
illicit ~:uq trafficking. 10 that en~. co~sideration'should be given by States ~o 
conclu~ing bilateral and multilateral 'greeme:ts to e~~ance the effectiveness of 
internatio:al co-operation. taking into partiCular account a~ticle S. paragraph 5. 
of the United Nations Convection against Illicit l:arfie in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic S~stances. 
68. States shall encourage international. reqional and national financial 
associations to develop guidelines to assist their me~ers in co-operating vith 
government a~tho:ities in identifying. detectinq. tracing. freezing and sei:inq 
proceeds and property related to illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic s~st~Cel ~ 
69. The elaboration of international ay~eements prOViding for stringent controls 
on money derived from, used in or intended for use in drug-related activities and 
p.nali:ing the laundering of such money might be considered. Such instruments 
~ight also deal vith the forfeiture or confiscation of funds, proc.eds and property 
acquired through revenues deriving from drug-relatea activities. 
70'.' States shall consider IIIeasures OD aD international livel, inch,,!!ng the 
feasibility of , United Nations facility to strengthen the 9athering. collation and 
eKchange of i::o~ation on the financial flov from ~ru9-r.lated funds. giving 
particular emphasis to principles. rules and national lav concerning the protection 
I ... 
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of onaoing lav e~for~ement investigations an~ of in~ividuals ~ith reia~d to 
a~tom;tic processing of personal data. 
71. States should encourage international, re~io:al and ~ational financial 
institutions, vi thin their respective areas of competence, to pay Ipecial 
attention, in their analyses of the economies of States, to the characteristics and 
magnitude of the conversion and transfer of drug-related ~onies in order to 
contri~ute to international efforts aimed at co~teraeting the negative economic 
and social co~sequences of ~~e drug problem. 
72. States shall consider the possibility of ~sing forfeited property LCd proceeds 
for activities to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking. In that context, the 
possible use of such proceeds and property or their equivalent value for United 
~ations drug-related activities shall also be taken into consideration. 
73. All measures and proposals on possible action to prevent the use of the 
banking systems ~d financial institutions for moner lauDdering, such as the 
conclusio~s arising from the study undertaken by·~~e Fi~ancial Action Task Force, 
established at the Summit of seven major industrial nations, held in Paris from 
14 to 16 July 1989, sball ~ made available to all States for information. 
F. Str.aq~h.nin9 ot ~u~i~iel end lase' IY$t.~$, in(ly~ins lev 
tr,to:,ctme;t 
74. States shall, as soon as possible, ratify or aceede to the United Nations 
conventions in the field of drug &buse control and illicit trafficking. 
75. States in a position to do so and the United Nations, strengthening their 
aetion in co-ordination vitb the regional institutes of the United Nationl with 
mandates in this Iphere, sball provide advice and leial and technical assiltance to 
enable States, at their re~uest, to adapt their natioual legislation to 
international conventions and 4ecisions dealing wLth drug abuse and illicit 
trafficking. . . . 
76. States are invited to give consideration to the model treaties on ~utual 
assistLnce in criminal matters and on eztradition, which contain specific 
provisions related to illicit traffic in uarcotic t:ugs and psychotropic subltance. 
an~ are to be dealt with by the Eighth United Nations Couire.s OD the Prevention o! 
Crime and the 7reatment of Offeuders. 
77. States shall encourage international and regional organi:ations to elaborate 
model agreements on co-operation amoDg customl officials, lav enforcement agencies 
and other interelted organs In·the field of eombating drug abuse and illieit 
trafficHn9· 
78. The scope of international co-operation In support of technieal assistanee 
programmes aimed at the strengthening of juticial, legal and lav enforcement 
systems, in particular in the field of the administration of justice, shall be 
extended. Particular attention shall be givtn to the training of persoDnel at all 
levels. 
I ..• 
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79. Measu~es to protect the jucicia~l f:o~ any fo~ 0: exposu~e and inti~ication 
threatening its independence anc integrity shall be stydied a~d promoted. 
EO. 7he United Nations shall act as a clearinq-house for information on training 
pro;rL~~es in drug law enforcement, including training fo~ national narcotics 
agents in investigative methods, interdiction and narcotics intelligence. 
81. Consideratio~ shall be give~ to est~lishing a cap&bility within the United 
Nations system to co-ordinate the provision by States of training and e~ui~ent to 
other States, at their re~uest, fo: their Own anti-c:yg operations, wi~~in their 
territories, to i~~ibit the Yse, interdict the supply and eliminate the illicit 
traffickin; of dru;s. 
82. Since the International Law Commission has been reiuested to consider the 
~uestion of esta~lishin9 an interr.ational criminal court or other international 
trial mechanism with jurisdiction over persons alleqed to be enqaqed in illicit 
tra!!icking in narcotic dryqs across national frontiers. the ~4ministrative 
Co~ittee on Co-ordination shall consider, in"its annual adjustments to ~~e United 
Nations system-vide action plan on drug &buse control reqyested by ~~e Ceneral 
Asse~bly in its resolution 44/141 of 15 Decem~er 1989. the report of the 
International Ltw Co~~ission on the question. 
83. States s~all consider the ap?ropriate~.ss of est~lishing arra~~emer.ts, or. the 
basis of bilateral. regional and multilateral a;reements. which vould allow ~h.~ to 
benefit from o~e a:other's criminal justict systtm in dtalinq with similar 
drug-related offences. 
&~. Consideration shall be qive: to elt~lishi:; a reqister of anti-try; expertise 
an~ services, u:der the lupervlsio: of the Divisio: of Narcotic Dru~s. which could 
be made avail~le to States, at their reiutst. 
8S. ~ review should be u:dertake: of inter~ational and reg10nal lay e=!orcement 
activities f~~ded or sponsored by the United Nations. as vell ~s those of other 
interqovernmental or9ani:ations and r.qio~al arranqements. to ensu:e a coherent 
a?proach to lav e:forceme:t activities vith!n the overall contest of the Global 
ProqrL"'VlIe of Action. 
G. HCI$U~'$ to bl tIkI" 'S'i~,t th- ~:y'·';Qn o· ':rn' &n4 
'!plpsiy'S end illicit tr'·(!~ hy v'I,.l,. a!rsraft 
And ycl-is:lu 
86. States shall consider the adoption of .easurIS. vithiA thlir tlrritoril'. to 
strenqthen arrangemeDts for controlling or _o:itori:; the licit tra:sportatioA of 
narcotic drugS and psychotropic substances, including the yessels. aircratt and 
vehicles being used for that purpose, so as to preve=t ~~eir _ilu.e for the illicit 
transportation of narcotic druqs and psychotropic substances. 
87. Effective .easures should be tak.n to prevent illicit and covert transfers'of 
a~s And explosives and their diversion to illicit drug traffic-related activities. 
I •.. 
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88. J.la~med by the ~~o~in~ li~k between illicit traffic i~ r.arcotic drugs. illegal 
activities of me~cenaries a:ld s\:.bve~sive and terrorist activities. States shall 
take prompt measures on their prevention. 
89. States shall take st~ict measures to prevent private airera!t. vessels and 
vehicles resistered in their territory from eas.siug iu illicit drug traf!ickiu9 
and related activities. 
90. The~e is ueed both for optimum utili:atio:l of existing resources of the United 
Natio~s drug-related u:lits acd for additio:lal resources to ~e allocated to ~~ose 
units ia order to e:lable ~~em fully to implemect their ~L:ldates. be.riDg i= miDd 
their i:lcreased respo:sibilities. 
91. ~ hi;her priority shall ~e accorded to V:ited Nations drug co~t:ol activities 
in the medi~~-term pla:l for the period 1992-l99~ a=d in the corresponding bie:nial 
budgets. a:ld the General Assembly. at its forty-fifth sessio:. is invited to take 
appropriate action in this resard, iD accordacce with existing procedures. 
92. Priority shall be given to providin;. OD bo~~ & short-te~ and long-te~ 
basis. extrabudgeta:y support to e:haDce ~~e efficiency of ~e United Nations 
structure for drug abuse coctrol acd to achieve acd promote a truly comprehe:sive 
~lob~l prosr~~e of eeti~:. 
9). Inte:lsifieation of efforts at the national level ~d incr.a,ed 
inte:90ver:ment~1 co-operation re~uire a commensurate stren9~eniDg of the United 
Natio:s d~ug co:t~ol orga:s and their secretariats. Against this backgrou=~, ~~e 
f~nctionin9 of the United Nations structure for ~rug ~u,e control need, to be 
reviewed and assesse~, in accordance wi~~ the mandate iiven to ~~e. 
Secretary-Cene:al by~the Gene:al Assembly in paragra?h , of its resolution 44/141. 
for the purpose of ide::ifyin9 alternative structural possi~ilitie., the ecd result 
beins the estLblis~~ent of a stronger, more efficient United NatioDs drug control 
structure with enhanced status, vith a report to be made to ~~e Gene:al ~ssembly at 
i ts forty~fl ~t~ .~ss ion. '.. . 
94. Attentio~ .hall be given to ~~e vithin the 
Uni d Natio:s dru -related units and 
non- ieatio: all drug-related ac v' . s across the Un ted Natlons system: 
(Il) integutl .. -re at. infonnation vithiD • :1. ., 
(~) integration of the reduction of illicit demand 1n U~ited Nations proqramming: 
(~) integ:~tion of law enforcement field espertise 1n United Nations programmes: 
(:) compliance with all non-discretioDary obligations ma:dated by the three drug 
control conventions~ and (1) an estimate of resources necessary to carry out these 
mandates s~ccessf~lly. 
95. Hore States should contribute financial and other reso~rces to the operational 
activities of the Vnited Nations Fund for Drug Abu.se Control in order to enable the 
Fund to expand its technical co-operation programmes and to develop ~ operational 
structure capa~le of assisting States in joint efforts on ~e I~regional level. 
I ••• 
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III. FOLL~-Ur KEA~JRES 
96. States sbould take the necessa~y ~easures to promote and implement ~~e Clobal 
Programme of Action and to translate it into practical action to the widest 
possible extent at the national, regional and international levels. The United 
Nations and its relevant bodies ~d specialized ageDcies, other relevant 
intergovernmental organizatioDs and nOD-gove~:mental organizations should extend 
their co-operation and assistance to States in ~~e promotion and implementation of 
the Clobal Pro;ramme of Action. 
97. The Co~ission on Narcotic O~ugs and the United Nations drug control bodies 
should continuously monitor t-~e progress on the implementatioD of the Global 
Programme of Action. and the Secretary-General should report Lnnually to the 
Ceneral Asse~ly on all activities relating to the Global Programme of Action and 
the efforts of Gover~~ents. 
98. 7he Secretary-Ceneral shall, in consultation with all Hember States. identify, 
whenever necessary. a lL~ited number of experts, from different regions of the 
·world. OD various aspects pertaining to the drug problem to advise hi~ a~d existing 
United Nations d~ug coctrol u:its and o~~er bodies and specialized agencies on 
specific issues dealt with in t-~e Clobal ProqrL~e of ~ction that ~ay re~uire 
further elaboration. These experts sball be fu:ded exclusively from voluntary 
contributions. 
99. The United Nations Decade against O~ug Abuse., coverbg the years 1991 to 2000. 
as proclaimed by the General Assembly in the Political Declaration adopted at lts 
seventeenth special session. is a period for intensifyin; LDd sustaining 
international. regional and national efforts in the fight against drug abuse on the 
basis of the measures contained in the Clobal ProgrL~e of Action. 
100. 7he International Day agai:ut Drug )J:)uu and Illicit Tr·aHickiDg, 26 June, as 
proclaimed by tbe Ceneral Assembly in its resolution 42/112 of 7 Dece~er 19&7. 
shall be observed in the continuing effort to raise p~lic avarlness of the fight 
against drug abuse a~d illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
s~stances, as yell as to.promote preve:tive ~easures. 
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APPENDIX D 
C=inee on BL"\k.bg Regcl.a:!oru 
L~d 
Prev~:c:m of c:-r=.:i::.lol use of the bL-..ki.~g 1'r1U::= for ~c. 
p..::"?Ou of coney-l&-.:..~c!e~_-:, 
1. 3L~XS L"\c! other ii. ... L-:chJ L-:st::..:::o:-.s :,~y ~e ~~''''ht:~gly :.aec &.S 
, 
i~te:-:::e:i&.r.es for the t:-i.:.s!er or deposit of !~-:c!s c!e:,ivec! from cr.:.i.~.&.! 
&ct!'.'i:y. Cr_":".L-:&.!s L ... d their &SSOCU.tes use the fi. ... a.. .. c~~ .ys:e: '0 c:.Ue 
pa.'f:ne~:s L-:d trL-:sCers of f'U.."\c!s from o~e &<:COI.:...-:t to a.. .. other; to hlc:!e the 
so!.!ree &.. .. c! be~e!l<:ial o~ersh!? of co~ey; &.. .. d to ?:,ovic!e sto:&&e for 
1:&""lk-notes th:ough a sa!e-de;>os.it h~.ll~/. '!l:.e.s~ ~c:,·itics a.:e c:o::-.::on.ly 
refe:-:ed to &.S Qoney-l&I.:.::IC!e:'i."\g. 
2. ~!orts ~de:-:uen h!the:-to ... hh 'the o:jec:!':e cf p:,e"'en:i~i th-e 
be.. .. ki:'.i syste:'!'l !:'o::: ~e~:~1 ~sec! in th!s "'I.:' ia .... ~ l&:,eir bun u~c!e:-:~i<e~ 
b:: ~\:f!ic!&! L~c! rtl\:.!a.tQ:-Y age:.cies ~: ~~~:o:-.a.l 1:"'~:. H?·~e'·~:-. :~: 
inereu!n& inte~atio::a.l c!i::a:uion of orlL::!,ec! cr..':'.i:::.l &c::i .. ·:::-. ::o:l.b::" 1.-: 
:,eja~ion to the r.a.rc:ot.ic:s t:ade. hu ?:'cr.'l?:ec! c:oll~~orl :;\'e ini:iati'/u :u t::e 
L-:te~&tio:l&l level. One of the earliest .uch initiativu was \.l.."\ceru.ken by 
the Co::,,_":,j~tee of Y.i~uters c! the Co~~dl cf El.::,ope L-: Jun, 1960. In its 
u?crt1 the CO::-~"!".!':tee of ~i. ... iste:'s conc:luded that n ••• the bL-:ki::1 'YS:I::\ 
CL ... pby a rJghly e!!eetlve preve~tive role whUe the co-opentlcn o( the 
1 Meuu:-es &ia.inst the tuns!er L-:d sa.!eluarc:!!nl o! fl.:nc:!s or cr.r.:ina.l 
o:-:&!n. Reeor:'_"':Ienca tion No. R(S0)10 a.c!.:lptec! by_ the Cor.-_,.':t~ee o£ 
!lti:.is:ers of the CO~:'Idl of El.:r:;)?t on l7th Jun': l~30. 
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::1:.its ilio Ll.SUU in :he upr":ssicn of such C:-T...i!".Jl act.! =:' the j...:cic~Jl 
autho:-::ies :L."1C the police". L"1 rece~t yu:-s the issue of hOI: :0 ;:re"'e:;t 
c:-i..~!::J.1s b....:~cedn& :he p:"oceecs c{ c:-i..~e th:-ou.h t~e E~3...-:c!&.! 'i's:e:=t r.!.J 
ut:"acttd increa..sinc ~tter:t:on (ror.! legislative a..:tho:"i:ies. law en!o:"ce::-:ent 
agencies a.-:c ba.-.king s...:?ervisors i."'I a nu.:':Iber o! co~-:t:-ies. 
3. 7he va:,io...:s zutionJl =a.-:itini supe:-visory a...:t~onties re?:"ue:::e~ 
J .' t) , 
en the 3&..Sle Cor:-_~:'tee en BI.:,ki~1 Regw&tior.s a: ... S-.:?e:"··'1s0~;- • ~&c:!,es-
do not have the sa.":1e rotes a..,c! responsibilities i.., relation to the 
s"':pp:"eJsidn of coney-la...:=.ceri."'Ii' 1."'I soce ·co~ntries J'.:per\-isc:-s have :to 
spec:'::c: ruponsi=iHt:1 in :his :ielc!: in ot~'Ie:"s they ':.~'! hiL','e no c::"ec~ 
s;.::,:c:~ess ;,{ :'L.,:-:S :"3.:he:" ::-.3..."'1 t~ e::s..::-e thu i:-.cj·dc',!&.! t:"L-.uc:::e:-.s 
::::c...:c::ec =1 b3...-.k c"o!stc::'.i::"s :tore !eg::!.-:.a:e. ='e·:e:"theleu. c:u?:a ':~e 
:i::i:s ~n !cr:-.e r;oun tries or: t!'leir s ?er;i!ic: res ?cl".sibility. a..!.l =e::.be:"s of the 
Cc::,,::-.::ae Cir.:-Jy beiieve thiLt s..:?e:-vlso:"s ca.-::lot be ir:::!!e:"e:-.t to the use 
=a.~ e of ~L~ks by c:-i.,,:,.i~aJs. 
4. P"o!blic: c:or.!icence in ba.-:ks. a..,d hence their stability. can be 
·.:n:e:-::-..!:-.ed by a~· .. e:se ?1.:~Hc:ity u a :es..:lt cf i::ac!"'e:"a~t a.ssoe!&::o~ 01" 
!:lL-:ks -:.-it!'l cri::"..!~a!s. In acdit!on. ba.-:ks ~ay lay the~selves cpen to ':::ec: 
losses :ro::'l (:-a'Jc. eithe:" th:-ough ::eglige::ce in sc:ree:.!nc uncu:r:l!:lle 
. 
c''!stor:':!:''! 01" ·.I.-he:-e the i::UI:"~tY cf ~:Hi:" o',;'n office:", hu ~ee:: 
___ I .-c -~ .':.... ~a.1. C __ ....... ~ '':.~ .~ • ~ _'.:_ .. __ " •.. : .... .! ~"t •• " .. 
••.•••. :> ••• w. " •.• ~ •• o .. _.~ •• _ • • e .. Jl __ , .•.. 1. _1 .. 1 .••. : I- r .. ..•.•.... ~ ..• 
8e:',e:"!.! :"01e to e::cou::t.~! ethieLl S~L~c!1:"c!S of F:"CO:usio::3.l C=:-.c:!'.l':': ~~.~:':~ 
bJ.nj(,s :L..-:c! ot!'le: fi..,a..,d&.! i:ut::\:~;o:':S. 
5. The Cc::,,_-:'.h:ee believes thu c:o:e v.-&y to pror::ote this objective.' 
Co:-.s:sa:lt v:ith c:!i!!erenc:u i."'I national ~"':re:-visory pnctice. is to obt1!n 
I:: te..-:atio::al ag:-eeme:: t to a S t& te:neM of r:-inci?1u to wh!c!'l !ina.-:eiz.J 
i::stit-.: tions s houle! be upectec! to &chere, 
, 
1 .I.~e Comr.Jttee comj)rises representui\'u of the ce::t:al b&nks a::c:! 
'I.:?ervi$ory authorities of the Cirouj) of 7en countr;es (3el~:'.::n. 
CiLn3ca. F:"ance. Cie:"':."::r. It~:,·. J&?a.,,\. l"'ether11::cs. S'';'ec:e::, 
S':.':t:e:"!~"'Id, t:niac r:ingcom. l'nitec! S:1tU) 1:,.d !.'J~:e~b¢-'::"l' 
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6, 
p:":~d?les -;hich er.cou:"ag~s ba.nlu' C3..~~g~:nent to ?ut i." pl&ce e!:ec~:· .. e 
procecu:,~s t:> c~su:,e th&t &.ll persons conc'.lc~in, busi:'ltss ',I'lth their 
i~s:itu:;or.s &:"e propcrii' ic'e~,::i!j,:,c!; th~t tn,:~nctio~s th&t do not &Ppu:" 
legi~icate &:"c ciscou:"l.ged; &~d that co·oye:";1tion v .. ith l&w e~!orce::lent 
:I.,ene:es is llchieved, The St&U::lel'lt is :'lot & leia.l c!oc~ent L-.d its 
L-::?1 e:::e:'l t:uion will de ?ene on n&ti~:'la.1 ?:"&ctice L"d law. !~ ?&:'':ie~l&:". it 
should be noted th&t in ~om(" :ountries b&.nks m&y be suojec~. to &dditior.1.1 
:nore stringent lega..! regull.tions b this field L~d the Statement is not 
::He:".ced to re ?l~ee I)r cii::-J~is h those re~ ui:,,~::en:s. .....hateve:" the !e g .. i 
i:-:sti:-':-:10r:S oec:>r.J:'11 I.ssoc:a t e! ·;it!". c~::-.i~l1s 0:' bei:'1I'-':uc: as a e::J..~:a! 
:or money·ll.u~cie:"ini' The St&te::le~t is intenced to rei~io:,ce those 
stL~d&:-c!s of conduct. 
I. The superviso:,y authorities re?rese:'1ud on the Cor..-:oJnee 
suppo:-t the pri:'1c:ples set Ot)f In the Statement. To the elCte:'lt that these 
~a:te:,s f3.!.l '.r.-~:hi:'l the co:::;a~o;;;ce o! su;::e:,visQri' autho:,,:ties 1:'1 C!i::e:e~t 
membe:- count~es I the autho:-itih wm rec:ol':'.'nenc L"d e:'1cou:'&ge all bL."'.ks 
to &copt policies a~d p:'&cticu consistent '''''i':h the St&te::'.e:'1t ..... ·ith a \':e'.II 
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Statement of Principles 
BL ... ks ,,:~ci other fi."lL"lci&l L~st:t".:ticns ::l.I.y I.:.~witt::'ily be I.:.sed &s 
L"lter::l!:eiuies for the tr1.:"ISter or ':~?csit c£ co~ey derived £:"Q? c:-:'::-J:.ll 
., -~. , •• '..1,., 'I f I...,.~ :lc:tlVlty. :. •• e l~tentlon :a:l.1."l .. suc: .• t:-~"lS&c::10t".S .s 0 ten to • .lee t •• e 
~e:'l~!idal cwn~:,ship "C :".:nes. 7he ',.ae or the !!."lL~c:ia.l syste::t i."l this ":"1.:: 
is ,,( c!inc:t ~onc:e:-:\ :0 ?O,ic:e ....... ci other lur en!crc:e::tent &ge:'lc:ies: it !s .1Jso -
a.·~tter or conc:er:\ ':0 ba.nid.-:g s".!pe:-.;so:'s u.ci :'a.niu' CL"l&ie:le:-.ts •• inc:e 
?cilc:lu I.:~ci ? ... oc:~ci"'!:u :h:s.t ba.-::<.l: :L-:."e:ents .ho~ci e::s~:,e :l:'e ::. 
plac:e r.tl-1n the!r i:lSti~:iQns 'G.;th a 'l.ie'" to a.uis:L-:1 i: t~e I".!?pressicn 
cf mcneY·!&l.::.dering th:,ol.:ih thl!!: b,;~k.i."l' s}'Ste::!. national L~d 
L"lte:-na:iat".&!. 'The Su.te:e:-.t th\.U sets Ol.:t to :,ei.--.!cree existi."ll but 
p:"1.C:.tic:es &:\on. bL ... ks L".d.s?4'd!ic.!ly. to enc:ol.:.:-I.ce vi,UL"lc:e a'a.L ... st 
cr"::':"-al use of the p&y'me:o.ts 'lste:. =ple..oenta:ion by bL"lk.s of e!!tc:!ve 
services. h:-ticular ca.:'e shc~~ b~ ta.ken to ie!e:ni!y the o .... nership of all 
ac:ccl.::o.ts L-:d thcse ulinl u! .. -c:~at.~<!y fAc:Ulties .• ~ bL"lks should i~stitute 
e!!ec:tive proceciures for obu.i.-:i~1 iden ti!ic:a.tion Iroe new CUltomers. It 
!houle! be L"l expUc:it pcUc:y that silt~i!iC:L-.t bl.:.sinus trL-:sac:tic~s ... ·jll not 
~e conl!uc:ted 1Id:h cus:o~ers ·.,.·hl) f:.!l to provid~ evi~enc:e o£ the!r Scenti:)', 
BL~ks' mL"l:1iemeM s~~l.:l,~ enJ:.;re that b1:sinclI is c:c:'l~ucac in 
ccr.!or:::.it:· ·.r.;:h hl,h et;";c:ll ;,ta.:'\t!uds L"ld that :&~I L-.c! rei\:!ations 
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pe~J.i"U:~i to !i."u""ci&l tn,::,uctic:u an ~e~:d to .• ~ ~,a:d.s tra: ';IC'""ltr'T', " 
e:ucl.!ad on behill of c\!.Stoce:'S. it is accepted thAt b&:"ks z::.ay hl.ve no 
t:lU:'S or k..",o""i.."'Ig ":Vhether the tf3..~sactic:\ st:=..s {room or fo~ par. of 
c :-bi:ou ~:'!ivity, S i:::illl.dy, L"'I L., i.., te:"!u'!:o:-.u cor. '!u;t it ::I.I.y be di!!:c:ult 
tQ ensl.::-e thAt c:-oss-bordel' t:-1."'Isloctions on behill o£ cu.stOQe:-s C'e i.., 
cO::1?li&. .. :e 'lltith the r~,ulat:o:u of L.,other C'!I\!...,try. ~eve:"theless. OL"'l.ks 
should not set out to of!e: services or ilfovide ac:tive us1stL"'l.Ce in 
. 
'!:,a..::nctio:os wl-Jdl they hAve good TeLSO:\ to suppose &re usociated ·roth 
=oney-ll.~cie:,i.. ... , &ctivities . 
. 
,v. 
3a~~s shol.!lc! c':-C??e:,,,a :u;,j'r ·:":t~ ~I.:io:ou :I.W ,,:ofcra::,:e!"'.~ 
a1.:t~o:-it:u 10 the u:te:H pe~Jt:eQ b~' s?ec::::c lcxu :-egclations ::la.:i:01 to 
c:~sto~er c:on!~c::a:&ljty, Cz.:: shodd be '!I.it:n to I.void ?l'cw~C:::01 s\.:::?c~ 
0: UsistL"'Ic:e to c:\.:sto::1e:~ se:~1 to deceive law e::!o:c:e=e:lt ale:".cies 
t~ough the Frovision of I.he:ed, 1."'Ico:=.;:le':. or cisluc!':":"1 ~!or::&tion. 
""'he:e b~k.s becoce a.wa:e o£ he:s which Iud to the reuonable 
pruU!:1j:1tion that coney held on c!epos:t de:-ives (roc crl=.i..,u a.eth"ity or 
th&t~t:-a.."'IS&ctions e~te:ed i::to a.re the:.selves er.:.!."'l.al 1.." pu:-pose, 
ap?:,o?r.~te cea.su:,u. cO::S~Jter:t r.~!1 the 1& .... should be ta.ke...,. for 
e!(!.:\?le. to de~y uSls'!L""Ice, seVe:- re!arlo~s -.;.-ith the eustocer L."e! close 
All bL~ks shol.:l~ fem.&!ly &C:Qj); ?c~ic;ics c:o~Ji.ste~t ~~:h :~.e 
pl"inciplu set out i.." this St~teme:ot L"'l.ei shc~ld e::~un ihu a.ll I:\e::,.~e:-s of 
their sa.!! c;cnce:-ned. whe:ue: locatee!. a:-e Inf~r.:Ied of the bL"'l.k's policy 
in this l'e,l.:-d. Attention shol.!ld be given to sta.!! t:-a.!..""I1."'I1 i.." =atte:-s 
cOVe1"~c! by the St~:ement. To premote ae!he:ence to these pr.nc:iples. 
bL""IkJ should i:npleQent s?eci!ie procecu:,u for customer Sce:\:Wea:ion &'""Ie! 
!er reta.i."'l.inl in'tema.! records of tr&..,u,:ions. Arr&'"'Ile:nents {or i..,,:emu 
audit ft'.ay need to be extended 1."'1 o:-c!e:- to es:abliJh &''''1 e!fective mu .. "S of 
testi::g for' lene:-&! cempliJ,nce with the St&te::lent. 
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APPENDIX E 
Group of 7 Econ(.mic Declaration of 16 July 1989 
(extracts) 
SOllrce: Dc;:.:r~=-:;! rt.' S!alt Bulletin_ Sepltmber 1959 
1) We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major indus-
trial nations and the Pre" id::ilt of the Commission of the European 
Comnunities, have met in ~aris for the fifteenth annual Economic 
Su:n .. ilit. 
Drug Issues 
52) The drug problem has reached devastating proportions. We 
stress the urgent need f~r nctisive action, both on a national 
and an international besis. ~e urge all countries, especially 
those where drug produc~:~n, trading and consumption are large, 
to join our efforts to counter drug production, to recuce demand 
and to carry forward the fight against crug trafficking itself 
and the laundering of its pr~~eecs. 
53) AccorJingly, we resulv~ the following measures within rele-
vant fora: 
• Conclude further bilateral or multilateral agreements and 
support initiatives and cooperation, where appropriate, which 
include measures to facilitate the identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizure and t~tE~~ture of drug crime proceeds. 
• Convene a financi~l -!.t::t". ;ljn task' force from Summit Partici-
pants and other count~ie~ interested in these problems. Its 
mandate is to assess the results of cooperation alr~ad~ undertak-
en in order to prevent the utilization of the banking system and 
financial institutions fc~ ~he purpose of money laundering, and 
to consider additional ~~~ventive efforts in this field, includ-
ing the ad~ptation of th~ legal and regulatory systems so as to 
enhance multilateral ;~di~ial assistance. The first meeting of 
this task force will be called by France and its report will be 
completed by April 1990. 
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APPEf\:DIX F 
Firlancic.l Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
RepO:i of 6 Fek.a ... :', 1990 
s:;.;::.!: F::~:gr. (f C:'-::!':'l;r.:..:'e:r::: :>5'4 L:r.~::l 
INTRODUCT!O~'·! 
Tla Hn~s er S:.:t O~ Ce~t:r.::,.e:".1 ef It"e:! ::,.1;er ir.!!'~!:::.1 ~.1l:e~.s a:'>d :~.e 
r:e!i:e:'>1 ef :~.e Ce::-,::-::lI:;:! of I~.e !"Ie~ea~ Co::-,~\::".j:ics r:-.cl in h:ls in hil)' 1;&9 {or :~e 
(ir:ee:.:!ll~.: ... al !:::-.c::-::: S;.;::-.::-::I. They s:aled :~.1I I~.c '''''. ;rcl:ie:n hs In;~,t~ ~t"u:;::q 
;::cj>cr:ier.s. a~.:! S:IWt~ I~,t \:lit:".1 r.et~ ror ~cdsivt '~~;"" i. ~I~ en I ta:i::.l! 1nd 
i:.:cI:".I:io: .• 1 ~l.!:s. A::-.;::, 0:1'::: Inch:lie:".s Oil cr::, ~::·.tS. I!-.t)' cc:"e:-.t:! , Fi~ .• :".::ll A::ie:: 
Tuk FCla (F ... ir) r:;::-. 5-':::-'::-::1 Parlid;lnu ln~ olher c01:llIrics i:.lelu:rd ill these ;::cl:ic::-.!. 
10 l.!HU l1':e res::!:s or I~.t :~:;,:.:i:n llro!!), \::-.:!era~.en '0 ;::C"t~,1 t1':e \:I:::::.a:ic: o( :~.e 
1:.:,),;:.& I~·::t::-' 1:.~ {!: .• n:;al ir.l:i::::ic:.s (cr t!-.e ;:'!:~:C o( r:'le~.e)' 1I.::!er:::,. l::d :e :;:.s':': 
l~=i!i:~.al ;:::'rc:.::": crf;:~ in t~.:s riej,~, ind\l~;:"\' \!lC a~a~tzljc: cr l!-;e S!.ln.:t::y ,!".~ 
rei1::;:el~ I;·\::::-.s I: !:.~ .• :::t ~-.:ltjll:calle,~Il!!:s:1~,:e. nay ~t:i~c~ \~.~: :~.e (i~SI ::'.Cc:::., 
c! \~!S T.!' F:::: .. :".:1~ ~e ca:it~ ~y rrl:-".c" 1:;4 t~.al i:,s :tiJcn \Ir:~lr! N c::;!c:c:! ~r A~:il 
I;?::!, 
I~ ;~~:::~~ :~ S".:::".~il Pa~ti,i~a:":a (l.:~j::~ Sates, !;;~:. Oc~::a..:Y. :n~'t. 
L'~.;t::! X;:.l~'::l. I:;'~·. CI:.I~I. 1:\~ :~c Co::-.::-.ission cr It-· h::~l:: Cc::-.r:-.I::::.iu). ci,:\ 
ce .. :;::ics (5" !~,::. ~1:~.I::a::~s. 3e1,i;:::-.. L\:u::-'~1:II. S .... l::c:la::d. A~::;a. S~~ a.:d 
Al:s::~E~). "'I:C :::,i:::! 10 jci:\ I~.C Tui: Feret. in or<!.r I.: ell!;:,e ia e:~n:'1 a.:~ a!Je 10 
rdie:t Ihe \jl"'s ,( t:~.,: C~I.:~.::iU ~ar:ic;:l;rly cen:c:::td l:~. cr t.;"i:J ~a::i=~L.' C:;>CI:C::a 
in I~.e r;,~t all:~.H ::-.enlY la .. :"cr::.,. II Ihe M:ier.al ?i ;;.l~: .. !:ie:all,'cl. 
'r:;:.:c t.ej~ t~.c ~:csi~cf'I'y 'of l1':e il!x r:-:tJ.. :>C"c:'11 ::-.ctli:.,s ""cle held ill 
rar:s ~::~ c~.e ::-.t:'.;~., in ~·llh::;'lon. ~cre \~.In Ol.t :-;:::~:td and 1~.i~l)' n~I~.s {rc::l "I:ic .. s 
r:;j:".:sl:ies. b":' c:".re::t::,.t:'>1 ~\I:~olitiu. alld h::k su~;r .. is:ry and rr,;:!a:ory a,c:lt:cs. ::-.11 l~.~ 
.. er~ed le,c:~,c:. The "'o:k or Ihc Tl!k rorct, i:'l itu:r, t:u i::-.~:t .. cd \)0.1 i::c:~.;:icr.al. 
coe~c:;tic:\ h :~c {i,~.II,aj:".S1 melleY h1:ndcri:-.&: cCII:aca "'Ia ts:a~lislltd ~: ... ttn t1~r".s 
~::d 11 .... · t::{er:c::-.c:.1 11:lhcri:iu or r..trnbcr cOi::\Irics. a:"ld • ce::-:~ahc::S:-t c!oc1:~tr.u:io: ell 
r:'lO:ICV Ia::n~c·:i:.& lC:~.:'IiC;i:ts. l;)d t.nior.al ;>Io&:a::-.s IG ;(I~1~31Iht::-. ~.u becn cc::-:~i1td. As I 
res.ll: Tuk Fcra cc·:.:·~::ics hi,·c .hta~)' irn~rC'Hc·tl.dt ;.,~i:lus l;d l!:i1i\y 10 r:,~.1 J"i::st 
:":'\:.::e)' 111.::'l~c:i:.r •• n~ 10 :~~I~ue 10 l1':is t;)d • 
To ra:i1i:;1t 11':e ... ork o( '\he iuk Fc;co, .nd'IO uh '~\'H\:;,e c{ the c:~r::u 
cr in ~1::id;:I~.:J. I~.:H "';:;:::1 ':OI.l~S ""e:& c:c.,:-.j. "hich roc1:)cd ru~;::\c!y e~ !':lCnt)' 
l;:;nc!crir.1 mlisti.'s l~~ rne:h~l. ( ... ·or~~nl • ,rol:~ I. ~rcsidc:\:y: C:.::ed I<.i~'~;::l). CD 11,.1 
~'.ItS1ic~s ("'orld:1 • S::\:~ 2. ~:Cli~t ;)'y : \"'!Ii:cd S!.~·s). 1M! en ~l:=r:-.i!llmi\ive l!ld (ir.l:lc:lI 
CC>OIX:-;:ic:\ ( .... ofk::1 • sr01:~ 3. ~:esiden:y: la!y). Their cc::,./::t~.t:S!"c u~r:.s COIISlil'l:\I 
/:;fl of to":t ba:k&lo1::d r:;:crill or Ihis rc~rt. 'lid or ~ssi~le. rIma .... ork. 
.. ,. .... . .. ' . . . .. .. ,.... 
hii~ir.1 ~~n' Ih:s· sl.l!:)·:u;lial p;c~anii=C', ~ht Tuk re::t rc;oCrt·bcsi:".i .... i I II' , 
Ihcrcqh J r·il,,;:, or ,"', rn"'I'ICV ltYI'I~i~;;I' :;cs.". hi nlt::1 ':ld 'r:'lct}j~ (~l:i J)': Ihen·. it 
":tH:-':S ,lit jl'l"rn'ic~J' j",'J!;;mu',! J"d ~.J';p~,JI :'~\'l.r:' JI·u"v b ='uc 10 cornhl ::c:c)' 
j';.nc!crir.& (r:arl I!): a:ld it dt"oltS iu r:'len ult;)si w : .'11'; c ~··;lld de"elc~::-.cr.:.s 10 Ihe 
fC:::'l.!~Iicn or )CljO!) 't~;~~f,,':l1;£~!, Oil hcw 10 i~.\.,rc .. e I;'e r.a:iccal h,,, I~UC::-.I. tll)o.lMI 
Ihe rolc or Ihe fir.indal srsa=-=. and J1Ttr.S\ht~ ir.una:ior.aJ c~:>t:'1:iclI 'Ilir.1I ~cr.c)' 
lal:nc!erir., (;:UI III). 
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Rrc:::-.::-.I ~.:, :ic~ 
r .• ::-.:trS 
:1 
2 
3 
Iii - R~COMMENDATIONS 
A - G rSn.At. (~::-.!EWO~X Of THE ~ £CO."~~!!,\DAT10~S 
~.:,.y er t:-'e c\:::tlll cjrriCl.:llies i~ i~!(r~:ilio~~1 c~;-era:j::'I i!'l ~r'o:l r.::~:y 
l.',;~~c:i~.1 cu:s are cia"ly or i:')~i:t:tl)' lidad ~it!'l I S:;iCI 2;:;:li:2:io:: or ~a:,.i: H:r::y r'o::: . 
... ·i:!I t:-'e fa:! t!lu, in ro .• ::y c:l.:::tritS, me:ay h;::'\:erl~, is nel t~ay an crrc:".se, a:ld .... ::~ 
i::~',;fficje:'\d:s i:: m'o:l:i!.:cr.1 coo~~l:ien l:'l:! m\lllal Ie,alusis:.l!'l:!. 
$.:::-.e or t~cse cirric;:l:i:s '\O'ill be a!lcvi;:cd '\O·~.e:l t~c "";(:'.:'.a Ce:'.'·:::::::'1 :s i:: 
errc:t i!'l .11 t~.e S:P2:0:Y cOI.::,.tde:, ~riMj;:.!ly ~e,a;;H this .. ;;;Id e;:-c:'l ::-.ere ... idel), t~.! 
~:!~:':jlj:y or r.:"::'o:11 lelal1!!im:.a i:l r.:~::·cy 1;'o::'Idd::, cues. A::::C:::,!y, I~e ,::'0:;1 
\;:,.2:,.b~'o:!sy li:ed as i:.s (int I::o::-.::-.c:-.c!.::e:l t~.H Clch (o".:lrr sho!;ld, .. It,..c"., h:n,:u 
c!111:', I1kt stt;1 I~ (lilly 1=;1c;;'1';1 t}., \,1,::& CCl:tl:tlc:, a: p:xted 10 ratl(rltJI) 
Cen:e::'Ii:., ~a·.~ ,t":~:y, il ...... u 1::,.a:::::'1:'.:s!y al:ed lht fl:&:cI,1 I:s'.!!.t!::s 
1t::tCrl,"'1 shcl.:Id bc ec:cri"C: so IS tot 10 I:hibit 1::;lc=&l:llli=: oC Ihe rtcc:==c:~.&:!::s 
d :1'.:s l:C"~' 
Fi~;ll:-" 1:1 ,((,etltt CO:C)' IaIl:ltrl:C t:forcr::t:! prolrac shc\ll~ I:dll!!' 
i~.;:clSd f:1:1t!h:tal ecepcrlt'''~ tIId =lIlnl It,ll asslsll:CC Ie =c:cr hl:c.!crlq 
i:>clt!il:ic:s Il\~ P:ltCllt!C:.S ui! nlradlllC:lI:I ==:Ir hll=~t:l:, cUtS, ... llttc pcul=lc. 
l'C\·crt~.e1tSS, Ihis :i:cl.:ld nOI'~e Ihe «:old ~:r.1 e( e~: crrcr:.s to n,hl :l':!s 
~"'c:'\c::-.c:'lC:'l. A~~j:ic:'l.1 mn.~"'~S art Mccln:)', fet at I(ut 1"'0 HU::-..! : 
As t".e ~\:r?:se o( I~C Yicr.r.i Cc;) ... ·cMio·:\ is the riShl al:::O:I: d:'.:1 t:"lUi:ki:,., i 
1~:,.e:l1, i:'lcluCir., or COI::st, ~1.:t n:t u:l:':si":cl)', the n,ht a,~i~SI C:I.:I me:HY la,;~~cri~S. se: 
c:l:r.trics co~id h~\e cirric'.:I:;cs if! ratiryi:'1 and implc::'lt:lli:, il (er rc~or.s Il-.U ire nel 
Iclatd to the j:S1.:C cr r.:CMY !a\l:'\<:cri::,. It rc::-.ains crud~l, lIt'h;;C'l'tr Ihe ~irr;cultiC1 r..a), ~e 
le,.1 a:ld IKh~jc~1 srol.::.cs, 10 r.!i(y· a:'\d im~lcmcnllhe Ccr.vcdc:'l (I:l!y and .... i:1'Icl.:l delay. 
. . ... ' . ~: . : .: ... '.:: .. ' .. :,. ,,' . . . 
. '. ~a;jd prc'ims tin tnt issyc'o( mcney lau'nc!c'rinj is ne~esury. He:'!:e, t1'le Tl.!k 
Fo:cc's rec·em=cod.t;er..! ioc'\loor i::-:~m:liSic~i Ih~1 •. :e.il':'lplied b)' II-lis CelwtMico. 
Fw:ller::lcre, eve: 0:\ Illc te'pic: ·rn:"::lior.td ~y tlie Yie::r.l Cc~v't~lje:, it SH::le-d to I~C Irel.:; 
Iht th Iro· ... i:' c!icc:.sion and in:icuiflS allt'a:'elleu or Ihe prc'blc~ or mCM)' bl:~<!e:i::s, 
"'ollld j\!s~i(y 1 rc:::(ei;cr..cnt or iu provisio:s' ii>pli,a~le Ie r.:Ont)' bl.::'Ic!ui::J issucs. 
i . :. • 0-: ... ~: ••.• ,:"':.'0. -.:: ~ •. '':':: •• :' 
.. , ::~:: :. ~:.s.:~ r-:.:.-.. ; .. i..s:.;.; ....... .. 
. 0. . _._ ..... :~.:. •....•.•..••.. -•. - ~.. • 
i;)" ~~-~·;;;i··~~; -;~-~ -i;;c:-;i~' ·fI::t:~~~:i~·;e~ ;~~;;I:~-i~~ -~~-2~-;::;;-;~~id -;; ~~~~~~; -I~-
r:'Ic:t I}.e re~l.:ia::-.tnu or Ihe Yienr.a Con.vt~lic!\. So, Ihe lc!e~licn o( I~.e p:opeu.!s ~d 
recc:'!'\mcn~.:ier.s or Ihe iuk FMCt ~e,;ld not IlKcm:ily cc:sli:ute (,;11 cem~lil:lce ... j~" Ihe 
c'::l:i2Iie:-.s 1!~\.::'\td ~y iu .... rM_:~.:c.~~~:riC".s·.u 'r'l:tic~ 10 t~.c V.~. Yie:r.t Cc::\t:t;o:. 
365 
4 
5 
A~,! C:iS:~t:l!'1:~' ~et~tt~ na:iC:O.ll r.-leU~~tS 1~ r:,~.: ~.'~e)' :a".:!"~t:i:"., CI:-' ~e 
::Ie~ O)~I~~::~;!Y cy l~l::j,k:·I .... !\~ "'o~l= ~:'t IlIti: la~~~f:;'" :!':a~.-.f:l I~ I~.t ::;;~.:::el l~~ 
(j:a:'\:ilJ s:sa~.s .. ~ea riO or -.e.it rt,u~l:i;.:".s Cl:H C:'\ t~.!S ~.l::ef. r:".ak;~1 ::-.:~: ~:fri;.:: :!-.t 
c::e::i~~ cr rvnc!s Or 'ri::li~.al ori,in. To I'ei:! lo:h a rjlk. I~CSC r.a:;c:o:al I:':nl·~::S. ~l::i:~:l:!) 
11I:IC ::r.a:~i~., Ihe cnri,~~,. cr rin.neial ins:i:;;:iolll. lIa-e 10 toe ,=n""e: in a loa1 I~.a: 
l::.:;j~s t.:=,CI'l l~e e:-.!u.:".:tS l~., 6tul >~:'t::"\e~t or Pdnd:trs. ':'I~ := be hl:::\er:i:e::! in ''''.e:r r.".:S: 
~:l::inl Il,e::s. "'~.i:h il ".:! ~rc ... i":d (=r ill I~.C S:a:c::Ic::I. 
ell Ihese h.stl .... ·r r:~=::-.;:'IC~:! a::i:1I la;1 I~.at. in 0":: ~iew. c=;;ld c;:'II:i:;;:c a 
::Iill;::Ill I:l~:!a:d in Ille (j,1I1 Ilainl: rnol'lCy Ia;;~:!crin" (or Iht c:::llt:iu ;1::i:i~I::nJ ill I~.il 
Till: ro::c, U ,.,ell U (er o:~.cr countries. Sol:'lt or Illese re:Q::Irnc:I:!I:ior.s urie:: Ihe "iew or 1 
I:':ljorily or c!c:cla:cs. n:lIer Ihan ulla:li::,:il)" 10 Ihat IlIe)' la nOI lir::i:t:! 10 llle .. ukcn uil:i:'ll 
1=1'~lioll in Illt ~l::i,i;:.:in, c:'l~.t·icS en n:lI ::~ic. CutS .... lll:1 • r::inorit), hcl:! I li,!!i!'i,,!!::) 
cirrt:,::1 "i,w art also rnr:l:iol'ld. A:::rdir.I!)', .. 'Ie cinir::als:al'l:!ard ..... U::'t:\::\C~.d can be 
"ie .. =~ U ra:lIe:' a::-.~iljo~. l'e.,::lIclclI, il s!\olllC: iD no "'I)' prtYI::1 jnc!i .. ic;;al c:\l:l::ies fro::: 
ad:':ll:::, or rr.l:n:ai::i:'ll more 1::inIC:l: rnClllltCl Illir.1I r::ont)' Ia::llc!erilli. F;;r:lIc::I:.t., U 
1:'::'1\;;- la·.n~c:i:., Ic:!I~i~~:s eyol .. ,. IlI!i-::-.:IIC), h;;lI:!t:i:!, r::ns\lru m~l: ev:.!>e 1:>0 : c\;r 
rc::.::\::-.e!\~a:jo::, ... ill O)r:.h~l)' ,~ud ~:i~ic ru'·alijl:io:l. 
TlIclt l::icn S::~I lpillll t:\e:.t)' Ia;;:::!e:i:., roc":l Oil irn~t:vc::e:a or r.a:ic:li 
Ic,al '~·S:C!'!".I (S), .~,~.all:c::.:::t or Ille role or Iht rillallcial 1)'lItm (e), I:ld Ill. 1::c::,:lIl:li:I of 
ir.:c::-.a:ie::a! ::.e;lCfa:ien (D). 
B - 1.\ir~v'·['\iL"T OF !'."TIO~A1. lEC.~!. SYSTt.\IS 
,0 -:CHBT ~fO:-LY l .... 1:!'-"£~I~Ci 
[It!! C:W::'I IlI~uld take IH!! IUlIurel, ., 1111 k Iccllla:7. IDcly~II' 
1.,IIIaII.c ocrs, 10 ,:a~" it 10 erlr:lcalll.l ~:uI lDou111W1~rtl:, U lit hr:lI II Ill. ·t'luH 
COD" :lloD. 
HC"'C"H, Illt i.'J:I~dll' or c!f\;1 mont)' is rttt;:u:::e!), uI:xia:ed "'i:lI :1I. 
Il~=d::i::, or olllu cril:':i.~tl Pto:tc~s. Ci'cII Iht dirricIIlty 10 brill I e.jdt:la or d:'.:, :-.e~.,)' 
12;;:\de:i::1 l:le:ifinill', a:: etlCnli:'1I or I~.C S::~t or Illis Orrt::". ror illl~!\:t 10 lilt r:e,: 
serio'.:s or:t::w. su:lI U 1:::11 lrl!(ickir.l. c:: .• mi,!l1 h:ili:aa ia prou:lllion. 
AC=Qtdir.,!l'. tlell eoval,y ,~o~ld coulel., u:n~ID' Ill •• rrult or dl"JI 1:0.,,, 
!'v~~trio, 10 -=1 O:IIff crir:u ror -lalcll III ... \I • Illk I. a,,:alles: II Ilterull-t .,~r:a:lI 
II 10 cri:i:lliu !:IOlf7 lavn~uill burl! 01 11I1I,lou, .rhulI, a:eI!or CI III OrrllUI I~'I 
,Ucrlte I li,:Hieul UlIOvol or pro.<t'~I, or oa cattai. urlOYI .rr.uII. 
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T~: ,~o;,;~ li'::~ :~,;:. u p~:.i~d I: Iht \'11::1 CC:',::I", Iht ofru,oW o( 
=:=«1 IB:dldq IlI=wl~ ,;;11 II 11111 10 k:: .. I:~ CODe1 Ilw~~,d:, &:11.11l', lotlw~ll' Ibt 
c:::.;1 Ill.! b:wlr!I' 1:1) h, I:~II"~ (~c= o~:fC:!" (,:: .. 1 elr:.=s!.::rs. X::-,e ~::ql::1 
c::-.~;;!~: t~6t t~,: Cr:e~.H cr j,',c:-.!;' r2 ... ~:e~::-.' )~:o;!~ ,: ~':~~:":~ :~.: v;c:,,:".a Cc:".~:::j:: =:-. \.. .... :S 
j)oi:.1 10 t:i:::::,;li:: 1:::-i:)' .. ~::: I ~or.ey h'~~.~::e: .),0~1~ ~.IYC be .. : Ille t:i::,.i~a.J 0::,:: er 
\~.e h'.I~~c~:~ r·,::-.~s. As 1:::3~y i.".e!"i:jo:'it~1 a f:w ;:'.::"'.::ics .... :'o:i~ i~;-:tc c:j~i:,,;ll s.:..:;:;;:-.s 
r;r :lIJ!:,:~1 r:',;:.ey h;,;:\~c:i~, 1::'''i:)I. 
l~ l~~::io:\. I!le I::'.:' re::::',::-,:~~J I~.U .... !lcr. ~olll~!t, (:r~r&llc:, 1~1=1I!.t1 
-::1 0::1 1~lir 1=;lc~lrI- .h=wl~ b. IlIb;tCll~ erl::!:lIIlI~i1II1. 
TlIe Yic:'::1 Co:\'c:I:ic:I ~::"i~u i~t ~f' ,iiic~.11 ~cu'.::u I:\~ c::lris:l:ic:I i:l 
t;.JC or c:~;:, l:orii:ki:, l:\~ h.,;~.;!.~i:\, ~r <!:'.:, ~~~.'/. ThUt r::cu'.::es arc a lIe:e~y 
t;:\~j:ic: 101:: errr-::i'" r.&~.1 1&1::\1\ <!r;:1 ::1:'1\(7 1.-'::'II!c:::,. flo~':ly bof:I\l1t thty fl:ilia:c 
l)le c:r-:.:i:: or w~.:c~;u l~~ .a!j> rdlla I~.t ri:-I!'>;ill 1::~:::'c~UJ of ::Ioncy h'.::I~t~i:\,. 
A:::r:!lqly. tow:l:lu Ihowli! I~o;l :.uvru 11:ll&r U 11Ios.c III (or:~ I. Ih. 
"'ItH' Co: • .::ln, U :'7 k ItCtIlH7, laclvill" 1.,!II,:l.t Uti, 10 tI,~lt 11I.lt co:~II:1 
8 I~:!lorltlrl 10 e::ns:.!t )r:~r:r hVl4crtd, ,,:>O<,..;U r,o=, lutrv:u:.allilu wud II 0' 
1:1,=~.4 ror vII II Ihe e==:I:.:!OI or a:1 :::'1 h.:~tI!:, or~,:It, or ,rc~rI7 .1 
torrCl~oo~I:, .. IVI. 
5.,11 II'IIIIWIII I~,:.~d ic:!v~1 I~. ,.llIe,iI7 10: I) i41:tif,. Irlll • .:4 ""W':' 
Fre,tllT -lIi:h is 1~~j,C1 10 c::risallo: : :) CII~' ovl F, •• hl:,,1 C'IIWIII. Ivella (ru:::, 
a~d lIi:i:r. 10 ~rl"~la~, (1I1i:,. 1/l:.f.l. or 41&~.1I1 01 svch Fr.~t:I, ,~d 3) ta\, a:l 
,;~r:;'!I:c i:'u::1.:i" roalf\lrts. 
h I~~i:i;a 10 co: nICl:lc: I:d cri::I:.1 lI:c:I::I, towclrill aho ,1I,wI4 tc:li~rr 
11'10:1:&:1 1:4 ci,lI ,.uhill. I:~/O:' prlXlI!!ql hclv~h, cloll ,rIXII41',I, 10 '014 C:llIJ:!S 
1:lcr,4 br ;ar:ill, ... lIer. prtl .. kuor or IlIow!d hl.t b:"1 th" u • I/lvlt or t~t u:tract, 
I~. II,:, "c.ld ~t ~rtl,,~I,d b 11.1 '~11I17 10 11:0'11 11uHl,1 cl,I:I, t., .. 11Irov,~ 
earisClli:: or c:lItCllo: or n: .. a:d ~ulll.~. 
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1:1 a~~:'mir" ;~e iu~j~:t or mOMy h~:'I:!cri~,. ~!II i~ou~' IIu kt~t i:l :lin~ Iht 
n::mit), t~ .... ril1\ Illt i~~I;t or its, re:om~cnc!l:io!'l: 0:\ finl:'l::al i:lI:ilutions, and 10 prcur-c 
Il'I: crricic:lt o~crl:ion or nltio:al a:l4 in:erna:i~_'t! (jlllncilIIYSU~S, ' 
Tile entry or cull into Ille Cina!l:ill syslcm is or crucial im;>cr:ance 1:2 Ille e!r\ll 
mO!lcy h"::I<lC:inl pr:x:css, Tllil may oc:ur Illrollill Ih. rina:'lcial .YSUr:l (blllks a:\d OIlier 
ri:u:\:ill ir.s:itlllioru), l!le! als~ Ihrollsll ctmin otller prormions du!ici -itll c~lI, _lIie1\ 1." 
u!lrr,'JII:d or Vir:1I11ly IInuSlllatec! in ml:ly cOII:llrics. 
A:;:lr<li::,ly, lilt rtcotll:uldatlou 12 10 29 or IlIll pa>cr sllo~ld .~,I, ul 011, 
10 bl2'u, b~t .Iso 10 Do:-bnk fiDUCial lutll~llou, 
For mui::',\1~ c~rt::ivt:ICU, thclt re:c.mr:u:I:!uio:ll nud 10 cover u r:L~y 
cr,l:lin:ior.s U possi~le 11Iit re:eive II:SI value cuh pa)'~e:lu in tile cOline o( I~,eir bl:.S:nes:s. 
Thc:rrQfC, Ille I~~ro~,ia:t 1I:loul Iwlllo,ltitl shuld lah IIt~1 10 ulur. 1~1111I_ 
rt:=:::=I:~,:iO=1 Ire 1r:~le=e:td OD LI broa~ " 'ra: &I" ,ratlcIlI, ~III~II. 
!'e"e::!ltless, u:cssivc vtrillio~ amor.: lilt IIllional Hs:i ror 11Inc DOr.·~,:1t 
rir,,~:ial ir.l:il:':lionl a:'le! other prorcssions duli:lS -illl casll, .lIbje:1 10 Ille (ollo"'i::, 
re:~~~e:le!l:iQIIS, could pote:'ltially ra:i1iu:c tIlt a:li"i:y o( mOlley la~n~crcn. To avoid Ilm, 
so~e deltllttS prefer tllll a COr:l::lon, miniml:~ lill o( Ihese fina:'l:ial i~:irJlior.l ud 
s:~=rcssicns be a::c~td. by all Ihe COI:III:ics, As e um~les or nOIl-bl:lk (illa:l:ial il'.Iti!'J!iCIIS, 
U"ill,1 sO(ic:ics inclll~ill' poml savillls .ocie:ies, loall .:x:iuitl, bl:ildins societies, It:\lri:)' 
b~ok::s ln~ dulers, cadi: Cl'~ cl>m;:a::ics, clIt:k c~lIcrs, Irlnlr:lille:-s o( rundl b), witt, mooe), 
c!uIII::. I burUl:l de challie. ules (jnln:c c"m;:llliu, CO::SI:r:let loa:l COm;ll:lics, leui!ll 
c:::,,;:a~iu, rl:lorins com;lanics, a:le! SOI.d deutrs ... c:c meMioncd. 
It wu a,red thlt, a .. orklal ,rup ,1I0vU hrtllcr tllCllu III. possibility .r 
tI:.~lillli=, I COClCloo ClIDiClalllllOr 101 buk fiAuC1a1 hl:llvllocl u4 other ,M1rUllul 
dulle, .. ith cLlII subJ'cI 10 IlItll "c:>c:=u~:lou. 
CrllciaJ io Ihe riSlIl llllnS! money 1~\lnde:iIlS Illrolllll Ille (inlnciallys:cm, a:e 
Ille a~ilifY or fi:lociaJ ir.slif\lIio~ 10 screen IInC!csin~l. ClIs:omc:-s, '!Iii L\. l~iIilY ror law 
cllro::eC'lC!l1 1'J:lIoritics 10 cond'Jcl Iheit t:lquiries on the bui. or rclia~l. clocumcMI '!>olll Iht 
lr1nla;tioQs a:le! Ille ie!eA:ity or clit/l:S. ' 
H:llce, rlDucl.llutltvtlou .1I0uld 101 k .. , .... ,1I0VI ItCOVIU I' ICCOVSU b 
ob.lovll, flclltlou DICIt! : IheT Illouid N rt~uire' (117 laW', " rt,vladOIl, " IS'":lIIU 
bet-'ID ,,,~tThor7 IVlho,lt1u 104 nlllCla; iUI::~II,," or " wU.",vlalof'7 l,r"lIl1:' 
a=oo, rlAucl.1 1IlIllvlloll) 10 Idlltlf7, II :1l1 hila .r &I .rnclal 0' olhr ,.lIabl. 
lc!utlr7loS docuccal, ud record Ih. Idtlll17 .r thtlr elln", .lth., o<culolll .r "".1, .. lIu 
utablhhla, bUllulI relatioal or COo4uClIa,lrullcllou (II ,artlnl" .,..lal .r accoVlts,or 
plllboo\., tatcrhs hID rlduc"r,. Irllllctioll, fllllo, or ur.."OIIl HUI, ,.rtorcala, 1111' 
ClslllraCllcllul). 
F\r.':!ler~"rl, layerina o( flllldJ oi illicil c:ilill is orun fa:i1iu:cd by nOr:lillH 
2::ounu ill Cir.an:ial ir.J:it'ollions I:\,:! slllrell~ldilllS in com~l:lics, "'lIe:l beneficill ownenlli;l iJ 
d:SluilC~, 
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HI:'\:t. rinloci,1 iOltitwtioClllIowlcll&lt rtllocl~l, CllIIHfI 10 ob!li: 
I~rotr:l:io= .~out t~.t ItVI i~lctilr or Ihl p'tlOel OD ""ou blllair &:I lCeovel il 'lIl~d Ot I 
Ita~IHtloc is to~ducl,d tr Ihl~1 Itl ICY dou~IIII to ,,11111111 Ihflt cllull or CVI!OI:HI la 
Ccl I::i:l 00 1!lIir 0-: behllr. I: ~lIlicvl&r. 10 lilt clIe or clor.:lcilillY cor.:~a:ill (i.t. 
i:l:itutic:l. tOljlOtllio:l. rovo~l:ioQI, Itvl!S. !Ic .• IlIlI ch 101 tonducl aay u=:crdal Ot 
ca:vracIOr!O, bUli:11I or lor ollllr rot: ci tc,:=e~dll o~tr&tio= I: III. cov:lr7 "llfre Illtir 
relilterld orrier II localtd). 
Finl=cIIII=s:ltVllo:1 Ihovle! clllt'!I, ror IIltlll rbl )tlrs, IIIltCUllr7 
rtcOt~1 0: 1:&:II:tio:l, bath ~==tI:lc or hler:ltlull, 10 Hllll. Ih,= 10 cor.:~17 ,wl(:17 .. ith 
lorOr:ltioQ rt,VIIII (roc Ih. co=~elul ,wlhorllill. ~c!! rt:ord, I:vlI b. Ivrrtclt:IIO ,er=it 
tccocstruttlol oC 10~i.iclulllrl:IIC1lol1 (hclvdfoC Ih. l=ov:1I l:dlYPII or cvrrut7 III'ol.tel, 
If 107) 10 II 10 ,ro.idt, Ir Itttlllr7, •• Ielnct rot ,rolttvllu or crl=I,,1 behl.lo.,. 
FiuHI,1 1:lIil.llolI Ihould \fI~ rtCot4.1 01 cvlloc::cr Iclcattrlcalloa (e.,. 
co~ill or rrettell or .rricl,IIGI:tl(lCIIIOI 40evc:tau llie 'lu~oru, IcluIII7 card., IItl.l:r 
lIernlcs or II:::ilar clocu:nl.), IBowal flIu ue! bWlluli cotrujlolduCt ror II lUll rloe 
)11/1 .Cter Ihe a:t=wol Is clcud. 
Thtll ~Ot.=utJ IIIovld bt 1·.i1a~lt 10 clo=lI:k CO=jlIU:1 ,vlllorhill, I: I~' 
cooterl or cli=lul prolltvlioOI I:d 1:'1111,.11011. 
I~e!\:i!iea:i=n or c:.:s:omcn il ,e~,a!\y ==1 11Imcit:l\ 10 ,now ri::l:::ill 
i::s:il'o:tic::s l:1e! I,w e:lrorcemc:1I a:.::lIcriciu 10 ~,:e:: 1::lpiciol:l Ir1nn:lic:ns. 
He:l:t. fI:IHhl Inllllulloll sllovld "7 l,e:I&1 Iflntlol 10 all co=pln. 
v:~lv'" larre IllftlHIlou, ud III v:vlWlI p.'It!U IIr lra:llttlnl, .. lIlell ha •• 10 1;~IIt:1 
Ho:om;e Dr .hib:e Iawr.1 ,vr~OIt. Th. h:\lr~u:~ a:4 ,urjll:u of Iveh Irlluetlnl 11Iovl~, 
lS rar .. pOIlI~lt, be ... =Iud. Ill. fledhl! tIIa~lh!lti I. wrllllr, a:d bt 1 •• II,lIl. Ie )ul~ 
I\lpcr.il~rl. Ivdilors a:d I ..... :rorel::le31 ',tlellI . 
... ·lIere ri:ll:l';ll inlli:\:lic:l1 S:':I~:1 1~.1: (\::I~ lam (rom' crimi::11 .;th·il~. 
h::k u:rt:y rules or Oilltr prjyaey lawl ... hiell ':t prcsc:::ly c:lror:ce! in I:IQII c~\I~lritl 
~:Qhi~il 11Ie::: IQ rer'Or! Iheir 1::I~icionl 10 Ille CQr.l;-c:t:ll '\I:hQritiu. ThIlS, 10 ,,,oi<l l:ly 
i:yolycme:1 i:l money h-.:oderi:lC optf"1:ionl, III.y hlY, 110 olher clloict. in Illat cuc. III an 
c!e::yinl lJlis:a;c, seve:i:l' teluions a:le! CIOlillll:;OIl:l:s ill a::ordance withlh. lu!. 
Slllcmt:ll or Princi~ICI. The CO:lJc~ucl\ce is l.'lIllhtu (11:14.1 call now 11IrouIlI OIlier. 
U:lC!cttcteJ cl:a!\ncls; ... hi:lI ... culd frumte 1!1l .((oru or c:mptfenl luthorities ic Ih. (jllll 
a,ai~1 l:Iooey lll::lderill,. 
To ,"oie! Ihil rilk, Ihe (Qllo .... ::I' prillci~le Illouid be u:ablilh~ : IC rI .. ael,1 
IUlllvllou IUI~CI 11111 ruad.J lIul (roes a crI=I .. 1 a:lhlt7, 111f7 Ihul' be perllilled Ot 
16 rr,vlrtd 10 reporl pro=,117 1~.lr 1V1~lclOIJ 10 I~i CO.~I .. I Ivlh,ldtl. Accordla,17, Ihcr. 
I~ovld be le"l pro.lslolI 10 proltcl rrlllclall,,!llvllou "' Ihel, nl,107"' rIO. crlmlul or 
cl.1\ lI,b1ll17 ror brlle!! of 117 rulrlellOi .. ~1"IOIvrt or \ahr.ltlOi 111,0..-4 '7 coalract or 
b7 1D7 hChl.tI •• , "cvlllol7 or Id,.hlsltltlr, ,ro.\sIOI, Ir Ih'7 tI~rll. ,004 raillt, h 
dllcloslo, IUlpt(le~ crl=I"I"II.117 10 Ih. co.~lnl Ivlhrltltl, .... tr Ih'7 h •• &01 howa 
precl"!7 _IIal Ih. udtrl71a, crl=lulacl!.l!r ... u, ud re,ar~:'u or ... lulhet IIhC.llClhll7 
aelVlll7 oecured. 
There is t di~cr'ln:e of o;:illic~ wi!\ill Ihe Tuk Fer:. Oil ... hether 11:1~i(iol:l 
a::ivity re;x:rtin, should be ca:lChlory or pc:::u.si~e. A rew c~l:nlliu llIon,17 bclic~e 11111 111:1 
re~orti~, l~e',/l~ be m111~1I=ry. ~ui~ly rtI:ri:l:~ 10 1\:I;li:iol\S Oil uriolll crir:i:ll I:li-iliu, 
a~d ""ilh 1~:::i!\!l:f"1:i.c ullc:ier.1 'Ylih~le (or r,:I'.I:C Ie ur'Ort. 
369 
0" :'::.' •• ' 
17 
18 
19 
20 
If f;~.i~c:al i="stit\;t;o~s. 1Io~.le r:':iki~a I"'elf rt;orts. lIoa~~t.:l al tile sa~c li~t 
t~,tir ':;!lC~.C~I. I~.e efrecl m;,~.1 toe s;::1;!ar to I rtf~sal to ~.a~c:e t~c I~!;e.:ed f~~.:s. lI'Ic 
!.;!;t::c~ :\;!:ome~s a~ . .:1 I!'\eir {U~=I 1Io~~;.:I n, .. tlllo.,!! ~ncc:r;ted c~.a~~.c!s. 
Htr::e. (lclOrlll IC\lII~tloH. Ih,lr dlrtClcn lad rlllplo)" •• showld 101. or • 
.. ht" aHro~rlalt. Iho~ld aol bt IlIo-,d to. -IrD Ihtlr (~Ilon:rn -h'D IDrO'lIIallol rtlllle& 
10 Ih'lII II brinl r'porltd 10 Iht con:ptlui 1~lbo.III ... 
h Ih, (1st or 1 lI:acc!IIO" rrponici ')11'111. or I. Iht (lit of •• ol~allry 
rr~ertlnl I~IIUI .. hrr, IHroprllu. (IUDrllllulll~llou "portlal Ibtlr ,wlplclou .howle! 
cOl1:pl~ -llh IOllt~cllocl (rolll tht (Oltptttal a~lhorlllti. 
10 ccualritl .. Iatt 00 obllpllcD of rrP<lttlcl thrw 1~1~lelce. ullI. -btl • 
fieae,:allcstil"lioa d"rlcpl IUI~lclccl ab.:>ut oprratlc .. or I ,.,Ieecrr, lid _lin Iht fielcc,Ll 
inllil"lloD (hocu. 10 =Il, DO ttP<lrl 10 Ih' (Oll:ptltll IUlhorllltl, 1Ilbo.ld dUJ UlhllCct 10 
Ihis ,ulleee", rr.rr rrlilicol -llh him led "Cit hi. acco~oU. 
T~.e '~:.;I a!so ~il::;s!d "'~,il a::iens (i~.ar::ial il'\l:i: ... :io~s sllo~ld uJr.e .. ~.e:l 
:-,t) ;ea~~ {::::l :;:':".;CIC:'II a;:I~.cr::;es. C'C:l in an ir.ror~.al "'ay. I~.al er:~ir.al s:rOoae~j:". 
;~:!":;~, jr:tcr~.alic~.al ~vl;:al L!!;lta:'la rec;.cltS a:'ld,'or a~;ro;r:a:e (ru::'.1 orc!e~. L" 
.. cr::i~, or i:t':r:'Iincr.l. F;:rt~.er eUr:'l:~a:ien of Ihe ir.lri:aa le,al lrld ;ra;:i:al U;otc:,s or Ih>J 
c;'.;e!ti::I IIoc.!d be \:sd\:1. 10 a,ei~ I ::a~.at ... ~e ",·i:h:!ra"ll or r\;n~S "'hi:!! "'cl::d I:ndl:ly 
j~~air the 'rimir.al ;oro.:Hc!ir.,s. 
Starr i:l n~.a:"ial i~.s:i:"'lic:":s a~e still cr.!)' l:elir.r.ir.l. ir. r:'I:SI :O\;:'It~;tS. to 
~e:=~.e 1".:C or rr.c~.e)' la\:llc!eri~l. This is c{ ,rell he:" to mc~r) la;;:~e:e~. 10 scr::e 
::\;~.tt':es. ccrr.;:!ie':)' or sarr ma~ ~ a!so a ~rotlC::1. 
HCrl:e. rteaDellllDIIII~llcDl Ihovld ele.clop prCIraCOI l,llOlI n:car) lawoel"lcl. 
Thrlt FrcErl!:' Ihollid IDellleI •• U • IIIloiclIlII : 
a) Ih. clt.tlcFllltDl cf laltrul pollcltl. proctc!lIrra aod (oal,ol •• loelwellel lb. 
c!rsiEclllco of (olllplluct oHlcrrs II IUCalrCltDt It.rl. led a~r~wal' ItrrtDICI p,ocl'dllru 10 
HS."t hlEb lucc!ard.J -hn hirici tecplc)rrl ; 
b) II OOlolcl 1=.10) .. Ira!clel "ccrul 
t) II Ivelll (wotllol 10 luI Ih. Stili •• 
.. - MCI.Hi"CJ to '::1 .. -jib the b·,..~t'm pC c;.~.tj:C' .. ·ilh :')0 cr :l"'!j.jfCj;jcer '''I; m"·cy 
ll.n¢c·j-, "'-CZJ;.:"ct. 
The strer.ltheni~1 of Ihe ri,hl ala.ir.S\ money laur.dcrir.1 in some cOI::llrics ecu:d 
lead 10 • sim~le mo'e or Ihe moee)' lauederir.1 channel •• 10 cOl:ntries ",ilh ir..surricirci Inctley 
Ilullderir.1 meuures, io • ~ro.:ess akin 10 rcaulalor .ho~.,i:l. 
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o:'>:s : 
• this nJ~ ... ·oul~ be laun~c:e::: :hr:\'l~ I~.e ~~~.:stie tormal or ir.ror:'::al rir.;:.:;&1 
s~sam c( th~st 1I1\e~S ; 
• the S\l'eIC~lIer\l sale "'QuI:! be I reaml or thell la\l:\C~ered r\ltl:!s 10 re,'.III:d 
cO~1\Irics ... ·i:lI n!e ~11:ement o;;-crtur.ities. ~I~:ic\l!lrl)' IlIroll,lI wire In:urers . 
.... lIile Icyt:ti&l'It)' ~rinei~ICI mlie il l!irriclllt 10 ~revenl III is I),;oe or 
~is~ll;tme:a or mO:ll)' h\lnc~tri:'\& ellillnels. lnd otller 11',I:lderir.& o;oeruiol\S I:li:\1 fCI\lII:ic:\ 
III"e~s. Ille rollo""i::, principles 1II0lild be s~plitd b,. (ir.1:\;ill illltilll:iol!s in relll!l:d 
cO:lntrics : 
• nCl~clal hs:llwlloDi sllould Ih. s~"laltutlOi 10 hsl .. " relallns .,~ 
lauHtlo:s ,,1111 pe/lOU, hcludlol co=plIlu .ud rhucl&llallllwlioas, rto= nuurles .1Iie~ 
~o 001 or Inswrtiei':ll: a~pl: IlulI ttcol:=u~&tloas. Will:"" IlleSt Iraaucllou ki.t 10 
a;'lIt:1 Hoao:ic or t\SI~lt h"ful ,wrpolf. Illelt backllovad nd ,ut~St sllovld, u ht u 
possilll" be uamined, lilt r;c~ic,s Clla~lIlllCd III .tltl:l. a:~ bt •• allallit 10 IItlp S"~t.\son. 
a~dilors I:d la" edorel=ul altadt!. 
• rluorhllllllllvllou sllovld 1111'" Illat Ibt ,thelplu anlloltd .!>o., Irt 
&ho a~pll,d 10 brloclles lad =IJotll: o"ud subsidiarIes 10cl:,d &~tud,'ts~:\aIl7 II covltrhs 
.... lIicll to ul or lu.rnclul11 aHI1 Illeu rrcoculIul!arloli. 10 lilt Ulnl Ihal locil 'Hllca~ll 
ta ... s Illd ttlulllions per:lI. Whn local 'Hllca~lt 1a". ud "11I1.tlolII ,tolllllll 11I1a 
l=pl,=t~lalloa. eor:~tle:1 IVlllorllltlla 1111 t~II::r7 of I~' 1110:1111101111111101 slsol/ld \t 
I:(or:=td hIli. riHoci.llas:llullo:s Ihal 111'7 cuaol .~;11 Illtst UCO=IIIUI!I:loaS • 
.... i:lli:\ Ihl ':)l'I:UI or rch:ior.J be:'~'c:n rc,1I1a:d Ind IIn:CI1lla:ed COII:'::;U. Ille 
S:Il~" or a system 10 mOllilor cull moyem.llu It Ille bor~cr is or S~t:ia1 im~mll:c (Ste pci~1 5 
herc:ln~H). 
11 ... ·u reeolnlucf 11Ilt Ille stalt or ~r".I'S cull r:loyemcMs ~I""eu cOI:::riu is 
crlleial in Ihe dlle:lion or money h:lll~c:il\'. A rew delcla:u mon,l,. sll~PCtl the ~r:~nl 
Illal a IYSltm or repon:=1 or alliaral inlCrna:ional Irlftlpomlicns or CllruDey or cull 
tQlliyale:t bCl:H instrll::unu 10 , domutic c.:tnl Ilencr witll a COQPIIICtiud c!a:.a but 
availa~lc 10 dOQutic j\lc!ieial Of I ..... enrorClmC:1 alllilorili" sllo\lld be tI:a~lisllecf ror I:Ie i:l 
::Io/ley lao,:cdcrinl CUC1. hI 11'I~ oj)inion is 1101 sllaree! by Ille. ~Ijotity or Ille .rOlli>. 
l"evc:":lIelm, Ihe arollj) acl::IC, ... ledlcd Ihl 1111 'ulllllllty .r .'Ulltll I. Itlt:! 
or 1II001Ior cub at Ibt ktdtr slloul4 \t slu41f'4, subJecl 10 IItlel "rr,urt. 10 IIsvr, ,roper 
lilt or lohr=&tloo .. 4 wltllolll I=ptdll, I, 117 W'7 lb. hud ••• r caplt.aIIlOtt:ltlla • 
. . 
· TIle dCle:tioll or SI:lpiciOIlI cull openlio~ cOllld pou:tiaJly '" &!so fa:iIillld if 
law Cl'IrOt:emC:lIllllllcHiliu WCrt in a politio: 10 be inror=t~ alld 10 11I11y:.& &1I1&:le cu1'l 
Iransactio/IS OC:llrir., wililin Illeit cOllntry. 
For IlIaI purpose, one 11I1I~ICc! SOllllioll is Illat Illeu Inr.n:liolls bot rOlllillely 
re;x:m:1 1:" (jn1~cill itJlitlllio:s I~ com~:CM IlIllIorities. 
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H~'" eve~, I~e erii:ien:y 0: s'J:h a sys:e::1, .... hi:h cu~::~:ly uis~ i:\ t .... ~ 
pl~ti:i;H:i~J c:-.;::::i:s. is \l::::min. n.e r..ljori:y or Il-.e 1:0::;1 ..... 1.1 r.~: c~r.vi:::e~ or Ihe c~s: 
efie:tive:l:ss or I!lis syHt::1 a: I~is lim:, a:l~ Cl~ressed r:l:S Iha: it c~uld I:d (i:Il:::ill 
i::s:itu:ior.s 10 (::1 1:11 r:l~cl'\si::e (~r t~: ri'~t ai1ir.1: mor.:y h·Jr,d::illl. On 1)0,: o:h:~ l\a:l:L i: 
is Ihe ... i:· .... cr a (e"" m::n~:~s Il".1: a C~:7.,::!ler\S: .. : P(~1:1:":'1 I:: c~::-,c.,.! ii.O:'l:y h·~r.~e:ir., m.H 
i:l:I'.Id: sv:!'. a C'~::::I:y (:~c::i::, $)'1::::1 IOI::he: wilh I!le r:;oo::in, o( ill:::ra:ionl! 
Irans~ra:io:l or CU((t:'\:y a:l:! curren:y e~uivllen: irlS:ru:-ne:::J. 
I':v:::h:~:ll. Ihe I:o'~;: aF::~ Iha: c~'ntrltl 5hovle! CO:II~H Ihe rt&ll~iliry a~! 
II1l1it1 o( a Sl s: t = .. here bao'u I=~ i"~'H (IHHI&I hnl:'oI:IHI as4 Isttr:t!!arlu wO'olIe! r,~or: 
all c!o:lCnie a=~ 10It~:&:Ioal cure::1 Iruu:llO:1 alxl., a nu~ I=OI.lS:, 10 a 1I&!lo:&1 cHI:al 
a"o:1 wIth 1 co=~~tedtd ~,:, bUt, 1',lIa~I, 10 cO:~Hnl a~lhortlltl (or lilt II 
r::OCCl !&'.;o~cr!:, ClItS. S.b)e:1 10 s::I:1 safel\1&r:iJ 10 '01:.1:' pro~r Ui4 or Ihe l:for=.:lo:. 
fu::lIe:mo::. I:v:n li'l: "u:ial i:-n;oor.1n:e or cuh i:: drys Inrridd:l, l:'l:j en"s 
r.1O:ley h:::'I~e~i::l. ~:::l c!:l~i:e t~e (a:: nu: no clnr co~r:!a:ioa cO'Jlc! ~ u:a':::is~~ be: .... :::: 
Ihe cu:-' i:'I::,~si'::'\:u o( a c~u:-.::y's c:~norny, l:'\d c:-'e r~:c or Ihis t~Q:orny il'l intcl":a:io:l! 
r.:o:-.ey r~".::'I~:~i::,. co:.::trlu sh~II!~ (~nllrr 1::OII:al' I: scoera! Ilu dcrc:~;:c:t or .~':"I 
a:-! Sf:lltt Ic:h:i~'Hs or eooc7 ca:11,=c:I, 1::\lIdl:sl::rcLStd Ult of chKks, P'1:nl 
cards, ~irt:: ~'~Olit or 1&!'~1 c1I«:ks. Id book ,::r1 Headl:, or &t:~:iliu, u a e,ul to 
,::ollr." I~' rt~la:'=f:: o( cull Ir':S('M. 
5'~: \h: a'J:~~ri:i:1 s".:;,e~visir., h::xs a:'\:! ether fi::a.,:ial i:':s:it'.l:ic:':s ha"e 
cu:r::ltly. i:-. ~l~:W- c::'..::.::ies. r.o eo~~e:e~:! t= ~a~:j:i;:l:e i~ t~: fiJ~: all!~s: Cri~.i:\l! 
a:ti,i:iel. b::l'~\: I~.:ir r.,issi::-. is ~:i~.a=ily a p~'Jden:il: e~.e, a:'l: bc:a'~se or proressic:'.1! 
se:~::y O~ o::-'e: r'JI:s. 
A::o~~i::l!y, i:'l n:lI r..:."I'\~C~ COI.I:'llry, Illt co=~It,: u:lIorlt!rs s:.I;".IrI:, 
ba:'o or o:h,~ ri:aocla! I:ltlllltl'.;:i er bter::diarlu. or Ollar cO=ilC:c:l a:':lhorlllfl, sholl!~ 
':lSlIrt Iha: Iht sll~crrlsd !os:lt,,!l,,:; JUT, Ji!c,lIalc prOl:':S 10 t-a:~ a,.hll l:Ia:" 
IA'J:deri:,. These J'Jlbrl:!cs Iho'olld cl>O;-ca:, a::! Iud u~cnl" l~slaHo'olI:' or u "~lItst 
.. ilh other ~o=cstic J'oIdi:lal or I,. ,:(,,::c=,:1 allthorltlu I: I':QOr1IH~~r:i:J 1:·ntls,:I~:. 
a:d prQIt:·Jllo:s. 
The erie:tiv: i~~le~e::a:ion or I~.e l~ve cl:l:iond r::¢r.\r::en~a:io:s i:: o:l-.:: 
p~c(u.sio:u dClliol ... i:h cull is hl:":'1~:ed by the ra:1 t~a:, i:l I':a::y c=l:r.lrin. thcu p::rcSJi~::s 
are ... i~r'~!ly 1l:::SI.111:d. He:'l::, c:o:~':t:1 allthorltles should H dcs!,"I~ 10 ,UII" U 
,(rHlh, 1=~I,=e:ta:lc: or all tbuc rHo=::n~atlolll, tb~o\jlh a~:lo1s:r'tl', '1I~f'r1s!0: ad 
nll/la:t,)o. 10 otller p:or"slou dullo, wltb cuh LI derl:lt~ br ,.:1\ cov:t". 
Th: es:~':lliS~I':'\::H or prOSf'lrns to corn':a: r:'\cney h:'::'I~,:inJ in n:ll::ill 
i:-:s:i:'Jliol'.s a:'l~ other pr::mio::s C!uli:lJ ... i:h c:uh, w:lul.:! r:~uirt the s::,;oor: or tl'les: 
c::..:;1::::t a'JllI::~i:ies. ~a::i:\:I1."ly I'~ r:\lk.~ thes: ins:it\l:io~ l:d prorusions awa~: or ra:u Il'Iat 
s!o.o'Jld no:r.:llly leld to s\:l,i:io:s. A:.:odinlly, the co:;cl,:: a.tbarltles ''''~'oIld e.I,~lIlh 
l'.Itdt!l~tI which will ul!sl flu::!at 1:Slllullo:. h del'~II~I Sllliidolll "lUlU or k~,·IOllr 
by Ihelr CIIl!o:en. 1111 u~dCMI»d ,1Ial tHh S'Jtdel!:es CIIS: dertlo, o'er tlrot, 124 .. \II lIC'tr 
be "hllllll.,. (I Is rllrther lI~dtMI~ that s\l:h IIIIdcllHI "ttI p:I:,:!I: w:">c LI 12 
cdu:a:!QHl IOQI ro: (loo:\,llcl!\I'.I:I"Qs' p.cn~==tl. 
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Futl!le~m01t. Ihe competent Iwthoriliu re,wl'li:.,; or 5wpcr.15ioC rinn,;,! 
inslilulioa5 should la~e tht DtCCIlIr} Icl.1 or reluhtorr 1IIt1IUru 10 IUlrif .,.iAlI eonlrol or. 
29 or Hquililloo ar I si,nir;CI~1 p,nicipilion In rin,ncl,lloslllwllons br crlmin,1s or 1I'IIlr 
coored."lu. 
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Tht ,~c\O~ a:i::'Io'" It::!,e:! tht risk Ihat. oUlside Iht finl:'l:ill SKlor. industria! or 
commer:ial "m;laniu a:s~ cculd be a:Quired by criminals IO'illl tile lim 10 Iat Ihe::l for mOi'll)' 
launeerinc ~urposes. 
o • STRE~CTHE~·I.'·C OF 
1"""T£R~·4TIO.""-"l COOPERATIOS 
The Study or pra:ti:al cues or monty laundcrinl clurly demonstnted that 
monty laui'lde~ers conducllheir Ictivities at an international Icvcl. Illus uploilinl differtn:es 
between national jurisdi.:ions a!'ld Ihe nislence or international boundaries. Therefore. 
e::han:ed i:Itt~:'lalional c~~ea::on bet,*ee= enrorcemenl ale!'lcies. (jna!lcill inSlilulier.s. &!'Id 
financial inSlilulion re,u!uOI1 and III;>crvisors to facilitate Ih~ i~··ulililions. alld prose:',Ilion of 
money bllndertrs. is crili:a\. 
I) Illb.l:c...Ilt:J!'I"11 ic'''r:jlltjon 
A first IIt;l is 10 improve Ihe kno" .. ledle of inurnilionll nows of drul monty. 
nOlicu~ly cuh news. In~ Ihc kno"'lcdlf of money launderinl mtthO<!I. 10 ena~l. a beau 
focllS of international and IIIlio:1I1 .fforu 10 comblt Ihil p"enomenoD. 
Accordin!I\'. urlooal adllllaislnllODI IlIollld uuld,; rlcordili. Ir ItUI I. Iht 
IU"III,. IOlCraalloarl :Jcys ot cash I. -!lalett' cur,ner. so l!lal tltlllliln ca. bt .ad, ot 
cash riO-I lid ratlow, ""= t.rlOIlI lourul Ib'Old •• 11 .. 11111 Is CDlllblud .1111 ctllral hok 
1,(orlllltIOD. Such Idor=ltlOI should b, •• ife 1 •• II.bl, 10 Iht I~F lid 115 10 rlclliliu 
II urDi rioDiI $Il1dlcl. 
101.,01110011 cOlllp,lnl lurhorllies. ,,,ha,s Illtr,ol .ed III, Cur08' 
CooperlllDD COUDell. Illouid b, Ihn r,spoIslbllltr tor IIIlur111 lid dls .. 81111111 
Idormltloa to compeltal IUlhorlll1l .boul Ih. laltll d",lo,m"l I •• 01t1 lauadtrlDI ud 
1n0DlY landerlol ttellolqutl. CtDlral buln aDd buk rtlwlllOrt could do III. '1111' o. Ihelr 
Itlwork. ~lrloD&1 IUlhorlll1l I. 'Irlolll 1,II.rll. I. COUIIIIIIIOI ... 1111 lrad, UJoclulool. could 
Ihn disulllluu Ihls 10 flDUci.1 1IIIIIurlODI I. IIdl.ldll.1 coullrln. 
b) fIShl:,)'. C' infqrmation rcl,sin' '9 lug';' jny' 'nn"stignJ 
PrescDI lTranlemenu (or inlernal;o.al admini"nriv. cooperation and 
internltioDal UChLIIl1 of information relllini 10 idenliried tnn"cliocs. If. aknowl'~ltd 10 be 
insufficienl. Allhe Slme time. IhiJ uehlnl' ot information mill! be eonsisl'lIt with Dalioaal 
and inltrnuiocal pro"isiNI! Oil privlcy and c!lta prollelion. Fllrlhermort. lIy.ral cOIIDlries 
consider Ihat euhLIII' o~ :n(ormllion rtlatinl 10 individllal mOll'y bUlld.rinl cuel should rake 
place only iD ,he CODIUI of mUIIIII "Ia' assistallc,. 
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. 1t,..1.1 'I~ud I~.U ucll fOWlI", ,'Dnl~ "Hi •• ((OlU 101=,,0" I '~Oll""owl or 
·u~o. rlqwuI' 10lu .. lloul 1'(01=1110, .ilclla.;:! :""'1, 10 ,wlplel .. , IIlIlICrlOll, "noll 
'Iod tolpOllllou.l.,ohld I. ,IIolt 'rlDllclloll HI .. ttl compeltll ·nlholhlC!. Sirici 
ur"ulds-sllowl. H .111.1'01111114 \0 tllw,. Ill,: :bl. p~lalll or l.ror:&llo. " COllhlnl "'I~ 
1I&1101lIIQ~ leicr:ltio:'" pI;,hlou 01 p,t."y 10£ ,,:~ PlolecllOi. .' 
A nc;csn'~' c;nc!iliclI 10 i~:ro', r:"\u:~al "111 lSliS:1:1:1 011 /:'IOllly lau:I:!crir., 
calli. il I~.a: cO~:Il:itl a:knO""IC:!lt Ih. offl::u o~ ~ oney Iallllc!::ini ill 0:111: cou:lttill a.: 1:1 
Ic:r~:a~11 buis for /:'Iul:;11 :'1.: ~,·is:aIlC'. T~.t !;:.r l"U~ Ihll COllllilill s~ollld cor.llc!H 
Illt:ldi:ll I!'II 1:0:1 of Ill. o(rl::;: of mOlllY Ja-..,.c!::i::, 10 ru:~ I:lY Ollie: c:imel (or .. hi:lI 
IlI"1 il I lir.k 10 nar:oli:I, or 10 all IlIiollS offl::stl. I:ld III Ihl ~,ri:lilion (01 Illil "'i~t: 
I:'ICIICY Il~:I~erir.I offcr.se opu bll"'un differe:l, '::Iionl. FIII:lIer/:'lcre, il IllUd IlIl: : 
• cour.:ries sllould I:!O~t I c:!erilli:icfl 'r Yeli~1 1111 offellu .,r d:ul /:'IOnty 
hun:!:rir.1 com~a:i~ie ,..ilh Ille ci!illilion of \!:c Vil:lna CO:\"I:I:ioll • 
• COUlllhs sllovlA t'l" IIllIrl, n I bll,IIr&1 olllul:lllltrll hlh, 1:.,1 
c:!,((unl bo-Idll Sla:411!1 II 111101&1 lI,fh1l1011 ·1 .•. lIirrrrni Itlld&ru c .. etr.I.~ III. 
1~1r=liocal Il.:t:1 o( 1111 I:fllcllu· do 101 a(f,,1 1111 a~l\l11 01 .UUIIIIII or COU.tllCi U 
pto.id •• !cll Ollltr .. 1111 ~uIUllltl,lall1sI&OCI. 
Fllrt~.c~::Iorc. lowH:lo"11 coo~trallol sllould ~c IIIHO,IIII h a III-ori .r 
billltrli nd cu"ilal'flllrttt~,.ts ud art':""'''!1 hit'" IlItr.II, ,1llftd 1.,a1 
rooel~ls with Ih. aIr: or pro,WII ,lItileal eln.,tI 10 arrHI tIll .Idell pOllllllt rlllt.r 
r:wl.alllliIlUCI. 
Thl t~:rc:\1 woris ill lilt (rl::-I'''':~i. "r tlle COlI:lCn or EII:e .... C:lIlCe~i:1 
ir.a::a:ior.al c:>o~c:a:icn 1.1 rc,u~s sear:lI, ;:::-'::1 ':'I~ conris:"ion or Ille PIXUc!S (ro::: 
crime, CQ~ld cor.s:il:la Ihe b1.liJ of 1:\ im:cmn: /:'I·.ltilla,,1 II:u/:'l.~r Oil Illil mlm:, 
A::or~in,ly. cO.:I,lu Ihould nnulIlI I.I,::::iOGiI '01'1111011 lull II III. dtart c ... tI:l .. 
or 1111 Co •• cil of [uro;. 01 c=o(lsca:ioa 0; ,ill Pt~U'~1 frot: O((IIICI. 
Ez~eri.n:1 of i:\:w\l:ic~aJ t:<l~t":;":1 ell /:'10M!, hl:nde:ir.1 b,IlU slle .... s Ilia: 
i::l~roYer:a:'l:l ':1 nc:mary ell IlIl fo1\owin, lo~ics : 
- Coo~:a:ht i:IVI:li,alior.s - Coo~~alht h.,,:lllIloOJ'a=OII I",o,rlil. 
coc~.\lU nillotlilu of COUDI,III, &lIould ~t nUII·'I.d, 
• MUIII,11.IIiSl·~=' I" crimlr..1 ml::e" • j·lur. IlIoulli be "oc.dlflJ ror IIwlual 
ISlbillce 10 crllll ... 1 .allIM ";&r~I'1 Ih. lit of coIIIJuhor7 lIeuur" hel •• ", ! •. , 
produ,IIOI or rrutu b1 (I.uclal 11111"11011 U' ol~tr ,'MOII, lIlt uareb o( pcn." II' 
ptecl ... l. Stlrur. ud o~t,I.I'I of •• ld.H. fir IISC II .0117 lautd.,h, 11'"111111 .. , 114 
p,ou,ulloll u4 II ulal,' acllo .. I, to,.I" J.rl,.iif.tloll. 
- Scl:~:e and cC:lril:llion • TI:~" t~nlll be nillorlt7 '0 tak. erpcdlt!owl acllo: 
la frspOO ... \0 re~ursu by tor.II' coullrlu ; .• 'hulf" rruu. uh ... 4 rufh:ll. Ptoc"~1 Ot 
0111" pro~"ly af cor:II~.4Io1 talve 10 sw'lIl'r:.ctt~, ~u.' II 110117 IaVl~rrl., II Ill. 
crl=rs IIOdtrl,I'I III. lauD~erh, 1(1"11" 
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• Coc~~i:.I:i;:! or ~::I;:II:,e:: t:~"~J • ';'0 ,·~I~ cn~lIc:J or J.~w!:c:lca. 
co:'~:r~I:::: s~~J~~ ~l ,!y . ~: !plil:, s:: a;;~I::1 =t:~.&.!!s:, r;r ll:c~=::d:, the ~st 
It::.:t fo: ;::Utw:!c; cr 4rt,.~,:~ I. t!-.. t::t~t1'.J or jvs:tc. 11 CLUI ,".1' I~. I .. ~;:<f to 
F'~ltt.tlc: I: c'". I~,U 0:. oHtr,.. S::::a:!r. I~e:. ,~o.ld boc a:ra:,t:ttu tor c~,!!:&:!:, 
Iti:.:e ad e::r:I:&:I~; F~OCld!:'1 .. biel! ='7 1::1.!e Ibe Ibad., or "art..:at.! LJa.cU • 
• Et:~l~;:;:~ • Con:,i" 1l\:.I! t.a·, pr~td.:tI ift pia:, t~ e,:ri!ilt ... ber, 
r:lSi~!t. il':~iti~l.il~1 C~,I~lr~ ,i1}. I ~!lt\t~ 1&.:~rd:1 o!rt~sr or ,,!.:.~ orr,:." •. ~'jt~ rc\~t:t 
10 i:1 ulicul 1',11 1)11.1:1 •• ,,11 C)""t:~ Ill:.!'; rre:pi:r 1;;~'7 lad"i", 1I a: u:t&!ill~:' 
orr.:II. S:~ilCllo t1l •• il.I',11 ra"'.",':il. eO"~l:itl 1:'.17 e~"litc: 1::'~lir~!,;, •. mdilioft.b.1 
1:::-1:1 ~.:t~t trl:':':lJSIOO or tl:!&~lh:: ","Cla bt:-tc~ 1;;rO;'I&:' r:"u.::at, tl:~.!'h:'1 
~II'C:I ~lI,d ocl) O~ "'arloa ;1 llttla 0' jw!,:r:II. Il::dllle, IlIelr 1"IGna". &:4/or 
i:I,~4"e:=& & ,:=;:lifid nl:di:i .. of o:It::iftJ ~"'::I -b~ -.10. rO,=II ClIII!!\lu 
p:~c.dICJI. 
CONClUSlON 
i~e :!t:rillll 1 •. ~.I Fi~.;~,:'11 A::':~ iui: F:r:1 IFIt~ I~.III~ .• ~:II::!I~(Y e{ 
'~c Tuk F:~:: .. ;·.1~ 1~~~::S ,~ds rt:'<:t t= !i:a!".:1 ~::"o:sa~s or rln;c!~a~!!".1 c~\,;~::iCI .... ~i:!\ 
,":I:id 1~~!'I\il il t: t!le,: r.!I~1 cr S:at. CI CiC'H~.!'I\I~I. I~~ ;'::~:Ia ill;) CllIl: (:~~:e::: 
1 ~ :)1::1:;11. 
TIle I~=" q:c:~ I~,I: ~r:'lic::1 r::m Ille S~::"\:,.;I Dr Ihe HU~I Dr S:a:c 01 
CeYI~:,!'I\I~1 or II>::: ~,Iiel i::~.II::I\ ,.ltj:~,I. "'~;clI C:::>C:lr-O Ille ,i::l:c;1I Tui: Fora. 
"'e'~!e ~c (:',1;,11 reI I~ .• i::"\;::::\I::II:iOIl or I~~ H;;t:'.::-"::~I:icr.1 'I\~ r'~r:lI&t ... o:t I::~ 1:\I~itl. 
F:litio\ i::-,;::.I ,.,:",ie III: ':e ~1::i( .. Il:I,. M:lla:y 10 c~)'I:.:!!i:1 $I:;::, c=c:~j::I:C:! c'ca:l 
ir.::::,llic:,~II::i;::. I::~ I;) err,:.c Illc bell '"'1)'1 te U)X;IIC CI:!-.U c:,,;:::icr. i::;!\I~'~' ~~., 
~:=~.:'~I :: .. :.::;:1. t: Ille ('L'.t 1,li::st me~ .• )' h.~:!.ri::, . 
... ·~,':I ~'I:.\S:q I~,t ::"01: 1~1'.I:t ""I~I t)' ... ~.ic!\ Ille r;llo ... ·\:~ I: i~ w:tkJ 
::',;I<! ~c c"I::i::~. I~.r I::.;: e::,,;:~.I.1;::~ I!\:I I~C ... i:!e: Illc "\I::,.~r Dr C:II~I:j" I;:;l!yi:, 
:~nc 1:::::-'!'I\i:l~I:i;::1 (ir,:!",~;:" c:"'::I:i~; ·,.U:~ ~.I"C ... cai: Dr 110 "us,,;:a:iC:11I 11';:'.11 
::'\;:11)' h~~.~c:i:.111~,e '~!J1tr t!\c:r crne;c:!:), "'~\lld ~. It c:~.si~-cre~ Illal I nl~h: U)cu:c:t 
er c:rqr:u rn:i:l~ ill cllror::~" m:::c)' \a1;:I~e:l~, I:\U:',/:U "'oul~ s:i~',/h:e C:~:::-jC1 I~ ,:.c 
to t!-;cu iSS~tS a ~.:,1-\ ;~i=::ty. 1:r\:J "':\:1~ c::-;::i':",u 10 a ~I::ct muu.:ll \:=,,~c:1~!\~i:1 &:-.d ~c::t 
I: 1:1 i::,,;~c'C!'l\:~: Clr I~,C r.alic:,lll)'$:t::'.S :0 c:~.~u m;~c7 h.::~c~i~,. 
", 
374 
APPENDIX G 
1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
Source; eo,,"dl of Eur:yt. Strll$boll~ 
PR.EA.V.3LE 
The member States or the Council of Eu:ope a.nd t.~e other Stat.:s si&r.Jtory hereto. 
Co~iderin, that L~e alm of the Council of Europe is to achieve a ,reater wUty bctv.·c:n iu 
members; 
Coovinced or t.~e need to pl:rsue i common c:i:ru:w policy a.lmcd al t.~e pro\:Qon of sxie!), : 
Cor.siderin, thaI l~e fiJ.it aiur.st s~riO\l.S crime, wh.ich lw becoCle L'I incrwi::,ly inte:national 
problem. calls for the usc of modern L'Id effective met.~~ 00 an Ultc:7'.ational ~e: 
Beli:\'in, t.lat one of these met.i~ co~isu b deprivi..'1, c~s of the p:oceec!s from cri:':'Ie; 
Cor.siderin, thaI (or the lr.ain.":'Ient o! L~:S aJ.:n a .... ·ell·~n::iorjn' system of i..'1temltional co-
opention also must be esabli .• ~ed. 
Have alrted I.S (o\lOl/o's: 
For toie purposes of this Cor:vention: 
CHAPTER I 
US! OF nlLy,s 
A:-.ide 1 
USt o/ltm-.s 
c. "proceeds" me.a.'IS any econo::.ic advL'Illie (rom a:.mi.'Ill off enc:s. It IMy consist of any property 
I.S defined in sub-pL"'liraph b or L'US .!'tide: 
b. "proPCl'l)''' includes proper:)' of a.:'i' c\r.::::iption. whether coljlOrw or incorporc.al. mo\·.ble or im· 
mo\·able. and lelal documents or instnlmenu evidencin, title 10: or interest ill such prope">,: 
c. .. inst."\Imenwities" me.ar.s any propel'!)' used or intended 10 be used, in UI'J manDer, wholly or in 
pan, 10 cotnn'lil a criminal offence or crimjnaJ offences: 
d. "confiscation" means I penalty or a mct.!lIre, ordered by. C:OIIM (oUowin, proceedin,s in relation 
to • climinal offcnce ~i c:rlrnina] orfc.""'~:, lesultin, in the rl:uI deprivation of propel'!)': 
t. "predicate offencc" muns In)' criin!oW ol'fence I.S a result orwh.ich proceeds were ,eneratcd that 
may become the subjec •• ,r a·j ,.!f'r"1:1: 'l.! t.lefil\~ h AMic1e 6 or this Coaveation. 
CHAP'T£RD 
MWUa.£S TO 1£ TAKEN AT )o:ATlOSAL LEVEl. 
Article 2 
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I. Elch Par:y shall adopt such le&isbt.ive and other musurcs I.S m:I)' be nccess.:lt)' 10 cn3ble it 10 con· 
fis:3le ins:rumcnulitics and proceeds or propeny Ihe nluc or 'Which corrcsponds 10 such proccc~s. 
Co,jfjcil of £lIrop~ 
2. Ea:h Party r..3Y. at t.ie time of signature or when depositinl its insU"Ument of ratification. accept-
ance. appro"al or accession. b)' a declaration addressed 10 the SecreW)' General of the Council of Europe. 
declare that parag:-aph 1 of !his uticle li'i'tiC$ only to o~ences or categories of offencC$ s~cified in such 
declaration. 
A:ticle 3 
/nvesrigc:ivt aM proviJio,...:1 TMc.Jures 
Ea:h Part)' shall adopt such legislati"e L'\d ot.ier measares a.s rnay be necC$W)' 10 enable it 10 ident-
ify and Ira:e proper.)' ..... hich is liable to ~'J::h~ation pursuar.t to Ar-.icle 2. paragraph 1. Iond to prevent 
L'ly dealing in. transfer or disposal of such propert)'. 
Article 4 
Sptcial invtsrigari·'t powtrs Cl".t! rtcMiquts 
1. Each Par.)' shall a,~,);r such legislative and ot.ier measures a.s rr.ay be ncusW)' to empo ..... er its 
courts or other competent :lu!.ic-·riti:s t<: od::r tr.at bar.k. fir..ancial or com:nercw records be made 
a"ailable or be seized in o·· .. ~r ") ca."!)' ell~ :.l'lc :t:~in,.s referred 10 in Articles 2 and 3. A PL't)' shaJJ not 
dedine to act under the pro~ isions of this L"tide on iTound.s of bank sccrcc:y. 
2. Each Par.)' shall consider adopd.'\1 such lelislative and ot!ler measures a.s rr.ay be necessary to 
enable it to u~e special invC$ti,ative techniques facilitauo, the identificatioll and tncin, of proceeds and 
t.'e ,at.'erin, of evidence related thereto. Such techniques rr.ay inc:lude monitorin, orden. observation. 
interception of tc:lecommunications. access to cOr:lputer systems and orders to produce specific 
documents. 
Anicle 5 
ult:! Ttlvdits 
Each Patty shall adopt such leil~!atlve and ocher measures u may be necessary to enS\lre that 
interestcd parties affected by mc.:uures under Articles 2 l.'ld 3 shall have effective lelal remedies in order 
to prese~'e t.'eit rights. 
Article 6 
Lt:UN!trir:g offtflcts 
1. Each Party shall adoF: ~ut:h letishd ve &:'.d other measures as may be necesSll)' to es:.ablish as of· 
fences under itS domestic l~w. when :o.':'I.mi::tc=A intentionally: . 
c. the conversion or tra.'l.5fer of propetty. knolWin, that such proper'!)' is proceeds, for che purpose 
of concealing or dis,uising che illicit orilin of che property or of usistin, any person who is involved 
in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the lela! consequences of his aetior.s; 
b. the concealment or disluise of the true nature, source, location. disposition. movement. rilhts 
with respect to. or ownership of. property. knowinl that such proper'!)' is proceed.s: 
and. subject to its constitutional principles and the bask concepu 01 its lelal system: 
c. the acquisition. poncssion or usc of property. bow·in,. at che time of receipt. chat such proper'!)' 
"":IS proceeds: 
d. p3rtieip3tion in. association or conspiracy to eom:nit. anempts 10 commil and aidin,. abenin,. 
facilil.1ting and counselling ,,'Ie commission of lny of the offences c:sl.1blished in accordance with this 
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2. For ,,'Ie purposes of implementing or applying paragraph I of this article: 
c. it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the 
Pa")' ; 
b. i: r:i3Y be pro\'ided that the offences set forth in that paragraph do not apply to the persons who 
commin:d the pre~licate offence; 
c. k..,owledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in that paragraph 
rr::ay be inferred from objec:h'e, fact'Jal circumsta!lCes. 
3. Each Pa")' may adopt such measures as it conside~s n~essary to establish also as offences under 
its domestic Ia\l,' all or sor!'~ nf the acts r~f~~e'llo in pa:ag~a?h I of this a.rj::\e, in L'Y or all of the foUow-
ing cases where the off~d, r: 
a.. ought to have as~,ur.\::rl Itlat ll\~ rrvpercy '.vlS pr~eeds; 
b, acted for ,,'Ie pu.? S~ of makin, ;:,:fit; 
c. acted for the purpose of promoting the carrying on of fur.her c:rirr-inal ac:h'iry. 
4. Each Party may. at the u:ne of signature or when depositing its ins:nunent of ratification. accept-
ance. approval or accession. by de::laration addressed to the Seerewy General of the COl1nc:il of Europe 
declare that parag:-aph 1 of this arJc\e applies only to predicate offences or categories of such offences 
specified in such dec:1antion. 
CHAPTER m 
Section 1 
Principlu of ir::trr.criO"..21 co-operc:iofl 
Article 7 
Gelltrel prilldplt,t 'lnr! tfleCSlJrtS for illttf1ll:tiOflal co-operariofl 
I. The Parties shall co-operate ""ith e.ar.n Clther to ""Ie ",'idest extent possible for L"Ie purposes of in-
vestigations and procee!ll!'gs "b:r.! :t tll!: co.,fl~atit)n of instrUmentalities and proc=!s. 
2. Each Party shall at:l)?t such le,islath'c or other meUl1res as may be necessary 10 enable it to ~om-
ply. under the c:onditions provided for in this chapter, with requests: 
G. for confiscation of specific items of property repres:ntin, proceeds or instl"'.lInentalities. as well 
as for confiscation of proceeds consisting in a require::lent to pay a slim of money correspondin& 10 the 
value of proceeds; 
b. for investigative assistance and provisional mWlIres with a view 10 eic."Ier form of confisation 
referred to under G above. 
Section 2 
lr:vtSrigarivt G.Ssisranct 
Artic:le 8 
ObligariDII to cssisr 
The Parties shall afford each other. upon request. the ",'idest possible measure of assistance in the 
identificltion and tracin, of instnJmen~li!ies. proceeds and other property liable to conrlscation. Su~h 
Issist1nce shall inc:1ul:!e :Illy me:lsure pro\'idin, and se~urinl e\'idence as 10 the uiSlence. location or 
mo\'em~nt. n:lture. les:ai St.lIUS or \'11-:: "f the afor:mentioned property. 
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Ar-icle 9 
£.UnlriOIl of c.ssiSlallce 
The assis:.lnce pursuant \0 Ar:icl: S ;h~!! be came.:! out IS peri.U:t:d by &.,d in Iccorc!a.,ce with 
the domestic Ia .... of the requested Par.y and. \0 the extent not incompatible ..... ith such law. in accorc!a.,;e 
.... ith the proce.:!ures specified in the request. 
Article 10 
SpC'l'a,ltO~ inJonr.t:rioll 
Without p~ejudil:e to hs o .... ·n investi,ations or proceedings. I Par.y may ..... ithout prior re.:;~est for· 
..... ard to another Party infom;~iior: CII l"s~l"\Imel.tallti~s and proceeds. when it considers that the cHs;losure 
of such information might usbt the recei-~i::. i'1&rt)' in initiating or tarT)'ing out investigations or pro-
ceedings or might lead to a request by that P&."t)' under Liis chapter. 
Section 3 
Pro·.isior.lll mec.su.fts 
A:-.i:le 11 
Obligarioll 10 leke provisiol'l41 mec.su.res 
I. At the request of Inother Party \fo'hich has instit'Jted criminal proc:edings or proceedings for the 
purpose of confiscation. I Party shall We,: the n=essa.")' provisional measures, such as (rulin, or seizing. 
to pre'-ent Iny duling in. transfer or disposal of proper.y \fo'hich, It I later sta,e, ma)' be the subject of 
I request for confiscation or which might be such as to satisfy the request. 
2. A Part) which has received a request for confiseation pursulnt to Ankle 13 shill, if so requested, 
uke the musures mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article in respect of any propel"!)' \fo'hich is the subj=:t 
of the request or ..... hich might be such as to satisfy the request. 
Article 12 
£.U(;u.::::1 ~j i'ro~isiofI:Jl mtc.surts 
I. The pro\'isional measureS mentioned 'in Anicle 11 shall be carried out as permined by and in 
accordance with the domestic la\\' of the requested Pal"!)' and, to ,,'Ie extent not incomplu"ble with such 
12 .... ·• in accoraance with the procedures specified in the request. 
2. Before lifting In)' prO\'isional measure taken pl!rs::ant to t."is &."licle, the requested Part)' shall. 
where\'er possible. gh'e the requesting Pal"!)' an opponunity to present its reasons in flvour of continuing 
the measure. • 
Section 4 
Co1\fisccriofl 
Anicle 13 
Obligation 10 confisccJt 
1. A Party. which has received I request made by another Pany (or confiscation concemin& 
instrumentalities or proceeds, situated in its territor)·. shall: 
c. enforce a connscation order macic b)' I coun of I requesting Pany in relation to such instrumen-
talities or proceeds: or 
b. submit the rcqu~::i !o its cOlnpctent allthoritics for the purpose of obuinin, In order of COnrISCI' 
tion an~. if su.:h ord~r is ,ranted. enr"~rc il. 
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2. For the purposes of applying paragraph I.b of this article. any Part)' shall whenever necesury have 
competence 10 ir.stiNte confiscation proceedings under its own law. 
3, The provisior.s of paragraph I of this ar-J:le shall also apply 10 confiscation consiseng in a require. 
ment to pay I sum of money corr:s?Ondinz to the value of proceeds. if property on which the confiscation 
ca., be enforced is loealell i" tl',~ rcqt::.ied Pw,. In such cases. when enforcing confiscation pursuanl 
10 paragraph I. the request.:d i'a.rt)' shall. If ~)"menl is not obuined. realise L'Ie claim on atlY property 
availa!lle for that purpose. 
4, Ii a request for c:onns::ation c:once:ns I spec:ific item of property. the Par.ies may agr~ that the 
requested Par.)' rnay enforce the confis.:a:ior. in the form of a require:nent 10 pay a sum of money cor· 
r:s?Onding 10 the \'alue of the proper.)'. 
Article 14 
!.UCUriOIl 0/ c:o'ifisc:a:iofl 
I. The procedures for obtaining and enforcing t.'1e confiscation under Article 13 shall be governed by 
t.'1e Ia ... · of t.':e requested Party. 
2, The requested Part)' shall be bo~nd by the findings as 10 the faeu in so far as L'ley are staled i., 
a conviction or judicial decision of the requesting Par'!), or in so far as such conviction or judicial deeision 
is implici\ly bued on them. 
3. Each Pl.,,!), rnay. at the time of signature or when de?Ositing its inStrl:menl of ratification. aceepl· 
a.,::e. l?prO\'a1 or accession. by a declaration addressed to the Seerewy Oenerll of the COWlcil of Ellrope. 
dee\are t.~at paragraph 2 of this a.-Jcle applies only subject 10 its cOasUNtiOnal pri:lciples and the basic 
concepts of its legal system, 
4. If the conliscatioll CI'IIS:Sts in ·lIe: requirem:nt to pay a sum of money. the competent authority of 
the requested Par.)' shall convert the &mOllnt thereof into the curre:lcy of that Party at the rate of exchan,e 
Nlin, at L'Ie time when the de:ision to enror;~ the confiscation is taken. 
S. In the ca.s: of Article 13. paragraph 1.12. the requesting Party alone ,,\all have the ri,ht 10 decide 
on 1:1)' application for review of the confiscation order. 
Article IS 
Co".fisccttd proptrry 
Any prope~y confis.:at:.d by the requested Pany shall be disposed of by that PI!":), in accorda..'1ce 
.... ith its domes:i.: law. unless otherwise agreed by Lie Pmes concerned. 
Article 16 
Right 0/ tn/orumtllt eM mt:.zlmum cmDunf Df collfocariDII 
I. A request for confis.:ation made IInder Article 13 does not affect the ",hi or the rcqlleslin, Part)' 
to enforce itself the confiscation order. 
2, I'othin, in this C:>nvention sh~lI t.c so intel'Preted as 10 permit the lotal value of the confiscation 
to exceed the amount or the sum of money specified in the confiscation order. If a Pany finds that this 
might occl:r. the Part:' s C:·),,'=C"r.('~ ~h:lil .::n'~r hlo consultations 10 avoid such an effect. 
Article 17 
lmprisollMtlll ;11 dtfault 
The requested P3rlY sh311 not impose imprisonmenl in default or any other measure restrictin, the 
li!lcr:~ of a person as I result of a requ,:si under Article 13. if the requestin, Part)' has SO specified in 
the request. 
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Section S 
R'J~al tv.d POSf?ofltmtnt oj co-operation 
A:tic1: IS 
(j"OIl.'!.ds lor rtf~al 
1. C<>-operation under this chapter may be refused if: 
tl. the action sought would be cont:a!)' to the f.:ndamenw principles of the legal system of the re-
quested Party; or 
b. the exe;ution of the r:.quest is likely to ?rejuc!ice the sovereignty. se;urity. o:Crt p;J,/ic or oLier 
essential interests of Lie r~uested Party; or 
c. in L'le opinion of Lie requested Pa.-:y. tie i:n?Orunc: of the case to which the r~ucst relates 
does not justify Lie talcing of Lie action sought; or . 
C. the offence to ..... hich the request relates is a political or fiSC1l offence; or 
t. the requested Par:y considers th:-.t compUa.,ce with the action sought would be conn:)" to the 
principle of lit his it: idtm; or . 
f the offence 10 .... ·hich lie. rcq!J,:st r::ates ':Jould not be an offence under the la ..... of the requested 
Party if commined \Itithin its jurisdiction. H"wever. t.iis ground for refusal applies to c<>-operation under 
Section 2 only in so far as the assiSWlce sought involves coercive ac:tion. 
2. C<>-operation under Section 2. in so fa: IS the ISsisWlC:: sought involves c:oerc:ive ac:tion. and under 
Section 3 of this chapter. may also be refused if the musures sought c:ould not be talten under t'le domestic 
ta .... · of the requested Par:y for tie puryoses of investigations or proc:ecdinls. had it been a similar domestic 
case. 
3. \\'here the law of the requested Pu:y so requires. co-operatioll under Section 2. in so rar IS tic 
assisance sought involves coercive ac:tion. and under Sec:tion 3 of this chapter may also be refused if the 
measures sought or any other me.uures having sizr.ilar effec:ts .... ·ould not be permined under the la .... of 
the requesting Party. or. IS regards the competent l!Jthorities of the requesting PU'ty. if the request is 
not authorised by either a judge or &:lother judicial authority. including publiC prosecutors. a.'Iy or Liese 
a'JL'lorities ac:ling in relation to criminal orfences. 
4. C<>-operation under Sectlon 4 of this c:hapter may also be ref\:sed if: 
tl. under the I ..... · of the requeslcC Pa:-ty confiscation is not provided for in respect of the type of 
offence to .... hich the request relates; or 
b . ..... iL'out prejudice to l~c ebiiiatior. pursuanl to Artic:le 13. paragraph 3. it would be contrary 10 
the princ:iples of the domestic la ..... s or the request:.:! Part)' conceminl the limits or confis:ation in respe~t 
of the relationship between a., ofrence and: 
i. In economic ad\'&:ltage thai miiht be quali fied IS its proc:eeds; or 
ii. property that mi,ht be qualified as its instrUmentalities; or 
c. under the law of the requested Par.} c:onfis:ation may no lon.cr be imposed or enfor:cd because 
of the lapse of time; or 
d. the rcquest does not relate to a pre\'ious con\·iclion. or a decision or I judicial naNre or a stale-
ment in such a decision that an ofrence or several offenc:es have been commined. on the basis or which 
the c:onfiscation has been ordered or is sought; or 
t. confiscation is either not enforceable in the requesting Party. or it is still subject 10 ordinary 
me3ns of appeal; or 
f Ihe request relales 10 a confis:alion order resulting rrom a decision rendered in cbunric of the 
person apinsl ..... hom the order ..... as issued and. in ,,'Ie opinion of the requested P3/'t)'. Ibe proc:eedin,s 
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conducted by L"Ie requesting Part)' Ic:iding to such decision did not s.atisfy the min.ir.lum rights of defence 
recognised as due to everyone .gainst whom. crirnical charge is a-.adc:. 
S. Fo~ L'le purposes of parag:-aph 4fof t,1Us L-ti;!e a dedsion is not conside~ed to have been rendered 
ill almnric if: 
a. it has been confin:'led or pronC'unced after op?Osition by t,~e pcrson concerned; or 
b. it has ~n rendered on appeal, pro\'ided L':.at the apra! was lod,ed by the person concerned. 
6. \\.'hen considering, for the purposes of puag:-aph 4f of this article, if the cuni ... nu:n ri,hts of 
defence have ~n s.atisfied, the requested Par:y shall t.al:e into account the fact that Lie person concerned 
has deliberately sought to evade justice or the fact tha: L':at person, having had the possibility of lodging 
a legal remedy against the decision made it: c:bw:riD, electet! not to do so. The s.a.:ne will apply when 
L"Ie person concerned, having ~n duly served with che su:nmons to appear, elected not to do so nor to 
ask for adjournment. 
7. A Put)' shall not invoke bank secrecy as a Jfound to refuse L'Iy eo-opel"ltioll under this chapter. 
\\. 'here its domestic la .... so requires, a Party cuy require that a request for co-opel"ltion ""ruch would in-
volve the lifting of ba. .. Jc secrecy be authorised by eit,ier a judge or another judicial authority. includi.'lg 
public prosecutors, any of thm authorit:es acti.ng in relation to crimi:W ol'feoces. 
8. Without prejudice to the ground for refus.aJ provided for in pa.~va?b I.c of trois article: 
c. L"Ie fact that Lie persoa under investigation or subje..'"t:d to a confi.scation order by the authorities 
of the requesting Party is a le,al person shall not be invoked by the requested Par.y as an obsucle to 
affording any co-operation under this chaptl:r: 
b. the fact ,,'lat the n.&tural person agu:lSt ... ·hom an crder of confiscation of proceeds has been issued 
Ius subsequently died or the !!'=t that a legal person against whom an order of confiscation of proceeds 
has been issued has subsequently been :!.issolvc.1 shall not be invoked as an obstacle to render assistance 
in accordance with Article 13, pa.~'l"Iph l.a. 
Article 19 
POSrpOfitMeIll 
The requested Part)' may pos:yone action on a request if such action would prejudice investigations 
or proceedings by its authorities. 
Article 20 
Pcr.it;/ or con.:iriofltl/ ,rllNilll 01 C rtql,jtSt 
&fore refusing or pos:yoning co-operation under t.iis chapter, t."Ie requested Pa.~ shall, where 
ap?ropriate after having consulted the requesting Pa.~, cor:sider whcloier the request may be granted par-
tially or subject to such conditions as it deems necess.ary. . 
Section 6 
Norificcrion eN! prolteriofl DI third parrits' rilhu 
Article 21 
Notification 01 dO~tlllJ 
I. The Parties shaU afford each other Lie widest measure or mutual assistance in the servins of judicial 
documents to persons affected by provisional measures and confiscation. 
2. "othin, in this article is intended to interfere with: 
c. the possibility or sendin, judicial documents. by postal chlnllels, directly to pcrsons abroad; 
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b. the possibility for judicial officers. officials or ot.'ler competent authorities of the Party of origin 
to effect service of judicial documeoLS directly through the consular authorities of that Pl.'"ty or through 
judicial officers. officials or ot.'ler competent a'J:horities of t.'le Pl.V' of destination. 
unless the Par:)' of destination makes a dec\a:-ation to the contrary to t..ie Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe at t.ie time of signature or ..... hen depositing its inst. .... ment of ratification. accepWlce. approval 
or accession. 
3. Vihen serving judicial documents to pe:-sor.s abroad affected by provisional mea.sures or confis-
cation orders issued in the sending Party. this Par:)' shall indicate what legal remedies are avwable under 
its law to such persons. 
Article 22 
Rtcogr:irioll of foreigll decisiol'.s 
1. Vr'hen dealing wit; a request for co-<)peration under Sections 3 and 4. the requested Pl.'"ty shall 
recognise any judicial decision taken in the requesting Par.y regarding ",,'Its claimed by t.lUrd patties. 
2. Recognition may be refused if: 
c. third pa.-ties did not have adeqlUtc opportunity to usert their ""its; or 
b. the decision is incompatible with a decision already taken in the requested Par.)' on the s.a:'ne 
matter; or 
c. it is incompatible wit..i the ordre public of Lie requested Pl.",:),; or 
d. t..ie decision was talcen cont."U)· to provisions on exclush'e ju~iction provided for by t.ie law 
of the requested Party. 
Section 7 
ProctdUI'al cr.d other IllItral T1l1,S 
Ankle 23 
Ctll:rl21 t:u:horiry 
1. The Panics shall designate a central authority or. if necessary. aut.iorities. which shall be respon-
sible for sending and answering requests made under this chapter. the execution of such requesu or the 
t:-ansmission of them to the authorities competenl for their execution. 
2. Each Party shall. al the time of signature or ..,..hen depositing its InstrUment of ratification. accept-
ance. approval or accession. communicate to the Secretar)' General of the Council of Europe the names 
and addresses of the authorities desi&nated in pursllll'lce of para&raph 1 of this ar.itle. 
Article 24 
1. The central authorities shall communi tate directly with one another. 
2. In the event of urJency. requesLS or communications under this chapter may be senl directly by 
the judicial authorities. including public proseculors. of the requC5linl Part)" to such authorities of the re-
quested Pany. In such CI!CS a copy shall be senl at thc wnc time to the central authority of the requested 
Party through the central authority of the requesting Party. 
3. Any request or communication under paragra?hs 1 and 2 of this article may be made throu,h the 
Inlern~tion:ll Criminal Police OrllniSllion (1nlcrpoll. 
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4. Vr'here a request is IT'..lde pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article and the authority is not competent 
to deal with the request, it shall refer the request to the competent national authority a..,d info:m directly 
the requesting Part)' that it has done so. 
S.· Requests or communications under Seation 2 of this chapt:r, which do not involve coercive action, 
rnay be directly trlllsmincd by the competent authorities or the requesting Pa.~ to L~e competent 
authorities or L~e requested Pa.~. 
Article 2S 
Fom: 0/ rtqu.tsr aNi /.an.guagtS 
1. All requests under this chapter shall be made in writing. Modem mWlS of tel~r..::Iunjcatior.s, 
such as telefu, may be usee. 
2. Subject to t.'e provisior.s of paragraph 3 of this article, tra.':slatiolll of the requests or supporting 
documents shall not be required. 
3. At the time of signaTUre or when depositing its instNrnell! of ncficacon, accepta.,c:e, approval or 
accession, any Par:y may corr .. "IIu:Ueate to the Secreta.')' General of the Council of Europe a declaration 
that it reserves the right to require Llut requ;sts made to it and documents suppor-.i.,g such requests be 
accompanied by a translation into its own language or into one of the official languaaes of the Council 
of Europe or into such one of these la.,guaaes as it shall indicate. It may on that occasion dedue its 
readiness to accept translations in any other language as it may spc:ify. The other Parties may apply the 
reciprocity rule. 
Article 26 
ulclisariofl 
Documents tra:umincd in application of this chapter shall be eumpt from all legaliution 
formalities. 
Article 27 
CO"JtI'J 0/ TtiUtSr 
I. Any request ror co-operation under. this chapter shall spe:ify: 
c. Lie luthOriry making the request and the authority tarrying out the inves:iga:iolll or proceedings: 
b. the object or and t.~e rwon for the request: 
c. the maners, includi.,g ::Ie relevant facts (such as Ule. place IJId circumstances of the offence) 
to ~'hich the investigltiolll or proceed in,s r:llte, ex;cpt in the case of a request for notification: 
d. in so fu IS the co-operation involves coercive action: 
i. the tut of the s:aNtory pro\'isions or, ~·here this is nOI possible, I satement of L~e relevant law 
applicable; and 
ii. an indication that the measure sou,ht or any oc.ier measures having similu erfe:ts eould be taken 
in the territory or the requestin, Pany under iu own law; 
t. where necessary and in so rar as possible: 
i. de:ails or the person or persons concerned, includin, name, date and place of birth, nationality and 
location, and, in t."e ease or I lelal person. its SClt; and 
ii. Lloae prope"y in relalion to ~'hich co-operation is Soulht, its location, its connection with the person 
or persons concerned. any connection wiL'I the offence, as well as any Ivailable infonnllion about other 
persons' interests in the property; and 
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f any particular procedure the requesting Pa:'!)' wis!!es 10 be follo ..... ed. 
2. A request for pro\'isional measures u:lde~ Section 3 in relation to seizure of property on \Which a 
confiscation order consisting in the requirement 10 pay a s;lm of money may be realised shall aho indicate 
a maximl!m amount for which recovery is sought in thlt property. 
3. In addition to t.:"Ie indications mention~ in parai:aph I, "'y r~uest under Section 4 shall contain: 
a. in toie case of Article 13, paragraph La: 
i. a certified L-ue copy of the confis.:ation order made by toie court in the requesting Par.y anc! a state· 
ment of LIot: grounds on the basis of ..... hich Lie order was Ir.ade, if Liey ce not indicated in Lie order itself; 
ii. an an:station by Lie competent aut.ioriry of toie r~uesting p",":), that the eon5s:ation order is en· 
forceable ",d not subject to ordin,,"Y mC"1S of appeal; 
iii. information as to the extent to whicb toie enforcement of the order is requested; and 
iv. information as to the necessity of taking L'y provisional measures; . 
b. in toie case of Article 13, paragrapb l.b, a statement of the faClS relied upon by Lie requesting 
Party sufficient to enable the requested PI:,:), to seek L~e order unde: its domestic law; 
c. wben third parties have bad the oPPOl'tUniry to claim rigbts, documenu demor.sO'ating Liat this 
has been the case. . 
AI"'..icle 28 
Dtftcrh·t rtt;'.ltS:s 
1. If I request does not comply witoi the provisior.s of this chl?ter or the infor:r.ation supplied is not 
surficient 10 enable the requested Party to deal with the request, that PL~ lNy ask the requesting par.y 
to amend the request or 10 complete it with additior.al information. 
2. The requested Pany may set a time·limit for the receipt of such amendmenu or infom",ation. 
3. Pending receipt of the requested amendmenu or information in relation to a request under Sec-
tion 4 of this cbapter, the requested Party may take any of the measureS referred 10 in Sections 2 or 3 
of this Chapter. 
Article 29 
Pllm:liry ()f rtquts:s 
1. VI nere the requested Party receives more toiL'! one request under Sections 3 Dr 4 or this chlj)ter 
in respect of the same person or property, the pluraliry of requesu shall not prevent thll Part)' from deal-
ing with the requesu involving the taking of pro"isional measureS. 
2. In the case of pluraliry of requesu under Section 4 orto'lis cbapter, toie requested Par.)' shall consider 
consulting the requesting Parties. 
Article 30 
Oblilt:ti()fI '" lillt rtt:S()f!J 
The requested Party shall live reasons for Iny deeision to refuse. postpone or make conditional 
any co·oJXfation under this ch:l;lter. 
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Article 31 
Jrifol'7l".:J~ion 
1. Tne requested Parry shall promp~y ir.for:n the requesting Pa:'t)' of: 
c, the action initiated on a request under L'lis cha?ter; 
b, Lie final result of the action carried out on Lie basis of Lie request: 
c. a decision to refuse, pos?One or r..al:e conditional. in ""hole or in part. a.,y cQ-Operation under 
L'lis cb?ter: 
c. any circumstances ..... hich render impossible Lie carrying out of the action sOllght or ue lik:ly 
to deby it significantly: and 
t. in Lie event of provisional me3.Sllres taken purs::a.,t to a request under Sections 2 or 3 of this 
chapter, such provisions of its domestic I."" as would automatically lead to Lie lifting of the provisional 
measure. 
2. The requestin, Put)' shall promptly inform the requested Part)' of: 
a. any revie ...... decision or any other fact by reason of ..... hich the confiscation order ceases to be 
.... holly or partially enforceable: and 
b, any de\'elopment. factual or legal. by reas.:ln of which a.'y action under !.iis chapt:: is no longer 
justified. 
3, V. 'here a Party. on the basis of the same confis:ation order. r:quests confis:ation in more than one 
Pa"y. it shall inform 1.11 Parties ..... hich I.re atfe:ted by an enforcement of the order about the request. 
Ar.icle 32 
RtS:riaioll of use 
I. The requested Party may mu: the execution of a request depe:ldent on the condition that the infor-
mation or evidence obtained will not. without its prior cons:nt. be used or trl.nsmiaecl by the aut.iorities 
of Lie requesting PaM)' for investigations or proceedinis other than those specified in the request. 
2. Each Party may. at the time of signaNre or when depositin, its instrument of ratification, accept-
I.n:::. approval or accession. by declaration addressed to the SecretaI)' General of the Council of Europe, 
declare that. without its prior consent. information or evidence provided by It under this chapter may not 
be used or transmined by the authorities of the reques:i:!, Pany in investi,ations or proceedin,s other 
than these specified in the request. 
Article 33 
Confictn:ialil] 
I. The requestin, Pany may require that the requested Pany keep confidentiallbe raeu and subSWlCe 
of the request. except to the extent necesSlI)' to execute Ibe request. If the requested Pany elMOt comply 
with the requirement of confidentiality. it shall promptly inform the requesting Party. 
2. The requestin, Pany shall. if not contrary to buic principles of its national law and if so requestcc!. 
keep confidential any evidence and information pro\'ided by the requested Party. except 10 the extent that 
its disclosure is necessary for the investigations or proceedings described in toie request. 
3. S .. bject to the pro\'isions of its domestic lallo'. a Party which hu received spontaneous information 
under Article 10 shall compl), with any requirement of confIdentiality u required by Ibe Pany which sup-
plies toie infor.n.1tion. If the other Party c:annot comply with such requirement. it shall prompdy inform 
the transmitting Pan),. 
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Article ~ 
Com 
The ordi~ry cosu of complyin& with a request shall be borne by the requC5ted Put)'. "''here costs 
of a substantial or extraordinary ~cure Ire necessary to tomply with I request, the Panies shall consult 
in order to a,ree the conditions on which the request is to be executed and how the cosu shall be borne. 
Anic:le 35 
DIl1'I'JlgtS 
I. When le,al action on liability for cWnJ,es resullinl from an act or OrNuion in relation to co-
operation under this chapter has been initiated by a person. the Panies concerned shall consider consultinl 
uch other, where appropriate, to determi~e how 10 a?portion any sum of dama,C5 due. 
2. A Parry which has become subject of a litilllion for d.ama&es shall enduvour to inrorm the other 
Parry or such liti,ation if that Parry mi,hl have lJI inlerest in the cue. 
CHAPTER IV 
FlSAL PROVISIOSS 
Article 36 
SigfIDrurt cnd tll/ry illto force 
I. This Convention shall be open for sil~curc by the member Sutes of the Council of Europe and 
non-member Stales which have panicipated in its ela!>oration. Such States may express their consent 10 
be bound by: 
c. si,nacure wilhout reservation as to ntification, acceptance or approval; or 
b. si&nacure subject to ratification, acceptance or appron), followed by ratification, acccpwce or 
appro\'a!. 
2. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or appro\'11 shall be deposiled with the Secreta:)' Ceneral 
or the Council of Europe. 
3. This Convention shall enler into force on the lirst day of the month followin, the expiration of a 
period of three monw after the dale on which three Stales. of which at ICUl cwo are member States of 
the Council of Europe, have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention in accC?rc!ance with. 
the provisions or para,raph I. 
4. In respect of any si'~tol)' !\tate which subsequently expresses its eonsenl to be bound by'lt. the 
Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month followill, the expiratioll of 1 period of 
three monw after the elate of the expression of its consent to be bound by the Convention ill accorelancc 
""ith the provisions of para,nph I. 
Article 37 
1. After the enll)' into force of this Convention. the Comminee of Minislers of the Council or Europe, 
Ifter consultin& the Contractin, Stales 10 the Con\·cntion. m.1y invite any Stale JIOl a member or the Coun· 
eil and nOI havinl participated in its elaboration 10 acc:ede 10 this Convention. by a decision taken by the 
majoril)' pro\'ided fot in Article 20.d of the SUlult of the Counc:il of Europe and by Ihe unanimous vOle 
of Ihe ttprucnulivu of the ContraC:lin, S~ICS enlitled 10 sil on Ihe Commince. 
386 
Cor:rrlllior: or: Lallr:drringlConfiscalion of P,oc~~ds from Crirr:~ - J990 
2. In respect of any acceding State the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month 
follo"'ing the expiration of a period of three months after L"e date of de?Osit of L"e insL"\Iment of accession 
with L"e Secretary General or the Council of Europe. 
Article 38 
Territorial cppIicc:iofl 
I. Any State may. at the time oi signa:ure or ..... hen de?Ositing its ir.sL"\Iment of ratification. acce?W\ce. 
appro\'al or accession. specify ,,"e te:ritory or territories to ..... hich "iis Convention shall apply. 
2. Any State may. at any later date. by a declaration addres~ to "ie Secrcta.")' General of the Council 
of Europe. extend the application of this Convention to any other territory s~ified in the declaration. 
In res;xct or such territory the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following 
the expiration of a period of L''\Tee monlr.s after the ciate of receipt of such deda.-ation by "'Ie Secretary 
Gene:'11. 
3. Any declaration made under the f\O'O preceding paragraphs rnJy. in respect of any ter.itory specified 
in such dec:laration. be withdrawn by a notification addres~ to the Secreta."Y General. The witMrawal 
shall become effective on the first ciay of the month following "ie expiration of a period of three months 
after the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General. 
Article 39 
Re!ario,.,Jhip 10 owr cOIIVtt:riollS end Clrttmtt:ls 
1. This Convention does not affect Lie rights and undel"'..akings deri\'ed from interr..ational multilateral 
con\'entions concerning special maners. 
2. The Parties to the Convention may conc:1ude bilateral Of mulnlate:-al agreements with one ano!.ier 
on the manm dealt with in this Convention. for purposes of supplementing or suengthening ics provisions 
or f3cilitating the application or the principles embodied in it. 
3. If "'"'0 or more Parties have alrudy CC?ncluded an agreement or Ueal)' in respect of a subject .... ·hich 
is dealt with in this Convention or otherwise have established their relations in respect of that subject. 
they shall be entitled to apply that a,feement or treal)' or to rel'llate those relations Iccordingly. in lieu 
of the present Convention. if it facilitates intematior.al co-ope~ation. 
Article 40 
RtstrvcriolU 
I. Any Stale may. at the time of signature or when depositinl its instrument of ... tification. Iccep~nce. 
approval or Iccession. declare that it avails itself of one or more of the reservations provided for in An-
iele 2. paragraph 2. Article 6. paragraph 4. Article 14. plragraph 3. Article 21. paragrlph 2. Article 25. 
parasrlph 3 and Article 32. paragraph 2. No other reSef\'ltion may be made. 
2. Any State which has made a reservation under the prccedin, paragraph may wholly or partly 
withdraw it by means of a norification addressed to the Secretary Ceneral or the Council of Europe. The 
wit.l-ad:~"'·al shall take effect on the dale or receipt of such notification by the Secretary Ceneral. 
3. A Party whieh has rr.~de a reservation in respect of a pro\'ision of this Convention may nor claim 
the applic3tion of thaI pro\'ision by any other Pany: il may. however. if its reservation is panial or con· 
diliot:31. cl:iim the application or th~t provision in so (ar as it has itself accepled it 
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Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the 
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
Source: H M Tre.:5ury. Londen 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
of 1 O. VI. 1991 
[COUr-;CIL DIRECTIVE 91/30SlEEC] 
on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CO~~UNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. and in 
particular Article 57(2), first and third sentences, and Article 100a thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1) 
(2 ) In co-operation .... i th the European Parliament 
(3) 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
(3) 
OJ No C 106, 28. 4.1990, p. 6 and 
OJ No C 319, 19.12.1990, p. 9, 
OJ No C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 264 and Decision of 17 April 1991 (n6t yet 
published in the O!fieial~J§~rnal). 
OJ No C 332, 31.12.1990, p". '6. 
European Communities 
Uhereas money laundering is usually carried out in an international context so 
t~at the criminal origin of the funds can be better disguised: whereas measures 
exclusively adopted at a national level, without taking account of international 
co-ordination and co-operation, would have very limited effects: 
... ·hereas any measures adopted by the Community in this field should be consistent 
with other action undertaken in other international fora: whereas in this respect 
any CO::\::lunity action should take particular account of the recommendations 
adopted by the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering, set up in 
July 1989 by the Paris S~~it of the Seven Host Developed Countries: 
... ·hereas the Eu!"opean Parliament has requested, in several Resolutions, the 
establishment of a global Community prO&rL~e to combat drug trafficking, 
including provisions on prevention of money laundering; 
"'~ereas for the purposes of this Directive the definition of money laundering is 
taken from that adopted in the Vienna Convention: Whereas, however, since money 
laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related offences 
but also in relation to the proceeds of other criminal activities (such as 
organized crime and terrorism), the Member States should, within the meaning of 
their legislation, extend the effects of the Directive to include the proceeds of 
such activities, to the extent that they are likely to result in laundering 
operations Justifying sanctions on that basis; 
... ·hereas prohibition of money laundering in Member States' lelislaUon backed by 
appropriate measures and penalties is a necessary condition for combat ina this 
phenomenon: 
'-'hereas ensuring that credit and lina:\c1&l institutions require identification of 
their customers when entering into business relations or conduct in, transactions, 
exceeding certain thresholds, are necessary to avoid launderers' taking advanta,e 
o! anonymity to carry out their criminal activities; whereas such provisions must 
also be extended, as far as possible, to any beneficial owners: 
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~hereas credit and financial institutions must keep for at least five years 
copies or references of the identification documents req~ired as well as 
supporting evidence and records co~sisting of documents relating to transactiens 
or copies thereof similarly admissible in court proceedings under the a?plicable 
national legislation for use as evidence in any investigation into money 
laundering; 
'-'hertas ensuring that credit and fina..""Icial instit1.:tions examine with special 
attention any trans~ction which they regard as particularly likely, by its 
nature, to be related to money laundering is necessary in order to preserve the 
soundness and integrity of the fina..",cial system as well as to contribute to 
combating this phenomenon; whereas to this end they should pay special attention 
to transactions with third countries which do not apply comparable standards 
against money laundering to those established by the Community or to other 
equivalent standards set out by international fora and endorsed by the Community; 
~~ereas, for those purposes, Member States may ask credit and financial 
institutions to record in writing the results of the examination they are 
required to carry out and to ensure that those results are available to the 
authorities responsible for efforts to eliminate money laundering; 
Vhereas preventing the financial system from being used for money laundering 1s a 
task Which cannot be carried OUt by the authorities responsible for combating 
this phenomenon without the co-operation of credit and financial institutions and 
their supervisory authorities; whereas banking secrecy must be lifted in such 
cases; whereas a mandatory system of reporting suspicious transactions which 
ensures that information is transmitted to the abovementioned authorities without 
alerting the customers concerned, is the most effective way to accomplish such 
co-operation; whereas a special protection clause 1s necessary to exempt credit 
and financial institutions, their employees and their directors from 
responsibility for breaching restrictions on disclosure of information; 
~~ereas the information received by the authorities pursuant to this Directive 
may be used only in connection with combatins money launderinl; whereas Member 
States may nevertheless provide that this information may be used for other 
purposes; 
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~hereas establishment by credit and financial institutions of procedures cf 
internal control and training progrL~es in this field are complementary 
provisions without which the other measures contained in this Directive could 
become ineffective: 
,,'hereas, since money laundering can be carried OUt not only through credit and 
financial institutions but also through other types of professions and categories 
of undertakings. Member States must extend the provisions of this Directive in 
whole or in part, to include those professions and undertakings whose activities 
are particularly likely to be used for mtlney hund,ering purposes: 
~hereas it is important that the Member States should take particular care to 
ensure that co-ordinated action is taken in the Community where there are strong 
grounds for believing that professions or actiVities the conditions governing the 
purusit of which have been harmonized at Community level are being used for 
laundering money: 
"'her-eas the ef!ectiveness of efforts to el1l)1inate money hundering is 
particularly dependent on the close co-ordination and harmonization of national 
implementing measures: whereas such co-ordination and harmonization which is 
being carried out in various international bodies requires. in the Community 
context, eo-operation between Hember States and the Commission in the framework 
of a Contact Committee: 
"~ereas it is for each Hember State to adopt appropriate measureS and to penalize 
infringement of such measures in an appropriate manner to ensure full application 
of this Directive, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
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Article 1 
For the p~~?ose of this Directive: 
- "credlt institution" mea.ns a credit institution, as defined as in the first 
indent of Article 1 of Directive 77/750/EEC (1), as last amended by 
Directive 59/646/EEC (2) a.""Id includes branches .... ithin the meaning of the third 
indent of that Article and located in the Community, of credit institutions 
having their head offices outside the Community: 
- "financial institution" means an undertaking other than a credit institution 
.... hose principal activity is to carry out one or more of the operations included 
(1) OJ ~o L 322,17.12.1977, p. 30 
[Directive 77nSOlEEC pro\ides: 
For the purposes o( this Directive: 
"nidI 1 
- 'credit institution' means an undertakin, whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds (rom the public 
and to ,rant credits (or itS own account, ... ) 
(2) OJ No L 386, 30.12.1989, p. 1. 
(This directive adopts lI.;thout chan,e thc dcftnition in Directivc 77nSO. HOII.'evcr, thc directi\'c contains I number or 
substantive provisions relating to credit institutions ,enerally. Thesc are not reproduced here.) 
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in r.umbers 2 to 12 and number 14 of the list annexed to Directive 89/646/EEC,(") 
or an insurance company duly authorized in accordance with 
Directive 79/267/EEC (11 as last amended by Directive 90/619/EEC (21 insofar 
[" Directive 89/~6iEEC pro\;des: 
AS.\·EX 
LIST OF ACTI\mES SUBJECf TO MI.;TUAL RECOGSmOS 
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public. 2. Lending('). 
3. Financial leasing. 4. Money transmission services. 
S. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards. travellers' cheques and bankers' dra~). 
6. Guarantees and commitments. 
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in: 
(a) money market instruments (cheques. bills. CDs, etc.): (b) foreign exchange: 
(c) financial futures and options; (d) exchange and interest rate instruments; (e) transferable securities. 
8. Participation in share issues and the pro";sion of ser.ices related to such issues. 
9. Ad";ce to undertakings on capital structure, industrial stratel)' and related questions and ad\;ce and services relating 
to mergers and the purchase of undertakings. 
10. Money broking. 
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities. 
1~. Safe custody ser.ices. 
(I) In:lYdin, iJutf .1 .. : 
- e'Omumcr credit. 
- monl1lf credit. 
- faClorin" .. ith or .. ithoYt ,acounc. 
-llnancin, 01 oommmial transactions [....rudin, folfailin,). 
(I)OJ ~o L 63,13.3.1979, p. 1. 
(Directive 791267IEEC pro";des: 
Anicl,6 
11. Portfolio management and ad\·ice. 
13. Credit reference sel'\;ces. 
1. Each Member State shall make the taking up of the acthities referred to in this Directh'e in its territory subject to an 
official authorization. 
2. Such authorization shall be sought from the competent authority of the Member State in question by: 
(a) any undertaking which establishes its head officc in the territory of such State; 
(b) any undertaking whose head office is situated in another Member State and " .. hich opens an agency or branch in 
the territory of the Member State in question; 
(c) any undertaking which, ha\ing received the authorization required under (a) or (b) above, extends its business in 
the territory of such State to other classes; . 
(d) any undertaking which, hl\;ng obtained, in accordance .. ith A.-ticle 7 (1), an authorization for a par. of the 
national territory, extends its activity beyond such part. 
3. Member States shall not make authorization subject to the lodging of a deposit or the provision of security. 
AniC/,7 
1. An authorization shall be valid for the entire national territory unless, and in so far as national laws permit, the 
applicant seeks permission to carry on his business only in a part of the national territory. 
2. Authorization shall be given for. particular class of insurance. The classillation by class appears in the Annex. 
A uthorization shall cover the entire class unless the applicant .. ishes to cover only pan of the risks pertaining to such 
class. 
The supervisory authorities may restrict an authorization requested for one of the classes to the operations set out in the 
scheme of operations referred to in Artic:les 9 and 11. 
3. Each Member State may ,r:1:1t an authorization for t ..... o or more of the classes, where its nllionalla"", permit such 
classes to be carried on simultaneously. 
<=l OJ:-:oU~0.29.11.1990,p.50. 393 
[This direc:i"e contains no provision affecting the provisions on authoriution in Directive 791267.) 
.. 
. .. ' 
Council Direc:h'~ - 10 Jun~ 1991 
as it carries out activities covered by that Directive; this definition 
includes branches located in the Cc~~unity of finan:ial institutions ~hose head 
cffices are ou:side the Co~~unity; 
- "money laundering" means the follo .... ing conduct .... hen com.~itted intentionally: 
the conversion or transfer of property. kno~ing that such property is derived 
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity. for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or 
of aSSisting any person ""ho is involved in the commission of such activity to 
evade the legal consequences of his action; 
the concealment or disguise of the true nature. source. location. 
dispOSition, movement. rights with respect to, or ownership of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act 
of participation in such activity; 
the ac~uisition, possession or use of property. knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act. 
of participation in such activity; 
participation in. association to commit, attempt. to commit and aiding. 
abetting. facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the action. 
mentioned in the foregOing paragraphs, 
Kno~ledse, intent or purpose required as an e~ement of the abovementioned 
activities. may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. 
Honey laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which 
generated the property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of 
another Member State or in that of • third country. 
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- "property" means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, 
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible. and legal documents or 
instruments evidencing title to or interests in such &ssets; 
"criminal activity" mea.'1S a crime specified in Article 3(1)(a) ot the 
Vienna Convention and any other criminal activity designated as such for the 
p~rposes o! this Directive by each Member State; 
- "competent authorities" means the national authorities empowered by law or 
regulation to supervise credit or financial institutions. 
Article 2 
~ember States shall ensure that money laundering as defined in this Directive is 
prohibited. 
Article 3 
1. Member States shall ensure that credit L~d financial institutions require 
identification of their. customers by means of supporting evidence when enterini 
into business relations, particularly \o'hen opening L"I account or savinis 
accounts, or when offering sate custody facilities. 
2. The identification requirement shall also apply for any transaction with 
customers other th~n those referred to in paragraph " involving a sum amountini 
to ECU 15 000 or more. whether the transaction is carried out 1n a single 
operation or in several operations which seem to be linked. Where the sum is not 
known at the time when the transaction is undertaken, the institution concerned 
shall proceed with identification as SOOn as it 1s apprised of the sum and 
establishes that the threshold has been reached. 
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3. Ey ~ay o! de~cg!:!e~ !~o~ p!~!gr!~~s 1 !~d 2. the ide~ti!icatie~ reG~ireme~ts 
~ith reg!~~ to i~s~~!~ce policies writte~ by i~sura~ce c~dertakinss w:thin the 
mea.:".i::g c:! ~!~ect!ve '''/2c7lEEC . ... ·he~e t~ey ~er!c~rr: activities I,.hich tall "'!~~,:n 
a."7,:~::t cr &::".:~:.:S to be ~a!~ in e,:.:' given l·t.!.r does er d~ net ex:ud E:::U , 000 •. 
... ·here r. si::gle prem:'um is paid a;no\::.ti:.g to E:::U 2 500 or less. I! the perio:ie 
;:re:r.:ur:: e,::\o ... ~: or UlO1.l~:s to be pa!d i~ L,y give~ yea.r is or &re i.".crea.sed so &5 
:0 exceed the ECU , 000 threshold. ide~ti!ication shr.ll be reQ~!red. 
t. Her::~er States may provide tha: :he iden:ificatio~ requirement is not 
compulsery for insura.nce polICies in respect o! pens!o~ schemes taken o~t by 
virtue of a oontract o! employment or the insured's occupation. provided that 
s\:ch policies contain no s~rrender clause and may net be used as collateral for a 
10a:"l. 
5. l:l the eve::.t of doubt as to \o'he:her the CUStomers refe:rec to in the above 
paragraphs are act ins on their 0'-":"1 behal!. or ... ·!".ere it is cerai:'l that they are 
not acting on their O"'":l behalf. the credit ane !inL~cial institutions shall take 
reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity c! the persons 
01": ... ·!'lese behalf those C1.lstomers are a::ing. 
6. Cre:!it and fina.ncia.l i!":sti':~~io::s sha.!l carry 0"· s~c~ ide::tifieuion. even 
... ·here the &mO\:l'lt e! the tra:.sa:t:'en is lo .... er t~L~ the thruhcl:!s laid c!o .... n • 
... ·!",e:-eve:- there is sU5?icion o! money la~nderi:-:,. 
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i. Cre:it a~d financial ir.stitutio~s s~all no~ be subject to the identi~jcation 
fi~a~ei~l i~stitction covered by this Oi~eetive. 
C?~:i~d in the c'.!stomer's name .... ith I credit i~stitutio:i subject to this Directive 
A:-t icle 4 
- i:i t~e ca!e o! ide~ti!ication, a CC?y 0:- the re~erences of the evidence 
required, for a period c~ at least ~ive years after the relationship .... ith their 
c\!sto~e:- has ended; 
- in the case of transactions, t~e supporting evidence and records, consisting of 
the original documents or co~ies a~~issible in court proceedinls under the 
applica:!e national legislation fcr a period cf It least five years !cllo~ing 
execution c~ the transactions. 
A:-ticle S 
Hember States shall ensure that credit a:id fir.L~oill institutions eXLToine with 
special attention any transaction whi:h they regard as particularly likely, by 
its nat'.!re, to be related to money laundering. 
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~~~e:tc~s ~~d e=?loyees co-c?e~a:e !~!!y ~l:~ the a~thc~ities respc~s:~:e !c~ 
c~m~a:ing money la~nder1ng: 
:y i::!o:-~':'::g those authorities, on t.~ei:" 0'-7\ i:.i~:'a~:'ve, c! L'"ly !!C~ '.;~ic~ 
\:1' fI.:~:-.~s!'ling those a-.:thcr1:1es, .... their re:r.:est, ~'1th all nece!u:-y 
i::!c:-~at::o:-•. 1:'1 accor~a.. ... ce 1o'1"h the ~roced-..::,es esta~lishe~ 1::, the applicable 
legisl!.~icrL 
7:;t 1:-.:0:-::-... :::0:: ~e!e~re~ to in t~e !:':s: ?a:-ag~ap!': 5:.all be !cr ... ar~ed to the 
2:.: .. hcri:ies responsible !:r combat!.r., me:':e:, la:'::'Iderir.g c! t~e ~e:nbe!" State i~. 
~'hcse territcry the institutior. !o;--.'a;~ing the in!c:-:::aticn is situated. 7!'!e 
?e:-scn c:- pe:-sons desig:':ated I:y the c:ed:'t and fina:'lcial ins:it~:!cns i~ 
accerd~ ... ce with the proee~ures p:,cvided fer in Article "(1) shall nor~ally 
fer ..... ar::! the ir.!orma:ion. 
Information s~??lied to the autherities i:'l acccrdar.ce wit!'! the first paragraph 
may be used only in connection with the combating o! money laundering. However, 
~em~er States may provide that s:.:ch in!o~.ation may also be used fer ether 
purposes . 
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Article 7 
ca:-.y:':;g o-..:t t:-ansactic:-.s ... ·~.ich ~h!y len:\.' c:- s:.:spe::t to be relaad tc money 
lau:;de:-ing until they have a?p:-ise~ the a-..:thorities refe:-:-ed to in A:-ticle 6. 
ThOS! a-..:thcrities may. unde:- con~:tions de~ermined cy thei:- ~atiOnll legislltlcn. 
give i:-.st'l:ctions not to execute the ope:-ation. .':.e:-e s:.:ch a t:-a.:lSa::tlcn is 
s-..:s?ec~ed cf giving rise to mc:;ey la-..:nderi:;g a.nd where tc refra.in in s-..:ch ~a.~ner 
is impc!si:le cr is likely to f.-..:strlte e!!crts to pursue the beneficiaries of a 
s;,:s?ected ~oney-laundering operation. the institutions concerned shall apprise 
the a-..:thcrities i~~ediately a.!te ... ards. 
A.t icl! e 
Cre~it and !inancial institutions I:;d their directors and emplcyees shall not 
disclose to the customer concerned nor to ether third perso:;s that information 
has been tn:.s:dtted to the luthc:-ities in accorda.:')ce \o'ith Article 6 I.."ld i or 
that a money launderl .. g investigation is bei~g carried o~:. 
Article 9 
ihe disclosu:-e in good faith to the authc:-i:ies responsi~le for combati:;, money 
lau:;dering b:-' L,,) employee or dir!Ctor of I cre~it or financial institution of the 
ii.fc~ation referred to in Article 6 I.."ld 7 shall not constitute a breach of L~y 
re$~riction on disclosure c~ info~m&tion imposed by contract or by L~y 
legislative. reg~l&:ory or ad~ir.ist~ative provision. L"ld shall not ir.velve the 
cree it cr !i:-.a..~c:i&l i:'lHitutic::. its direc:tc~s or em~lo>'ees in liability o! any 
xind. 
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Article 10 
~er..~er S:a:es sr.a1l e~s-.;re tr.2~ i~. i!'\ t:'e co'..::"S! of i::s?e:tio!'\s carrad 0'" :.~ 
c:e~it cr f!!'\a~ci!l i!'\sti~~~ie!'\s by the co~?ete~~ a'..::hcrities. 0: in a!'\y ether 
~ay. thes! a~:harit!ts c~sc:ver fae:s that eo'..::d cc!'\!:it'..::e evide!'\ce o~ mo!'\ey 
2a'.lnoering. 
A:-t!cle l' 
~e~~er States shall ens~re that c:-ecit L~d finL~cial i!'\stit~tiens: 
t; ~;res:all and preve::t ope:-!ticns :-elated to money la~!'\deri!'\g: 
2) take appropriate mcaS'.lres 50 that thei:- e~ployees !:-e aware of the ~rovisions 
contai!'\ed i!'\ this Directive. These ~eaS'.lres shall i!'\el~de ~artici~atio:l ef 
their releva~t e~plcyees l!'\ s?ecia~ training progrL~~es to help the~ reeog:li:e 
operations which may be related to ~or.ey laundering as well as to i!'\struet 
them as :0 how to proceed in s'..::h casts. 
A:-ticle 12 
Mem~er States shall ens'..::e that the previsions of this Directive are extended 1n 
whole or l!'\ part to professions a!'\c to categories of undertakings. other thL~ the 
crecit a!'\c fi.na:'lc:'al i:.stit'..:tions referred to in ".rticle '. I,.hien engage l:l 
activities which !:-e particul&:-ly likely to be ~sed for money-laun~er1n, 
pc:-peses . 
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A Co:na:t Cor..,:,.:tae Ihe.eir.a!te. re!erre: ~o as "t!':e Com.'1'.itae") sha! ~ be set 
v!ew are deemed ~se!~l: 
(~) to facilitate consultation between the ~em~er St&~es on the more str!ngent or 
aocitic •• al ccnc:'tic:-.s a..":d o~liga:icr.s ~ .. hi:h they rr.ay lay do"'n at r.atior.Il 
level: 
Ie) tc a~vise the CCr.II:'.ission. i! necessary. 0:': L":y su??!eme:'lts c:' a.me:,c::le:-.ts to 
be mace to this Directive o. O:'l p",,:y acj'.:s:mer.:s deemed neoesu:";,, in 
?artic'.:la:' to ha.mor.ize the e!!ects o! A:'t!c!e 12. 
(0) to examine ... hether & pro!essicr. or I category c! undertakir.g showld be 
included in the scope c! Artiele 12 whe:'e it has been established that such 
prc!essicn or category o! u:'loertakir.g has been used in a ~em~er Stlte !or 
mO:'ley-laur.dering. 
2. It shall not be the functicn o! the Co~~ittee to appraise the merits of 
deeisior.s taken by the competent authorities in indiVidual cases. 
3. .he Committee shall be composed of persor.s appointed by the Hem~e:" Stites and 
of representatives of the Com.~ission. !he secretariat shill be provided by the 
Com.~iss1cr.. The Chairman s~lll be a representative ef the Com.~issien. It shall 
be convened by its Chliman. either en his o.-n initiative or It the reQuest of 
the delegltion of a Member State. 
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Ar-ti:le 1': 
Ea:h Hem~e~ State shall take a~~rop~iate measu~es ~o e~5u~e !~ll a??li:aticn e! 
all the prcv!sio~s c! t~is Directive an~ s~all in pa~t!cula~ ~ete~~:ne the 
7~e He~be~ States ~ay adcp~ C~ retai~ i~ foree s~~icte~ p~ovisior.s i~ the fiel~ 
ceve~ed by this ei:ec:!ve to prevent money la~nder!~g. 
1. Xe~~er States shall bring into ferce the laws, reg~latio~s and a~~!n!s:~ative 
~ec!s!e~s ne:essary to com;ly w'·~ this Directive before 1 January '993 at the 
1 atest. 
2. ~~e:e Hem~e: States adop: these ~eas~:es, they shall contain a reference to 
this Di:ective or shall be accompanied ~y such refe~ence on the occasion of their 
cfficial publication. The methods of r..uing s-..:ch a re!e~ence s!'iall be 1I.!d do .. " 
~y the Hem~er States. 
3. Membe: States shall com~unicate to the Com~ission the text of the ~a!n 
p:-ovisicns o! na~icr.al law ... hich they a~cpt in the field governed by this 
Di:-e:tive. 
One year after 1 Ja:\uary 1993, ... hene .... er necessary L"Id at hut at thru yearly 
i:nervals theredter. the Commission shall c!raw up a report on the implementation 
of this Directive a.nd submit it to the European Parli&lllent L"Id the C01.:ncil. 
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S?XXA-~.V 
1. :::! ::"f:h =0'':;-,: c! t.~! :~:.a~::'i!.: iL:::=~ ':asK Fe,::! (r;' .. :!'j, .. ":.::: .• ·So! 
cha.:':e: =::" t.~e ~:-.. :'te::: ~·..i~;:'O:l, ~OC'..!S!:. 0:"), th:!! r:':'o:i::'!!: 
(:) mo~::o:i~~ the L~?le~e~:a:io~ e! t~e !o=ty Reco~e~~ltio~! e~ 19~O by 
::5 me::,.be:s; 
(i:) r..o:'.::c:ing de-:elo?=e~ts :n cc~ey ll~~~e:ing ce:hods a~~ e:·:a.,,:,~~!.~; 
apF:O?=iate =!!i~e~!~:s to cou~te=-~!a!~:es; ~n~ 
(:"ii) ca:=y:":-:.; O\:: a:-. a.:~i·.·! e:-::e:nal =!:a-:ie~s r=o~:a...-=~ toe ~:c·:n~:e t~e 
w::es~ ?o!si::~ ~~~e=~a:ie~&l ac~ie~ a;a:~s~ =c~e: la~~=e:~~:. 
2. !~ adc.i:ie~, a ::-.ajc: task con=~c::e= i:-. 19:3-19~4 by t!-.! Fr.:: .·&S the 
=e",::.e"* c: its :i.!~\:':! .. i.SS:C:1 a:"lc F:O;:L""":::l!.. !':. ..... as c:!e:i=e: :~a,: the r;..:r 
sho~!c :e ~a~~~ai~e: ~c: a :w::he: ~!ve yea=s. n~ile t~! la~~:!:i~; c! c:~: 
money \till r~..a.:'r. a E:'i!'lci:.al !oe'.:s ~e= t~~ FAT:, "·lo::.s··~:~~4 W!._. co:.t:.nu~ ':.0 
co"-!!. ,,,_ ney .1c;!!'loe=!.:'Ig c: the p=oc!e:s c! !e::'o~s c=i:nes an:'/o: c~!e!'lces which 
~ene=a:e s:g!'li!ica~t !U:'lC'S. Ove: t~e next five yea=! ~he !Isk Te::e will 
e~~:~~:=a~e C~ ~r.=~~ ~4~r. a:ea!: ~~=:h~= cc~~~c=i~~ c! ~~~e=!' ~:o;=es5 i~ 
co~~:!=i~; m~~~r la~~d~=!~;; the =!V~!W e! money la~~~e=in; te:~~i;~es a~~ 
co~n:!:-~eas~=e!; 2~~ e~te:~al =!:a~~o~!, i~ c=~e= to p:o~ete w::l~-~~de ac:ion 
a=ai~s~ ~cney la~n~e=in;. 
3. As in p:!~:Ou! :OU!'l~s, the !l!~ Fo::e ce~ote:' a cons!.ee=a~le pa:t of its 
""o:k to the rnor.it.o:in; c~ rn~~e=5' i..-:?le;ne::.ta~io~ c:~ th~ fe:ty ~e:orn::\e~catio~5 
on the basis o! the seH-u!eS!~ent I:lO r.'.'..:t'.!ll e-.. al'.!ation p=ooe:'..::es. Tht 
19~3-1gS< s!l~-a!!ess~e::.: e:~!=:!se s~owec ~ha: me~!:! ha: co~:in~e= to ~a;'e 
!i;~~~ica~t F:o;:es! i~ ~.~:~~~~:!n; t~e le;al a~c fi::.a~c~al ~e:e~!~~a~io~s. 
!n ?a=tic~la:, aL~:st all me~e:$ have now e!'lac:ed laws to r.~ke e=u; money 
li'..!:'l:!: i~; a c:==-~~a!. cf :e~:e. I:. ~I.:allel, 1.11 lne=~e: io\·e=~-:\e~~ s pe:::.i t 
the~: ba~~s to :e?o:: !~s~icious t:a~sactio~s to t~e eo=?e~ent a~t~o:ities ane, 
i~ ni~ete!~ rn~~~: ;~=i!eictio~!, t~e b~~s a:e :e;~~:e: tc c: se. 
4. The mutual evaluation p=oce:'~:e, w~ic~ p:ovides a hi;:_ly eeailed 
e~a.~~ni:ion c! anti-money lau~=e=i:'l; meas~=es, has again p=ove: to ~e a 
Fartic~ll=ly e~:ectiv! mo~~to=i~; ~ec~&~!s~. !he m~t~al e~llul:ier. 
e~~~na:ions continued to be ca:=ie: out at a :api: ?a:e a:'le twenty one TA~r 
members have now bee~ evaluate~. S~~:ie! e~ the nine eval'..:ations conducted 
d~=ing TA!F-V (the Kingdom of the Nethe:la!'lc!, Ge~~r.y, No:wa:, Japan, G:tece, 
S?ain, r:nla~c, Eong Kong an: !:elar:e) a:e contained in ia:t II o! the repo:t. 
The remai~in; evaluations will take place in TA!i-V!. 
5. The collection a:'le sha:ing c! in!o=matior. on the la~est eevelo?ments and 
t:!~CS ~~ mo~!y lau~d!:ing me~hoc! confi:.rned the te~dencies o~se:ve: in 
p:e\":ous e::e:cises. \oi!:ile n:rF me~e:s hao:e int:oeuced p:eventive meuu:es 
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?~co~.e:;:'atio~s .,·e:e a=:,:·:~:' c:':'::":1; :.:'.7:--;. Hc .. ·!:· .. ·~:, t-:> :~:e=?:'!::i:;,· .. ·e ~:~'!! 
we:e a;:e~d: o~e C~ th~ ide~~i~i:a~io~ c~ c~5:0~e:s who a~! le;al e~~i:i!s a~~ 
the o~h!: on rn!as~:es to co~~:e= ~:~!r la~~de=in; th:ough ~i~a~cial a::ivi:ies 
ca==ie~ ou: by no~-~i=a~=~al b~!~~!!S~S c: p=:~ess:"c~s. =he :a!k F::c! a:~~ 
c=nti~~e~ its w=:~ C~ s!~e=al i~i~ia~i~!! la~n:he~ i~ ea:lie: :o~~~s: 
F:!ve~~ive mea!~:e! by non-ba~ ~i~a~=i~l i~s:i~~:i:~s, es?e:ia~ly :~:ea~: de 
cr.a.:"lge: co·.!n:e::":1; the \!s! c: nc:: :i:"l2.:1cial b,,=.!.i~.!ss~s_c;e~e=a.l!y :!-:: t:l~n~y 
la~~ce=;~;; i:~~:i:i:atic~ =e,~:":~~~~~s i~ cases w~e=e the:! is ~~ !a:e-~c-!a:! 
con:a=~ betwe!~ a~ ins:i~~~io~ a~e i:s c~storo~:; a~d mai~~ai~i~g a~ .~~~t trail 
for fc~:s tra~s!e=s on el!c::o~ic ?a~~~~t a~d message sy!te~. o~ t~! la~~e= 
issue, th~ FAr: =~~~~we~ t~~ ~T~!e~~~~ation by i~s m~e:s cf th~ s~:r~ 
broadcast c! 30 J~:y 19S2, a~~ ~: also ?ursu~d pos~tiv~ co~:a::s w~:~ S~!r:, 
th~ lea~:'ng i~te:na~io~i!.: ~\'!:1C:s t:a:-.s!e: rnes!aS'~ syste:n. 
i. ~~:h :e;a:c tc t~e e~:!:~al :!la:io~s co~~i~, th~ Task :e::e ~~in~aine~ 
its e~:::t! to e~:c\!:a=! ~o~-~e~~'!: c:\.!~::ie! ~o ta.ke e:~!:~i·"! ~ea.!\;=!s 
agai~s: :none~' la'.!~de=i~S'. !:--. a:'::',':ic!;, the r;..!': \!:'l=!=~o~k a r.a.jo: :e· ... iew c~ 
its e~~!=:1al r!la-:.i~!"!! wo::( a!"lc a s::a-:!~l "'"as c:a-·!'"1 u!' ~c: i-;s cc~:a:ts ",·':'th 
nC:1-m!~~e= j~=i!:ictio~! i~ the ~c=~h=:=l~~ yea:!. 
- ., --... ::-: - --- - .- . --- -
s. !:·:te=~a.l actior.!_c:l~!=ta.ke:: i:",. 19S3-19.S~.hJ·"'! al!o_i:,:-.. cl\·~::.c;~~~::.s 
with co~~~ries !rom every conti~e~t, w~th ?artic~lar e:,?ha!~s O~ t~~ Caribbea~ 
area, Ce~tral a~: Ea!ter~ E~rc?e, a~~ ~!ia" As in 1992-1?93, the FA.; car:iee 
O\!t S!\.·!:a.l a~":i-:no!'l~y l!.\!~d~=i:-:; !~-:...!.!"'.a=! !.:"l: tr1.s!ie~s i:; ncn-:n~='!'e= 
j~ris~~::io~s. ";we majc: !~":"~a:! \o'e:e held d·,;r:'~; r;.:::- .... : i~ P.i::"a:ih 
(Octob~= 1993) a~d M:s:o .... · (Nov~~~= 19:;). :)..:r =e?=e!e~te-;:'-.,.~s &~s= too;':' pa:t. 
i~ hi:~-le~el ~~ssio~! to !!=a~l, tr.! ?!c?le'$ Re?~li: c: C~i~&, ~ally!i., 
.~aila~c a~~ !!i~a~" 
9. !~ ca:ryinc o~t its e~~e:~al re:atio~! pro~r~~, the FA!: has cor.ti~~e: 
to work i~ c~ose cc-o?~ra:~on w~:h o:~er i~terna~ional bo~~es invclv~~ in 
co:r.ba':.in;, money 12'.!nc~=~~;, s\!ch as t::e li~:'ted Natio~s I:'t:e=r.a:ic~ll t'=~; 
Co~t=cl Prosr~~e, the Co~ncil e! E~:o?e, the Cornrnonw~alth S~creta:iat, the 
Custo~s Cc-o?era:io~ Co~~::'l an:! !n:e=?ol. 
10. A: its i-S Ju~t ~e~~ini' the C~:D Cc~~cil at ~~ni~~e:~al Le~tl 
e~dc=s!d th~ d~ci!~c~ c! :~e r~!r to e=:e~d i~! vQ:k f~= a ~~=:ht= ~i~~ y!I:!1 
em?:.asi!ing th! iJr.?c=~a:'l:e 0: cc·!"'.:i::\.:!: wo:l~-w!'de a::io:-: a;:a.i::.!: mc.~!y 
lau:"'Ad!:i~g. D\:.ri:"l; th! 193'-1995 :c·;~~, FA:r-V! "'"ill bt Chii:!: :-y th~ ::i:'li:~m 
c~ the ~eth~rla~c!" 
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":'.=::.:' :;?:, :: :.~~-..:~ a :~?::: ..... :::: a. ~:~::a..-:-.~.! c~ ::::y ?!::::-::-.!:-.:!::::-.! .-
t.:-.~s a:~a. ?-!~~'::,~:!:.!::. c: t.:.~ F,.::: c=::-.~=i!~s ': ... ~:-.::- !:;:~": j:.:.:i!:::::'-::-. ., a.:-.c 
:~;::~a: c:;a~:sat::~!, :!~:!s~~:i~; :~~ ~:::~'s ~a5c: ~i~a~::!: C!~::!!. 
12. :~ A~i~s: :SS3 , ~~~ ~~!:~~ K~~;~:= !~::~!~!~ ~~!:=a:ia I! :~! F:!!!~!~:y 
~~:~~;-:~~:H~.~~~;e !;: .. ::!! _ !:~~:: ~:~:-.: :: ~::::~·~'=~~!~~*~::~7~*~:~~:.:~:e 
," •• __ .•••• J ,.".~, _w __ c,. _ .• _ Cw,",w hec._cr_c. •• t.! W" .a •• 5 a .. _ C ...... _~ •• w_ ... 
. ~ ..... '.' .",.. .... ,...-' -~ ... ...:~..,,... ...... "':'" c· .... --. •• ' •. ,- ~ - .• ,,;. - .... -. &., 
.". c ••• ~a ..... $ ... _.:1 __ "", ''' •• c, •. oc: • _. __ c.._ c.a- .. -,,:C'M a '"--- ._ .. ::- C":i 
~isci;li~!!t includi~; e~?!:~5 f:o: ~i~a~c!, j~!:i:! a~~ e::t!:~ll a~!li:5 
~i~i!~:i!!, f!~a~cial :!i~la:c:y a~:hc:!:i!s a~d law e~~e:ce=!~: i;!~=i!!. :~! 
FA:: c:-O?~:I:!S closely ~i~h i~:!=~a~iQ~ll e:;!~:!lt~c~s c;~~!:~!: ~ith 
co::-'=a~:'~; I:\c~ey la;'::'ld!:!'~; a.:"l~ =e~:e!!~~a':iv!! !:c::-. t~e t:!*'.i~!~ Sa'::::'";! 
!~~e:~a:ic~!l ~=cg Cc~~::l :=O~=~~~~, ~~~ 
:~! Cc~:~~ea~~~ Sec:!:a:!!:, ~~! C~s::~! 
~~~ C::!:~:::! G::,'.=? C: =1.:-... "<:.:-.; S·..;?e: .... ·:,!::! 
t-i==:': :a:"':~1 :.~e Cc',,!~::l c~ !'..!::;:!, 
C~-::!:!::::" CC'"..:.:-.:il, ::-.:e:?c:' l:".: 
- •• ·:--c ... _--_ .. ;-
11.' :~ a~~~t~:~ to i:s ~le~a=y $!S!~C~!, ~~e r~:F ~as c=~:!~~!~ ::: c~~:!:e 
...... _ .. _ .............. ;; ... _~-.' .•• , .... -_ .. ,. .. ""' .• -c "': ... 0:_- ... c .. ' 0 .. 'I _'!t'" ':se •• ( •. _ ... .,~ .. _ 
.... ___ : .......... _ ~ .. ...: ......... :- .. , ,-_= __ '0: ..... _::~: ... :..,:!_:. '.':"':~ _!:,G. ___ ,; __ r'1 __ • 0 .... ,: 
G:::~? :, C:.a!~,a:;: !aly); ~:':-.a:1::!al ~.i::~:! (r;c::-:i~: G::'';? Z:, C;.a!~.!::: 
:=a:".:~;; l:"'.: e:::e=~al =!li~:'':::$ (r;e:iti~: G::'~F !!!, C:-.ii:7.'.a~: ~S.:..). ;"3:':-; 
?:e~ic~! =e~~~!, ~::k:~~ G:o~?S ! a~~ :: :!: j:i~:ly C~ se~!:I! C::i!:C~5 t~ 
C:!:'';!! t::e c:a~: rn\;t~l: !· .. ·a:·~a:ic:-.. :'!?C::S C:i ri-.:: ::-.~'":'::!:S a.~: ~1:~~''':S ?cliey 
:.!s-.:~~. 
::'4. .-. :.-.aJc: e!e:':\e:.: c: :~! .... :::< c: :~! :a.!~ Fe::! c!''':::'~; l::;-:::~ .·as t~.! 
=~V:..!· .. :: to:":.! ~~t-..::! ~..;.!!~:~ 1:-.: ~=:i':L~t e~ to:;! :~.:r. ?&::: e~ t:.e :e?c:~ 
!!~S :~: t~~ c:~:l~s~e~! e~ t~!! :!~!!~, ~~ic~ ~l~! ~t!~ e~~::!!~ ~y al! FA:r 
~!:7'::!: i:· .. ·!::--"':'·~:-·~s. :a::! !~, --_ !~: !.,,' t~ t.~! :!?c:-: e\,;~l~~, t:.! F:o;:,!!! 
=a~! ~y r~rF C~!: t~! ?2S: y!!: i~ !:! c:~:i~~~~; ~::~ i~ t~! ~:l::~~~; t~:!! 
(:.) e·:c.:·~a:i::-. c: t~! :::o;:!!! c: ::5 ::-.~",:,~!:! ::'1 ~::,.~:!::,.!:-.:~~: t::! ~c::y 
F.! :c::".",:,.<!:l:'l: :c:-.! ; 
(i ~i I l,;:1e!::a.ki.:-:; &:1 e::te:na! :elatie:.! ~:ei:l::'~! to ~:c:n:~t ~:":! "':':!!~ 
?:!s:'bl! i~:!:~i:ie~~l a:t!=~ lili~!~ =:~!y la~~~~:i~i' 
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D~:in; 1~95, w~en ~c c~:~al e~a:~i:io~! ~:~:~ be c~~~~::e~, the:! w~~:~ b! a~ 
a:-.al.ysis a:1': c:'s:-';S!~:::-. c: \·a::':'.;! ::~~::,~::.: a!~·e:~! c: ~~! ~e!!''':=~! -:.a:~~:-. :.:: 
c.i:~~:~:".: me.r:'::·e:s to : ... ::,.;:le:r.e:,: :~; :~~:~~!:::'a~io::s. 
19, :~! a:::"~',;a: s~l:-ass!:ss::-.e:.: e::e:::'!!, .':-.!::e::' :::!::-~e:s :~~::: C~ :~e':': 
s,:a:e c: e?plica:io:":. c: ~~e R!co~en:'a:':c~s, will :! cc:-:.:i~t;!:::. ~~ .... !·:e:, ;;'ve:: 
t.ha: ::'1=s: ree.",:,';'e:s ~a·:e i.",:::le..~~~:.!':' t.~~ F.e:~:=.e~:a::'c:,.!, c: a:e c~r:":":.i to.'a::'! 
t~!: e:.:! c: :1::"5 ;::ocess, t.!--.! se:!-a.sses!~!::: ,,':'11 be cc~:'..:=:e:' c:: 2 si.m;:i::''!: 
basis. 
20. M~:'ley la"..l!ide::':1; is a cy:-.a=.i: aeti':ity. ':he:e is a c:;:".s~2.:"'.: neec to 
keep t:en~s a~: tec~~i~ues ~:1:e: =e~~ew so t~a: a~y e$se~~:'a~ =e~i~~~e~t5 ca~ 
b~ r.ad~ to t!-le co\!~:'e=-:neas',,!=e.!. The !o:,:y ~eeo==e:\Ga.tio:-.! ha·· .. e de..-:ko:\st:-a:e: 
thgi: eo~ti~~e~ u:ili:y a~~ n~ =aj:: c~a~;!s 2:~ pla~~e~. H~w!~!:, a 
sto=x:ak:'~'; e:-:!::ise "":!.l be c:~:~e-:.e: i~ lStS:, ta~in; :..~ a:::--..:.:-.: e:=?e:ie:;:e 
sa~~ed eve: t~e las: !O~= yea=s, i~=:~~~~; t~~ !~:e=?=!:!':i~e ~o:e! w~ich h!~e 
be!~ c.'!",,"!!oP!c. !:1 s~se~.;e:-:: r:'..::":=.s, ~~! ~e:o~e:".:'a~:"c:"'.! w:-.:.1: c:::-.!:"~'..!! te be 
r.'~o:-.. :',:c=e:' bt.!-:' 0:11y alte:ed in e~:!::::'o!"'.a: c:'::'.::..s:a.:l:es. 
21. !t has been :!:og~:'se~ :=o~ the i~:!?:io~ e: the r~:: t~a~ ~~ki~i .::!e~ 
i:'l Me::-~!: j...=.::'s:'ict.:'o::.s '-·it.~o\.!:. =::=es?o~:':":'l; ~ea!'..!:e! e!!!'.·~!:e w~t.!lc s:"m?ly 
~o~e rnon!y 12~~de::'n; to new paths. Wo:k:":l; wi:h o:he: i~:e:~a:io~a! a~~ 
:!~ic~al c:;a~isatio~s cc~ce:ne: w:.:r. co~~a:i~~ =c~ey la~:l:e::'~;, ~~~ FA:: ~a! 
t~e=e~==~ b!!~ a::i~! i~ its e~:c:t! to e~:o~:a;! ~he ~::~!: pc!!i::e ~:c~a! 
mc~:'l:'sa::"o:: i~ t~':'~ a:ea. H::· ... ·!·:e:,!! m::e a~: ::'LC:! c~'..:.:;.:=i~! C'p~:'l \!? ~h!:': 
eco:1,r:-..!.es a:l:: ce·,·elo? t:,e:': ::'::",.c.~::'i.l sys:.e..-:-.s ~:.ty ,,·:'~l :~:o:r.e i:;.:=!a!i~;ly 
a:t:a:tive to ~o::~r !a~~~!=e:!. H!~c! :~!:! is a ~e!: f:: t~! r~:F to !:!~ ~~ 
:.~S ~:O~:~~.e c~ co~ta:~! ~i~~ ~:~-~~~~!: cc~:;.::!!!. !:'e ~cll i: ~IS S!~ 
itse:f is to ?e:s~!d! all co~~::ie! ~::h !!~~i:ica:;.~ ~i~a~c:'a: c!~~:e! to 
e:i:o=se a:ld i.~.?le..9f'le~: th~ rA':: ;.e=~~e:"le!,':!.e~!. ~h!= ~e·:!::""_~en:! !~o~l: ~t 
?!:!'~a=e:: tc co!::r..i: t!'le=.!!l ... ·!s -:0 ta.:~! a:-:icn to :::!.".!::~ ~::~ a~\!5! o~ the:': 
co~~~::'!! by mon!y l!u~d!:e:!. 
22. 'I!'l! r;.::r r.as a;:eec 2. !~:a:e;:' ~:: i~! ce:-::a::s \10':.:.:-. :.:-..:..:: c~...:.~:::'!s, 
~:-~ Eas: h!~a, ta!:e:~ !~=o?e &~d th~ Ca:i=~e&~ IS t~e fi:s: F:i:::':ies. 
~~~$ !t:a~!~' eall! fc: close ec-o?e:atie~ with o:;a~isati~ns !u:~ as the 
v~:"~e~ ~a~ie~s !~te:~a~io~a! ~=~: Co~~=cl P:O;=L~! &~d !N!£?~~L. :~e :~!:'5 
p:i:ne role w:'ll b~ o=t2.i~ins a pelitical co::tt'.i·~::le:-.t to I:::'C:' &:"1: :,:,,:>~:':::i~; 
p:o~:ess to~a:cs L~?leillen~a~ior.. 
23. T~e:e ~as a;:eemen: tha: a s~~n~!icant ~nc:ea!e in the si:e o! the FA:: 
~o~2~ F:!judice i~s !le::i~ility a~e e~~icie~=y. Hence it ~as decided thl~ 
the:e s!1odd be no mc:e than a ve:y liIr':'ted e:~?ar.sior.. Eo .... e;·e:, t.he FAr: ~ill 
be e:·:a..'Uininq fu:the: the ?ossibility of setting \:? adc.i~iona:!. :e;:.onal Task 
Fo:ces en the lines o! the Ca:ibbear. FA!r. 
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~h~:.= e',,;==e~~ v,::k F=o;:a..'"':'::':e!, ::'~ cc~-=.::.!! !::...:.::t;:! !~:,~:: :~ c:.~s:::,,::.:'~~!:! 
a~: t~e ~~!'lc':.~o:" . .5 c: t:~~ ple:-.a.=y !:.:e::;-:.h~:".e:'. :::::-, :;..::-.~.: ::.! :::e:-.a:-y .':" 
the=!::=~ play a ~=ea:~: =cle i~ FA!: ~eeti~i!' C~!=$~!~~; t~! ~~e=~al 
:ela:io~s ?:o~=L~e a~~ cisc~ssi~; &~C ce:ici~; C~ a~: !~=:~e: ?::icy 
F~eco=e:'l=a.tior:.s a~ci !nte=?:e~i!.t:'ve No:es. !: .:'ll also c:'s:\!!! the sec:!")= 
:Ol.!~: c! I!:."..!~ cal e":a! '.!a:!.c~ =e?c:-:!. How!,;,!:, 2: h:>c ;:0'';:;5 ::"l;,~~ be c=~a. :e:! to 
ca:=y C~~ s?e:i~;,: tas!..! :..;: l:'~e w:'~h s?ee:'~:'c: :.~::s c! :e~e:e:1:e B??:o· .. e: :y 
the pl~:"',c.=y. 
J.. 5:-.... :1 
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MOKI'!'O!l.ING ':F.:: PROGP..tSS 0; FAIT ME:.."!3E:?.S !N !..~:"::'~~"::NG 
':F.Z rOR~ RZ:~~A:!OKS 
.::. j. 7:"~~ :Lasit:. Fc:ce mo:".:..:::s :~'! ?'!=:::7.'.a~ce :: ~:s ~'!::-.::.!:! '..:!:~;- ':~~ t ... ~ 
~e:h~~s a;:eed in 1991: a~ a~~~al s!l~-a!s~!s~~~: e~~::is~; a~~ ~~e ~==e 
c~:a:'l~t ~.\.l:c.al e-."a!\!a:ic:"'. ::::OCI!SS \:.n:'!: w~i:~ eac!1 ~~~-='!: j-..:::'s:::::i::; is 
e::a:.-":':le: C:1:e c·\r·e: :':i! ?~=:.::: lSoS:'-:::~. 
29. r;::F me=~e:! co:n:l!':.!: tw: q·~4!s:ic:".:".!:":~s :~:a~i~g :~!?t!c::"\"~!.y to t:-'~ 
le=al a~~ :i~a~cial ~eco~.~~ca:ic~s. S~rn! ~~~c: ~~:~fiea:io~s we:e ~a=e to the 
q~~s~icn~ai=!s us!d in the ?:!vio~$ =o~~d. The cha~i!! ~!=! ~os:ly ~e!!i~~~ to 
e:'i:it r::;:e p:e:ise i:'l~c=:t"~::'on !:c::. the$~ mem:e:s \.r"~e r.a:' r.ot y!; i."'trle::'l~:l~e: 
?a=ti:~:!: ~~co~!~ca:io~s O~ ~~!~ they e~?~c:!~ ae:~on to b~ ta~e~ i~ these 
a:eas. 
2:. ::.~ F;.::r See=!~a=ia~ p=o:'"..lcec co:::.?:'la:.;":~s o! th~ =e$?c:;,!~S :0 s~o",· t~~ 
s~a~4! c~ :....~.?:!.~~e~ta~ion e~ ?.eco~e:1:'a~io~s a::c!! t!'le ~~::'~~:s~;,? .:1:' a 
c:~:::-.::a:is=:1 ... it.~ t~.e :esc!:s c~ la.s: yea=' s e:-:~:::..s'!. '!~oes~ w~:~ c:'SC\!!St:' ~ ~ 
th~ !e;a! a~c fi~i~:~al ~c:~i~; G:c~?s. 
30. :!'l! r;..'Z': :!\e.~e:s:,,::'? ~a! cer::i:-."..:!: t: ::-.a:~! !;';:"".!.:!i:a:-.~ ?:o;:e!s e .... e: t!":.e 
~as: y!c.: in i:r.?le~e!"lti~; t~e l~qal ::.e:o~~nca.:i=~$. !:'l pa::i:\;l!:, r.ea:ly .. :l 
~e~~~= j~:is~;,ctic~s have nc~ e~a=:.e: l~~! to ttA~~ c:u; ~C~!: la~~:~:;,~; a 
c=ir.l.:-.a! o~:~:",ce. 'I'.::, C'~: c! the tr.:!! =e;:, .. ~:-.. :':'l; :ne=~e:s \r.·~c ha-,:e y!t. to t&;ce 
a:tio~. e:·:?ec~ to ~a.S! the ~!:!ssa:y l!;:'sla~:'c:: "'i:hi~ th! r.!::t; 12 :r~O:lt~s. 
rhe=~ has also be!:'! a:'l i:-.c:e!s! i~ the ~'.!:,:,~~: c~ r.\~~t:s "'~o r.a-:t :.a:e t~~ 
lau~d~=i~S c~ F=o:ee:s c: c=L~es, othe= tha~ c=u; t:a~!ickin;, a~ c!:!~ce. 
S:":-::''!e:-:. ~.~~~~:s ha-,!! 2.1:~a:y c!c~e S~ a~::! a. f\:::::e: five e:·:?e:: to be :':. t~:'! 
?c!::icr. by th~ e~c 0: 19?~. 
3~. Goo~ p:oi:ess has also bee~ a:~ieve~ o~ maki~; the req~isi:e C~&~ge! ~o 
~~~a~:!al i~!ti~u:io~ se::e:y law!, a~~ C~ r~~ti~; ~~ pl.:, t~~ n!:~!sa=y 1t;&1 
f=L~~~C:~ fo: rnu~~~l e!!i!~a~ce in c=i:~~&l ~a~te=!, i~cl~:i~; ass~sta~ce 
co~c~:n:"~; th~ !r!e:in~, sei:u=! a~: co~!is=a~io~ e! assets. !~ a:=i~io~, mo=e 
me=6~:! !"'.ave =ati:i~c tht CO\lneil c! E\:=o?! C~~";"'t::'~:"O!"l O~ MC:'lty LI·.:.: .. '~e:i~; 
(\o·!-.icr. ca..~e into ~orce or. 1 S~?te.~er 1$:3) anc! there s!'loulc! ~e I s'.:.!:stl~tial 
inc:ease in the n~~~ers doin; so over th~ ne~t twelve mont~!. 
32. k~on; the 9~n~rality 0: the me=~ershi?, the areas where there has been 
l~cs~ p:og:ess in takin; a:tio~ a:e these w~e=e the:e are co~s:i~ctio~&l or 
o:her f1.:ndamental cifficul~iu over L':I?le:nentini a partie·.!la: measure. 'I'h~se 
areas mostly concern Reco~~~daticns which, fer these reasons, ha~e a 
ciscretior.ary rather than a mandatory charaete:. !~am?les include the issues 
of introducing cor?orate cri:r.inal lia.:ility for 1:Ioney laun~erin; offences l!'l:i 
arrar.ge:ne~ts for sharing of confiscate: assets between ju:is~iction!. Howe~e:, 
anothe: a:ea where ?ro~:ess has been s!ow has been the rati!icatio~ and 
impleme:;:ation of the Vier.:-.a Cor.ve~tio:"l as aCi~iad by n.:; ~ecor.::lendation 1. 
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o!"'.:y j;.!s': C\·~: ~al! t~e r:l~::'~~:.!,," .. :.p a:! ~:> .... _ •• :c::.:::':"a=.:~ · .. ·i::. t:.~! 
~e:o~e!'l:a.:io~J a.::.hoc·;~ a:'lo:.h!: :i",:! pa=~ia.:::· co::-.~!.y a:"J-: c :~=:~.~: !::~: 
me::-'::'e: s e:':?!:: to r.a.·,,·! :a-:. i ~:..~:. a:--.c :"'-:.~ ::'~:-.~=-.. :!:' ':.~! c::: ',,·e:-, :ic~ t.. i ': :-.':':-. :::! %:!;.:: 
t~el·v·e r.'\~~:.hs. C~=tai~ :~7: me::-~'!=! a:! a~!: !i:1:i:1; i: c:'~:::'.:l: :: r..a.:.t! :7',';:~. 
;=o~=e!! i~ :"'-:.::~~:n~::t~::; s:';:",.:":::a:-:.~ ::·..:..~e:s c~ ':::~ l~;!.: F.~:::7'."7.~:",.:c;::,:-~.!. 
e "~.· .... ~ c:_ ... _ .. ----
~:..:_.a:_.'::.a: ~1!:o:::Je=_.ca.:.io:_'.s w~:; he:' ~~::'y a.~p:ie:' ::y a:'l c!..:'~'!:s, =.s.j:: c .... ·!:!.:: 
r=o;=e!s had bee~ r~ce. As ~o:e: las: yea:, ~~e =eq~~=~~e~~ ~c: s!~!:a: 
!i.:.:~?!a~ FA!: ~e~!:s to c~c~·ly wi:.!'. :~~ ?:c·,"':"!::::-.! c~ t~~ 1:': M~::!:: :"a.'.;.~:e::'~; 
~i:e:tiv! playec a s,:,,~i~i:a~t :cle i~ the p:og:ess eose:·,,"!:'. Rc""!":'!:, it. is 
:~;=e:ta=le that none ef the fi~a~cia! ~eco~e~ca~io~! ~!S, to c!~e, b!e~ 
a??liec ry all FA!: m~~~:s" CO~$~~~:a:l! ~i!:e:e~ces s:ill pe:!!s: i~ t~! 
s:ate c! L-:?le:ne:'ltation o! the \·c:io".;.! P.ec:o:::n~!"lda~ic~s }:e':W!~:l t!;! :a~':-;i::; 
sectc: a~~ nc~-~a~ fi~a~cial i~sti:u:io~! (N::!!). 
34.. 'Z'!'l~ \"a.!t r:-.ajo:i:y o! me...~!=! c~::;ly !\!11y \."i:h c\;s-=.o~e: !.:e~:i~::a:i~;-. 
=eqi.!:'=-e.."'ne~:St a:1.:.hou~h the:e a:e 5::'11 s=~~'! r.:-:.a=:'~ e:::e?t.i~:-.s ~c: 
P.ecorr:n~!"!:a~io~ 13, eS?4!cially a..~::'l'i }I.=:!s" J.. !?e:ill r..a:t!: c~ c:!"'.:e:::. lie! 
th~ :a-:: t:--~at the baMs of two r.t!~!:s a=! st.ill allow~: t.o X!!P a~o:lY'=~''':s 
a:=c~~ts. ~ll ~~~!:5 b~: e~! a:e i~ ~~ll c: Fa=~ial co~~l~a~:! ~:~~ 
r~:c=~-k!!?:~; r~les . 
.:~. Si;:'li!iea~t p=o;:es$ ha: bee:,: ::"..ade .... :.:~ the i=::l!=e:::..~ic~ c~. 
::.ecor.tn!~:aticn! on the inc:eas~d c.ili~~:'1c! e~ ~i:" •• ~eial i~!':.i't.\!tie:".!J "'!'""il~ a 
la:~e ::-.ajc:ity c! II;:r: ~cve:n::le::ts :e;\::':es baMs, anc to I. lesser e~te::t 
no~-~a!".x fina!"l-:ial i:".s~i-:\!tior:s, to ?zy s?~=:"a! a~t.e:'lt.ion to C~=-?:~::, \;~\,;s-..;a::'y 
l!:-;e t=a!"!sa=~:":::'l!" J.. !i;:".i~:':a.!"!: :r.!.:'le=!.~y c! r:t~::-~e=s has :lot j"!: "';:lc!::.aite::. 
a:-:y a:tio~ to put thei: nC:1-:a:".;:' ~in2.!'l::'al i~s:i~\:'!i~~! i~ eo::?lia~:e ... ·;,th t~1 
a~e'\re-~~!'l~io:'1ed re~\,l!.:~:n~n~. ~.!l me!!'~t: qovt:r:.-.ent! pe=~~ t~~i: :1~k.S t~ 
=~?:=t: tr.e:': !us?i~io~s i~ they !'..!s?!:: t:-"a: ~\:~C! s:e= ==or:-. a c::'.:r.';':1&l 
a:ti~ity. M~:~ov!:, in n~n!~e!~ rne~~!: jc:isdie:ions, th~ :e?e=ti~; c: 
s\:spicic\:s t:a::sactior.s is rna~ca:c=y. :~: two thi:cs o! F~:r me~e:s, mest c! 
the nc::-ba~~ !inancial i~stit\::icns a:e o~li~e: to :e?o:t their s\:srici~~s to 
the com?!:e::: a~~ho=ities. Sa:,,~s, ~~ a ll:91 ~.jorit: of rn~~~~=s, a:! :e;~i:~~ 
tc pay s?e:ial a:~e~tio~ tc b~!~~es! :!~!~io~! a~~ t:a~sl::ic~! w~~r. P!=so~s 
f=orr. C~\!:l:'=i~s ,,-·ith i~!t!!fie~e:".~ a.!'l~i-=-o~ey la'.:.n:e:i~; mta.s\;:es. 
3€. W~ile 211 but !ou: rne~~!:! :e~~i:e bar~s to ceve!c? 5?e:i!ie r:~;:L~tS 
!=!i~!~ ~o~ey la~~de:i~s, this re~;::!~~~: is ~e:t!: L~~l~~~~~e: ~:: the 
i~!~=a~:! and se=c=~ties i~d~$~=ies tha~ in othe: ea'!e;e:its e~ ~~~-~a~ 
::na~:ial institutions. I~ qen~:al, th~ 1~?~=V~50:Y &~thc:itit! t~s~:t thl~ 
ade~ua:~ ?=os=~~!S a:! set ~?" Only a !e~ ~e~e:s ha~! c,si;~ate: eo~?tte~~ 
a"..l':.hc:ities to deal with the il::::lleme!ltation of the ~eeol:l:!lenc!atio::s to otht: 
F=o!essions dellin; with cash. "Although G~idtli~es have al=eady eeen 
establishe~ by two thirds of tnt me~e: Qc~e:nments to assist their banks in 
detectin; s"..lspicious t=ansactio~s, few m;~~e:s have dont so !o: non-bank 
fi~a~cial instit~~ions as well. Finally, the vast mljo=ity o! me~~e:s hl~e 
take:! me!.S\:=es to c;ua:d banks, in!u:a:-.:e com;:I.r'.ies anc i!l" .. e!tmen~ bl:!i:lesses 
2~ai:!st cont:ol, or acquisition by c:~~nals. 
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;.;. '!:-'e FA~r is f!OW !1ecl=:"~; th~ e!"l: c: th~ fi:s: :O\!':ld c: ~:.::;,:!:. e ... ~a:~!:.:.::-~! 
c! ::s r.l~~!= j·..!=isc.':'c~io!"~s. Jo. :i.::::"1:: i.i~~ h.,,;:\.!al evalt.!a~:"e:".s w~:~ ca:=!.~:' 
ou: i~ r;..::-·Y~: t~e K':'~;:::~ c! t:.e l;e:he::a:-.='s, Ge:-::-..a:.y, N::'ooiay, ':a?a~., G=~e:'!, 
S?a:"~, ri~la~~, HO:lg K~~; a~~ I=e:a~~. :~ a~~i:ic~, e~a:~a:i:~! W!=~ also 
bei~~ c! New Zealand, P::tu;al a~~ ::ela~~ ~~: :he =~?o::s C~ ~hese cc~~~:~es 
~'ill fall :0: c:.is:u!s:'O;'l i~ r;..:r-·;:. £:-:a..~!".a:!.o!1 v':'si:.s :0 t.h! :~;:,~i::in; t.~ 
r~::: me:~e=! t.e be e~a.l\:.a~e=. - S:"~=a?c:e !:'l: !~:ke: - __ :"11 :a.y.~ F!a:! i~ t!'l! 
S!:o~c r.a~! c: 19~~. 
32. Gi",;e:: that ma.~: F;'.!: r:\~:r~!:s e",,'"all,;a:e:' c~=i:i; t.~is rou~: !"'loa: c:-.ly j1.!!: 
es:ablished thei: a~ti-mo~~y la~~:e=i~; :=~~~~O:~ c: we:e i~ t~: ?:oc~S$ c~ 
dci~g sc, i~ ~as not possib~e tc :!a:h c!!i~iti.e ccn:1~sio~s O~ t~~ 
e!fe:~iv~ness c: the Q~as~:es i~ cO~2:i~; ~~~~: la~~=e=i~;. ~e~!=:~~~e!!, t~t 
eva!~atio~! w~=e c! ~=ea~ ~al~e i~ che:~~~; tha~ ~e=~e=5 hac p:o?e:ly 
iIt?::'e.":l~ntec. t::~ Aecor:c~~:at:io:-:.! 2:1: :::0"';':":'::":-'; a ce:aile: sc=\;ti~y c·! t~! l!~!:' 
t:'.-eas1.!=es a:'1C e:-.:o:c~,:':\e:-:.: a:lc. ::e;-.:.:'a.:c:y s::-s:e.~! :'ei:-:; ?-..:: !.~ ;::.:e. 
39. S\!''7.::'.a=:'es c! the :".:'~e r.' .. .:~',,!a:. e·· .. i.:...:at:.c~ :e?c:t.s c~=?le:e: c~=i:i; :1"'..:-", 
a-a as !oll~""5. 
40~ As wi:~ othe: £;,::cpea:: c:o'..!!'l~=i!!, t~! Fe:e= .. l ~!?\::lic c~ G4!:7,a:--.: :"5 a 
tr.ajc: c:ug-consl!.-r.ing co.:~t:y a:olC it a~so se:· .. es as a t:ansi: COI.:::::::· £0: the 
f~cw o! c:~;s !:orn Asia a~c Cen::al anc SOl.:th k~e:i:a. A!thol.:gh the:e a:e no 
sta:.is:ical ca~a O~ the 2-~e'..!~: c! r.'lc~ey l!·~:'lce=':'~; tak.:':lS ?!a:! in G!::=.a.:-.y, 
the:! i! nc do\.!~'; tha.t ~::'e i..-n?o::a.:-.c! c·: the G!=r..a~ ~&:".ki~; Si'!:~" t.he e:~~=~"':': 
s~a::ili~y 2.:".: t~ .. ! :c-l.! o~ t.h~ n<t·~~s:h..li.=:':' ir. i~~e=:".a:io:".ll !i.:la:'lCil~ 
t:a~sac:io~! a~t=a:t me~ey la~~:!=e:s. I~ .:~~~io~, C=il~ise: c=L~e i~ Ge==~~: 
has btcorn! an tsta~li!h!~ factc: a~: is s~:ea~i~; !~::~e:. 7~e a::i~i:ies e~ 
c=;a~i!!e c:~~t a:e no~ lL~tt~ to c=~; t=a!!ickin; :u: alse e~~e~c to se:io.! 
c=i.~e!. 
(~. ':he r!:'~:al ?e?~~ic c! G~==.a:-:y r.!S j\.:s~ fi:.aliu: the p:o:us cf 
$~:ti:"lS \:o? new 18"'·" anc syst.e:r.s t.c co~a: money la~!"lde=inS'. Or. the 1e;1.1 s:"de, 
th~ G~:rr.a:-: st:ategy is ~ase: O~ the c=~~.i~&lisa~io~ o! la\.:nde:i~i the p:ccee:s 
c! all c:L~~~al o:fe~ces ca==yi~: a u~~irnl!.~ !i~~ c! one yea:'s i=?=isonme~t, as 
we~l as c=~:-:e~at!: c!:e~ces .:ole e!!en:es co~~tte: th:o\.:q~ c:ganistd c:~e. 
Th!!! ?=o~i!ion! a=e ce~~let~d ~ith !e=!ei:~:e .a~c cQn!~$c.tic~ le;islatio~ 
co~:a~ne: in Sectio:-: 2~1 of the re~!l COCt ~~ich e~te:ec i~to fc:c~ O~ 22 
S!?:e:t1be: 19~2. 
42. On the !inancial side, the re:!~t M("\'"l~·: ]· ..... r!'!:.i"c At:~ (Gw.:;), ,,"~ich 
e~~e:ed into !o:ce on '.Q ... -............. , Q.CI'. p:o .... :.oes ~lle p:~:":q..!i.s:.tes for cor.~lti;"1; 
money lal.:~de:ing acti .... iti~s effectively in a re?:ess!.ve as well as p:e .... enti .... e 
man~e:. The GwG contains three t~ye! c~ measl.::es: identification requirements, 
the 0~li9atic~ for banks and othe: fina~cial institutions as well as casinos to 
:epo:t s~s?icio~s transactions to the F=osec~tini a~thorities, and preventive 
musu:es to protect finan':ial institl.ltions a~d other bl!sinessu f:om money 
lal.:nce:ing. Most of the obliiations ~hich the GwG prescribes fOr banks .lse 
apply to non-~ank financial instit~tions anc to many non-fi~aneial institutions 
s\.:ch as bl.lsinessm~n, p:o?e:ty a~T.inist:atc:s and :L~lin, casincs. In Farl11e1 
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no~'! t:.a: t.h~ G~~~a:1 ba:-.i:.':":lS co=.-.::-.:~y ~.a! ca.:: ~: c;.;: :e::.a:f.a:::! t.:,.:'!::":: 
p=O;=L~eS a~= i~i~iat~c g=o.~~; awa:en!!! i~ t e:: s:a::. ~~::. :~~ e:~?e= !~:! 
th~s ;a'::i~= :.~ th! :e:!:-:.~ le;i!la~::'c::., ~~.'! G~:7.ia:: a·.::~,:,=~:i!! "lay ~:.!:: c: ... 
co~::e:e rneas~=!s !c: t~~ ~~:~:e. 
(3. As th~ a~tho:i~y =~S?o~!~~l~ ~o: :!=eiv~~; s~s~!:~:~! :=a~sa::i=~s 
r!pc::s is cie~~:-:rlnec by each La.~:', C~:'lC!:~S ha.·:! bee~ e~~:e!!~: C:-. t~e ~a=: 
th!":. ~h! e!:iciency c~ th~ C;e=::-~:-. !ys:e=. e:'..;:~ be !:=~~=ly 2.!!e::.e: :::~ t.!"'.! la::k 
c: a ce~t=a.! point :0: the =~?c=t.i~; :ne:~a~ism. :'..:::he!':lc:e, ~~! ~:"s?e=5Gl c: 
the :!?c:ti~; p:oce:u:e th:o~;h~~t the G!==~~ j~=is::::::o~ co~lc ~~c!~n! 
e~cea7o~=5 to !a~o~= a co~o~ p~licy i~ the o:qa~isa~io~ c! law ~~!c:c~~~~~ 
syste::ls. 
~~. !~e c~!=all L~~:!!sion o! the eva!uaticn c~ Ge==.~y is t~a: the 
o~jecti~es c~~i~e: i~ ~h! FA7r F:in::ples a:e bei~; se:ioc!ly a~: co::ectly 
?'.!:sue:. Once a!l t~.e :1!". :eg\!!a:ior.s hz'":'! k:·ee:l e~!::=ce=, G~==..a.~y "':"11 b~ 
e~:??~~ \1;:" th a corn?=e~!~s! ve ~~~ strong a~:i-::le:-.ey la.\!::.:e=!.~i ~=a.~e, ... c=k. Th~!. 
is n~ C:c"':=: -:ha:. tne s:=ict :eS'-..:.:'a:io:--.s e~:-.. :a.:":'le~ ir. t~t Gw~ \::"11 ce~s~i~\!~e a:l 
e~c!ll~~t basis ~c: corn;a~in; ~c~ey l!~~d!:in; i~ the ~~e:~ !i~a~eial s~c!e:. 
Ho·",e·:!:, a:-.y e· .. ·al'.!ation of the e::iciency c~ the le;isla~ic~ i:"i p:ace rn·~!: be 
cc~sicie=ed as tenta~iv!, ~:"ve~ tha: the e~a:t~~~: e! ~he GwG is !O :!:e~:. 
45. The evalua~io~ eovt:ed net e~ly the Ne~he=la~ds i:sel!, t~: also the 
Netr.e:li!:'lcs A:l':.illes a!'\c A:~a. The va:i~~s Fa::s e! the Ki!'\~do::: a:e a':. 
ci::e=~~~ $ta~~s in ~h~i= ~c=m~~a~ion a~= i~?l~~~~ta~i~~ c! a~:i-~=~!y 
12~~ci!=i~g ~eas~=es ~~~ he~ee w~=e co~s!~~=!~ se?a:a:e!y. 
.-. . 
.. , .. 
~~. !he N~~he:la~=! is si;~i!ica~t as a c:u~-?:ocucin; a!'\~ c:u;-cor.s~~l~~ 
co~~t:y as we2l a! b!:~; an ~?o::a~t t:a~5i~ pei~: fo= e:u;s t:I~!iekin;. 
La=~~ ~~antitie$ o~ sy~:he~ic c=~;s, L~?hetL~n~s, ecs:asy a~= ca~na:is a:t 
p:ocueec ?a=~ly !o: ho::'l! cO~5\:.-:?tion a:'l.~ pa=tly !c: e!:?e=~. ':'he Ne~h~:l.~-:'s is 
a !i;~i~::2~t !ta;in; ?ci~t ~e: th! C!st:~=c:ion e~ he=ci~ f=o~ So~~h £a!~ a~: __ 
Sou~h W~s; Asia to othe: pa:ts e! Eu:e?e a~c also !o: the :e-e~?e=':. o! has~ish 
a~d ma:ij~ar.a. The a~nual tu:no~e: e! the ille;al e:u;! t:ade is est~.a':.ed at 
some 3 - ~ billio~ S"'..:il:~:s (USS lV:-2 ~illien), the zr.ajo:ity e! \o·:-.i:h \o·ill be 
a~aila=le fo: laund!=i~;. On! :e:e~t es~~~~.i! thl: i~ tO~ll s~~e lC c~ll!o~ 
g~ilce:s (USS5V: cilli~n) of ?:o:eeds ef C~i~e! a:e ~ene:a:e= ann~ally in the 
Ne':.he:li!nc! . 
~7, r~e Nethe:la!'\~s is eomin~ tO~I:~! the en: ef puttin~ in ple:e neW la~s 
and !yste~! to eo~~at money laund~:in;. rhe st:atesy is based on the 
c:iminalisation of money laundering e! the F:ocee:s e! all F:edieate offences; 
tou;h and fle::ible eon!iscation law!; a recr.!ir~:nent fe: :t:in.n~ial inst.it.utions 
to :e?o:t all unusual t~ansaetions (as defined in pUblishec indicative e:ite:ia) 
to a ne~ Disclosu:es Offiee, se?arate f:om the peliee; an~ the institution ef 
a!'\;i-money launde~in9 syst~s e! contrel (customer identification, staff 
training, ete.) in finaneial institution!. Soth the 1988 Vienna anc the 1990 
Co~neil e! t~:ope Cor.ventions have now been rati!iec. The a~':.ho:ities a:e 
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willing to add:!!! ?a::ic~la: a:!!s c~ c:~:e=~ i~ ~~~ N!:he=:a~~s, !~!~ W~! 
t: .... :.s g:-es b!yo~: th! =e~'..!:=!."ne~:! c: :.:.! Fr.:: F~!:o:::n!:a .. :'a::":>:".!. ;..:: ~;:a..~.~:~ s 
the d!~ision to int=oduc! a =e;is::a:i:~ a~d m=~~:Q=~~g !ys:e~ f:: b~=~a~~ ! 
42. The new a~ti-~on!y la~~de=i~; sys~e~ has c~:y j~s: b!e~ ?~: i~to 
e::e:t a:-.d so :i~ ccn::ll.!s::"O:ls cc.~:lc: be c.=a.-:-. O~ ho ... · ':"t .·~ll w:::k :.~ p=a=-;':'c~. 
Ho;;e".-e:, the l'ethe:la:l::s cc::.;:lies ",·:'t!'! a:1 the a??lica.::le n::: ?e:o::::te:l::atic::s. 
!~ ?a=tic~la=, it ben!!its !:cc ha~i~; a~ e~=~ll~~t cc=?~~ c! la~~ ~~ ~h~s 
fiel~, :an;':'ng =:OIL. the basi: rl~~!y la'..!:1ce:i:'lg e!~e:lc~, th:oug:.I asset. 
co~::'scation a:l:: in:e:natic~al co-ope:ation, to the o::li~at:'c~s c: :ina~cial 
ins:itl.::io::s. :'he last ca:e~o:y c: la'''s ha .... e t!1e :I.::the: lSt:en~h that they ca.:-. 
be pocified in L~o=ta~t r~!?ects as :!~~ired withou~ the ~!e: fc: !:esh r:L~~=y 
lei:'slation. 
~9. The la;; e~:o:ce..."lI~::: sys:e...'7. is also ve:y well cesiinec. Its s::eL'7..,ined 
natl.::e an:: the :eco~~i~ion o! the L~?o:ta:lce 0: a ~~lti-cisci?:ina:y a??:oich i~ 
i:".\·~st.i~a,=-in; a:l:' p=ose:\';~:":1g ~cney la"::lde=i:l; has S'=~a~ pot!:'l:ial to It'.a.~:"""'!".i!e 
e::e:~i~e er.!o=c~~e~t a=~io~. =~t, as th~ ~e~h!=la~~s a~thc=~~i!s =ecoi~~S!1 in 
o?e:!~i~g t~e sys~e~, it ~ill be L~?e::a~t to e~s~=e tha~ i: is ace;~a:e!y 
resou:ce:. A ltt'ea.ke: a.:ea is the syste:n :0= supt:visinS co:n?lia:'lc~ c~ ~i:".a!\c:'l.l 
i::s:itu~ic~s. 'I'h!:! 2.??!I:S to :! SO~! 1.::lce::.ain:y a:'o',,!":. t~e i=:e::'s! :o!es c~ 
the aee::cies i:l¥ol~ec, ~hich co~lc have an a:¥e:se L~~ac: on the e!!e:~i~e::ess 
e: th; s~?e:viso:y e!!c:t. It is L"lI?c:tan~ tha~ the ~ece:lan::sche Sa~ plays a 
:cle co~e~!~=a:~ w!th its sta:'~s as the most i=?e:ta~: !ina~eial :ei~la:o:. 
5C. ~~e 0~e:al1 concll.:!io~ is t~a: t~e Nethe:lanes has c:a~n ~? anc is 
L":".F!e:ne::t.in; a w4!ll-desi~::!:', l~;ally co=.?=e~e~!ive ~ys:e:=. ""~~ch sho\!:'c ?=o·.·:":'~ 
a .... e:y e:!ective :es?o~se to the ch!~le~~e posed ~y money la~n~e:in;. 
51. The Nethe:l!n~s k,~illes an~ A:~a a:e se?a:ate j~:is:ictio~s. no~e .... e:, 
th~ !it~a~ion in e!~h is ~:oacly s~~~ll:. Soth a:e of little L~?o:~ance as c:~; 
F:oc~ce:s but they are S:'i~i!ican~ ~:a::lSit ?O~~~S fo: cocaine t:a::icking !:om 
Color.~ia to the US anc tu:c?e. :'he:e is at p:elSent insl.:!ficien; in:o=rnation to 
rr~ke a~ assessmen~ of the money launde:ini sit~ation. The two j~:ilScictio~s have 
be;un the p:ocess of ~~ple~entin; measu:es to.co~~at money 1a~nde:ing ~:oadly 
cased en those bein; b:ol.1;r.: into e!!e~t in the l'ethe:l&:'lcs. Both alrudy hl"a 
l! ..... ! o:i..~:".alisini money lal.:nce:ing and leS'islation is now bein; d:a~n ~? 
:e;a:c~~; C~!to~~: id!ntifiea~ion a~= ~~~da~e=y' repo=tin; o! ~~u!ull 
t:a::sa:tions, as well as im?l~entation ef the provisions of the Vienna 
Conve~~ion. It is i~t~nc~d that th~ le:isla;icn on id!~~i!ica~ic~ &~~ ~~us~al 
t:a:.sa:tio~s lSnOl.:1d CC~e: all c:edit a;:: financial instit~tions and also Clsin~s 
anc t:ust companies. 
52. The:e a:e the:e!o:e en:ou:agin; signs of P:oi:eSS bu~ both j~:iscictions 
are lStill at too ea:ly a lSta~e in the p:epa:ation of thei: ne .... anti-money 
launce:in; f:~ewo:k for firm conclusions to be c:awn. A f~:the: e .... aluation, 
in~olvin; on-site e~L~nations, ~ill the:efo:e take place in ea:ly 1995 when it 
is hoped that all the n~w laws will ha~e been e:'lactec and the new systems 
i::lplemented. 
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a~~ ~=~~ t:a!~i:ki~: ~n N:=~!v :a~ ~! c:~!~~!:e~ 
. . . 
p~:~a?! ~~: a! !e:io~s a! !~ c!=:a!~ othe: 
r-..::o?!a:'l co\.!:):.::es. Pt"~.ile not c. c:u; ?=C=l.!~i.:"l; CC'.!~":.~J", ~':I='-'a:: r..!.;:-:': b~ 
=e;a:=ed as a t=a~s~~ cou~::y f:: cocai~~. ~~o:h!: :!a:~:! c: t~e c:~; 
!ituation lies in th~ hi;~ st:~e: p:ic:s ~~ic~ r~ke NC=_iY c~e c: ~~! me!: 
p=o~ita:l! c=u; r~=k~!s in ~~=O?~ a~c the:e:==e ~ay ;~~~=a~e i:~i:~~ F=~ce~~s 
:c: local money ll-.:nde:':'n~. E..-e:: i: N:::::-.rIY ca::nc,: be cee::le: to :'e a r..ajc: I:l~~.ey 
la~~c~=~~S ce~::e, it is rnos~ F==~a=le ~~a: ~he ba~! ~a~e be~~ ~s~: to !a~~ce= 
:":\O:1!::-r. H~w~" ... ·e=, the:e is littl~ :'%'":.:':':&':io:. c! the tire c! !a'..!~c!~=:"~; e?e=a~i.o:".! 
that ~~h~ be ca::iec o~t in Nc:-e;:an :a~j.!. Unee: these c:"::~~s~a~ces, the 
Gov~=~ent c! No=way has be:ome a~a:e c! t~e r.eces!:~y c~ se::i~; ~~ a co~~::: 
syste=. a;ains~ money launde::in~. 
5C. As fa: as the Pe~al law is conce:~e~, Nc:way has develope: a h:"ih level 
o! l~:al p:otection a9ai~s: men~y la~~=~=~~i. !~c:!~~ 317 e! t~~ re~al COC!, 
cy "'hid: !:Ioney lal!nderin; has be corne a c::"'-":"nal o~~ence, ?:o~·ides a s~~::"cienq 
b:oa: ce::~itien o~ meney la~nde:ing acti~:"ties. I': cc..-e:s a:l p:e:icate 
of!e~:es a~d penalises in~en~io~a! as well as n~g~!;e~~ a:~!, !~ a::itio~, t~~ 
penalties con:ained in this 5e=~io~ a:! !!~e=e. A:so, t~e F=Ov!!!o~s :!;a=~i~; 
S·" .. " .... a:'lC co:-:.:isca:.io:'l p=ese:".~ no s?ec!.!i: p=o:,le:ns. 
55. !h~ basic p:ov!s!ons c~ Sec~io:':. 2-17 o~ the rina~:!ll S~:vie!! A::, 
t..'!'lich ca..":l! int.o fo:ce 0:1 1 Ja~...:a.=y 19:4, e!?e:ially the o;!:'S'I:ic~ te :t?o:: 
s~sFieious t=a~sactions to the Na~io~al A~~ho=ity £0: !~ves:iqation a~~ 
P:o~ec~:ien 0: Econo~c and £nvirc~~ental CrL~e (~KO~~I~) as ~ell as the 
fa:-:!aching pow~:s 0: tha': ~ni':, p:ov~ce :0: a cohe:ent ::L~ewo:k. It !~o~ld 
b! n::.':~'= that the le~islatio~ O!"l C:i.!.s:o:':\~= :..c~~:i!icatio~, =e:o=:-kee?:':l~ a:lc the 
no:i!~=a~ion o! suspicious t=a~s!=:ion!J i~~lu~~~~ the ?e!!~~il~:y fc: ~KOK~!~ 
te c:oe: the fi~a~cia! instit~tion to sto~ a t:a~sactio~, is lar~ely elsed c~ 
t!ie r;.::: ~eeo::::\enc.a:ic~!. 'In! :!:::-..:::'=e::\~:".,;! c~ t~e r.~w law a=e !\:=t~e= s?e:i~i~: 
in a :e;;.!l2.!!o:'l "'!1ien ca..-ne in:.o :o:ce e~ 1: reb:..:a:-y 199'. 
5~. The s~?e:v~slon o! the ~~ole fi~a~cial sector ~y the Sa~in;, In!~:&nee 
an~ S!c~=ities Co~-ission (EISC) anc th~ consice:a:le attentien they have s~ve~ 
to the fig~t against money lau~ce:in~ C~!: ~e ~nde:lined as ~e:y pcsitive 
as?e=~! c~ the Nc:we;:"an syst~~. E..-en be~c:e Sectio~ 2-17 c: the Financial 
Se:v:"ces lct ente:ec into force, the S:SC has sta:tec to c:aw the attention c~ 
t::e Bea:d! 0: the s\!?e:\"ised instit~tions to t~e iss-.:e e~ z::oney la~ncerin;. 
Thi! ac:ive a?proa:h include! the c:li;a~::~ to check co=?lia~:e ~ith a~~i-co~!y 
la~nce:in; measu:es in the :o~tine a~cits cf f;nancial i~stitl!tions. 
57. Given tha~ the anti-money l!~~d!=i~; le;isla:ion :t;a:ci~; tht f~~l~:ial 
system is ve:y :ecent, the evalua:ion o~ No:way ~ust be considerec tentative. 
~~ a:ea o~ weakness is the de!inition of ~=edica:e o:fences, the p=oceecs o~ 
w~ich can be de~ed by financial institutions to constitute a money lal!nderin; 
!!tuation. The cu==ent co~tent e~ th~ nea Sectio~ 2-1; e! the Fi~A~:ial 
Se:..-ices Act ~ill preba~ly prove too nar=ow for the srnooth f~nctio~in; 0: the 
:e?o:tin; anc investiqation system. 
56. The ove=all impression conveye~ by the mutual evaluation of Norway is 
that there is still room fer irn?:oveme~t, even if the efforts made in the 
con~e::t e: money launce:in; sho~ld be cc~!:"dered in proper':ion to the si:e an: 
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59. Ja:;:a.:1 :"s not a C::-":S' ?:~:'i.!:::1;- :-.:: 2.~ :"';-.pc::a:"'.t c:'-l;- t:a:"l!:': co\:~:.:y. 
~~·..:~·:e=, c.=u; a=\.!se is a S'=o""·~:'l; ::=o:::"e=., a.l.:'-e.~~ ~=t as ... ·:.= .. !s~:~a=. a! ~:-. c::-.~= 
::-.2.j:= :"r::''..!!::':a:':'s~: e:c!"lo:..i~!. C':\.!; t.=a.!!ickin~ is c~~t=olle: =-y c:;a.~:'!4!: 
c::"'''r:-! ~::-'~::s .':'c a~sc e::.;a;! i:;. c::'e: :c:::-.s c: il!e;a: a:t.i· .. :.:y. ::. is 
i ... ~?:ss.:..::! to es:ir..at! ho .. · r.-:..:c:-. ~:::\i!:' lai!~:'4!=i':lS ta~~! F:'a,:~ ~~ Jc?a.: .. S: :a: 
:~e:e ~as o~ly bee!"l o~e ?=csec\::io~ ~:: roo~ey la~~~!::~; a~: ~~: =~:;,y =epc::s 
c~ s~s~!:!o~s t:a~sactio~s. Ect i: is ?css:~le tha: the Ja?a~!!! !:~a~c!al 
sys~e=, :'s ab\!,se: ~o= lat,!.n~~:i:'lg pl.!:'?O.5~S Cl:"'!C thre \!!~ e~ fi:"'.a.:l::'al i:".s~i~\!t:"c:".! 
to t=a~s=~t ~cney by tra!!ick~rs has b~en observe:. 
60. Ja?a.:"l.' s New S?ec:'al A.~~:'-::-:u; La.', \r:~ic~ e:.:e:e: into !c:ce :.~. J '.=.1 iO 
1:92, ~:e c:u; mo~ey la~~c~=i~~ a c=i=~na! c!:e~:e a~: i~::oc~:ed a ~~~:a:::y 
c~~:isca~ic~ :e;Lue !o: c=Ui ~=o:ee~s 2~C ~~s~=~~!~:alitie!. The:! a-· 
c~==4!:~:1::' no ?la:ls to c:.L"r..!.:'l.a.li!~ ~~e la.-.;:'".c~=i:'1S c~ th! ?:oc:e~':'! c~ no:"'.-~:'.!; 
c:i..-:t!!, !:1 th! ~i~a:\cil~ !ec~c=, =e;'.::'=e.~~~:5 l".a-:e be~::. p!aced c:: ins:i.-:\.!~i:~! 
tc id!~:ify the:: c~sto~!:s a~c to =e?c=~ to th! reg\:la:o:y a~:ho:i:i!s a~: 
t:a:;sa::!.=~! .... ·::!:e th!:e a:! !'.:!::ici,:~s t.hi!':. t~~ ~''':':-::'! r:-..ay be e:'..!;-:ell-=.e-:. 
Ja?a:. ~as rat~:ied th~ V~e~na Cc~~e~ti:~ a~d unde: its co~e$:~c law ca~ o:!!r 
~ .. .:t'..!al le;al assistance, s~ject to :-eci?=oc::~y a:'lc cual c:::'-.inali:y, i:'1 t:\:!'l!y 
la~~de::"~; i~~estiia~ion!. Ass~s~&nee in confiseatio~ actio~ ca~ :t F:~vi~t: i~ 
c:ug mc~!y l!~nde=in; cases i~ th~:e is a m~tual le~al .ssis~&~ee t=ea~y 0: ~~e 
s:at! is a pa::y to the Vie~~a Co~v~~:io~. 
€:. =c.p2.!,,: is to b~ e~::::ne!'!de:: :~= the s?!ed \l::":h ",·:-.ic~ i: i:~~~l~~!~:e= 
a~~~-~:~~y la~~d~=ins meas~:e! ~oll:~ins the adoption o~ the ~c=:y r~:F 
F.~:~:::':\~:;~a:i::i.$ an: i~! la"$ 1.:1: :e:.;!.at.ic~s c 0::'.: li' .·:"t~ mes':. e~ tnt 
~!Co~~~~~a:ic~s, r:"~a~:!al ir.!~i:~~ie~! also se~~ to be well 2~a:e c! t~e ~:~ey 
la~~de:i~; ?:o~l~~ an~, i~ pa::icula:, have ma~~ lauda~l! e!~c:t! to e~?la!~ tc 
their ct.:!~o~e=! th~ nee: ~c: the new id~:'.ti~ica*:.ien :eC1'.:.i=e.~e:-.t.s. Ja?a~ ta!~es a 
pc!i:ive a:ti~u~~ to t~! f~:th!= e~~a~c~~e~t c~ i~s sys:e~ a~= !c~e =e~i~~~~~~! 
c:~2e F::::~a:!y b~ co~!i:!:e=, =~i~ly i~ t~t L~?l~~en~a:io~ c~ the mea!~:e!. 
E~. ;.! :e;-a:::s the m:>ney le"':l:l!:i:1S' law i:sel~, t~e e:·:a.:r':':-.t:s co~!i:!:e~ 
t.ha.: t~! c::e:.::! !~c·.;l: cove: a~l ca!~s "'n!:e a t:a~~ieke: rna.k~s cepos:'ts c! 
c:~; :~~=s tc 0: tra~!!!:s mc~!y !~c~ & finaneial ~~sti~~t~:~ i~ th~i: e~~ t:~. 
r.a.-ne, c.::!1o',;=~ the JC!?a:l!s! &·.:~he::'t!.e! ccr.side= tha~ the:': c\!::e~: !y!~e:n is 
adeq~a:! in t~:! :!S?!C~. It was ~ls: s~;;e5~e~ that the:e wo~le be be~e~it! i~ 
c=i::-.i~alis:'~; the launde:inq o~ the p:o:nc:!s o~ othe: u:io'JS c:i.'l'.u :lthe: 
tha~ j~!t ~ru;s. However, ;~ven the a~se~:e o! evide~c! o~ ~on-ci:u; la\!~~e:i~; 
a~~ the e=iste~ce of o:he: laws i~ t~i5 a:ea, the Ja?a~ese autho:i:its now 
think it best to concentrate on dru; lau~de:in;. 
€3. A :eason !or the lowe: than e=~e:ted n~~e: e! lus?icious transaction 
re?c:ts so fa: ~.C! may be unCt=tli~~y· L~O~; fina~eial instit~tio~s en ~ha~ 
type e~ transactions should be re?o:teci. The authe:ities will the:t!c:e Frov~de 
go;idanc:e on this point. This is w!lcorne. A~othe: positive step is the 
establis~~ent o! a we:kin9 g:OU? to ci:aw u? guidelines fo: fi~a~cial 
i~!~it~:ions C~ wha~ r.Jg~t eor.s~i~cte a s~s?iciou! t:a~sac~ie~. A?~!ica~ie~ e: 
ice~:i!ica~ion :eq~i:ement! a:! alsc beins ti;ht!~~c, al:hou;~ a lo~e: 
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64. G=~~:! is F=o~a~ly ~o:e ~c:a~le as a t=a~!i: co~~:=y f=: ~=~;s t~a~ a 
c.=u= c:::-.su.. • ..:.:1; co~~~=y. G:eeC!:'5 ~a~ c! the R:al:-:.a:-. =o...::e" \·i2. \JI':-.~=~ e='..:;! 
!=orr. sc'.:':h '-'~!~ A!ia a:::' :.he !--,J..~c.~e !as: 2.=~ c:"=e:'=.e=- to th~ cc~.s\!."':'..:.~S eot.:.:"'.-:.=:"~! 
0: n~=:~!=~ a~d W!s:e:~ !~:~?e. As i~ r~~y o~he= cc~~:=i!!, G:eec! ~! a~ 
a~t=a::iv~ po~en~ial money la~~~!=i~; ta:;et beea~!! e! the C~==!~t e?!~i~i c~ 
its e:o:'lo:':'1j' a:1c fina.ncial !y!:e~" a~c! :"t! ?=o~ir...ity te :!;-\!l!.: c.:'.!: t:a~f:'ck:"'!"'.; 
cor:ic!o:s. 
65. G:ee:e is ~ pa:ty to a~l =~leva~t i~:e=natio~al ~~ltila:e:al a::~e~~~~! 
(~he U~ited ~a~ic~! 2~: Coc~c~l c! E~:o?t Co~ve~~!e~!) a~~ is s~ject to t~e 
Eu:opea:-. CO;:::I""::l.~ti~s Cou:"lcil Dir~:tiv~ 9~!3Ce as well as the :A!: 
F~e=e!':::\e!1ca:io~!. Howe~!=,:,,: has nc: yet e:-.a::te~ all th~ l~ii!!.a:ic:: r.~ces5a=;: 
to L~?l~~ent :ully the F=o~i!ic~! co~ta~~!c i~ these i~t!=~a~:~nal a==a~g~~e~:~ 
a:--.:' Con·:en~ior.s.· ;'~il! G=~~ce ~cs 21:~a:y ?a~!e:! le,;.!.!la~i~~ ""~i=~ r:-.akes r.\~~!::' 
la~nd!!'':''n~ 2. e:irr..inal c::fence, th~=e a=e no la·,,;s to :':n?l~:=le~: s?e:i!ic: m~a!·-:.:e$ 
for the fi:"la:"lcial sectc:. 
66. Se~e:e the Act :21-<5 was a::io?tec! by the G:eek ?a:li&''':le:.':. cr: :ZS l".a:r 1993, 
mO:"ley launc~ri:"l~ was a~solutely U~~:"lO~~ as a crime. A:ticle 5 e! t~is Act has 
introc!~cec! a new A:ticle 39~A i:"l the Greek re:"lal Coce, =~ki:.; it a c:i=~~al 
off~:"lce to launder money which de:i'.-e! not o::l~' from c=u~s but a~se from a 
variety o~ cth~: serious o~~ences. !~is Act 2l~S ~:ovic!es a s~u::: leil1 basis 
!o: b~~lcins 2 !ys~~~ to co~~~e= ~h! la~~:!:i~; e! f~n~s. :~e spe:i!i: c=L~~s 
ic!~:i!;'~:: b~:{o~d r.a:co:i:s t:a.!!icki:-:; t:\.!.k! t~! d!f~~i::"cn c~ rn::'l~y ll·..!!'lc!:i~; 
~~ce: G:!ek 12~ b:cade: tha~ t~e c~~i~it!e~ i~ rn&~y et~e= eo~~::ie! a~~ e!::~~:! 
- \0, • .... -
67. !h~ ~~jo: pro:l~~~ e:"lccu~:e:e: in G:e~~ 12~ wi:h =~!?~et to the 
i~~l~~e~ta~io~ of the S~:a!~ou=i a~c Vi~~~l Co~ve~ti~~s, as w~ll as t~! FA:: 
=~=o~~~datio~s, a:e cl~sed by st:on; ta~l:io~ laws a~d ~a~ki~; see:e:y. :=c~ 
a~ i~ves:igc:i~e point o! vie~, the!! c~=tai~ly ea~!e =~je: ~i~fi:~l:ie! 
mo~~y la ·':':l:'e:i:l~ c: L'Ti!.~!l i:'l"""es~ iia~ iOh! a:e bein; cO:1ciuc:'ec. 
e8. !he most ~~O=:l~t i~iti~:i~!s eo~e!=ning a~ti-mon~y la~~=e=ini rnea!~=es 
i:l th~ fir.a:lcial s~cto: h2'''~, so far, bee:. taken by no:: gCV!::-"''':l~:":o:al a-.::hc:i:i~! 
s~ch as the Ea~ of G:~~ce a~d the F.~ll~~ic 3a:lkin~ Associatic:.. !h~:!fe=e, 
specific m~2Su:eS on mo~ey laund!:ini a:e o~ly di:~cte: a: ba:-...~s a~~ not at 
non-b~~ financial insti:~:ion! ~hieh a:e not eove:ec by the!! ~~e~i!ion!. ~~~ 
r~gulatio~s of the Bank of G=eec! a=~ not sutticie~t e~ough to co~er the whele 
area of money launderin;. The obligation to report 0: identify the eustome: 
only appli~s to transactions in forei;n currency. ft~ile banks a:e requi=e: to 
recorc! the correct information 0= notify the proper authorities, th~re is no 
c~nt=al re?ository authority for th~ :ece:~s ana the information re~uire: to b· 
kept by the Gove:no='s Decisions. Without a central body to reviev these 
records, the effective~ess of th~ rece:~-kee?ing as a deterrent e: as a:"l 
investigative tool to identify money launcering patterns wod: be liJti:ed to 
deteetion an~ use in inC!i~idual cases. 
419 
r'ioC'-'':·O 
---:----
.. . 
?CS!t!V~ !~=~S a~ 
354 A ~~ the :e~a 
a ;~~~ b~;~n~i~;, a~ ~~:~~ by ~h~ i~::o~~=:ic~ c~ 
Co:.~ a:'l~ ct.~~: i:\:':ia:iv~s !":or:. th~ ba:"j .. :"r.; !~:~C:, 
:ak~~" 7~~! iss~! ~~:~:~ be ~ea!: ~:":~ ~y l!~ 6~ 
S:'C:'. as ?,::S!~::~ a.~= ::-:: ::y a c:~:.:.~:..~:: c! t:.! !a:-":~ c! (;=ee:~'! G:· .. e::-.o: w:-.!.:::' i! 
o~!y i~ a ?o!::~o~ t: co~::ol Fa:: c: th! ::"~a~c~al se:tc: w~ic~ ~~~:s t~ :! 
c:::; ...... e :e:'. 
A:~hcUi~ S?a!.~ is no: a ~=~; ?=o~uci~; c~~~:=y, i:s ;~o;:a?~ical 
~=c:-::"::-':":y as .. -ell as i:s lin;'..!is:ic, c'l.:l:~=al A:ld !~:ia.l li::.ks tc :-:~:.a:'le c:'.:; 
p:ocuctio~ a=eas ~~k! it a se~!~:iv~ locatio~ fer t~e inte:~atio~a! t:&~fickin; 
c! na:cotics. In pa::i:~la:, Spain is use: as a t:ansit count:y !:: cocaine a~: 
has~ish to t~e :est o! t~:o?e. Given these a!o:e=entionec ci:c~~tances, it is 
o~\'io~s that Spain is c::::!:o:'.te: ... ·ith atte=.pts at cO:le:: la·.!:'lce:i:l~. 
-, 1- • 
a pc!:':}' ~=O\!? a~ g::·""~:::'~~:1:2.1 !e ... ·e~ ",.~:.:~ is c:-o::'inatec ::.y the S!~icr.al tla~ 
O~ D:~;!. S?ai~ has ~~?ley~d F:o;:ess!vt e~!e:~! f=: sev~=al y~a:s ~o e;~i? 
i~sel! ~ith a~ e!:ici!~t means ~== action, ?a=~icula:ly le;~s!a:i~e a:~~o~, i~ 
t~! f:~~!wc=k 0: t~! :~;h: 2;ai~s: mo~~y lac~:!=i~;. r!~C!~; the a~?:or:ia:! 
l~;i!la:io~, the Ce~:=il Sa~ a~: the t&~~i~; asso=ia~ic~s a:op:e: ~=a~!itic~al 
~!as~=!s. T~! fi:s: o:j!::i~e e~ t~e a.~:i-=o~ey la~~e!=i~; pcliey .as to ce!~~! 
m~n~y la .. ~nd!=:':'lS as 2 c=~!, SO lS to ada?: c!=~es~ie le:i!lat!.e~ to the 
f:cvisio~s c! th~ Vie~~a Cc::ve~tic:.. This soal ~as rece:ltly :eacne~ th:o~~h 
O:;;a:'lic La'" E/19S2 o! ~3 De:e~e: H92 ~~i:~ i:\cldu in the re:,.al Code the 
c:~~e e~ rno~!y la~~=!:i~; de:ive: ::~~ e=u; t=a!~i:ki~;. A ~~=~he: o:jee:i~e 
V·" to be a:~:~--"e= is t.: ce!i:'le S-~:'le=ie Qon!y la\!:l~~=i!'l; as • c:.:...:ne. 
i2. :~e Ac: l:/l::~ c: 28 De:~~~e: l,93 i~t=o=ucl: s?e:ific ~e&!\!:es t: 
~=~ .... ·~~t tb! l!·.:.~d~:i~i c~ f'.!~~!. '!~~ !ys~~::. c~ p:!-:e:"'.tic~ o~ :n~~!::' lat:.::ce:i~; 
cO:'ltaine: i~ this Act a!!e:ts all cate;o:ies of !ina:lcial Docies, i:l=lu:i:l~ 
b~:ea~~ de cha~ge, but it also a??lies to casinos a~: real es:ate e=~?a~ies. 
7h~ basi: p:OVi5io~s c: this ~c~ ?:ov:e~ ~o= a cche=e!'l~ &!'l: cec?=e~e!'lsiv~ 
a~:i-mo~~y 1aunde:in;; !:L~ewo:k. 
I;. Thanks to the Acts o! 23 De:e~e: 1992 anc 2B Deee~e: 15:;, S?a~r. has 
=e:e~:ly a:~i:ed a ba!~c a~ti-=o~ey 1a~n:e:i~, lesislatio~ ~~ie~ ~ee:s tQ be 
!u::~e: re!ined i~ tw: mai~ areas. First, pe~al law sho~ld be aea?te: so as to 
ccin:i:! ~i~h the SCO?! c: ~:~~y ll~~de:i~; a=:i~ities as de!ined in A:~ 
19/1993. Seco:lc1 !iq~:':ica.:'lt =e;'\!la~o=y mels\::es to L'nple:ne:-:: th! A:: cf 2: 
D~ce~~~: rn~st still be e~a:ted by the a~~hc:itie!. Oth~~~ise, the sys~ern !o= 
p:e· .. ~~tin~ mon~y la·.!ncie:in~ ea:'.:'lot be cor.si~~:e~ as ~holly ope:ati-:-nd 
es?e:ially the ~ystem !c: re?o:ti~~ s~s?icio~s tra~sactio~s. ft~ile sooe 
practical :esdts h.· .. e al:ea:v been ac~ie""ed by the bank inc: neto:, no~-ban): 
fi:la:lcial i~~titutio~s lack ~?lL~entin, rules even though"they a:e broa~ly 
coverec by the lesi~l.tion. Finally, as n~e:ous a~tho:ities are involved in 
the anti-money la~nde:i:l~ p:os=~e, tne necessity for co-ordination is crucial. 
!n this :es?e:t, the =~le of the Co~ssion for the Prevention of the Launde:in, 
o! :~nc! anc Monetary C!!ences, as far as preventive measu:es are conee:ne~, a:ld 
the role o! the Gove:~~ent's Delesatio~ for the ~.tional Plan O:l Drugs, as 
co-c:di~atin~ bocy, ~ill be esse:ltial. 
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i4. G:w·!;'", t~a~ th~ l~;!.!la':.i~~ is 5: :ec:e~.: a!'ld tha: the i:lple:nen":.i:'lS 
=e;\.!l!':.ion! hzve n~:, to c.a':.!, :~!~ p:o=,'.!l;a':.e:, t.!1~ e·:2.~-.:.a~':"~~ e! S?ai~ C\\':$:' be 
c=:;.!:.c~:e:: a! te~~!':.i· .. !. F.:~~.:!:, b:~~ the a~:.~~:':':ie5. &:ld t~e ba:--..:.c.in; sec:to: 
a:e "'illin~ te c:o:r~~·ly 'W::h i~:!=:'2.':.!.o:'lal recr.:i:e.",:\!:l:s 0:\ money la\!n:e:i:'l;, 
pa=':.ic~l!:!y ~~e FA!: ~!:~~e:l:a~~c~s. Ki~h A:~ 19/19;3 on s?!:ific mea!~=e5 tc 
F:eve~, the la~n~e:ing c: :~nds, S?!in has chose~ a e:e!: a??:~ac~ to the :igh: 
2;a~~st ~on~y la~nd!=i~s. In s~~e :es?ects, the S?an':'sh !ys:ec 90!S beyo~~ t~~ 
~~~~a':.c:y :~:o~!~da:io~!. Spc:~ is the:e!o:e on ene :ig~~ ?&:.h towa=~$ 
o!velCFi:'lg 2.:1 e~!e=~ive a~':.i-:no~ey ll"':"'-'l:e=:':i; p=o=:a.',::ne. 
is. Finland is not a d:~S p:ocucin; cou~try ~~t is increa!in;ly beco~~ng a 
transit coun~~i. Dr~; C~~s~~?tion is low b~~ th~:~ has be~n I cor.sidera~le 
i~c=eas! i~ the r.~~~!: c! e:u; :ela:e~ cffences and c=ug t=&~~icT.~~; is b!=o~~; 
m~-· Fro!~:$ional anc cr;a~ise:. In a~~ticr. to crug ?:ocee~" it is belie~e~ 
tha~ tra~itio~al cr~e such as ba~ru?tcy o!!~nces, :rauds anc ~T~e::l~e~ts 
also a::ol:.!".: for a s\!!:s~an~ial ele.'lIent of mo:'l!Y 111.::'Ice:in;. H~weve:, the 
ci~g~s: ?c:e~tia1 p:obl~= is the flow c~ f~~~s !=o~ the ~O~!: So~it: Un~o~ fo __ 
c~?o!i~ in Fi~~i$h fi~a~eial ir.s~i~~tic~! c: fo: tht ?~::h.s~ c! :e&: es:a:e c: 
e~:!:~:i!e! in ri~la~e. l~ is !~s?ec:ted t~a~ the!! ~~~:! ~~y i~=luc! :~~ 
ille,:a! ?:o!it.s o~ th~ s!:c:'ow eC~:lo::tj· bein; la.'.!!'lce:e: a~c :':'l·:!ste~. 
i6. 7he ri~:'I~s~ autho:~ties take mcney la1.:ncerin; ve:y !eriol:.s~y. Finlan~ 
heS e~ui??ed itsel: ~ith virt1.:ally a co:?lete set of new laws anc :egulatio~s 
conce:r.in; money launcering. These la~s, ~hich CL'lIe into ferce at the start of 
1~9~, a:e basec on a very widely C:I-~ coney launderi:'lg c:!ence c07e:ing all 
proceeds obtained by c:L'lIe; cO:'lfiscatior. of the proceed! anc ir.st:~~entalitie! 
c~ ~o~~y la~~de=in;; a ~e=y fle~i~l~ r..w law ccnce=~i~; i~:e:~I':.i~~ll 
C~-c?~:a:io~; th~ r~~:a~c=y :!?c:ti~; c! s~s?ieio~s t:a~sa:~io~s to the 
~i~~~:ill :~i~llte=y .~~hc:~ti~s ~y c:~:i~ i~!~itctior.s a~d i~s~=a~ce eom?ar.~e!; 
a~d the r.~~da:ory a??lieltion ~y these entities of Iyst~ to help ~rotect the~ 
agai~st a~u!e by la1.:nderers, inclu~i:'l; c~storner identification and cue cili~enct 
?:oce~\:.=es. 
77. klthou;h the la .. ·s a:e new a:'ld untested, they look to ?ro\·ice a ,ene:ally 
ve=y ~~O~ leia1 f=L~ewo:k ~~C in so~e :es?ec:s - !c: e~L~?le :~~~a~ le;al 
assistance - are well in a=~ar.ce o~ oene:al practice. ~earlv all the FA!i 
Reco~~n:atior.s have been ~?l~~~:'I~ed anc le;islatior. cur:e;tly goi:'l; th:ough 
Fa:lia:nent will acd to the list by p:ovidin; for cor?oratoe c::iJr~nal lh!:lility 
for rncney launce:in;. The legal f:ame~c:k is :ein:orc:ed by the positive 
attitude o~ the financial s~ctor to~ar=s com:ating ~oney laundering and the ;ooc 
co-o?erltio~ between it, the fi~ancial :e~lator! .:'IC t~e la~ e~!crce.~e:'lt 
autho:it.ies. 
7S. There are some are!S w~ere the anti-laundering system could be 
st:en;thened. In plrticula:, all parts of the financial sector nee: to be 
brou;ht wi:hi~ the a:'lti-launde:in; ::L~ework as soon as possiele - currently 
secu:ities brokerage fi:ms and bureau: de cha:'lge are not covered. In addition, 
it would be cesirable fo: the money launce:ing oHence itself to be e::tended to 
cover attempted laundering. Ope:ltio:'lally, e=perience in other FATF m~ers 
suggests that the law enfo cement authorities in Finland need to have leial 
authority to carry out I ~ de: range e! investigative tec~~i;ues; a:'ld the 
fo:u.a~ion of dedicated ant -launderini in~e!tiqative units is c:ertainly worthy 
c! co~!i:!=a:ion. 
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~he 
::-:we·,t~=, th! W!a~~!sses :~ ~:-.!' r~:1!".:'!:-; !:·s:,!~. a:e .. _ ........ _ .. c:>=.?a:~$:~ .. "... 
t==c~:ess tr,at. hes a:=~acy bee!': %'"...c~!. Mo:eo",:!=, ::.'! :i:'l::.is!'-, a\,;:~o=it!~! I:~ 
~~st th~:!~o:! be t~a: Fi~!!n~ ~as s: !a: ~ad! a 
lau~de=:~; c~all~~ge it is !acin;. 
.... c- ...... c. 
---~- .. - ... 
e~ ~''':~ to i:s c:O!~ F:c~!.r"':':y t:: c:.:-..:; so:::ce co~~.:=ie! &:".: ~he ~ac~ :': .. 1:' ;,,: 
is a ::e! ?c:: a: th~ ce~::! o~ the c~~c~i:a:io~ a~~ t=a~!?:=:a~i~~ n~twc:k ~~ 
S,o-..::.h ::ast }..sia, H~:'lS' Ko~S !ac~! it. s.!.~:':!ica.~t. d:t.:; t=a~~~c:k~:-,; p:o:le::-.. t=\,!~$ 
f:orn t~! RGcld~~ Trian;le" a:e s~ugsle: into Ho~; Kc~; bo~h fo: lo:al 
Cc~!~~~icn a~c =e-e~?o=t to oth~: co~n~=ies. The=e:o=e, Hons Kons has a 
s:s~i~~ca~~ m~n~y la~~ce:i~; ~:c~l~~. Ihe majority c~ ~~~~s la~nc!:e: in 
Hc~g Kcn~ :es~lts !=o~ c:u; sales w~i:~ took place o~t~~ce c! Eo~g Kons, t~~ 
a=~~al a~o~~: 0: w~ich is a~~os~ ir.~ossi~l~ to as:e=:a~~. !nese h~Sh ?=c!i:s 
a-a a~ l~as~ a~ some s~a;e ?~a:!dr lay~:e: a~= i~:e;:a~e: ir. Eon; K=~;. 
Sl. As one of the wo:l~ts lea~i~; !i~a~:ial ce~:=es, H=~i K:~i p:ese~:! 
s~· ... ·e:a: a:.t:acti .... e fac~c:s to ::\::1~y la"..!:::e:e:!, s~c~ as a l:w t!:~ !~·!:e:: 
pa=~ic\,;la=ly fo: !o:!i;~ so'.!:ce inco:"J.e, fle::i:l~ c:>:?o:a:.! 1 .... ·s, !o?h:'st.icl':.e~ 
ean:o:b; :ac':'lities and the a~sence c! c-.:==enc!· an::' e::cha.:l;~ cc~~=e!s. Other 
:a .... oc=&~l! facto=s a:! a~ e!:ic~e~t co::::~~i:a:ic:: $j"st~., t~! boo:: e~ real 
~s~ate i~~es~~e:lts in So-.:th C~~na and ~he !act that th~ Hons Kens dolla.: is a 
ve:y c!si:a:le ccr:ency. 
EZ. D'!te~.in~d te eo~'::'l: c!:'.!; ~=a~::'ek:"~i &!'l: the :e!a:ed rno:aey l.~~c!:;.~;, 
t.:.e H~:;.~ K:>n; Go· .. !=:l.o~!::: hiS !cllo.·e= th! 2??=oach a!'l: e:-:pe:ie:.ee e! the tJ:-.::=.~: 
Ki~;~o~. Ho~; Ron; e~l::e: its !i:s: &~~i-d=~; :ela:e: :~ney la~~:e:i~; 
h;isla:io:,: i:l D~=e::,~e: 19£: (:he D=uS ::a!!icY.in; (Re:o· .. e:y c! P=ocee:s) 
CI:=:~a~:!). !~is key le;i!~a~!v! mel!~=e ~ith res?eet to c:c; rn~~ey la~~=e:i~i 
e~?ow~:s the co~=ts to f=ee:e anc cor:f':'sca~e the p=o:eecs cf e:u; t=a.:fic~~~i, 
a~d i~clu=e!, in Se:tien 25, the c!fe~c~ c! lau~c!:i~q the p:cceeds 0: c:u; 
t:a:ficki~~. 
E3. W~~h rega== to meas~=es a??l~ca:le to the ~~~a~;ial se;tc:, the 
Hon: Keno Mon~ta:v A~tho:itv issuec in J~lv ~9S3 a G~icel~~e on Monev L.~~ce=inc w~i;~ s~?e=seded the s~~cieli~es, issu~c i~-~~=:h 1:::, on the p:evention cf th~· 
c:L~~al ~se o~ th~ ba~in~ system ~e: t~e ?~=pcse e! ~oney ll~~ce:in;. !~ 
?a=cll~l, G~!ca~ee Ne:es O~ Mc~ey ~a~~=!=i~i w~=e i!5~e: i~ ~e:L~e= 199; t: all 
~ns·.:=e:s a~:hc=isec to ca==: On lon; te=:n b-.:si'ness i~ Eon; Kon;. 
e~. Th~ F.o~S Kon; ;ove=~~ent has s~o~n a since:! co~~t=en: to ad~=e!! the 
p=o=le~ c: mon~y launce=in; anc is takin; si;n~ficant ster! to com?ly ~it~ the 
1. U~C!= the Sino-E=itish Joint Oe:!a:ation sie~~Q on 19 Oece~~e= 1ge~, th~ 
Gove=~~ent of the People's ~e?ublic of C~in; will r!sume severei;nty o~e: 
He~; Kon; with effect f=cm 1 J~ly 1,97. Unde= the Joint Oe:la=ation, the 
rno~!ta:v a~c financial sYstems F:eviouslv F=actised in Hone Kenc, inclu~~;c th~ sys~e~s c(:e:ulation and ~~oe:vi:ion cf ~e~;!it-~akin9 i~!ti~utio~s an~ financial ;a:kets, as w~li as the laws ~;evio~!ly in 
:o:ce, shall b~ r.~~~~ai~ec. 
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F;":: F~e ::':':':\e:1':a:io~s. 'Ih~ l~g:'s:a~i·.·~ !:a...'t\~wo:k a~': thoe G'~i~'!li:'les c:':. "M'::1!Y 
:'a·.!:lc~= :'l;" tc the ba:u:':':lg' a:l~ i~!I..!=2.!'l=~ :":'\:'t.!!:=!.~! ?=o·.·ic.~ ~e= a 9C"~= ba~:'! !== 
ccc:-.-=.e= ~; i.'.:.:-.ey la',,;.:'ld'!:in~. no'"'! .... !:, :'.:=:.h~: e~::=:! ~ho1.:1: be :r.a:e t:> c:·,·!: 
~:~ c~ly !.~v~5:rn~~: b~!ine$ses b~: als: e:~e: ncn-~a~k !i~a~:ial !~!:it~:!~~! 
!',,;:":l a.s ::~::-~i:.tarl=~ h·~"..lses &:"lC bc=~a-..:..~ =~ =~a:1;~. :0::. :r.~ l!'ia! !':'C!, t~e 
e~a:~rn~~: c: the O:;a~ised a~d Se=io~s C=~~es Sill, ~~i:~ ~=:v~:tS fc: ~~! 
c=ea:ic~ c! a mo~e: la~~ce:i:1; c::e~:! :e!a:in; ~o the ~:OC~!:! e~ a~y c=~~., 
"",="11 i::~?=,· ... e !ig::':'~ica!"'.:ly t.h~ a~:i-~~~~::" li"~:l.~!:=i:1S le;is:"a~:"c~. '!h~ rea:y 
a .. ·a:'la:'il:'::y c: !!"l~ll co~?a:", .. :'es :r~K!S :"r.v!!:i;a:io~s e:-:::e:n~:y c:'!!ic\!l:, ::.:s 
:a::., ~~S"~::.e: "".:,~:. la· ... Je:/c.~~c=:1~i· ::=i· .. .:..:!~~!, c:ea:es ?::::~s !:: la-.; 
e:::c=::~~e:'lt a;!~c;..es l.~ i'~!:-.~i:y:'n·; =,!:le!;',::'al o ... ·:"'.e:s. 
SS. !:ela~~ has e~?~:~e~ced i m~:ke~ i~:=ease i~ the a~aila:ility a~: 
cc~s~~:ie:'l c~ illicit c.=ugs in :ece:..~ y!a:!, ""i:.h cc.:'l.:.abis !cllcwe: by tcs:.a!~· 
a~= lS~ a~ t~~ Q~S: co~c~ c:u;s. No e!~~~~:es a:e availa:le fo: the r:oeee~! 
c! c.:'JS" t:a!~ick.i:"l; !:1c., ~i",,·!~ the a:se:1:e c~ ::.; o:;a~:s!~ c:i..:\! <i&~~! a~: t~. 
~=a~~:::.e: ~a:~=! c! t!'l! ~=\!;'S t=a:~, ::~::ey la~!"l:ie:i!l; is n~:. b!lie'''~:! to be a 
.!~=io\!s ?=o:1.e:r-.. lio .... eve:, t.e:::e:is~ e:;a:", .. :'sat;.ior,s c= i~:-,e:a~e s,,~~s~I.:":.~ia.:' s\.:."":'..! 
:0 !:~a~:~ t~e:= c?~:a:io~s an: n~ec to cc~:!al t~!se !~~Cs. 
E5. :=!lc~d is rnovi~~ !:orn 2 !:t~!~i~~ i~ ~~:'ch lit:le actic~ had bee~ t&i.e~ 
a;a:'~!~ ~c~~y la~~c~:i~; to th~ ade?:io~ c: a wiee-=l~=i~~ !=L~~~:=k in t~i! 
a=!a. !t~ ~ew la. c~=:!~:ly ;O~~i t~=o~;~ ?a:liL~~~t will ~rl~~n~ the FA:: 
R~cor:rne!'l=a:io::s a:-:.c the ?·=c~·isio~s c~ t~e !: M:r.ey La''::l~~=in; Oi:ecti ... •• I.:'l: 
e~a:l~ !:ela~: to :ati~y tb~ 1geE Vi~~~. a~~ 1990 Co~~eil c~ t~=e?~ Cor.~en~io~s. 
!=~la~:'s ap?:oac~ is b~~~: O~ the c=~~~~alisa:!e~ e~ t~~ la~~:e:i~; e~ t~e 
F:o=ee:'s c: 2.::'1 c=:"'''7.es, :'a:i;,~:' C? by tOi.:;~ co:".!i$:a~i':):'l ::=o .... ·isic~s anc 
=e~~i.=~~!:':t! C:-. ~:..!"'"a:1=:.a: :":".st:"t'..:~i=·~$ to ;.ee~~i~y t.:.ei: c\!!:ome:! 1.:1: re?c:: 
a:-:y !\:.~~i::'c\.!! t=a~!a::ic::s to th! la'. e:"',:~=c~:nt:1~ ac~h;:i:it!. The leiisll:ic:-. 
~., 11 be s-..:::::h::le~";e: by t::e F:oc·~:~ic:-. c:f c~";ail~: Ij· .. ic.l~ce nctu. 
Ei. !~~ r.!W l~~i!l!~icn p=cv~~es a ve:y ;~oc le;ll ~=~!~ork !c: eQ~I~i~; 
m~~~y 12~~~e=i~i' The money la~~~!=i~; c~!e~ce itse:! cee:s all the FA=r 
~eco~e~~a~io~! a~d !=e~a~~ is :c be cc~~~:e: fo: the com?:ehe~siv! co~e:I;! c~ 
f:!:ica:! o!!!~ee!. !he n!~ co~!i!cc::o~ ~:~vi!io~s a:~ a ~c=the: I~:on; 
!eat~=! c! the n~w law. !~ ad~i:io~, ~~e obligations to be placed on fi=an:ial 
i~s~it~tio~~ ~e~~=ally m~e: the !~:r :e~~::e~e~ts. ~: ~:ese~~ these e:ligl~io::! 
co not cev~: all =~l~va~t bo:i~s - c:~~it ca:~ i!!~~:!, ~~i"; t=~!ts InC. 
ir.v~!~~~~t i~te~.e=il=i!s a:e the mos:. n:ta~l! e~:e?tic~!. r~e le;islatio~ COt 
e=-~a::!e the obli9'c~ion! to ~e e::t.~!'l:~: te s·..l:h e.~ti:ies :y \It'a: e~ s:a~\::c:y 
=~;~l!tior.s. C:ecit ca:: iss~~:! a~: ~~it t=~s~ ma~a~~:s ~ill b~ eov~=~: by t::~$ 
rnea~s. H~w~~!=, fail~:e t~ co~e: i~~~s~~~~~ in~~=me!ia:it! co~ld :e~=.sen~ I 
weak pci~t in the ::L"ewc:k and it W~~~~ ee d~!i=a~l! fo: all !i~~~cial 
insti~~:io~s to be s~j~c~ to th~ o:li~~tio~s as soon as possibl~. 
S8. T~e r..in financial s~cto= t=~~~ a!s~ci!~io~s ha~e a positive a~c 
const:uctiv~ a~titude to th~ n~~ l~;isla";i~~. !~e ba~ks, b~il~ini $oci~ti~s an: 
also the li!~ i~s~:a~ce s~ctor were all w~ll aware o~ the ~o~ey l.und~rin¥ 
th=~a~ and r~ady to co-o?e=at~ ~ith th~ 90ve:~~~~t on eo~nte:-mels~:es. 
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a~= he- ~h~: !~=~:c b~ L~?le~~~:!: i~ r=a::i:~. !: i! t~~:!:::~ ~~?c:~a~: t~a~ 
~~! ce:a:l~= ;·.:':':'a~.:! ::: :i::a.~::'a! ::.!:::...:::':!".s e:. :--C::~=s !~:~ .5 :.=a~:"'.:":.; ar.: 
ha~~li~; o! s~!;i:i:~! ::!~sa:::':~!, w~ic~ !s ~=~ ~!~~; F:e?~:e~, !ho~:~ ~~ 
!~se:':.c:! a::~ !~C'':::', as :e: a! ?c!si~:!, l.ar ci~~':: e;-..:.':'vale:l: :'I.!:'es to & .... :~: 
co:n::,e'::'::v! c:'s:e=~i~::, &:1: e:..!~:! e!:e::i ..... e a??:':':a~io~ c! :h~ measc.:e!. 
g,J. !=~:a.:'l~ r.2S be!~ =e:a.-;i· ... !:y li~e a.~~:.; r;,::: r..eu~e=s :":. ?\,;:.t.in; I.:'. 
c.::ti-~:::.~y la\.:..~':e::~; !:a..-:-.e .. ·=:;" !.~ ?!!:!. f.o--e":e:,:"t i! te ~e con;:a.:l!l.a:e: 0:-. 
th~ l~;~s~a~~c~ ~~ has ~=a~~ ~? a~c the ve=y ?o!it~ve at~ituce c! the ~~i~ 
fi:--.a:"lcial i~c,.!s:=y a5s~cia:io:".s :o· .. ·a=:.s cc=~ .. ;.i:\r; ~o:.ey lai.!:lce:i:lg. :~ t~~ 
im:le~e~:a:ic~ c~ the O!!S~=!S ~~:che! ~~! s:&~da=: c! :~e r:L~~=y l~;is:l:i~~, 
!:ela~~ s~o~l~ ta~e a ve=y e~!!::iv! a~:!-la~~de:~~; sys:e:. 
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I:::I. HONI'rOP..!N~ I)t\o'"t:..o?M!:h.S os HOh"1:Y LAUNDtP.:S:; ':t:!-:NIQtJ::S 
A.'O 'J:FI1.-::..-a:.,,-r or T?.!: FAIT P':;C~~""DA:IONS 
d~""elo?m~~:.s 2.!'lC tren:s i:1 mor:ey la'.:!'lce=:":\g te=h~i;·..!e!. '!r.is !:!e:ci!! is 
cs~:ul not c~ly fo~ i~!e~n~ la~ e~!:=:~~e~~ a;en:~!! ~~~ et~e=! ~:~h 
c?e:a:ic~al =e!?on!i~ili~ie! i~ FA:: m~~!=! b~: al!~ ~:= co~si:!=i~; ~~a: 
:l.!=~he= rr.:>:"l~y la'.!:1de:in; COl.:.:lte:-:,:\!as·.;=es ~.:.;~.: ne!~ to be a::?:e:: to ta.ke 
a:cc\!~~ cf the!! ci!velo?t:\~!'l:!. Hone::" la\!!'lde::':1; ~ \It no: s:":r.:l-: a ~:~::!!=. ~a:! 
by th~ ba:1.ki:ig cort::\t.:.r.:ty InC. c:he: f:I.ai~s~:ea..~ fi~a.~:ia.l i~!~i:'..!;ions. A! FA: 
rne!!"~e=5 r.a\o·e i:1t:od1'!:ee p:ev!:".:~\.·! meas'..!:!s e::7e::'~; the ":~~la~e:" !ina.nc:a 
sec~or, money la~nderers have been increasingly ~!in; mcre civerse rc~~es, bc:~ 
in te~s 0: the qeogra?hical areas targetec ane ~et~oCs usee. Durin~ the 
1993-1994 ro~~c, the :~7: has t~ere:cre te~ce: to foc~s increasin;ly on iss~es 
w~~:h we:e no~ give~ such cle!e atte~tion when the e:iginal forty 
Reco~e~:atio~s were cra~~ u? i~ 1929-1990. Howe~e=, in line with the ce:i!i:~ 
tak!~ i~ F~::-!!!, no ne~ ~eco~~n:a:ic~s will be co~!i=e=ee ~-.\, a:~~= a!l 
the m...::~al evaluat.ior. e!:a..-r~~a::'o~! ha""! b~e~ c:o~.?l~:e:. 
:2. 'Z!"-.! a:-.:"lual :ev!.e'J of c!e":!!.c?me~:.s i~ %:\o::ey la',,;~:'!:!.~~ t!c~:.i~·,;!! c:e· ... C~. 
a la=;e :;-..:..~~= c: case ~.:'!:c=ie! S~IlI";':':.!~ by FA:: r.1~::-::!:!' i~:l'..!:':'~S so;:\~ 
::le~ers who r.ae not ?re·..-io\:sly cont:ib~te: to this e::e:cise. 'I'!"IeS!, a!'lc othe: 
cases, were ciscussec by an ac hoc e~?ert gro~p. As in ?revious e~ercises, the 
r..a.:e:!.al was conce:ned with c!· ... elcpm.!~:! c: t.:e:'l:s i:: e::':'s::'ni money la'';:'l:e:i::.; 
rne~hods - e.~. use o~ !~el1 co=?anies, wi:! t:a~!!e:s, ne~-~a~ !i~a~:ial 
:'::!:.:':~:io:"'..s (!!?!cially ~~=!!~.: ~e c~a~~!) a.:'lC ?hys:':1.1 rnc·,:e:ne::.:. c! c;:.==e~:::- -
=a~he= t~a~ i~c~cati~s 2~y !~;~:'~ica~tly inno~a~iv! te:h~i~~!s. !~~~e~:e .as 
p:~S!~:~~ o! I.~ inc=!a!~~~ L~~~~: c~ la~n=e:~~; Q~ t~t r:ccee~s c! c:Lut 
~~:!l!~!~ to c:ug! t:I!!ic~i~;, s~c~ as a~s smu;;lin;, r:o!~itu~io~1 whi:e 
colla: c:ime a:'l: even t~e ille;al t:i~~ickin; of a~L~~l h:~e~es, ~~i:~ i~ C~! 
:~7F me~er ~as seconc only tc ~ru;s as a so~rce o~ c:~~nal p~ocee:s tc: 
la ".::lceri:l;. 
53. There were further incications e! the e~iste~ce c: joint ven=~:es ef 
cru; t:a:!ickers anc financial professionals, w~ic~ resultec in inc=el!~n~ly 
s~phistica~e: money launcering Det~o~s. !~is was :eflectec in the growinq use 
of i~s=:~~e~~s such as gold 0: bones; a~d the e:~?a~!ion of ~nee:;rounc ba~in; 
syste:::s ,,·ell beyonc the geo;raph~cal areas with wr.i:!": they are tracitio=-.ll!y 
a!socia~ed. There were also a si;nificlnt r.~~er o! e::L~?!es of banks 
connlvln; in money launde~ing o?e:ations, with crir.lnals beinq able to take 
control 0: ba~s ane penetrate othe~ financial ins~it~ti~ns, es?ecially in 
j~:is:i:tions with weak supervisory syste~s. 
5~. Geo;:a?hically, the wo:ld-wi:e r.at~=e of monev launderi!'lc ooerations was 
agai~ e~?hasised. Centra! a~c taste:n t~ro?ean countries are b;co~~n9 
i:lc:easi:l;ly ~!ed i:l mO:ley laun:er~!'lS schL~es. In parallel, the ~se of 
alter~ative financial centres i~ Asia!'l anc South k~erica~ co~nt:ies is also 
ce .... !lo?ing. 
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95, G~~e~ th! ?=o?~~~ity !o= ~hel1 cc=~:=a~i~~~ tc ~e ~~.~ ~- =:~!y 
la'.!nc~:::ig ope:a:ions, the n::: has b~~:i e=-:a..~":'::.ing w~a~ s:eps :r.!g~: be taK.en to 
coun:~: thei: a:::ac:ions as la~nde:i~; ve~icle!, F~!:-v co~:i~~ed the ~o:T. 
:;,e;'~; i:. 19~2-B:3 to t:y to e::.s;;.:e tha: the b~ne! cia1 ow:'!e:s c! such bo~:"es 
""e:e i:'e:-.. ti:':'e:: a:lc! tha~ tn..:s i:" .. :o=:r.a.:.ien "'·a.s avai a:'le to 1 a"" e!1~c:ce.."nent 
au~hc::t.i!s co::c\.!c:i:'l;' mO:1!y la'.!:'l~e=i~i i:-:ves:i;a.: O~!, As t.!ie s:ucy o~ th~ 
iss~~ cor.~i:i1.:ee, the impo:ta:ice cf applying the F: nci?le o! t:a:1Spa:ency c! 
c .... :ie=s~ip to co:po:a~e boe:"es in gene:al "'as empr.as:'s~: since no: only shell 
co=po:atio::.s but vi:t~ally a::.y legal entity could be ~se~ in money la'.!nde:in; 
sche:nes. 
96. A ve:y L~?o:ta~: e~~e~: in p=ev!~tin; the use o! 1e;a1 e~~i:ies by 
~a:~:a.l P!:SO~S as a mea~s C: o?e:a:ing ce ~a:to a~o~ymo~s a::o~~ts is to 
e~s~=! t~a~ ~i~a.~ci~l i~sti~c~io~s o~tain i~~o~a:io~ O~ o~~~=s a~c 
be~e!icia=ies c: th!i: clie~~ legal e~ti~ies. A:~e: co~!ice:a::e C!s:~S!!O~, 
a!'\ !!'\t~:?:e:a:i ... e Note to Re::o=e!'\~atio!'\s 12, 13 &;')c 16 to 19 "'as a:o?tec to 
cla::'!y the ~~as~=es to be take!'\ by :i:;ancial ins;~;~;ions :eia:::"n; the 
ide~ti!i:a:io~ o! c~sto~e:s ~~o a:e le;al e~:iti!s. !h! tt~: e~ this not~ is 
set o~t in ~_~n~~ 1. 
S7. rhe:~ ~as also so~e cis::~ssion o! o:he: ",ays c! L~?:ovi~g t:ans?a:e~cy 
of o~:;e:s~i? c! co:po:ate bo~ies and some possible additional measures we=e 
propose: :0: dea1ioy w:"th s?~c~!ic p:ob1e~ posed by shell co:?o:ations, 
r.o~eve:, no concl~s~o!'\s were =ea::nec 0:; these is!~es ~u:in; :A!:-V. 
t~c:c. c~ P~;"l_z~~ . .;",~:~, i;"C:"'-.~'Q-'c ZQ_ m~"".\' lS··:lO--;""c 
~S. :~e TAT: also co:,\t:':;uec the wo=k be:ur. in the previous :ou~d o~ measures 
~c co~a~ t~~ ~$e o! b~si~!s!e! o~t!id! t~~ fi~ancill secte: !o: rno~ey 
lc~~d~=i~;. !h~ s~~j~:t ~as cea!t ~i:~ i~ t~o sta;~s. The fi:s: foeusec C~ th! 
cou~te:-~ea!~=e! a?plieable to financial a:tivities ca:=ie~ C~ by businesses 
c~h!= th&~ ~i~a~c~al i~s~i~~~io~$. I~ some FA:: ~e~e:s cnly license: 
:in&~c~!l i~stitutier.! ca~ ?=ov~e! finan:ial se:viees to th~ ?~lic. How~ve=, 
i~ o~h~: m~~e=! a~ leas: ce=tair. fina~:ial a:tiv~~ies ca~ be con:ucte: by a~y 
b~si~~s! i~ co~junction with its mai~!t:eL~ c?e=.~io~s, ~~ e~L~rle is tbe 
F:o~i!~on of be:ea~ de c:'a~~e !aeil~~ies =y travel agents. If no meas~r.s 
... ·e:e ~l.T.en i::. this a=u, the=e .... o·d:: be a pote~tial loo?~cle in the anti-money 
lau!'ld~=i:'l; ::a.'"O.!wo:k \r.·~ic:' eoul:! be e::;:leited. by c:::..inals. 1-_'1 Inte=;:=e~.~i\·e 
Note ~a! the:e!o:e proposed to Re:o~~e:;dation! 10 a:;~ 11 reia:::ing the 
application cf ap?rop:iate a:;ti-money lae:;de:ing mease:e! to the con::~::: of 
!ina~ci!l a:tivities by non-fi~ancial businesses 0: p:o!essions. !he te:t of 
the e:a!t !~te=?:etative No:e is to be fo~n~ in k~~e= 2. 
gg. The se::on:: stage "'as an e:;L~~na:ion of the .... ays in .... hich non-financial 
busine!s~s co~ld be e~?lcited by money laende:e:s, whethe: willingly 0: witho~t 
their knowledge and consent. It .... as ag:ee: that there was no one set of 
melse:es ",:'ich would be ap?licable to the ~hole of the non-financial sector, 
.... h~ch cC'\·e:s a 'I.'ast range cf businesses. Instead the rAT: is st'Jcyin; a mi:·:t~:e 
of measu:es. Some w~uld be cf ge~e=al application. These include 
conside:ation of m~a:1S to L'Ilp:o\'e the t:a::.s?a:ency of owne:!:'ip cf legal 
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e~,;::i~!; e~a..."!'...:.n~n; tc w~a.: e;-::e~,; e:!~ ::.al a~r:i:c=s 2.~:' ;:\!~:i: a'..!:ho:i!ies 
!h~~l= b! e~a:le~ to pas! O~ ~o la~ e~ c::~~e~: a'..!:ho:ities any rea50~a:le 
s~~~ici:~! c~ mon!y l!~~de::~; a:::~~: !! ~hey d~~e!=~ !~ :a::yin; O~: thei: 
w::k ~::~ ~~sine!ses; a~d the ~~=:he: s:o?e !o: r~d~:i~; a~~/e: ~~~i:o:i~; th~ 
\.!!e c: cas~ as a pay:r\e:.':. mec:-.a:"".is»'. !o: la:;e va.::':l! t:a:"".sac':.ie:.!. 
100. 7~!:e .as a1!: se~e~21 a:=~e~!~: t~a~ ce=~a~~ :~si~!!s !!:tc:s - !:: 
e~:a.,,:,.?:~, the ga.-:-":'~g :'~:::-..:!':.:y i!~= ve~::::s o~ hi;:: ... ·a!.ue i :e::-.! (a:: Il~':.iq~e 
eea!.e:s, :eal es:a':.e eea!.e:!, selle:! o! ea:s, bea:s a~c c:he: l~~-..:=:· 9~OCS) -
w~~~ ?a=~ic~l!=!y v~l~!=a~l! to ~~~!! by m=~ey la~~de=~=!. !~! a~?l!:a:ic~ c! 
me:! s?~::i:i': a:1~i-:nc::!y l!o,;~::!:i~; I:!!!!-..!:es to these se=tc:! is th~=e~c:! 
bei~; s':.uciee. 
101. !he F~!: has no: rea~~e: c!!i~iti~e conclusions o~ ~~at aetie~! -
~!~~=al c: !?~ci!:; - ~~~~t r.!!~ te be tak!~ co~:e=~!~s nc~-!~~a~cia! 
=\:$:"~es!~!. ::~ sho\!l: be nc:ec tha: a n-..:..-:-.:oe: c~ t~. m~a5\!:es u:"'.d~: study w;:,\!!~ 
go beyo~d th! e~!s~!~~ fc~ty r~:: ~e:~endatic~s. !~=~h!= w:=~ C~ t~~s 
s~je:t w:l1 the:e!c:e ne~d t~ ~e pc:!ue::! in r;.:r:-V!. 
1C2. !~e r~:: cc~ti~uec i:s w::~ C~ the i!s~e e~ i:~~:i~:=a:io~ ~!~~i:e~!~:s, 
~a:~ie~la:ly in cas!! ~~!:e the:! is ~o fa:e-~~-!a:! c:~~a:: be~~ee~ the 
fi~a~:il! i~s:it~tio~ a~~ its custe~!=5. V&:ie~s o?tic~!, w~i~~ ha~ bee~ ?~: 
~c:~a::: by rAT: m~~e:s we:e c:'sc~!se~. It was :eco~~i!e: tha~ the:e sho~!.c be 
a sa:is!acto:y balance betwee~ fle~i~ility i~ the methoe c! iee~ti!yin; the 
e-..:sto~e: anc secu::'ty. It was also pei~:ec c~t tha':. the:e sho~lc be no 
c:s:=~~lna:ion betwee~ ca~e~c:ie! o! fi~an:ial i~!tit~tior.!. 7ne a=~a~~.;~! a~~ 
c~sa~~a~:i;!! o! the va:iou! ce~ho~! e! id~~ti!icl~io~ W!:! =e~i!~!d. It was 
g!~!=a:ly 2i=~~: tta~ a~y i:!~ti!ica:ion metho~, w:'e~ the:! is n~ !a=!-to-~a:! 
ec~~c::, sho~!.e a:~i!7e the ~nee:lyi~; e~je:tivis c! ~e:o~!~~a~io~! 12 a~e 13. 
Ho~e~!:, this ~~~s:ion will be =e:o~!id!:!d ~~:in; FA:r-V!. 
103. Du:i~; 1992-1993, FA:!-:V hi~ :evi!wed the te~~e~:y c! mo~!y ll~~~!:e=~ 
to ~se t~e no~-~a~~i~g fina~:ial sec:c:. ~~:ea~ ee cr.a~ge, i~:e:mecia:ie! id 
i~~es~me~t b~sinesse5 and i~!~:a~=e cem?anies we:e id!~ti!ie= as hlVi~; b.e~ 
\:se:, c: as pa=tie\:la:ly ... "\!l:le:i1:le to being usee, fo: m~:'ley la~nce:b;. !A!:-V 
ccnsice:~d f~=ther a:~ion e~ the L~?l~~e~t.~ie~ c~ t~e FA:: ~e;c~!nc.tie~! i~ 
... ·a:ious sec:c:s cf N::!s. !: was e:~?e::ec tha: the il~\::le.":le:::a,;io:,. o! the 
F.ecOImle::cl:io~s to the i:,.s\::a:::e i!.~e i:,:vestme~":. b-..:siness i:l:'Js::ie! wo\!lc 
r.:=rr.ally be achie7ec w~en anti-money la\:nQe:i:'l; mels~:es we:e beini esti!.:lishe:. 
104. Howeve:, a ~atte: of qe~e:al conee:n was the implementation of the FA!r 
Recorn:ne~da:ions on financial matte:! to bu:eau= de chanee sinee these 
i~stit\::ions had b~en icenti!iec as bein; ve:y v~l~e:abie to money la~nde:iny 
schemes. In this :e;a:d, it was decided to deliberate o~ meas~:es s~ch as 
set:ing up :e;:.st:ation 0: s~?e=~isory requirements 0: the a??li:atio~ o! othe: 
t:'.ethocs !o: the en!o:c~:nent c~ anti-money lau~ce:in; rei~lations b:r· the DI.!:eau:: 
de ehange. 
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lC5. Finally, it Va! a:so ~ :i~~~ ~:: :: cv~=loo~ e~:i:~:y th~ c:~!: !~::c=! 
c: N:::s, F-a,=:ic\!:'a,=ly i::t~::n~ ::'a:':'~! :":: :..::':~!:'=:!!~:' :::.;!':':-.~!!!!. ':";.! :a.s~ ::=:! 
?~=s~e~ cc~:a:t5 wi~~ the ~c:k ~; Fa=:y , o! th! :~:e=~~:ic~a~ O=;!~isa:i=~ c! 
Se:-..:.:::ies Cc:::=":"ss':"c:-.s \:~S::i s:. as :: cc::.~a.:! :':'5 .... ==:< ,,'::'::' ::.a: c! ::.! :;::: 
t"i._~",,,,,-'';r :""'-'~c ~-,;-c&.-s 
106, !h~ FA!F cc~tin~ed to wc:k o~ t~is iss~~ since the:e w~:e in~ic&tic~s 
that a r,c..~e: of mo:,:~y la'~:,::j~:i:':; cases t.a:: in-"c).ve: the \;s~ of el~ct:o:".:'c 
pay:ne!1:' !:lst~. It "as c!!::.cec. t.o i~!:i:\,;:!! a:i e~:=hange c~ in:c::-.o.t.ic!"'. O~ ~o.· 
FA!F m~~~~:s had L~?lem~nte:: :~;~latc:y meas\;:~s relating to elect:o~ic f~n::s 
t:ans:e:s, Several m~~~e:s presented their do~esti: ~eas~:es on this ~atte:: 
Gcve=~~e~t =e~latio~!f ci:c~~a:s !:oc th! Ea~ki~~ Cc~~s!io~ c= the Ce~t=al 
Bank as well as i::st:uctio:'l! 0: directives fro:: s'.!?e:-.iso:y authcrit.ies. 
:cllowi:lg' this :e-.ie":' i: .·a! a;:ee: to cc~:i~-.:e to co:".ito: i:n::'le:l!~';.ati:>:". c-y 
FA!F m~~~e:! of the S~:Fr broadcast of 30 J~ly 1992 -- in partic\;:i:, the 
i~fo:r.'.atioi. loss whic~ tr.ay occ~: \.'hen data e:'lte: i:'lte:r.a! ::iy::\en~s !yste:s, .,." 
:e· .. ie'* c: tr.! i.=L?~~:ue::a:i~~ c: the Si-t":rr b:oa:':a!: ",·ill e=~:i~'J! c".!:i~i 
r.:.::r-v!. Hew'!· ... ~=, t!'le r;..:r \I.·as c::>nce=:ltc ~~O\!~ t:-.! POS!:":~~ s:':":: c! t.~'! 
p:cbl~"'! to o:he: ... i=e t.=2.~!!e= sys:e.-:.s a::: the:e!c:! tor.is c:~es:ic~ \ro'as s':.~:~e: 
rn::e c:lo!e!y. 
lC~. !~ pa:alle:, th~ ~a!~ :c=ce ~i~':.a:~ed i:s ce~:act v:t~ 5"::7. ~ FA:: 
dele~a':.ion attendee the ar.r.~al co~:!:e~:e cf S~::: \;se:! or. 10 Se?te~e: 1:=3 ir. 
G~~~~e. !he C~ai~~~ c! W=:~in: G=o~p I: a~= $e~e=&l FA:: e~?e=ts also me: w:·· 
=e?:e!enta':.i~es of s~!r! in o:de: to ?~:s~e t~e ~ood co-c?e:ation al:ea:y 
es-=.a~lish!c i~ ?=e\·:"o~s :C'--=..~:!. :!'l! S,,"!:! e:oa:ea!t c! 3C1 J\;:'y lS:2 was 
co=..:r.i:ate: to t.he C:!s~~:! G::>'.:? c! Bai..\in~ S\;?e:-.-isc:= &:".: to the Bu~~ 
Corr.-":' t t!'~. 
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108. As i~ th~ ==e~io~s =~~~=, the FA:r ca==ie~ O~: v.=io~s 2~:!-:~~~Y 
la'.;:-:de=i:-.; s~":':.a=! a~: ::-~!!:.c:-.! .:..:: :'l~:;-~~!':"'::-e= j\.::!.!~!c:!c:-.~" ':h~ :J.::r :::~:.:e: 
~~o u~jo: s~~~a=s d~=i~; the =o~~c: !.~ Riya~~ i~ Cetooe= 19;3~ a~c Moscow i~ 
Nc· .. e:'::'e= 19~:. The=e :.as also bee:: a s::-.alle= scale se::-.i:-.a= i:: the 5aha::-.as a~c 
l-.:";h-level r.":'~s:"o::s tc ls=ael, .. ::e Feo?le' s ?e?~lic c! C~:"::a, !'IoAlaysia, 
7~aila~c a~c :a!~a~. ~~O~! a:!, a ~~jc= re7i~w was ~~de=take~ c! th~ rA~:'! 
ex~e=nal =ela:io~s wc:k an: a !t:a~~~f ~a! c=aw~ c? fo= the F~:r's con~a:~s 
1,.;!..th th!:c cC'.!:1::i~s i:. :o=t.~=c~~; yea:s. T::'e r;.::: also c::-lcccte: its a:\~\,;a.l 
!i,;=~ey cf p=C'~:!S~ i~ :...~.?le,:n~::.ti!1; a.~:i-~~:'l~Y la~:".ce=:":')s C\~as~=~s i:--. De?~:':.d~~':., 
.t.s!ociat~d 0= O:he:"-"!!'! Co~t'!~:te~ !!=::':o=i~s o~ F)"!: tne::-~e:$. 
109. The se.-r.ina= ." Rivac:...'l helc c:: 1l-!3 Octc~e: 19::, '''is conC'Jete: in 
co::j\!nct:'cn "'ith the Gl;l! Co-c?e=a:ic:: COl.:ncil enc the Se·Jci A=e::"a:1 Moneta:y 
~ge~cy a~d had b~~~ a:te~dec by !izea::le d~le~atio~! (i~:l~:i~: =e?=e!e~:I:i~e" 
:=o~ t~~ ba~ing se::e:, :!~la:o=y a:e~:!~s, !inan:e a~~ j~!:iee ~~ni!tries) 
f=o~. all s:'!! C-:C mero~=! (Sa'..:di A: a.::' a. , K-..:· .. ·ai.t, !ar..:a!.:-., Q·.!a.~a:, tbt t:r.!. &!"lC 
~~~). The !~~~~~= ccve:e: all a!?~=:s c: t~e rno~!y la~~:!=!~; iss~e a~: the 
a\!:'i~:1.ce had bf!'!:l '-'!ll-i:l~c:-mec a:"lc ta.:':e::. 2 positi\·e I.t:':':u:!. 
110. The FA!: se.~na= in Moscow, he:c en 2-' Nove.~e:, !cllc"'e~ centacts 
betwe~~ the C:'ai~~n &:le the Ce~~=al 3a~~ c~ R~s!ia. P:io: to th~ se~~~a:, :~~ 
Chai=ma~ v~~i~ec Moscow to: me!~i~;! ~i~h ~~!s!a~ q~ve=~~e~: .i!~:ie! to assess 
th! .si~\:a-:,!.o!"L So:r.: hu:.:=e: =e?=e5~:,:-:a:iv!$ e! vl:io'.!! P.~!!:"a:". aq1!:"l:ies, 
i~cl~~~n; co~~:cial :1~!1 a::e~d!d t~! s!~~~a:. rcllo.i~; a ~le~I:Y sessie~ 
c~ t~e !i:s .. ~ay, se?!=ate wc:kshops we:~ helc fo: financial a~: :eg~lato:y, 
le~al an: j~::"cia!, a~: la~ e~!c=ce~~~t g=O\!ps. The concl~!io~! !:cm these 
~=ouFs we:e p:!se~te: 2.: a ~:~al pl~:.a~J s~!sion. The =e=o~e~ca:icn! to th~ 
P.~!!ia:": ~ov!=:"'..~e~t :!!'~lt:":l; !:o=~ th~ se.:-~na= includec! the ~ple:ne~tation c~ 
the r;.::: mea.5~=es &!"lQ =a.tif':'ca~io~ c! t~! Vie:l:1& 2.:'1C Co'.:.~:il c! t-.;:o?e 
Co~v~~tior.s, "'ith ?a:tic~l!= e~?ha!i! on the im?cr~anoe c! en$~rini that 
!i~a~=~al i~!titu~ior.! w~:t no~ o~~e: c: co~:=olle: by c=~~~a~s. I~ res?onStr 
the FA:: "'as i~vit~d to s~~d a s~~ll teL~ to ~~ssia i~ 1:9' to eval~ate 
?:o~=~ss i~ taki~g action against ~oney launcering. 
111. ;"lthe'.:.;!'l tht rio.!: c:·~du:ted no othe: se~na.=5 i:: C4!~::':i.l I.:-:'~ ::'a!~~:~ 
t~:O?! c~::'ng the =o'J~:, it cont!!'l'.!ed to mO!'li~o= c~"w·elo?::~!"lt! i:l thr! 
a??licatic~ of money la~~ce=i~9 co\!~te:-~eas~=es in Hun9a=y a~: ;cla~c, v~e=~ 
se~~na=s had taken Flace in early 1993. ~~?resentatives f:om th~ H~~9aria~ 
Natio~al Sa~ end the National Sa~ o! Fela~= atte~ded mee:in;s of WO:kin; 
G=O\!? II! in Nove~e= 1~93 anc Ap:il 1994, res?ectively. The H~~;a:ia~ 
Pa=li~"ent has now ?a~se: a law to ~~ke m~ney launde:in; o! the p:oceeds o! 
d=ugs t=a!:ieking, te==orism anc a:ms t=l!!ickinc a cr~~nll of!ence. Money 
la~nde:in; has net yet been made a c:~~.ir.al offe;ce in Poland b\!t the National 
Ba~ c! Pelan: has tak~~ 2 n~~~: of meas\!:es and it is hope: that a~ti-mcney 
la·J~de:in~ le~islation will be introduced in the Polish h:lia:nent i~ the nu: 
futu:4!. 
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1 2. rlse' ... ~~=e i~ tas:e::1 t\!=:?~, r;...:r tn~:r.be=s ha\-e ?2.=~i=i?a:ed i:1 Cot.:n:il 
c E'..!=c?~ t:'.i!!i:>~s e::. ~~:'1!y la"..!:1d.~=ini t.~ l:":h~a.~l.i., the f • .T:-' .. =a.i:l! a!'\: £!:c~i!. 
T e r;"T: w~ll also ta.ite ?a:t ir. a r..ajc: co::!ere!'lce on :tOney la\'::le!eri!'l; for 
E~:~?~a~ S~a:!s, ~hich ~h! Ce~~:il is c=;&~i!i~; .~ th! !!:ond hal~ c! l~;~. 
:: !~o~:c also be n:te= tha~ th~ r~~~~ F=o;=~~e c: ~~e £~::?ea~ Cc~~~~i:YI 
wh~ch co.e:s money la~nceri!'l;, ~as been e~te!'lded to i!'lcluce Al:a::ia, the ttree 
Ea:~i: S:a:es (Estonia, La:~ia a~~ Li:~~a~ia) a~d Slc~e~ia, i~ ad~i:ion to t~e 
e::isti~; be:1e!icia~ CO~:1t::~s. :~~ :=:o;:a.-::ne w=-ll th!=e~::e aS5:5: t~e 
im?:!me~ta:ic~ o~ a~:i-li~nd!:i~; ~!a!~:!! i~ elev!~ Ce~~:~l a~d Ea!t!=n 
£u=o?!a~ c~u~::~es_ 
113. 1:-: t~e Caribbean, with t~e s\.:??crt c! the Fr.:: s?cnscri!'l; co\.:::tries 
(Canada, France, the Netherla!'lcs, the U:-:ited Y~n;:o~ &!'ld the Unite: States), a 
p~~~~~t s~c:~ta:~at fc: the Ca:i~bea~ :~r.a!'lcial Action 7ask Force (CFA!:) tas 
now been established. !~e secretariat is basee! in 1rin~e!a~, ~hich c~rrently 
hc!ds t~e :res~dency cf the Cr~7r. D~:~n~ 19S~, III erA:: m~~~e~s ~ill take 
pa=~ in a 5el!-assess~!~~ e~!=cis! to ~:~itc: the:: p:o~:!!S i~ L~?le~e~:i~; 
t~~ ~~=~y FA:: a~~ r.i~e~ee~ erA:: Re:c~~~~atio~$. ~ r.~~~~= :~~cal eval~a:ic~s 
~il1 also be ea::ie~ OC~. A !~:l ~e!ti~; e: the C:h:: ~ill tA~! ~!ace to-a:es 
the en: cf 19:~. 
ll~.. '!~'! FJ..::r ca::i~~ C~-: ene eve:l'; i!i t~e Ca:ib:'ea:l in !A!:-V. !~i! "'as I 
!~~:'la: ~!'l l\assa'J on :2:-22 O:~e~e:. !'~! !e::.i:-.a: W2.! he!c ?=:"'~a:ily !c: ba:-.k:':"li 
:e:~lato~s !:orn the me~ers of the crA:: S:eeri!'l; Grou? anc ?roe!~ced a 900C 
n~be: e! :~=o~e~ea~ie~s !c: t~e we=k c~ t~e erA!:. 
1!5. 7h:ee r.i;h-l!~!~ ~~!!io~! W!:! cc~=~cte~ c~:in: FA!:-V. A ~~!!ion 
visited Jer1.:sa1ern a:'lc 7el-A·:i1." ~:'\ De:~~~er 1993 for eise1.:ssio:'ls ~ith Is:aeli 
go·,:~=n:ne~t aS~:lci~!. !s:ael is not c:o::si:e:ec to be a s!.;~ific:a~:. money 
lau~c!:i~; c!~~:e be: has th~ ?o:!~tiAl to be:orn~ a t~I~S~t point !c. the fle~ 
o! e!irty money. Israel has yet to take aetic~ asainst money la~!'lceri:'lS but the 
!~jec~ i! ~nd~: a=ti~e co~s~~~:a:io~_ 
116. A ~~!!icn also to~k pla:! to =eijin; in De:e~~: 1993 !:: me!tin;s ~ith 
the l".i!'listry of J·..:!tice, the Na:cotics Cornr..issio~ anc cthe: a;e!'lcies. Again, 
so fa: there hac only been lL~ted a:tio!'l a;ai!'ls: money la\.::-:eeri!'l: but it was 
Flan~ed to introcuce l!:islatic!'l i~ 1994, ~~ic~ ~o1.:le t:in: Chi::a i~to 
cO!'lfc~.ity ~ith the Vienna Convention. 
117. Finally, the F~!: has sta:ted p:!?a:ations in conjunction ~~th tht 
Cocmon~ealth Secretariat for a further A!ia!'l Money Launde:in: S~?osium planned 
fc: late 1994 to follow u? the event hele in Sin;a?ore in A?ril 19:3. :he FA:: 
President visited Malaysia, Thai1a!'lc and Taiwan in l"~y 199' for eiscussions 
w~th these 90~e:~~ents in adva!'lce of the ser..inar. A s~all unit will be 
established in the near futu:e to su??crt the Asian initiatives cf the FAr:. 
This U!'l~t \o'ill be fundee! by ad· ... ances from Aust:alia's Confiscated Assets T:ust 
:\!nd. 
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118. 7he FA:r has co~~u:ted a~ !n::!as~~;~y a::i~! e~:!:~a! ~!la:io~! 
~:o~:~~e a~d this as?e:t c! i:s w~:k ea~ be ex?e~:ec to ;:ow in si;~~!ica~ee 
c',:e: the ne:·:t :~", yea:!. r.~:iC~ i: .... ·2.S c~::.:~: t.::aa: l p:a~ WI.! ~ee':e: toe ;·.:.i::~ 
-its f\.!:1.!:e ac:ivi-=.ies i:-. t'his c.:~a. D~:!.~= r;·,:::-v 1 ;;::k.:'~; G:~\.:? I:! c!:e .. · ~? 
an e~te=:".C!.l :elations $: ra-='~~l bas~~ C:l pa?e=s p:epa:e:' :y the Chai:-::-.a~ .. 
119. ~he a;~eed cbje::ive is ~o ens~=e th~ wides: po!si~le ~~le~e~:ation c~ 
r~Tr policies ~c comba: money la~~cie:i~;. The F:O~=L~~ adoptee, ~~ie~ 
ce:e:-:-"':'ned the geog:a?:.ical a:"!~ S!:to=~l ;::':"o:i:i!! 2.:1c:! w:'ieh '-'ill be :!;-\!la:l:" 
~?dated, is the:e!o:e foc~sed o~ actic~s to pe:sua~e thi:c co~~t:ies to adopt 
a~d im?l~~ent the FA!: ~eco=me~~a~ic:"!s as peli:y rn~ls~=es. B\!t. it e:sc 
inclu:es the m~!'litc:i:l; 2.n~, .... ·h~=e nec!!ssa,=y, rei:l!c=c~me~:' o~ the!.: ?=o;=e!s 
in doinS 50. ~he strategy is cased on ~~~~ co-c?e:atio~ with cthe: 
inte:national and regio~al o:ga~isaticn! inte:estec in cQmQa:in9 money 
la~nde:i~g and builds o~ the ;ooc co-c:dination whieh the FA!: through ~o:y.in; 
G:auF III ha! al:eady esta~lishe~. 
120. Cl\,"'e: the ne,.:: t .. el ..... ·e :no:-::hs the ;:=ic:ity a=~a! !c: the rJ.::r a~= th~ 
pro?csec actions a:e as follo~s: 
:'c~:a: China, Taiwan, Sou:h ~~o=!a, In:!:'I, rlk:'!~a:,:, S=i La:'.ka, \·ie~~a..~'1 
Thaila~d a~~ ~Alay!ia. All t~e!! cou~t:i!$ vill be i~vite: to a:t!~: th! 
seconc Asian Money Lau~derin; S:~?osi~ tc be held in late 19S~. 
'''-0 .. -: Russia, Poland, Hun;ary, Czech I\e?~lie. Co:':taets with tbese 
count:ies will be pu:sued bilate:ally 0: at the Cc~n~il o! tu:o?e Money 
La~n:e=i~; Se~~~a: to be hel: i~ the !!:e~~ ha~~ c: 1~9~. 
~a-;~~-2' Ba';~: Par.~~~, Ca:~~n Islands, Ba~~~s, and Vene:uela. Co~ta:ts 
will be pursue: th:ou;h the erA!r. 
~nb~~ t~.-;ca: Colo~ia, E:a:il, A:ge~tir.a, teuaco:. :~c se:lna:s ace planned 
:c: the se:on: hal! e~ 199~ i~ co~j~~c~ic~ vith t~! o=sa~~satio~ c: k~e=~=.~ 
S:a:es. 
~: Ke~ya, Cent:al Af:ican Repu~lie, Z~a~~e, South Af:ica, Mc:occo, 
!vo:y Coast, Nige:ia. It is F!a~ned to hold two s~~!l ;:OU? co~fe:ences fo: 
the s~-Saha=a!! CO\!:1:::'es in la:e 199~ c: el.:ly 1~:5 a:"l: a hi;-h l~·:el ,·!.s:'t t= 
Mc:oceo i~ 199~. 
M~dC'· tAtt: t917~. A hi;h level vis!: co~ld tak! ~lace i~ co~j~~::io~ ~!:h 
one of the African co~fe:ences. 
l2l. Rep:esentatives from the Council of tu:ope, !N!£R?OL, the UNDCP, the 
Co~onwealth Secretariat and the CCC have reiUla:ly attended meetin;s of 
Wo:kin; G:oup III. Du:ing FA!r-V, the FA!r has also developed its contacts 
with the Offsho:e G:o~? of Ba~kin; Supe:viso:s. Whe:e~e: possi~le !~~na:s an: 
conferences a:e o:;anised in conjunction with .~d i~volvins the pa:tieipation 
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c: =~:e·.;a!".: :e~:'O~4a!. a~: :'~.-;e=:-.a::'::'".!~ ::;!!"'.:"!a::'::-.!. 7:-.! F.!.:: !i.-:-.:":c::::: 
~!:=o~~s ~~! C??o=t~~i:y ~: :~~! ~a=: i~ !~:i-~:~!y l!~~~~:~~; e~!~:! c:;!~is!: 
::io c:;.!: ~=:.:~s. !~ a::i:::~ :: ~~! C:-~;.:.:.1. c: r'~:::! ":c~,!!:!~,:!, :;"'7: ::"I!~'=~:~ 
~~ ....... 3..1.1. a:so.?e.;..~.~~e~~i:l~.::.e C::-.:e:!:-.. :e i:". C:-·..:==r..c.~·~·,,:: :.~ J'.!~! e:;!.:.:'!e: jc:':-.o:l:: 
,," :v the r~; a:'lc ~~e ~t.a.l':'a~ G:v!=:-_-:e:".~ ;' .. ! a· :c.;:::~~:..~.~a!~:! :: ~:::.::e 
.. ,..,- ... --:- ... ~.- ..•• ' .... : ......... -- • .: -.~ .. ,..;-- ... :~... ... ""-~:·;-~l·· .. ~~--c:·""':.----~!I co-~:-~- ... -- .. ------" _ .. ___ .. "._c .... _ c_~ .... _s .. _c .. s. c ....... _ A_ ... e __ :'l: -.J' .~ 
;.:"'.i~ia:i·:e!, th~ C!"'.a.:'~..a!"'. ~! ;';:=~:':-.~ G=='..::: !:! c:-'a.~=s a:-. a: ~::-c c~-:=:.:.:" .. ~':.!.::"". 
c:o~= c: :e:e~a~: bo~:"!s. 
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:22. 
i{~Ji~:~~~~~;~~iE~~i~~~:~~~~~.~~~~:~~.~~~~~~~;~;f~;~:~~~~;,~r~f 
:'~::;'!~!:,.:a::::-. c: t~! ::::y ?!::=-::7.!~.::a::'c~.! :y :.!.:: ~,!:7''=~: G:·:!::-."7,!:'.':.!. :.-.~ 
=!~~~~ :~ ~:~!y la~~~~:~~; :~:~~~;~!S ~~~ ::~~:!:-~!!!~:!! ~a! a;i~~ ~~ 
!!!~~::!_ a~~ b!~!~~::a~ ~a:: c~ ~~! ~::~ :! :~! :a!~ !:::!. :~! r~:F 
c:~::~~!: :: ca::y e~: a !~;~~!i:a~: !~:!:~a: :!:a:::~! ~::~:~ ~~~:~ ~i! 
.. , 
~~;. 
la·"::,,,.:::~~;, ~'';':~::!: a::!.:~. :!~.!:..:-.! ~: :~ :l:"'~::' :: l-::.:'!':! :~.! :.:'.:r'! ~::';:L~::-,!. 
!::~=:~ :-::,;s: !~:ll !-! ~.a:! !::" :.!.:: :;.!~'::~: ;:· ..·!:!'".-:!:"'.:s to :::a.:':-, t ::~.~l!:! 
ai!~~!~ ~:~~j !!~~~~:~~i is :~~~:~!. :: is !:: t~~! :~!!:~ :~!: i: ~l! ~~:~~!~ 
t~~: ~~! r~:r !~=~l~ ::~~:..~~~ i:s ~::~ !:: 1 ~~::~!: !:~! y!a:! l~~ :~!:, ~~:~ 
c:,..:; ~.::-.!:: :!';:::!:~:-:= =!::-.i.~:-'!: c. ~=:':-:':~~2.: :::'.:!, i-:. !:-.:,;:: c::-::,i:-,~! ~: ::.:!: 
~:~!y l!~~~!:~~; e~ t~! ?:::e:~~ c! :~:~:~~ c::~!! l~~:':: c~!!~:!! ~~~:~ 
;~~!:!:! ~:;~!:i:l:-:'! ~~~~!. A! =:~!y :l~~~!:i~; is l~ t~::~:~::-:'l:~ ~~!~:~!~::-:.: 
!: !! !!!~~:i!l :e k~!? l~:!!!: e: ::!~~! I~~ =!:~:~! i~ :~~! ~:~!~~ !: IS :: 
!!!e~:~!: :: k!!~ ~~~~: C::-:!:t~: :t~~!~ :~! e::~!:!~i C:~~:!:·:!i!~:!!. As 
~.:~!:' !!·.::-.:t::':-.; CI:-::::: :! c:::'':!.':e:: e::!:::.· .. e:::· i: l::i:~. is :!!::!.:~e: ~o :.:'.:; 
;:;!~.::-!:!, :': :.~ c! -;:.! ".::~.;!: !.~.:::::l:".:! :: t:-.::·-::!;t !-..;:::-.'!: :':"'.e a:':~:!::-. e~ 
a~:i-~:~~y l!~~~!:i:-:.; =e!!~:!! :.~ t~i:~ ::~~::i!!. :~~!!~, :~! ~~~!::y:'~; 
:::!::~ .. :! e~ :~! :.!.:: !:-.:''':::: :! to: e:.!'''::! ;:-.! :'~'F:~:"-!:':e.:~::-, c: !!:t:::'''o"! 
~::;::...~.",,:,,!! ...... C::7'::f.: ::.::"'.!:-' :!'.;~:!:::-.~ ;- :!-.!!! c:';:-.::~!!. 
~~,. ~! :~! ~:::~-~i~! ::~il:'!l:i:~ li!~~!: ~:~ty l!~~~!:!~i is t~t ~::!~1:! 
::!~ :! ;~.~ :.:',::, i:! ~;::!=:-.!: =!:!.:i::,:! '.':::~ •. !.:~ :! ;i-:t:-. & :.:';:-, ~::':::'::' _. 
t:-.! :::::-.::~i:.: y~!:!, :.:'.::-'::/ -.::,.:!: ::-.! ~:!!i:!:"'.:::· e: t.:-.~ :-:!.:"'.;:::":'. ~: t:-.'! 
!:!:r.!::::::!, " .. il!. C!::·.,· :::· .... a:: -;~.:! :!!:<, 
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:a,"":':::R2~!;'.':!"1: NO':'E 'l'O ~C~h"DA=!ONS 12, 13, 16 =:-~::;~~R 1; COSC::;,.'\:S'; 
!i'.z ~!l.!SA::::ON IN 1".::ll .. ::r Um .. :n?":NG Sc.".l:..'2S 0: ACCO~"":'S IN !::.z N~~S OF 
COS:OM!:?.S ""EO A..:o.E NO': NA:v.--.;.:. i'i:?.SONS 
1. :~!:e is i~:=!ase:' cc:::e=~ ",·:":h t!'le I'"'~!'.;S! c: .. .a~::. t~"'?~s c! le;a! 
e~:i:!e! a: eve:y stage c~ the ~~~ey la~~d~:i~; p:OC!ss. :~is ce~:e=~ e~:~~~s 
beyc:'ld e~:i~ie5 e5:a:lis~e:: sol!1y !c: conc!a.l::u!:l: ::\:=?cses. I: also 
e~=o~?asses the ~:ilisa:io~ c~ e~:i:ie$ ~i:h le;iti=~:e o?e:a:i~; b~si~esses ~c: 
ooney la-":':lc.e:i~; ?\.!=?cses. Thus the co~ce=n is not li...~ited tc a~y pa,::icull: 
~c==, c~ lec;al e:-.':.itji (s"..lc:. as, ~e: e~a=.?le, shell c:=?c:a:io::s) si!'lce "·i::'.!a!ly 
a::y e~':.:ty ca" b~ \!S~C in O~;'l~y la::nce:::l; s:~e.'ne~. 
2. ~o~ey 12~~d~=i~; i~~es:i;atio~! 5~O~:~ not be hi~de=~~ c: c~s:=~=:e~ ~y 
t.r.! \!se e: ===-.5 c~ l!ic.l e:::i':~· w~':'chl i:-:. ?a::ic~la:1 c~~cell c: o=~\:sca.:e :h! 
~:~~ b~~e!i:ial ow~e=$~i? e! a:=o~~:!. I~ ~~y i~s:a~ee!, S~:~ c:~c!&~~e~: is 
ac:o~?:is~e= =y ?laein; fi~a~c~al i~s~i:~:ie~ aceo~~:s i~ t~! ~L~!$ e! e~:i:i!! 
:a:he: t~a~ ~a~u:il pe:so~s ~i~h t~e e~:~c:atio~ t~a: a~ i~~!!:!ia:i~; a;!~=y 
w~11 roct be a~!e to cete:=':'ne th! ic!:::i:i!! c~ the ~=\!! C.~!:! c: t.:-.! e:'.:itie! 
a~~ th~! o! the a==o~~~!. 
3. The ide~:i~ication by ~ina~;ial i~s:i:utiens c! c~s:ome:s w~o &:e not 
~atu:al P!:!=~S =ai!!s s?eei~!e F:o:l~~s =!:&:e~ t: th! c:~~:!::i:y c! ~~!i: 
a=ti~i:i~! a~d e=;a~isa:ic~al s::~ct~=!!. F~na~cial i~$:i:~:io~s shoul~ =IV 
s~e:ia~ a::e~:~o~ to this t:7e e~ i=e~:i!i:a:io~. 
~u!~il i:e~:i!i:l~ie~ :e~~i:.~e~:s ee~:.:~~~; 
i~~:::~:!:~! !~C~:: take c!a!~=!! a! ::: 
Ii) ve:i!y:~; the le;al e:isten:e a~d s::~::~:e 0: the c~s:c~e= by o~tai~i~; 
e:~~!: ~=c::'. a p'':'=l:': :e:-:"s:e: c: !:om the c;!!';c::e: c: be':.!'"., ;:=oc~ c! 
i~c:=?c=a:icr., i~c:~~~~~ i~:c~.:io~ co~ce=~i~; t~e c~!:o~!='s ~L~e, 
!e;a: ~C=:t.1 a:'::!!sl c:":e::c:! a:;~ ~=e·.:i!!.e~! :!:\!:l!:"~: :.~e powe: to 
bi:'lc the e~tity. 
I:"i) \'e::':;..-:'::;, that a::y pe:sc:: :::':=?c::!.::i to ae: e:o: behalf c: the c~s~e::le: is 
so a~:hc::"!!~ a~~ i~e~ti~yi~; tha: p~:son, w~~~ ~!Ce!5a=y. 
S. Wheneve: it is ne:essa:y in o::e: to knew the t:~e identity c: the 
custome: and to ens~:e tha: lec;al entities cannot be ~!e: ~y natural persons as 
a method 0: operating in reality ano~:~o~s accounts, fina:l:ial i~s~it~tio::s 
shoule, i: the in~o~ation is not othe:wise available t~:o~~h pu=lic re~is:e=s 
c: other :elia:le so~:ces, reaues: i::!o~atior. - a!'ld u~date·that in!o~.;tio!'l -
f:om the c~s:omer concerning prinCipal o~ne:s and be:le!i:ia:ies. If the 
c~stc~e: dees not ha?e such i!'lfc:r.~ticn, the ~inancial ir.stitutio~ should 
reques: in~o=mation from the custome: on whoever has actual control. 
!f adequate ir.:ormation is not obtainable, financial institl.ltions sho~l: c;ive 
s?~:ial a':.te::tion to business relaticns a:l: transactions ~ith the customer. 
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6. I!, based O~ i~!c==ation !~??lie~ !=o~ the c~!to~e= c: ~:o~ ct~e: 
sou:ces, the !ina~cial i~!:i:u:icn has :ea!o~ :0 ~elieve tha: the c~!:o~e:'s 
a:co~~: is b~in; ~~ili!ed in ~o~e: la~nd!:i~ t=a~!a:tie~!, t~e !i~a~:ial 
:'ns~it..:tic:l ::-.~!t coe?!.y \It':':.h the =!!!"'2.~~ !e :'!~z.ti~:':, -:!;"..:.2l:'ic~!1 c.i=ec~i·.·!! 
0:' a;=~~e:'l:! eone!=~i.:,:; :!?c:'ti:"'J; 0: !".!!ric O'.!S t:i.~sac~:o:"'.! c: te:':':"l.~.ati::~ c! 
~~~i~~!! with !uch C~!:c~~:!. 
435 
~C::a!S '!'O CO:rh~?~ !-'l~N::Y U':,jl\~!?"!SG 'r::_~OOGH r:!\h.~::k!., ;..:::\-:::z:S c.;...;_':~!::J os EY 
NOK-r~n~~C~ :NS!:~!OSS 
1. r=o~ t~e o~tS!t c! the ~c:k c: the :~:: i: ~as bee~ =e:~~~is!~ ~~!: n:~ 
c~lv !~~a~cial i~sti:c:ic~$ b~t also o:he: t~7~! e! b~si~!ss~$ a:e ~~l~e:a:~e 
to ex~lcitatio~ by ~oney la~nde:e:s. :his is :e~l~:~e~ i~ FA:: ~e:~~encati:~! 
10 a~~ 11 which ~ote that ce&s~ie! to hel? p:otec: ~i~a~cial i~!t!t~:io~s 
agai~!: ~oney la~nce:ing need to be a??lied on as e:oac a !:on: as r:ac:ica~~y 
?:s!~:l!1 i~e~u~in; to ?:e!e!sio~! out!ioe the !ina~=ial see:::. 
2. ~eas~=es to co~~~e: th~ ~~e c! no~-!i~&~cial ~~~~~!$$e! !cr Q:~ey 
la'.!!"lc!:i:'lg 2.:e t~e E'-!~jeet e~ a se?a.:a:e no:.e. Ho·.e-"!:, the:! is also a :"l!'e: 
!o: cc·.;::*:.e=-~ea!\!=e5 ceve:i:"J; the CO:lcu:: c: !i:"'.a:lc:'a! a~:~\·i~its =::- b.!:'ness:$ 
.~ic~ ~=e not :inan:ial i~s:i~~:ie~, as !~eh_ (:he ~~ne~ to ~~~s Note se:s O~~ 
the l~s: c~ ac:i~ities ~hich a:e ec~s~ce:e: to ~e :i~a~ci!l a:ti~i:ies.l 
J..ltho'.!;-h i:'l some n..!i ::I~~e:!! these aeth'itiu ea:'l c~ly be ea::ie: Ol:t by a 
lice~$e~ ~i~anci&l i~s~it~:io~, i~ c~~e:s a~ lea$~ !O~t c! t~~~ ~J ~e 
cO~:'.J:t!~ ~y ~ b'-!!ine:! a.s 2.:'\ &:lcilll.=Y acti\"'itv to its :.&':"n eo::=e:cial 
c?e:a:io~s. !:~~?les o! t~is inelude the r:o~isio; o! ~'J=ea~ de eha:'l;e 
$e=vi~es by ~=ave7 ag~nts 0: the ?=o~ision o! eleet:o~ie ~~~e t:a~s!e: se:vices 
c: sa~e c~ !~~a~:~~l ~~!:=·~e~ts s~=h as ~e~~y 0::t:5 by :!tlil she?s. M~~!Y 
lc'~!l::~:e:s ::.a::: ~i:'l: it as a';t:ac:ti~e to I:se the ~ina:'\cia! se:l-icu ;::o·.-ided by 
!-..::h =·';!!..:1~S!~S as to obta.':":l the: ~=c:: :~co;~:'se= ~:"~a~=:'ll i~!:i':'..!~ion!_ 
3. r.!:lce it is im?o=~~~~ that a??:o~:ilte a~ti-:Qnty ll~~~e:i~; =eas~=tS 
sho'.!l: ~e a??lied to any Dl:siness co:'\d~cti~q fi~a:'\cial a::i~itie!, e~e:'\ i~ i: 
is no: a !i~a~cial i~!titction as s~e~. !hese measc:es wo~le, of coc:se, o~ly 
be ap?lica:lc to the fina~cial acti~ities ca::ied cut, not the se~e:&lity of 
the =~s~~ess's o?e:atio~s, a~d neee not be a=oliee in de :l~~s eases. The 
a??:op:ia:e rncas~:es a:e those s~ch as e~s:o~~: ieen~i!ica:ion, :eeo:c-kee?in~, 
e';c. set o'.!t i~ rA:: Reco~e~catio~s 12 to 22 a~d 2~. Sowe~e:, Ree=~e:,\~ltions 
26 to 29, w~ich dcal ~ith the role c! :e;-~latc:y and othe: a::inist:ative 
c'.!th::ides, r':oA'i also be a?plica'::le i~ a??:o?:iate cuu. 
<. !he r~!r ~as the:e!::e adoptee the fcllowin; !nte~?:e:ative ~ot. to 
Reco~e:'\~aticns 10 a~d 11. 
FAr; ::I~e:s shol:ld co~side: a?p1yin; Reco~e~~ltio~s 12 to 22, 24 a~d 26 to 29 
to the co~dl:ct of financial aeti~ities as a cc==e:cial ~ce:taki~i by 
b~sinesses or professions even where these bl:sinesses or p:o!essio~s are not 
fina:'\cia1 institutions as sueh. ri~ancill acti~ities a:e to be understood as 
those listed in tbe attaebed~ex. It is !c: ea~~ inCividual jurisCiction to 
decide whether speeia1 situa~s shol:ld be define~ where the applicatio~ of 
a~:i-=oney 1a~de:in9 ~easl:res should not be :e~i:ed, for ex&:?le, when a 
!ina:'\eial activity is ca::led out en an occasional or ve=y 1i:ited basis. 
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!::: th~ 
2. '.:;"" __ 2 _____ .0:. 
c: -."::-... -_. 
7. ::a:..:.:;; !::: 0"":; a::o-.::-:~ 0: !::: a:c:::I.:~.~ c:! c:-.:s~c;':\!:! (S?:::, !o:;.'a::, s .... a?s, 
~~:~:e!, c?tio~s ... ) i~: 
S. Fa.:-tici?ao;.io:l i:'. !I!-:·.:.=i~i~s is!'J~s 2.:1:' t::'e ?:c·~,"~sic~ c~ !i~.&:"leial se:--;ices 
:el~:ed to 5~C~ i~$~~!. 
12. !~sc:a~ce e?~:a~iC~!1 i~ pa=tic~ll: li!e i~s~:l~ee a~c oth~: i~~!s:me~~ 
p:oe'Jcts. 
2. !nc:lu~ng in~e: alia: 
- cer.s~!: credit 
- c:::tsag! c:e~t 
- factoring, with 0: withol.:t :ICO-'::S. 
- fi:;anc:ing of co~!:cial t:ansac~ions (incl'Jeing !c:faitin;) • 
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